C.O., N/K/A C.K. VS. T.O. (FV-09-1472-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )


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  •                              RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5570-15T2
    C.O. n/k/a C.K.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    T.O.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________
    Submitted September 26, 2017 – Decided October 31, 2017
    Before Judges Fasciale and Moynihan.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FV-09-1472-15.
    Clara S. Licata, attorney for appellant.
    C.K., respondent pro se.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant     appeals    from    a   July   11,   2016    Amended    Final
    Restraining Order entered pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic
    Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.                      The evidence
    supported the judge's finding that a final restraining order (FRO)
    was   necessary    to    protect   the   victim   from   further     abuse;    we
    therefore affirm.
    We previously vacated the FRO entered in this matter on
    February 26, 2015.         C.O. v. T.O., No. A-3510-14 (App. Div. Mar.
    24, 2016).1     We did not disturb the judge's finding that defendant
    committed the predicate act of harassment, but remanded the case
    for a re-hearing because "the judge made no finding that the entry
    of a [final] restraining order was necessary to protect [the]
    plaintiff."      Id. at 4-5.
    After hearing testimony on remand, the judge briefly reviewed
    the messages sent by defendant to plaintiff deemed to constitute
    harassment, and found the testimony of the divorcing parties
    revealed a very disharmonious relationship
    between the two of them that was escalated by
    [defendant's] texts and messages that [the
    judge] found to constitute harassment, and at
    that time [when the divorce complaint was
    filed in December 2014] given what was clearly
    going to be [a] very acrimonious divorce[,] a
    final restraining order at that time was
    necessary to prevent further escalation of
    that behavior and further harassment of
    [plaintiff] by [defendant].
    The   judge    also     found   that   evidence   of   defendant's    contempt
    conviction in March 2016 for violation of the restraining order
    1
    The facts pertinent to the acts of defendant's harassment are
    set forth in our previous opinion and are not repeated here.
    2                              A-5570-15T2
    was a "factor" that "support[ed] the continuance of the restraining
    order if what happened after the original hearing is relevant."
    On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred because the "bare
    finding" that the restraining order was necessary because of the
    parties' "acrimonious divorce action . . . [was] not supported by
    the record evidence that existed at the time of the FRO and which
    was considered again during the [remand] hearing."           He contends
    plaintiff's   testimony   -   that   she    feared   defendant   -    was    a
    "subjective, self-interested declaration of fear," belied by the
    texts and messages she sent to him, and by plaintiff's profanity-
    laced attack on defendant's girlfriend.
    Our review of the trial court's conclusions is limited.                We
    are bound by the court's factual findings if they are "supported
    by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."          Cesare v. Cesare,
    
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411-12 (1998).             We defer to the trial judge's
    assessment of witnesses' credibility because of the perspective
    the judge gains from seeing and hearing testimony.2         
    Id. at 412
    .
    As we held on the first appeal, the judge was not only
    required to find that defendant committed a predicate act, N.J.S.A.
    2C:25-19(a), but also that an FRO was "necessary . . . to protect
    2
    We deem defendant's argument that the judge improperly asked
    leading questions of plaintiff during the re-hearing to be without
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    3                               A-5570-15T2
    the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse."
    Silver v. Silver, 
    387 N.J. Super. 112
    , 127 (App. Div. 2006).          Only
    the second prong is at issue here.
    The judge did not base his conclusion that the FRO was
    necessary on plaintiff's fear.     The judge found the predicate act
    of harassment was based on a number of messages from defendant to
    plaintiff.    He found the restraining order was required to protect
    plaintiff from "further escalation of [defendant's] behavior and
    further harassment."     He determined that defendant's harassing
    communication     worsened   the       parties'   already      discordant
    relationship. In his judgment, the harassment would have escalated
    if the FRO was not issued; the order was necessary to protect
    plaintiff from further harassment.       In essence, he ordered the FRO
    so plaintiff would be left alone, an entitlement found to be a
    "basic protection" of the PDVA.        State v. Hoffman, 
    149 N.J. 564
    ,
    584 (1997).    We conclude the evidence supported his findings.
    Defendant    also   argues    the    judge   erred   by   utilizing
    defendant's contempt conviction to support his finding regarding
    the second prong because it occurred after the initial FRO hearing,
    and violated defendant's due process rights because it was not
    initially alleged in the complaint.         The judge found defendant
    "was found guilty of a violation of the restraining order and that
    factor, as well, would support the continuance of the restraining
    4                              A-5570-15T2
    order." (emphasis added).   As noted by the judge, the contempt
    conviction was not the only factor upon which he found the second
    prong was met. Since the issuance of the FRO was justified without
    consideration of the contempt conviction, we need not address this
    portion of defendant's argument.
    Affirmed.
    5                          A-5570-15T2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5570-15T2

Filed Date: 10/31/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/2/2017