Nancy Miramonti v. Richland County School District One ( 2023 )

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Nancy Miramonti, Respondent,
v.
Richland County School District One, a body politic and
corporate; and the Board of Commissioners of Richland
County School District One, Appellants.
Appellate Case No. 2019-001624
Appeal From Richland County
Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 5958
Heard October 4, 2022 – Filed January 4, 2023
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART
Eugene Hamilton Matthews, of Richardson Plowden &
Robinson, PA; and Kenneth Allen Davis, and Charles J.
Boykin, both of Boykin Davis, LLC; and Sedeirdra Lynn
Smith, all of Columbia, for Appellants.
L. Cody Smith and Jessica Clancy Crowson, both of
Rogers Lewis Jackson Mann & Quinn, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
HILL, J: In 2019, Richland County School District One (RCSD One) changed its
policy regarding English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) students to
provide that ESOL students would no longer receive ESOL instruction at specific
magnet schools but only at the schools for which they were zoned. The policy was
adopted after the deadline for transfer requests had expired. A parent of one ESOL
student wrote a letter to the RCSD One Board (the Board) requesting the Board
reopen the transfer request window to allow ESOL students currently attending
magnet schools outside their assigned zones to request to stay at the magnet school
for the following year.
At their next meeting, the Board went into executive session. The record is silent as
to the stated purpose of the executive session. In the ensuing open meeting,
Chairman Jamie Devine announced he had received the parent's complaint.
According to the Board minutes, Chairman Devine stated, "The Board has
responded" to the parent's complaint, and the parent "will get something in writing
from the Board tomorrow." Commissioner Beatrice King then asked the Board
counsel about the Board Policy requiring the Board to "consider" complaints about
Board policies at the next meeting "and dispose of the matter according to its best
judgment." Commissioner King asked the Board counsel whether the Board could
dispose of a complaint without a vote. Counsel stated the parent's complaint was
discussed during executive session, but counsel would not agree with Commissioner
King that a vote was required to dispose of a complaint. Chairman Devine then
interjected that "the best judgment of the Board is to send a letter to respond to this
complaint," and a letter would be sent out tomorrow "based off the discussion we
had in executive session." Commissioner King voiced her disagreement, noting "we
can't vote in executive session." Chairman Devine responded no vote or motion was
necessary.
The next day, Chairman Devine sent a letter to the parent on Board letterhead. The
letter explained the parent had met with Chairman Devine and other district
personnel about his question regarding the transfer policy. The letter declared "the
answer to your question has remained and continues to be the same," without
explaining what the answer was.
Nancy Miramonti (Respondent) then brought this lawsuit against the Board, seeking
a declaratory judgment that the Board's actions regarding the parent's complaint
violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 1 requesting attorney's fees
pursuant to FOIA, and an order enjoining the Board from further FOIA violations
and requiring the Board to reconsider the parent's complaint at its next meeting. The
circuit court granted Respondent's requested relief. The Board now appeals. We
affirm.
1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (2007 & Supp. 2022).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A declaratory judgment action under the FOIA to determine whether certain
information should be disclosed is an action at law." Campbell v. Marion Cnty.
Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 280, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. App. 2003). "As to
questions of law, this court's standard of review is de novo." Citizens for Quality
Rural Living, Inc. v. Greenville Cnty. Plan. Comm'n, 426 S.C. 97, 102, 825 S.E.2d
721, 724 (Ct. App. 2019). Our standard of review extends to correct errors of law,
but we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings as long as they have
reasonable support in the record. Seago v. Horry Cnty., 378 S.C. 414, 422, 663
S.E.2d 38, 42 (2008).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Executive Session
The Board contends it did not abridge FOIA by discussing the parent's complaint
letter in executive session because the discussion occurred while the Board was
receiving legal advice. This argument stumbles at the starting block: a public body
is forbidden from entering executive session without complying with section 30-4-
70(b) of the South Carolina Code (2007), which states: "Before going into executive
session the public agency shall vote in public on the question and when the vote is
favorable, the presiding officer shall announce the specific purpose of the executive
session." Because there is no evidence the Board complied with this section, its
executive session was improper. See Donohue v. City of North Augusta, 412 S.C.
526, 531–33, 773 S.E.2d 140, 142–43 (2015) (announcement that "contractual
matter" would be discussed in executive session insufficient to satisfy "specific
purpose" requirement of section 30-4-70(b)).
Even if the Board had complied with the FOIA's specific purpose requirement when
it retreated into executive session, it could not have taken any vote except to adjourn
or resume its public session. § 30-4-70(b). Importantly, the "members of a public
body may not commit the public body to a course of action by a polling of members
in executive session." Id.
The Board argues it took no action on the parent's complaint during executive
session. However, Chairman Devine's statements during the public meeting
undercut this argument. Chairman Devine declared the decision to respond by letter
to the parent's complaint was "based off the discussion" in executive session.
Nevertheless, the Board insists that because no vote on how to respond to the parent's
complaint was taken, the Board did not take any action in executive session. This
argument chases itself and then collides with Chairman Devine's statements and the
letter he sent in response to the parent's complaint. These immovable facts support
the circuit court's finding that the Board decided how to respond to the parent's
complaint during executive session.
We further note Chairman Devine had no authority to send the letter without a
majority vote permitting him to do so. Absent constitutional or legislative authority,
an individual member of a public body has no authority to act. In general, a public
body may act only after the action has been approved by a majority vote of a quorum
of its members. See Garris v. Governing Bd. of S.C. Reinsurance Facility, 333 S.C.
432, 453, 511 S.E.2d 48, 59 (1998).
Our supreme court confronted a similar situation in Business License Opposition
Committee v. Sumter County, 311 S.C. 24, 426 S.E.2d 745 (1992). There, the Sumter
County Council passed an amended ordinance after discussing the ordinance in
secret meetings that had not been publicly noticed. Id. at 26, 426 S.E.2d at 746-47.
The clerk of the Council testified the Council had "reached a consensus" about
amending the ordinance in the closed meetings, but "no formal action was taken."
Id. at 26, 426 S.E.2d at 747. The County contended no vote was taken at the closed
meeting, but the record showed that even though no motion was made to amend the
ordinance, the amended version was read and passed during a subsequent public
meeting. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d at 747. Seeing through the ruse, our supreme court
held the ordinance had been amended during the closed meetings in violation of
section 30-4-70(a)(g) and affirmed the circuit court order invalidating the ordinance.
We see little daylight between Sumter County and this case.
Nor do we see any factual dispute that would have precluded the circuit court from
ruling as a matter of law that the Board violated FOIA, a ruling we hereby affirm.
Cf. S.C. Lottery Comm'n v. Glassmeyer, 433 S.C. 244, 251–52, 857 S.E.2d 889, 893
(2021) (remanding FOIA declaratory judgment action for trial because factual issues
were in dispute).
B. Injunctive Relief
The Board asserts the circuit court erred in issuing an injunction requiring it to
consider and dispose of the parent's complaint at its next public meeting. The Board
claims the injunction was, in effect, an improper grant of mandamus against a
legislative body.
The FOIA, by its terms, empowers a circuit court to order injunctive relief it deems
appropriate to rectify FOIA violations, and FOIA violations "must be considered to
be an irreparable injury for which no adequate remedy at law exists." § 30-4-100(A)
(2007 and Supp. 2022). It has been held proper, for instance, for a trial court to
enjoin a public body from future FOIA violations. See Sumter County, 311 S.C. at
27, 426 S.E.2d at 747 (affirming trial court order enjoining County from any further
informal meetings violating the FOIA); Burton v. York Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 358
S.C. 339, 354–56, 594 S.E.2d 888, 896–97 (Ct. App. 2004) (affirming order
enjoining sheriff from future FOIA violations).
Notably, the Board has not appealed the circuit court's rulings enjoining it from
improperly entering into executive session or taking any action in executive session
in violation of FOIA. But the circuit court order requiring the Board to take up the
complaint anew at its next public meeting stands on a different footing. We can
understand the circuit court's frustration with the Board. The Board's cavalier
disregard of FOIA reflects a clear abuse of power. Cf. Singleton v. Horry Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 289 S.C. 223, 227–28, 345 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 1986) ("Courts will not
interfere with the exercise of discretion by school boards in matters committed by
law to their judgment unless there is clear evidence that the board has acted
corruptly, in bad faith, or in clear abuse of its powers.").
The portion of the injunction requiring the Board to reconsider the parent's complaint
at its next meeting is not merely an equitable remedy for a FOIA violation; nor is it
an instance of a court reviewing a completed legislative act. Rather, it is a judicial
decree requiring the Board to take specific legislative action. See Patton v. Richland
Cnty. Council, 303 S.C. 47, 49, 398 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1990) (noting the general rule
that court will not restrain by injunction the exercise of legislative power). We agree
with the Board that such an order should only ensue, if at all, by way of mandamus,
a cause of action that was not pled or raised by Respondent. We therefore vacate
this portion of the injunction.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.
GEATHERS and McDONALD, JJ., concur.