National Trust for Historic Preservation v. City of North Charleston ( 2023 )

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States and the City of Charleston,
Respondents/Appellants,
v.
City of North Charleston, Appellant/Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-000728
Appeal From Charleston County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 5965
Heard October 11, 2022 – Filed February 1, 2023
AFFIRMED
Derk Van Raalte, IV, of City of North Charleston Legal
Department, and J. Brady Hair, of Law Office of J. Brady
Hair, both of North Charleston, for
Appellant/Respondent City of North Charleston.
George Trenholm Walker, of Walker Gressette Freeman
& Linton, LLC, of Charleston; and Anne Elizabeth
Nelson, of National Trust for Historic Preservation, of
Washington, D.C., both for Respondent/Appellant
National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States.
Frances Isaac Cantwell, of City of Charleston Legal
Department; Julia Parker Copeland, of Hinchey Murray
& Pagliarini, LLC; and Wilbur E. Johnson and Russell
Grainger Hines, both of Clement Rivers, LLP, all of
Charleston, all for Respondent/Appellant City of
Charleston.
WILLIAMS, C.J.: This cross-appeal involves the municipal annexation by the
City of North Charleston (North Charleston) of a one-acre tract of real property.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States (the National
Trust) and the City of Charleston (Charleston) (collectively, Respondents) appeal
the circuit court's order finding Respondents did not have standing to challenge
North Charleston's annexation of the acre. North Charleston also appeals, arguing
the circuit court erred in alternatively finding North Charleston did not properly
annex the acre pursuant to section 5-3-100 of the South Carolina Code (2004). We
affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1967, Georgia-Pacific Investment Corporation (Georgia-Pacific) obtained title
to approximately 12,293 acres of real property located in Charleston County. In
1980, Georgia-Pacific conveyed approximately 26.53 acres of that property to the
Nature Conservancy. The deed included the following description of the property:
Those certain strips or parcels of land, being 100 feet in
width and immediately adjacent to the southern
right-of-way line of Highway 61, and parallel with said
Highway; and being a total of approximately 11,556 feet
in length, composed of three strips of land, and being
along the northern boundary line of all of the property
owned by Grantor along the southern right-of-way line of
Highway 61.
The Nature Conservancy immediately conveyed this property to the National Trust
(the National Trust Parcel; TMS 301-00-00-017). The deed conveying the
National Trust Parcel did not have a corresponding recorded plat. In 2005,
Charleston annexed the National Trust Parcel.
In 1989, Georgia-Pacific conveyed to Whitfield Construction Company (Whitfield)
2,294.17 acres (the Whitfield Parcel; TMS 301-00-00-005). In 2009, Whitfield
recorded plats illustrating eighteen access easements through the National Trust
Parcel (the Easement Plats), which Georgia-Pacific reserved in the deed it
conveyed to the Nature Conservancy. 1
On September 22, 2017, Whitfield executed a quit claim deed conveying one acre
(the Acre; TMS 301-00-00-797) of its larger parcel from Georgia-Pacific to North
Charleston. Whitfield recorded a plat of the Acre (the Acre Plat) with the deed on
September 22, 2017. 2 The deed described the Acre as part of the Whitfield Parcel.
In October 2017, North Charleston annexed 113 acres (the Runneymede Parcel;
TMS 361-00-00-002), without challenge. On December 21, 2017, North
Charleston annexed the Acre, pursuant to section 5-3-100, by Ordinance 2017-080
(the Annexation Ordinance). Runneymede and the Acre are separated by Highway
61 and the National Trust Parcel.
In March 2018, Respondents filed a summons and complaint challenging North
Charleston's annexation of the Acre, arguing the Acre was not contiguous to North
Charleston. North Charleston answered, counterclaimed, and subsequently filed
(1) a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting section 5-3-100 does not
require contiguity and (2) a motion to dismiss Respondents' complaint for lack of
standing. Respondents also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the
annexation of the Acre was void because (1) the Acre was not contiguous or
adjacent to North Charleston and (2) the Acre included a portion of the National
Trust Parcel, which was already annexed into Charleston.
The circuit court held a hearing on the motions and issued an order dismissing
Respondents' complaint for lack of standing. The court alternatively found that
should this court find Respondents had standing to challenge the annexation, North
Charleston failed to properly annex the Acre because it was not adjacent to the
municipality. All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e),
SCRCP, which the circuit court denied. This cross-appeal followed.
1
The Nature Conservancy deed stated "the foregoing conveyance is subject to the
reservation by Grantor of certain easements over and across the foregoing real
property, . . . [s]aid easements shall be limited to eighteen (18) in number, and each
separate easement shall be limited to a total of sixty feet (60') in width."
2
In mapping the dimensions of the Acre Plat, the surveyor relied on the Easement
Plats and the original plat recorded with the deed conveying the Whitfield Parcel.
Both the Easement Plats and the Acre Plat have width variations regarding the
boundary lines between the National Trust and Whitfield parcels.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. Did the circuit court err in dismissing Respondents' action because it found
Charleston and the National Trust lacked standing to challenge North
Charleston's annexation of the Acre?
II. Did the circuit court err in alternatively finding that North Charleston failed to
lawfully annex the Acre pursuant to section 5-3-100?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss for lack of standing challenges the court's subject matter
jurisdiction." S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Wilson, 437 S.C. 334, 340, 878 S.E.2d 891,
894 (2022). "Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which
this [c]ourt is free to decide with no particular deference to the circuit court." Id."The party seeking to establish standing has the burden of proving it." Vicary v.
Town of Awendaw, 425 S.C. 350, 355, 822 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2018).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. STANDING
A. Statutory Standing
Respondents argue the circuit court erred in dismissing their claims challenging the
annexation for lack of standing because the Acre contained a portion—four
inches—of the National Trust Parcel, which Charleston annexed in 2005.
Therefore, Respondents assert North Charleston's annexation violated their
statutory and proprietary rights. Respondents further maintain the circuit court
improperly dismissed their claims because a question of fact existed as to whether
the Acre included a portion of the National Trust Parcel. We disagree.
Chapter Three of Title Five of the South Carolina Code addresses a municipality's
ability to extend its corporate limits and annex additional areas. Chapter Three
contains various methods of annexation that a municipality can employ.
Specifically, section 5-3-100 provides:
If the territory proposed to be annexed belongs entirely to
the municipality seeking its annexation and is adjacent
thereto, the territory may be annexed by resolution of the
governing body of the municipality. When the territory
proposed to be annexed to the municipality belongs
entirely to the county in which the municipality is located
and is adjacent thereto, it may be annexed by resolution
of the governing body of the municipality and the
governing body of the county. Upon the adoption of the
resolutions required by this section and the passage of an
ordinance to that effect by the municipality, the
annexation is complete.
§ 5-3-100 (emphasis added).
In its order, the circuit court found North Charleston did not claim to annex or own
any portion of the National Trust Parcel and any deviations in the legal description
or plat did not affect Charleston's or the National Trust's ownership rights. The
order stated:
No matter what the property description or plat to the
Acre might say, it is legally impossible for Whitfield to
have conveyed to North Charleston title to any of the
[National] Trust's land. Since North Charleston acquired
its ownership to the Acre through a Quit Claim rather
than a Warranty deed, assuming National Trust is correct
that its boundary is exactly 100' from Ashley River Road
rather than the 99.7' shown on the Acre plat, the result
would not be that North Charleston owns any of National
Trust's 100' strip property. As a matter of law, National
Trust would retain its full undiminished acreage. The
claimed 4" error could only reduce the amount of land
obtained by North Charleston from a perfect acre to
99.999% of an acre.
The circuit court therefore found Respondents lacked standing to challenge the
annexation because North Charleston only intended to annex the property that it
owned. Thus, Respondents did not "have the requisite ownership to challenge the
annexation."
We agree with the circuit court. Section 5-3-100 is a method for annexation when
the municipality wholly owns the property to be annexed. See id. ("If the territory
proposed to be annexed belongs entirely to the municipality seeking its annexation
and is adjacent thereto, the territory may be annexed by resolution of the governing
body of the municipality." (emphasis added)). Here, North Charleston annexed the
Acre pursuant to section 5-3-100 via the Annexation Ordinance. Thus, although
there is a four-inch deviation in the proposed plat, we find North Charleston only
sought to annex the property within its proprietary rights as the proposed plat relied
on the previously recorded Easement Plats in mapping the boundaries. Further, the
legal description in the Annexation Ordinance stated North Charleston sought to
annex property "consisting of approximately 1.0 acres." (emphasis added). Even if
North Charleston believed it owned the contested four inches, it would be of no
consequence. See F.C. Enters., Inc. v. Dibble, 335 S.C. 260, 266, 516 S.E.2d 459,
462 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The courts of South Carolina have traditionally followed the
property rule that a purchaser cannot purchase more than his grantor owns.");
Cummings v. Varn, 307 S.C. 37, 42, 413 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1992) ("No deed can
convey an interest which the grantor does not have in the land described in the
deed, even though by its terms the deed may purport to do so.").
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly found Respondents lacked standing
to challenge North Charleston's annexation of the Acre. See Glaze v. Grooms, 324
S.C. 249, 255, 478 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1996) ("The general rule is that a municipality
must allege an infringement of its own proprietary interests or statutory rights to
establish standing."); Wilson, 437 S.C. at 341, 878 S.E.2d at 895 ("If a plaintiff
lacks standing, he does not have the right to proceed to the merits of his claim
against the defendant.").
B. Public Importance Exception
Respondents assert the circuit court erred in finding they did not have standing to
challenge the annexation via the public importance exception. We disagree.
"This Court has consistently acknowledged that even without an allegation of
particularized injury, 'standing may be conferred upon a party when an issue is of
such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance.'" Wilson,
437 S.C. at 341, 878 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 434,
593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004)). However, our jurisprudence has also established that
public interest standing is rarely utilized within the context of annexation disputes.
See St. Andrews Pub. Serv. Dist. v. City Council of Charleston, 349 S.C. 602, 605,
564 S.E.2d 647, 648 (2002) ("[T]he better policy is to limit 'outsider' annexation
challenges to those brought by the State 'acting in the public interest.'"). When
considering whether a party has standing under the public interest doctrine,
appellate courts must make this determination "without regard to the merits of the
underlying claim." Vicary, 425 S.C. at 358, 822 S.E.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
We find the circuit court did not err in holding Respondents did not have standing
under the public interest doctrine. Although we acknowledge our precedent has
not yet addressed whether the term "adjacent" within section 5-3-100 requires
contiguity, which is specifically required for municipal annexations under section
5-3-150, Respondents have failed to demonstrate that North Charleston's
annexation of the Acre incites anything more than a boundary dispute between two
municipalities. Further, the absence of a challenge to the annexation by the State is
illustrative of the State's position on whether the matter rises to a level of public
concern. Respondents have also failed to show any deceitful conduct by North
Charleston that would necessitate finding standing under the public interest
doctrine. See Vicary, 425 S.C. at 358, 822 S.E.2d at 604 ("We do not believe the
General Assembly intended to preclude standing where there is a credible
allegation that the annexing body engaged in deceitful conduct.").
Based on the foregoing, we find Respondents lack standing to challenge the
annexation of the Acre by North Charleston; therefore, further consideration of the
matter by this court is foreclosed.3
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the circuit court is
AFFIRMED.
THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
3
In its appellate brief, North Charleston states that should this court affirm the
circuit court's dismissal of Respondents' claims, then consideration of its issue on
appeal—the validity of the annexation—is unnecessary. We agree. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).