Wendy Grungo-Smith v. Joseph Grungo ( 2023 )


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  •                       THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    Wendy Grungo-Smith, Respondent,
    v.
    Joseph Grungo, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2020-000934
    Appeal From York County
    Thomas Henry White, IV, Family Court Judge
    Opinion No. 5969
    Heard November 16, 2022 – Filed February 10, 2023
    REVERSED
    John Brandt Rucker and Allyson Sue Rucker, both of
    The Rucker Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for
    Appellant.
    James R. Honeycutt, of Fort Mill, and James B.
    Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, both for Respondent.
    LOCKEMY, A.J.: Wendy Grungo-Smith (Mother) appeals an order from the
    family court awarding primary custody of Child 1 and Child 2 (collectively,
    Children) to Joseph Grungo (Father) and granting an award of child support to
    Father. We reverse.
    FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 2012, Mother and Father divorced. Pursuant to a court-approved agreement, the
    parties were to share joint custody of Children; specifically, a 5-2-2-5 schedule.
    The divorce decree provided, among other things, that (1) if one parent had
    Children for more than fifty percent of the time, the other parent would "contribute
    to the support and maintenance of Children"; (2) Children would be enrolled in any
    private school agreed to by each party; and (3) each party would abstain from
    using profanity or making derogatory comments about the other party and ensure
    others would not make such comments in Children's presence.
    In March 2019, Mother filed a custody modification action, asserting Father failed
    to "take advantage of shared visitation." She sought sole custody of Children,
    standard visitation for Father, and child support. Father filed an answer and
    counterclaim seeking essentially the same relief in his favor and alleging numerous
    changes in circumstances.
    At the June 2020 trial, Mother testified Children were eleven and twelve years old.
    Mother testified she had two jobs and worked during weekdays, every other
    weekend, and at night, from home, after Children went to sleep. She explained
    Father never exercised his full custody time, even though she and her husband,
    Kenneth Smith (Stepfather) did not prevent him from doing so. Mother stated she
    had moved five or six times since the parties' divorce and each move was to a
    larger home or closer to Children's school. Mother testified she moved into her
    current home, which was twenty minutes or twenty-two miles from Father, shortly
    before trial and was required to live there for fifteen years as a condition of her
    loan. She stated her current home was closer to Father than her previous home,
    and the longest Father ever had to travel to her home was thirty-five minutes,
    assuming there was no traffic. Mother testified Children behaved well and
    excelled physically, mentally, socially, and academically. Mother indicated
    Stepfather was a father figure to them, and neither she nor Stepfather spoke badly
    of Father to Children or discouraged their relationship with him. She stated that
    although she and Stepfather argued like normal married people, they discussed
    their issues outside Children's presence.
    Stepfather testified Mother was Children's primary caretaker, and neither he nor
    Mother discouraged Children from having a relationship with Father. He stated
    although no one prevented it, Father never utilized all of his allotted custody time.
    However, he acknowledged Father recently visited Children more often because
    they were out of school.
    Father testified he had lived in Fort Mill for the past thirteen years and owned his
    own business. He admitted he occasionally missed Monday and Tuesday
    overnight visits but explained he usually took Children to dinner on those nights.
    He testified he did not exercise his full custody time because of his work schedule
    and traffic. Father testified he provided only $1,200 to Mother during the year
    prior to trial. Father acknowledged he could have taken Children to school earlier
    or modified his work hours and further acknowledged that neither Mother nor
    Stepfather prevented him from exercising his custody time. He averred Mother's
    moves had a negative effect on his ability to spend time with Children because of
    his commute to pick up Children and drop them off at school. Accordingly, he
    requested primary custody of Children so they could go to school in Fort Mill.
    On cross-examination, Father credited Mother for Children's academic success.
    He admitted the divorce decree did not prevent either party from moving and it
    required the parties to share Children's expenses equally. Father also admitted he
    never tried to legally enforce the school provision.
    Several additional witnesses testified about Mother, Father, and Children. Gwen
    Catron, Children's maternal grandmother, testified Mother was a loving mother,
    Stepfather was a good father-figure, and Father was a good dad. John Willfong, a
    former administrator from Children's school, testified he believed Children
    excelled academically due, in part, to Mother's involvement in their education.
    The guardian ad litem (Guardian), testified she conducted five in-person visits with
    Children and spoke to them five or six additional times on the phone, with the last
    occurring on the day of trial. She testified she was welcomed at Mother's and
    Father's homes, and both parties were cooperative throughout her investigation.
    The Guardian stated Children indicated Mother and Stepfather yelled and fought a
    lot in front of them and belittled Father to them. The Guardian testified Children
    told her Mother put oil on their heads to "be blessed" before they spoke to her and
    so they would not say anything negative about her to the Guardian. She stated that
    at Mother's home, Children were "much more uptight," appeared "very nervous,"
    whispered to her so no one would overhear them, and requested to go to their
    bedrooms for the visits. She also stated that during one visit, Child 1 showed her
    videos of Mother and Stepfather arguing. The Guardian testified that at Father's
    home, Father let her speak to Children privately and Children appeared very
    relaxed. She stated Children loved both parents, did not want to be torn between
    the situation, and were credible. The court requested the Guardian provide a
    recommendation because "of the disparity in the testimony before [it] today" and
    that neither party provided "a middle ground." Upon the court's request, the
    Guardian stated she believed Father would be the better suited custodial parent
    based on the information provided by Children.
    In her written report, the Guardian stated Children were happy, well-mannered
    children and were always willing to speak with her, regardless of whether they
    were at Mother's home or Father's. However, she stated they told her they felt
    comfortable at Father's home and liked his home better because there was "so
    much peace" and no "stress." She indicated Children told her that at Mother's
    house, they performed most of the chores and watched their sibling and other
    children Mother babysat. The Guardian also reported Mother gave her videos of
    visitation exchanges, which showed Mother telling Father not to come close to her
    car and Children appearing stressed. She stated she had not found any reason to
    believe Father was a threat to Mother.
    The family court found Father showed a material change in circumstances to
    warrant a change of custody and such change was in Children's best interests. It
    stated Father admittedly did not exercise his full custody time. However, it found
    the parties initially lived twenty to thirty minutes of each other but after Mother's
    changes in residences, Father's home was forty-five minutes to an hour away. It
    found Children had changed schools six times and a daily commute for Father
    rendered the parenting plan "extraordinarily" difficult. The court determined
    Mother did not consult with Father about any of her moves or obtain Father's
    agreement before selecting Children's schools and concluded Mother's moves and
    Children's schools were not conducive to the 5-2-2-5 parenting plan.
    The family court found although Mother and Stepfather denied it, Children told the
    Guardian that Mother and Stepfather argued in front of them and called Father
    disparaging names, which impeached Mother's and Stepfather's credibility and lent
    credence to Father's allegations. It acknowledged Children told the Guardian they
    loved both parents; however, it found Children also told the Guardian they liked
    Father's home better because there was "so much peace" and no arguing or stress.
    The family court determined Children showed the Guardian videos of Mother and
    Stepfather arguing and told the Guardian they could not speak to her on the phone
    because they were at Mother's home. It further noted the Guardian recommended
    Father be granted custody. Accordingly, the family court granted Father's request
    for sole custody and awarded him child support. This appeal follows.
    ISSUE ON APPEAL
    Did the family court err in awarding custody of Children to Father?
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    "In family court appeals, this court reviews factual and legal issues de novo."
    Whitesell v. Whitesell, 
    431 S.C. 575
    , 584, 
    848 S.E.2d 588
    , 592 (Ct. App. 2020).
    "Although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not
    required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the
    witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
    comparative weight to their testimony." 
    Id.
    LAW/ANALYSIS
    Mother argues the family court erred in awarding custody of Children to Father.
    She asserts the evidence showed Children were thriving in her care and all parties
    agreed Children were exceptional. We agree.
    "The paramount and controlling factor in every custody dispute is the best interests
    of the children." Brown v. Brown, 
    362 S.C. 85
    , 90, 
    606 S.E.2d 785
    , 788 (Ct. App.
    2004). In modifying a custody order, the family court must consider the children's
    best interests and other statutory factors. 
    S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240
    (B) (Supp.
    2022).
    "In order for a court to grant a change in custody, there must be a showing of
    changed circumstances occurring subsequent to the entry of the [custody order]."
    Latimer v. Farmer, 
    360 S.C. 375
    , 381, 
    602 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (2004). "A change in
    circumstances justifying a change in the custody of a child simply means that
    sufficient facts have been shown to warrant the conclusion that the best interests of
    the children would be served by the change." 
    Id.
     (quoting Stutz v. Funderburk, 
    272 S.C. 273
    , 278, 
    252 S.E.2d 32
    , 34 (1979)). "[T]he change of circumstance relied on
    for a change of custody must be such as would substantially affect the interest and
    the welfare of the child, not merely the parties, their wishes or convenience."
    Shirley v. Shirley, 
    342 S.C. 324
    , 330, 
    536 S.E.2d 427
    , 430 (Ct. App. 2000)
    (quoting Sharpe v. Sharpe, 
    256 S.C. 517
    , 521, 
    183 S.E.2d 325
    , 327 (1971)).
    We hold the family court erred in awarding Father custody because Father did not
    establish a substantial change in circumstances. First, we find the record did not
    show a change in circumstances sufficient to modify the custody order. During
    trial, Father admitted, among other things, that: he failed to take advantage of his
    shared visitation blaming his failure on his work schedule and traffic; he never had
    Children in his care for more than fifty percent of the time and failed to provide for
    them financially pursuant to the joint custody agreement; he did not take Children
    to school because it interfered with his work schedule, yet acknowledged he could
    have taken Children to school earlier or modified his work hours; neither Mother
    nor Stepfather prevented him from exercising his custody time and he praised
    Children's academic success and credited Mother for it; and the divorce decree did
    not prevent either party from moving, he never tried to enforce the school
    provision, and the divorce decree required the parties to share Children's expenses
    equally.
    On the other hand, the evidence and testimony demonstrate that Children behaved
    well and excelled physically, mentally, socially, and academically while under
    Mother's predominant care while she worked two jobs, working during the
    weekdays, every other weekend, and remotely at night after Children went to sleep.
    She moved five or six times to a larger home or closer to Children's school.
    Several witnesses, including Children's former school administrator, testified
    Children were well-adjusted, great kids, Mother was a good mom, and Children's
    academic success was due in part to Mother's involvement in their education. See
    § 63-15-240(B)(1-2), (10-11) (stating that when modifying a custody order, the
    court should consider "the temperament and developmental needs of the child;"
    "the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of
    the child;" "the child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and community
    environments;" and "the stability of the child's existing and proposed residences").
    Second, we find the family court erred in concluding Mother's moves and
    Children's schooling arrangements were not conducive to the parenting plan
    because she did not consult Father. Rather, we find each move was in the best
    interests of Children. See § 63-15-240(B). Mother testified she moved into a
    larger home each time or was closer to Children's school and that she was required
    to live in her current residence for fifteen years as a condition of her loan.
    Further, we conclude the family court erred by finding that the moves and changes
    in schools were not conducive to the current parenting plan because the record did
    not support such a finding. Rather, the 5-2-2-5 plan was not in practice because
    Father did not exercise his full custody rights and Mother had custody of Children
    more than fifty percent of the time. Additionally, though the divorce decree
    provided that if one parent had Children for more than fifty percent of the time, the
    other parent would "contribute to the support and maintenance of Children," Father
    testified that for the year prior to trial, he only contributed $1,200 while Children
    were in Mother's care.
    We express our concern with the family court requesting a recommendation from
    the Guardian because it should have only requested a recommendation in
    extraordinary circumstances, which were not present in this case. We are also
    concerned with the family court's heavy reliance on the Guardian's report and
    testimony in its findings because a family court should determine the best interests
    of Children after considering all the evidence presented at trial. See Pirayesh v.
    Pirayesh, 
    359 S.C. 284
    , 296, 
    596 S.E.2d 505
    , 512 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Rather than
    merely adopting the recommendation of the guardian, the court, by its own review
    of all the evidence, should consider the character, fitness, attitude, and inclinations
    on the part of each parent as they impact the child as well as all psychological,
    physical, environmental, spiritual, educational, medical, family, emotional and
    recreational aspects of the child's life."); Shirley, 342 S.C. at 339, 536 S.E.2d at
    435 ("The role of the [Guardian] in making custody recommendations is to aid, not
    direct, the court. Ultimately, the custody decision lies with the trial judge."). At
    oral arguments, Father's counsel only pointed to the family court's determination
    that the 5-2-2-5 plan was rendered difficult to follow, but was unable to identify
    any other findings in the family court's order establishing a change in
    circumstances favoring Father that derived from something other than the
    Guardian's testimony and report.
    Father did not present evidence of a substantial change in circumstances. Under
    Mother's care, Children were well-mannered and excelled academically and
    socially. Additionally, any changes did not adversely affect Children's well-being
    and no issues were reported as to their welfare. See Latimer, 
    360 S.C. at 381
    , 
    602 S.E.2d at 35
     ("The change of circumstances relied on for a change of custody must
    be such as would substantially affect the interest and welfare of the child.").
    However, this appeal derives from Mother's custody modification action and
    Father's counterclaim. As such, both Mother and Father were required to show
    sufficient facts demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances warranting a
    change of custody in the best interest of Children. 
    Id.
    While the testimony and evidence demonstrate that Children excelled under
    Mother's predominant care, it also demonstrates that Father was a factor in this
    success and a positive influence. Witnesses testified that Father was a good dad
    and saw Children at least once or twice a week; he took Children to dinner and
    spent time with them every other weekend; he demonstrated proactive effort to
    spend time with Children and participate in their lives; he withheld any disparaging
    remarks about Mother or Stepfather; and evidence from the Guardian indicated
    Father created a peaceful atmosphere where Children felt comfortable.
    Therefore, based upon the ample evidence demonstrating Children's emotional,
    social, and academic success under the original joint custody agreement, both
    parties failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances or that the best
    interests of Children would be served by a change in custody. Accordingly, we
    reverse the family court.
    REVERSED.
    WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS, J., concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 5969

Filed Date: 2/1/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/10/2023