Com. v. Hall, F. ( 2017 )


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  • J-E03008-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    FREDERICK HALL
    Appellant                    No. 1669 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001083-2015
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J.,
    STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:                            FILED DECEMBER 12, 2017
    Appellant, Frederick Hall, appeals from the order entered May 22, 2015,
    denying his motion to dismiss, which asserted a violation of Pennsylvania’s
    compulsory joinder rule.        See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.     After careful review, we
    remand with instructions.
    We derive the following statement of facts and procedural background
    of this case from the record. In May 2014, Appellant was arrested in the City
    and County of Philadelphia.1 At that time, Appellant was charged with three
    counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and one count each of recklessly
    ____________________________________________
    1   Philadelphia is the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
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    J-E03008-16
    endangering another person (“REAP”) and disorderly conduct.2 Appellant was
    simultaneously charged with the summary traffic offenses of driving while
    operating privilege is suspended and reckless driving.3 In July 2014, Appellant
    was found guilty in absentia of both traffic offenses in the Philadelphia
    Municipal Court Traffic Division.        The remaining charges were listed in the
    Philadelphia Municipal Court General Division for disposition, and Appellant
    was found guilty of a single count of DUI. In February 2015, Appellant was
    sentenced to time served to twelve months of incarceration.4 Appellant timely
    appealed the conviction pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006, requesting a trial de
    novo before the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
    In the Court of Common Pleas, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss
    pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule.5
    ____________________________________________
    2See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3) (all graded as misdemeanors);
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2705 (graded as a misdemeanor) and 5503 (graded as a
    summary), respectively.
    3   See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(a) and 3736(a), respectively.
    4We note that the procedural history in the trial court opinion is not consistent
    with the record. However, the above recitation of facts accurately reflects the
    record. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/10/2015, at 2.
    5 This Court addressed the compulsory joinder rule in our recent decision,
    Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 
    169 A.3d 1114
     (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc).
    The Perfetto Court recognized, “[s]ection 110 is a codification of the rule
    announced by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Campana, 
    304 A.2d 432
     (Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 
    94 S. Ct. 73
     (1973), reinstated, 
    314 A.2d 854
     (Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 
    94 S. Ct. 3172
     (1974). In Campana, our
    Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires a prosecutor to
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    Following a hearing, the Honorable Vincent N. Melchiorre denied Appellant’s
    motion to dismiss.        However, no findings of fact or findings as to the
    frivolousness of the motion were entered on the record. Notes of Testimony
    (N.T.), 5/22/2015 at 3-8.
    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. No 1925(b) statement was
    ordered.     Nevertheless, in August 2015, the trial court filed an opinion
    explaining its decision.      In June 2016, this Court issued a memorandum
    opinion reversing the trial court. Thereafter, the original panel assigned to
    this case sua sponte sought en banc certification of this matter, which was
    granted in August 2016.
    Appellant raises the following claim for our review:
    1. Did not the lower court err in denying [A]ppellant’s motion to
    dismiss pursuant to 18 [Pa.C.S.] § 110 where [A]ppellant had
    previously been convicted of an offense which arose from the
    same criminal episode as the offense in the instant case?
    Substituted Brief for Appellant, at 3.
    As an initial matter, we must determine whether this Court has
    jurisdiction over the instant appeal. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    120 A.3d 1017
    , 1021 (Pa. Super. 2015) (noting that issues of jurisdiction may be raised
    sua sponte).
    ____________________________________________
    bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising
    from a single criminal episode.” Perfetto, 169 A.3d at 1117 (most internal
    citations and quotations omitted).
    -3-
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    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 587(B) governs motions to
    dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B). An order denying
    such a motion may be appealable as a collateral order.6 An immediate appeal
    from the denial of a double jeopardy claim is allowable under the collateral
    order doctrine where the motion is found not to be frivolous.               See
    Commonwealth v. Brady, 
    508 A.2d 286
    , 289-91 (1986) (holding that
    absent a finding of frivolousness, an appeal may be taken from the denial of
    a motion to dismiss). In our recent decision, Commonwealth v. Diggs, ---
    A.3d --- (Pa. Super. 2017), we held that Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B) applies to
    motions to dismiss based on compulsory joinder “[a]s Section 110 embodies
    the same basic purposes as those underlying the double jeopardy clauses,
    [and] the interlocutory appealability of double jeopardy claims has been
    applied to claims based on Section 110.”         Diggs, --- A.3d ---, *5 (citing
    Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 
    658 A.2d 755
    , 759-60 (Pa. 1995)); see also
    Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction exists only where a court
    determines that a motion to dismiss on compulsory joinder grounds is not
    frivolous and thereby qualifies as a collateral order. Diggs, --- A.3d ---, *5-
    6; Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B).
    ____________________________________________
    6 “A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause
    of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and
    the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment
    in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
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    Here, our review of the transcript and record reveals that the trial court
    failed to comply with Rule 587(B), as it denied Appellant's motion to dismiss
    based on compulsory joinder without entering on the record a statement of
    findings of fact or a specific determination regarding whether Appellant's
    motion was frivolous. N.T., 5/22/2015 at 3-8; see Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(3)-
    (4). Accordingly, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. In
    light of Diggs, we are constrained to remand this matter to the Court of
    Common Pleas for additional findings and with instructions to comply with Rule
    587(B).
    Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/12/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1669 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 12/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/12/2017