Com. v. Smith, G. ( 2017 )

J-S49026-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
GREGORY SMITH
Appellant No. 1767 WDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order Dated October 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0015978-2012
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017
Pro se Appellant Gregory Smith appeals from the order dismissing his
first Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 petition. We affirm.
We state the facts and procedural history as set forth by a prior panel
of this Court, which resolved Appellant’s direct appeal:
The evidence adduced at trial was based heavily on the
testimony of James Upshaw. Mr. Upshaw testified that he was a
friend of the victim, Jacquae Pascal. Mr. Upshaw testified that,
on July 6, 2012, he had made plans to meet Mr. Pascal at the
Team Mozzi barbershop in the Hill District area of the City of
Pittsburgh to get haircuts together. Mr. Upshaw explained that
July 6th was Mr. Pascal’s birthday and they were going to hang
out for a period of time on that day. Mr. Upshaw testified that
he brought his four year-old son along to get a haircut. Mr.
Upshaw, his son and Mr. Pascal met at the barbershop to get
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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haircuts. When Mr. Upshaw arrived at the barbershop, there
were others in the barbershop waiting to get a haircut. Most of
the customers were discussing basketball. [Appellant] was in the
barber’s chair. Mr. Upshaw testified that he had known
[Appellant] for a number of years.
Mr. Upshaw testified that [Appellant] got his haircut and
left the barbershop. Mr. Upshaw was under the impression that
[Appellant] left to go to his girlfriend’s house. [Appellant]
shortly returned and remained outside the barbershop. While
Mr. Upshaw and his son were waiting their turn for a haircut, Mr.
Upshaw’s son advised Mr. Upshaw that he was thirsty and asked
if he could get some water due to the hot temperatures inside
the barbershop. Mr. Upshaw agreed to purchase a bottle of
water for his son. Mr. Pascal indicated he would go with Mr.
Upshaw and his son to get something to drink. The three of
them left the barbershop and crossed the street on their way to
“Juan’s”, a local convenience store. As they crossed the street,
Mr. Upshaw saw [Appellant] come up behind the victim and
shoot him multiple times with a chrome revolver. Mr. Upshaw
testified he screamed at [Appellant] and asked him “why would
you do this, what is wrong with you?”
Immediately after the shooting, Mr. Upshaw saw
[Appellant] run into his girlfriend’s residence. At that point, Mr.
Upshaw left the scene with his son and went to his mother’s
house. He called Mr. Pascal’s girlfriend and told her what
happened. He did not, however, inform the police what
happened at that time. Because [Appellant] was not in custody,
Mr. Upshaw feared for his safety and kept what he knew to
himself. For some time, he did not contact the police about what
occurred. He later agreed to provide details of the shooting but
only after his family was placed into the witness protection
program.
City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Matthew O’Brien responded
to the scene. The shooting occurred near the intersection of
Center Avenue and Kirkpatrick Street at approximately 2:00
p.m. Upon arriving at the scene, he canvassed the area
attempting to locate any witnesses to the shooting. Despite the
presence of many people at the scene, nobody was willing to
discuss the shooting with him. There were no bullet casings
found at the scene. The absence of casings was consistent with
use of a revolver to commit the shooting.
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Homicide detectives were dispatched to the scene.
Through the course of their investigation, they were informed
that a person known on the street as “Pretty” may have been
responsible for the shooting. It was learned that [Appellant]’s
nickname was “Pretty”. Detectives then sent out word within the
police department that they were looking for [Appellant].
Later in the evening, on the night of the shooting,
Pittsburgh Police Officers pulled over a vehicle in the South Side
section of the City of Pittsburgh that was involved in a hit and
run. [Appellant] was inside the vehicle when the responding
officers stopped the vehicle. When the officers identified
[Appellant], they contacted homicide detectives to advise that
they had [Appellant] in custody.
Homicide detective Thomas Leheny interviewed [Appellant]
on the night of the shooting. Detective Leheny informed
[Appellant] that he did not have to speak with the detectives.
Detective Leheny did advise [Appellant] that he was not under
arrest. [Appellant] agreed to speak with Detective Leheny.
[Appellant] told Detective Leheny that prior to the shooting he
was with a girl in the West End of Pittsburgh at the time of the
shooting. [Appellant], however, could not provide a name or
phone number for the girl nor could he provide an address for
the girl.
[Appellant] then told Detective Leheny that he was driving
through the Hill District talking on his cell phone when the
murder occurred. Detective Leheny had not advised [Appellant]
where the murder occurred. [Appellant] verbally consented to a
gunshot residue test of his clothing. Detectives obtained
[Appellant]’s t-shirt for processing. Testing confirmed that
gunshot residue was present on the front of the t-shirt. After
this was done, Detective Leheny continued to speak with
[Appellant]. At this point, [Appellant] put his head down and
told Detective Leheny that he “wasn’t right in the head” and he
was prone to sudden bursts of anger since he was a kid.
[Appellant] told Detective Leheny that he didn’t want to talk
anymore and asked if he was free to leave. [Appellant] then left
the police station.
An arrest warrant was issued for [Appellant] on August 30,
2012. [Appellant] could not be located. Officer Matthew
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McCarthy testified that he was on patrol on November 7, 2013
when he conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Johnny
Rutherford for speeding. Once the vehicle was pulled over, the
front seat passenger, [Appellant]’s brother, quickly exited the
vehicle. [Appellant], who was the back seat passenger,
attempted to get out of the vehicle by climbing over the front
passenger seat. Officers quickly secured the vehicle. Upon
being asked for identification, [Appellant] gave a false name and
date of birth. He provided an age that was not possible based
on the date of birth he provided. Because of his false answers,
he was placed into custody. [Appellant] was subsequently
identified and arrested for the homicide of Mr. Pascal.
Amber Traylor testified that she was driving in the area.
As she was driving on Kirkpatrick Street, she heard loud noises.
She observed the shooting in her rearview mirror. She saw
three people standing outside the barbershop and she saw
another person shooting at a person lying on the street. She
was not able to provide detailed descriptions of any of the
persons she observed at the scene of the shooting.
The medical examiner testified in this case that the cause
of Mr. Pascal’s death was multiple gunshot wounds to his trunk
and extremities. The manner of death was homicide. Mr. Pascal
suffered six total gunshot wounds. Three of the gunshot wounds
were to his back. The first wound entered the middle of his back
and pierced his pulmonary vein and the heart. Mr. Pascal
sustained other gunshot wounds to his buttocks, his right
shoulder, his right upper arm and to the back of his hand.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 2015 WL 6675474, at *1-*3 (Pa. Super., Aug.
21, 2015) (internal ellipses, brackets, formatting, citations, and footnotes
omitted), appeal denied, 128 A.3d 220 (Pa., Dec. 16, 2015).
Appellant was charged by information, as follows:
The actor intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently
caused the death of Jaquae Pascal another human being, in
violation of Section 2501 (a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
Act of December 6, 1972, 18 Pa. C.S. §2501(a), as amended.
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Crim. Information, 7/6/12. Our prior opinion discussed the subsequent
procedural history:
Following his arrest, on February 11, 2013, [Appellant]
filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and statements,
arguing, inter alia, that the police conducted a custodial
interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings and he did not
consent to speak with the officers or to submit to a gun-shot
residue test. A suppression hearing was held on April 29, 2013.
On August 20, 2013, the court denied [Appellant’s] motion to
suppress with respect to the physical evidence, and granted in
part and denied in part his motion as to his statements.
[Appellant’s] first jury trial was held September 30, 2013
to October 3, 2013, but ended in a mistrial. His second jury trial
began on January 13, 2014. Two days later, the jury convicted
[Appellant] of first-degree murder. The court then sentenced
[Appellant] to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
for the murder conviction. On January 27, 2014, [Appellant]
filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the
evidence and requesting a new trial. The court denied his
motion on February 20, 2014.
Smith, 2015 WL 6675474, at *3 (footnotes omitted). This Court affirmed,
and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal
on December 16, 2015.
The PCRA court docketed Appellant’s first PCRA petition on June 4,
2016. His petition raised, among other issues, a Batson2 claim. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, who filed a petition to withdraw contending that
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2
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). “In Batson, the United States
Supreme Court reiterated that a defendant is denied equal protection of the
law when the government ‘puts him on trial before a jury from which
members of his race have been purposefully excluded.’” Commonwealth
v. Jones, 951 A.2d 294, 298-99 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Appellant’s Batson claim, among other issues, lacked merit. On October 4,
2016, the court issued an order that simultaneously granted counsel’s
petition to withdraw and notified Appellant of the court’s intention to dismiss
his PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
According to the PCRA court, Appellant filed an objection to counsel’s
petition to withdraw, which raised three claims: (1) the information was
defective because it contained only a general charge of homicide; (2) the
court violated the sentencing code by sentencing him to life imprisonment
without parole; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a Batson
claim during jury selection. PCRA Ct. Op., 1/17/17, at 2. Appellant’s
objection, however, is not in the certified record transmitted to this Court.
The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on October 25, 2016,
and Appellant timely appealed, raising the following issues, which we set
forth verbatim:
1. Was Appellant’s bill of information-indictment, facially
defective pursuant to Pa. Rule of Criminal Procedure 560(B)(5)?
2. Did the trial court err in proceeding to trial upon a defective
information?
3. Did the trial court pronounce judgment and sentence upon
Appellant on a specific crimes code violation not contained in the
bill of information?
4. Did the trial court order the bill of information offense
originally charged to be amended, after the imposition of
sentence?
5. Did the trial court deviate from sentencing procedures set out
in the sentencing code at 42 Pa.C.S. sub. sec. 9711?
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6. Whether or not the state or defense didn’t object to
proceeding with immediate sentencing, what authority did the
court have from deviating from sentencing procedure set out for
first degree murder at 42 Pa.C.S. sub. sec. 9711, and if this was
not a death qualified case, what authority is stated in said
procedure at 42 Pa.C.S. sub. sec. §9711, that permits automatic
imposition of sentence of life without parole?
7. Sentencing procedures for conviction of first degree murder,
under statutory law, at 42 Pa.C.S. sub. sec. 9711, are only for
death qualified and pursued cases, what other statute authorizes
mandatory life without parole for a conviction of first degree
murder, 18 Pa.C.S. sub. sec. 1102(a)(i), and if no other statute
exists, how was defendant’s jury instructed on first degree
murder when it was not a death penalty case, and no statutory
penalty exists for the court to access for imposition of any
sentence thereafter, under statutory law?
8. P.C.R.A. counsel did not meet individual Finley requisites to
show no pattern of exclusion of prospective jurors county-wide,
as alleged, but merely spoke with trial counsel whom believed a
Batson claim didn’t occur and took her on her word, and
showed no individual investigation steps per Finley?
Appellant’s Brief at iii-iv.
“Preliminarily, we recognize that in reviewing the propriety of an order
granting or denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to ascertaining whether
the evidence supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether the
ruling is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 158 A.3d 1260,
1262-63 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Appellant’s first four issues concern an allegedly defective information.
He argues that the information lacked sufficient specificity and thus gave the
Commonwealth free reign to pursue any degree of homicide. For his next
three issues, Appellant argues that the court lacked authority to impose a
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sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without parole. Because
Appellant’s brief does not present an argument regarding his last issue, we
conclude Appellant has waived it. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141
A.3d 512, 522 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 161 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2016).
We need not address whether any of Appellant’s issues are cognizable
under the PCRA, or whether Appellant actually filed a response in opposition
to the Rule 907 notice, because none of his issues have merit. After careful
review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the decision of the Honorable
Anthony M. Mariani, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s decision.
PCRA Ct. Op. at 3-4 (holding an information charging criminal homicide
sufficiently placed Appellant on notice, and that for a conviction for first-
degree murder, mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole was
required by 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)). Because the PCRA court did not err, we
affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition. The parties are
instructed to attach a copy of the PCRA court’s decision to any pleadings that
reference it.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2017
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J-S49026-17
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Circulated 10/25/2017 03:20 PM
Allegheny County - Department of Court Records
Criminal Division - Filings Information
County caseID:CP-02-CR-0015978-2012 (OPINION)
Case Description: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SMITH
Official Docket Entry, Sort By Document Number Ascending
Document Title/Entry Filing Date
Number
1 OPINION 01/17/2017
(Index Page-1)
1-OPINION
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DNISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
) 7 ,)( "2
VS. ) CC No:-2008-15978
)
GREGORY SMITH, )
)
Petitioner. )
)
)
OPINION
Mariani, J.
After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder.
He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. He filed a direct appeal and
on August 21, 2015 the Superior Court at No. 451 WDA 2014 affirmed the judgment of
sentence. A Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied on December 16, 2015. On
June 4, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act
(hereinafter referred to as "PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq . This Court appointed
counsel, Scott Coffey, to represent the petitioner relative to that filing. Appointed
1
counsel then filed a Turner/Finley "No-Merit Letter" advising the Court that he had
I
Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (En Banc). When PCRA counsel seeks to withdraw, he must first file a Turner/Finley
"no merit" letter with the court, stating that after a review of the record, all of the issues that the petitioner
desires to raise have no merit. Commonwealth v. Smith. 700 A.2d 1301, 1304 (Pa. Super. 1997). "Arguing
against one's client's position is not only permissible under Finley, it is required." Id. "The independent
review necessary to secure a withdrawal request by counsel requires proof that: 1) PCRA counsel, in a "no-
merit" letter, has detailed the nature and the extent of his review; 2) PCRA counsel, in the "no-merit" letter,
lists each issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed; 3) PCRA counsel must explain, in the "no-merit"
letter, why petitioner's issues are meritless; 4) The PCRA court must conduct its own independent review of
the record; and 5) The PCRA court must agree with counsel that the petition is meritless." Commonwealth
v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009).
undertaken a thorough review of record and he believed the issues raised by Petitioner
had no merit. He sought to withdraw his appearance on behalf of Petitioner.
This Court then determined that there were no meritorious issues to be raised in
the PCRA. This Court considered the Turner/Finley No-Merit Letter filed in this case
and this Court undertook its own independent consideration of the record. Having done
that, this Court then issued a notice of its intention to dismiss the PCRA petition on
October 4, 2016 and it granted appointed counsel's request to withdraw. Petitioner then
filed an Objection to Counsel's No Merit Letter challenging the fact that the information
filed in this case was defective because it only contained a general charge of homicide,
that this Court violated the sentencing code by sentencing him to a term of imprisonment
of life without parole for First Degree Murder and that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a Batson claim during jury selection. This Court subsequently denied
Petitioner's PCRA petition on October 25, 2016. Petitioner filed a timely Notice of
Appeal.
On November 18, 2016, Petitioner filed Petitioner's Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to R.A.P. 1925(b) raising the same claims of error he
raised in his response to appointed counsel's no merit letter.
Petitioner first claims that the information filed against him was defective for a
number of reasons but chief among them is that the charge as set forth in the Information
did not provide notice as to what he was actually being charged with. The trial court
2
record establishes that the information filed in this case specifically charged Petitioner
with
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently caused
the death of J aquae Pascal, another human being, in
violation of section 2501(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, Act of December 6, 1972, 18 PA. C.S.A. §2501(a),
as amended.
The actual crime of criminal homicide, found at 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2501(a), states
A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of
another human being.
Petitioner's claim is clearly without merit. As set forth in Commonwealth v. McMullen,
616 A.2d 14, 16 (Pa.Super. 1992)2, a charge of criminal homicide is sufficient to put a
defendant on notice of the crimes with which he or she is charged:
A criminal information must inform the defendant of
the crime with which he is charged and must be read in a
common sense manner. Commonwealth v. Badman, 398
Pa.Super. 315, 580 A.2d 1367 (1990). An information will
be regarded as sufficient in law provided it serves to notify
the accused of the charges filed against him.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 323 Pa.Super. 512, 470 A.2d
1376 (1984). "[T]he several types of homicide, namely,
murder of any of the three named degrees and voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter are constituent subsidiary
offenses within the single major offense [ of criminal
homicide.]" Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 378
A.2d 1189 (1977). In Badman. supra, the court found the
language did "kill or take part in the killing" of the victim
was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the crime
with which he was charged. Id. at 324, 580 A.2d at 1371.
Contrary to appellant's contention, we find Badman lends
support to the trial court's finding the information
adequately advised appellant of the crime with which he
2
McMullen was subsequently reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on a basis unrelated to the
notice issue.
3
was charged. See Commonwealth v. Taraschi, 327
Pa.Super. 179, 475 A.2d 744 (1984) (informations are
sufficient where crimes charged are substantially in the
language of the statute). We find the information alleging
criminal homicide clearly notified appellant he was being
charged with the death of Barcelona and advised him of the
crimes which he was compelled to defend.
Petitioner also claims generally that his sentence of life imprisonment without
parole was illegal because this Court did not follow proper sentencing procedures.
Petitioner does not explain the basis for his challenge. Regardless of this omission,
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without paroled was required. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §1102(a). This issue is
baseless.
Petitioner's final claim is that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to raise a Batson challenge during jury selection because, according to
Petitioner, there was a pattern of exclusion of African-American jurors from his jury
pool.3 In Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873 (Pa. 2011), the Supreme Court
explained
[I]n Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74,
86 (2004), we held that in cases on collateral review like
the one before us, where no Batson challenge was raised
during voir dire and the only viable claim is one of counsel
ineffectiveness for failing to raise a Batson objection during
voir dire, the post-conviction petitioner may not rely on
Batson's burden-shifting formula, but instead bears the
burden in the first instance and throughout of establishing
actual, purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the
evidence.
3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.79 (1986)
4
This Court has reviewed the entire record in this case and agrees with appointed
counsel that there is no evidence that the Commonwealth engaged in actual, purposeful
discrimination during jury selection. There is no evidence that any juror was stricken based
on race or that the jury pool excluded African Americans. Petitioner's failure to make any
such showing renders his claim baseless.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Petitioner's PCRA petition should be
affirmed.
By the Court:
Date: J(Y'll«,et"t { 7; '2-o ( '7
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