In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Richard Ridley ( 2021 )


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  •                      THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
    In The Court of Appeals
    In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Richard
    Ridley, Appellant.
    Appellate Case No. 2018-000527
    Appeal From Aiken County
    Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge
    Opinion No. 5810
    Heard November 10, 2020 – Filed March 17, 2021
    AFFIRMED
    Arthur Kerr Aiken, of Aiken & Hightower, of Columbia,
    for Appellant.
    Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
    Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
    both of Columbia, for Respondent.
    WILLIAMS, J.: Richard Ridley appeals his commitment to the South Carolina
    Department of Mental Health (the Department) as a sexually violent predator
    (SVP). On appeal, Ridley argues the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony
    regarding his diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder –
    Biastophilia/Non-Consent (OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent). We affirm.
    FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 2002, Ridley pled guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature
    (ABHAN), third degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), and failure to register as a
    sex offender. Prior to his release in 2014, the State filed a petition for Ridley's
    civil commitment to the Department pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act1
    (the Act). The trial court appointed an evaluator who diagnosed Ridley with
    OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD)
    with Narcissistic Traits and recommended commitment. Thereafter, Ridley
    voluntarily committed to the Department for treatment pursuant to the Act.
    As required by the Act, the Department evaluated Ridley's mental status in 2015,
    2016, and 2017 and determined each time that Ridley required further
    commitment. In 2017, Ridley petitioned for release against the Department's
    recommendation, and the circuit court held a trial.
    During a pretrial hearing, Ridley made a motion in limine to exclude expert
    testimony regarding his diagnosis of OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent, arguing
    the diagnosis was not scientifically reliable and was, therefore, insufficient to
    qualify as a predicate diagnosis under the Act.2 The State proffered testimony
    from Dr. Gordon Edward Brown, Jr., an actuarial measures forensic psychologist
    for the Department. Following the proffered testimony and arguments by the
    parties, the trial court denied Ridley's motion and permitted Dr. Brown to provide
    expert testimony regarding the diagnosis before the jury.
    During trial, the court qualified Dr. Brown as an expert in forensic psychology, and
    he provided testimony summarizing his evaluation of Ridley and opining that
    Ridley suffered from OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and APD with
    Narcissistic Traits. Ridley presented expert testimony from Dr. Selman Watson, a
    forensic psychologist, who opined that OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent was not
    a valid diagnosis for the purposes of commitment under the Act.
    At the close of trial, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ridley still
    posed a danger to society.3 The trial court subsequently filed an order of continued
    commitment. This appeal followed.
    ISSUE ON APPEAL
    1
    
    S.C. Code Ann. §§44-48-10
     to -170 (2018).
    2
    Ridley did not challenge his diagnosis of APD with Narcissistic Traits at trial and
    does not challenge the diagnosis on appeal.
    3
    See § 44-48-120(B) ("The burden of proof is upon the [State] to show beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the petitioner's mental abnormality or personality disorder
    remains such that the petitioner is not safe to be at large and, that if released, is
    likely to commit acts of sexual violence.").
    Did the trial court err in admitting Dr. Brown's expert testimony?
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    "A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed
    absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion." State v. Prather, 
    429 S.C. 583
    , 598, 
    840 S.E.2d 551
    , 559 (2020) (quoting State v. Chavis, 
    412 S.C. 101
    , 106, 
    771 S.E.2d 336
    , 338 (2015)). "A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony
    constitutes an abuse of discretion whe[n] the ruling is unsupported by the evidence
    or controlled by an error of law." State v. Jones, 
    423 S.C. 631
    , 636, 
    817 S.E.2d 268
    , 270 (2018).
    LAW/ANALYSIS
    Ridley argues the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Brown's expert testimony
    regarding his diagnosis of Ridley with OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent. We
    disagree.
    Pursuant to the Act, an individual is considered an SVP if (1) he "has been
    convicted of a sexually violent offense" and (2) "suffers from a mental abnormality
    or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual
    violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
    treatment." § 44-48-30(1). Ridley asserts Dr. Brown's testimony was improper
    because OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent is scientifically unreliable and thus
    cannot serve as a predicate diagnosis under the Act.
    "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
    to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
    expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
    in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Rule 702, SCRE. "Before admitting
    expert testimony, a trial court must qualify the expert and determine whether the
    subject matter of the expert's proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule
    702, SCRE." Prather, 429 S.C. at 599, 840 S.E.2d at 559. "The trial [court]
    should apply the Jones[4] factors to determine reliability." State v. Council, 
    335 S.C. 1
    , 20, 
    515 S.E.2d 508
    , 518 (1999).
    The Jones reliability factors take into consideration:
    4
    State v. Jones, 
    273 S.C. 723
    , 
    259 S.E.2d 120
     (1979).
    (1) the publications and peer reviews of the technique;
    (2) prior application of the method to the type of
    evidence involved in the case;
    (3) the quality control procedures used to ensure
    reliability; and
    (4) the consistency of the method with recognized
    scientific laws and procedures.
    State v. Jones, 
    343 S.C. 562
    , 573, 
    541 S.E.2d 813
    , 819 (2001). "Once the evidence
    is admitted under these standards, the jury may give it such weight as it deems
    appropriate." Council, 
    335 S.C. at
    20–21, 
    515 S.E.2d at 518
    .
    During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated Dr. Brown's expert qualifications,
    and the State proffered his testimony for the trial court to perform its gatekeeping
    duties. Dr. Brown testified he evaluated Ridley for his annual review in 2017. In
    performing his evaluation, Dr. Brown testified he conducted a series of clinical
    interviews of Ridley and thoroughly reviewed Ridley's records, including his
    criminal records, prior evaluations, and treatment records. Dr. Brown confirmed
    the records he reviewed were those typically and reasonably relied upon by other
    experts in his field. Dr. Brown testified that after conducting the annual review, he
    diagnosed Ridley with two diagnoses: OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent and APD
    with Narcissistic Traits. Dr. Brown explained that in diagnosing Ridley, he used
    the fifth edition of the Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), which is
    the official, peer reviewed publication of the American Psychiatric Association.
    In its chapter on paraphilic disorders, the DSM-V lists eight specific paraphilic
    disorders but also includes two additional categories: other specified paraphilic
    disorders (OSPD) and unspecified paraphilic disorders. See American Psychiatric
    Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 685–705 (5th
    ed. 2013).5 In the introduction of the chapter, it states:
    The eight listed disorders do not exhaust the list of
    possible paraphilic disorders. Many dozens of distinct
    paraphilias have been identified and named, and almost
    any of them could, by virtue of its negative consequences
    for the individual or for others, rise to the level of a
    5
    The DSM-V replaced the previous designation of Not Otherwise Specified (NOS)
    in the DSM-IV with other specified disorder and unspecified disorder. See
    Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at 15–16.
    paraphilic disorder. The diagnoses of other specified and
    unspecified paraphilic disorders are therefore
    indispensable and will be required in many cases.
    Id. at 685 (emphases added). The DSM-V specifically describes OSPD as follows:
    This category applies to presentations in which
    symptoms characteristic of a paraphilic disorder that
    cause clinically significant distress or impairment in
    social, occupational, or other important areas of
    functioning predominate but do not meet the full criteria
    for any of the disorders in the paraphilic disorders
    diagnostic class. The [OSPD] category is used in
    situations in which the clinician chooses to communicate
    the specific reason that the presentation does not meet the
    criteria for any specified paraphilic disorder. This is
    done by recording "other specified paraphilic disorder"
    followed by the specific reason (e.g., "zoophilia").
    Examples of presentations that can be specified
    using the [OSPD] designation include, but are not limited
    to, recurrent and intense sexual arousal involving
    telephone scatologia (obscene phone calls), necrophilia
    (corpses), zoophilia (animals), coprophilia (feces)
    klismaphilia (enemas), or urophilia (urine) . . . .
    Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
    Dr. Brown explained Biastophilia is when a person is "sexually aroused by the
    aspect of having nonconsensual sex with someone." He acknowledged that OSPD
    – Biastophilia/Non-Consent is not specifically listed as one of the OSPD examples
    in the DSM-V but maintained his belief that the diagnosis was valid and reliable
    because the DSM-V instructed that the list of examples was not exhaustive. Dr.
    Brown further testified biastophilia is a recognized modifier for personality
    disorders and mental abnormalities in his field. On cross-examination, Dr. Brown
    admitted there is debate within the psychological profession as to whether OSPD –
    Biastophilia/Non-Consent should be considered a valid predicate diagnosis under
    the Act because rape is considered a criminal act of control rather than the result of
    a mental abnormality or disorder; however, he maintained his belief that it was a
    valid and reliable diagnosis. He further stated practitioners, for that reason, should
    exercise caution in making the diagnosis and admitted it was his first time using it.
    Following the proffer, the trial court denied Ridley's motion, finding the
    disagreement within the field regarding the diagnosis did not render it scientifically
    unreliable for the purpose of serving as a predicate diagnosis under the Act.
    We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Brown's
    testimony. See Prather, 429 S.C. at 598, 840 S.E.2d at 559 ("A trial court's
    decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed absent a
    prejudicial abuse of discretion." (quoting Chavis, 412 S.C. at 106, 771 S.E.2d at
    338)). Although a contentious issue, we find the trial court properly dispensed of
    its gatekeeping duties in assessing the reliability of Dr. Brown's diagnosis. See id.
    at 599, 840 S.E.2d at 559 ("Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must
    qualify the expert and determine whether the subject matter of the expert's
    proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule 702, SCRE."). Dr. Brown
    testified as to his method in diagnosing Ridley, which included standard practices
    within the industry such as conducting clinical interviews; thoroughly reviewing
    criminal, evaluation, and treatment records; and consulting the DSM-V.
    Accordingly, we find Dr. Brown's approach in diagnosing Ridley met the threshold
    of reliability for admissible evidence. See State v. White, 
    382 S.C. 265
    , 270, 
    676 S.E.2d 684
    , 686 (2009) ("All expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria,
    and that includes the trial court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed
    expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate
    consideration."); Council, 
    335 S.C. at 20
    , 
    515 S.E.2d at 518
     ("The trial [court]
    should apply the Jones factors to determine reliability.").
    As to whether OSPD – Biastophilia/Non-Consent is a valid predicate diagnosis
    under the Act, we hold the trial court properly found this was a determination
    within the jury's province. See Jones, 423 S.C. at 639–40, 817 S.E.2d at 272
    ("There is always a possibility that an expert witness's opinions are incorrect.
    However, whether to accept the expert's opinions or not is a matter for the jury to
    decide. Trial courts are tasked only with determining whether the basis for the
    expert's opinion is sufficiently reliable such that it [may be] offered into
    evidence."); see also Council, 
    335 S.C. at
    21–22, 
    515 S.E.2d at 519
     ("This [c]ourt
    has noted that 'vigorous cross examination, presentation of contrary evidence and
    careful instructions on the burden of proof are the traditional appropriate means
    of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.'" (quoting State v. Dinkins, 
    319 S.C. 415
    , 418, 
    462 S.E.2d 59
    , 60 (1995))). Furthermore, as it currently stands, we find
    the Act and the DSM-V do not expressly prohibit a diagnosis of OSPD –
    Biastophilia/Non-Consent. See McGee v. Bartow, 
    593 F.3d 556
    , 576 (7th Cir.
    2010) ("The Supreme Court's cases on this point teach that civil commitment upon
    a finding of a 'mental disorder' does not violate due process even though the
    predicate diagnosis is not found within the four corners of the DSM."); see also In
    re Snow, 
    425 S.C. 544
    , 549, 551, 
    823 S.E.2d 467
    , 469–71 (2019) (holding the
    diagnosis of other specified personality disorder was a legally sufficient predicate
    diagnosis under the Act). Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in denying
    Ridley's motion in limine and admitting Dr. Brown's testimony.
    CONCLUSION
    Based on the foregoing, Ridley's commitment is
    AFFIRMED.
    HUFF and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.