Jesse Ray Alishouse v. Stephanie Ann Nicholson ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1891
Filed January 21, 2021
JESSE RAY ALISHOUSE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEPHANIE ANN NICHOLSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Kathleen A. Kilnoski,
Judge.
Stephanie Nicholson appeals the denial of her motion to set aside default
judgment and entry of parenting plan. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert J. Engler of Cambridge Law Firm, P.L.C., Atlantic, for appellant.
Kyle E. Focht of Focht Law Office, Council Bluffs, for appellee.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Justin D. Walker and Gary J.
Otting, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Danilson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
2
DANILSON, Senior Judge.
Stephanie Nicholson has three children, one with Jesse Alishouse (A.R.A,
born in 2012). Stephanie lives with her three children in Iowa. Jesse lives in
Minnesota, approximately five hours away.
On August 8, 2019, Jesse filed a petition (DRCV025751) to establish
custody, child support, and medical support in which he requested joint legal
custody, physical care with Stephanie, “liberal visitation” for him, child support in
accordance with the child support guidelines, and medical support. Jesse also
requested Stephanie be ordered to pay his attorney fees. Also on August 8, Jesse
filed a motion to consolidate his petition with a separate action (DRCV025710) filed
by the Child Support Recovery Unit (CRSU) against him alleging paternity and a
support debt.1 The district court entered an ex parte order consolidating the two
actions on that same date.
In the CSRU action, the CSRU filed a resistance to the motion to
consolidate and Jesse’s motion to continue a hearing set in that case. On August
9, the district court acknowledged the CSRU’s resistance and ordered a hearing
to be scheduled in the CSRU action. That same date, the court also entered an
order in both the CSRU action and Jesse’s paternity action setting a hearing on
unspecified matters for October 15, 2019.
On August 15, notice of the paternity action was served on Stephanie in
Atlantic.
1 See Iowa Code ch. 252F (2019).
3
On September 5, Jesse filed a notice of intent to file written application for
default, which asserted it was mailed that same date to Stephanie at the Atlantic
address.
On September 19, Jesse filed an application for default requesting
the court enter a default judgment against [Stephanie], that the
parties be awarded joint legal custody of A.R.A. with primary care
being awarded to [Stephanie] subject to [Jesse’s] extraordinary
visitation as set forth in his proposed parenting plan, that child
support be set pursuant to the guidelines, that [Stephanie] be
ordered to pay [Jesse]’s reasonable attorney fees along with the
costs of this action, and for such other and further relief as the court
deems just and equitable in the premises.
The court filed an order that same date finding Stephanie in default, which provides
in part:
5. This matter has been consolidated with Cass County
Docket No. DRCV025710 making the State of Iowa a party of interest
herein. The issues of child support and medical support are reserved
for final hearing on October 15, 2019.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and the child in
this matter.
2. [Stephanie] is in default and judgment should be entered
with regard to custody and visitation.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the parties shall be awarded joint legal custody of
the minor child. . . .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that [Stephanie] shall be awarded primary physical care of the minor
child with rights of visitation awarded to [Jesse]. Jesse’s proposed
parenting plan is adopted and incorporated in the Decree as if fully
set forth herein.
The court also ordered Stephanie to pay Jesse’s attorney fees in the amount of
$1047.
4
No proposed parenting plan was on file with the court until September 20.
The parenting plan provided visitation to Jesse every weekend and eight weeks of
visitation in the summer.
On October 8, Stephanie filed a motion to set aside the default judgment,
accompanied by an affidavit in which she asserted the visitation ordered was
excessive and not in the child’s best interests, noting the several-hour travel time
between the parties’ homes. She also stated:
After I was served with the Petition on August 15, I did prepare a
response to the Petition and attempted to file it with the Court on
several occasions. This included me going to the Courthouse and
having someone at the Courthouse in Cass County, Iowa, put me
through to the Help Desk. When I spoke with someone at the Help
Desk, I was told that I had to clear out three different EDMS accounts
in my name before I could file. Eventually, with the help of the Help
Desk, again, I did electronically file a response and was assured by
the lady I was talking to at the Help Desk that my response had been
filed. Having believed that my response had been filed, I carried on.
I never received a Notice of Intent to File Written Application for
Default and I never received a Default Order or the Order Nunc Pro
Tunc that was filed in this matter.
It wasn’t until Thursday, October 3, 2019, that [Jesse]
informed me that there was a Default Order entered in this matter.
Prior to that I had absolutely no idea that a Default Order existed.
The following day I got in touch with an attorney and set up an
appointment for Monday morning. I retained my attorney on Monday
morning. Therefore, not even two days had passed from the time
that I found out that there was a Default Order until I hired an attorney
to deal with the Default Order.
I did not understand that I should have received an email
notification of the filing of my response. Therefore, I went back and
looked at my account and noticed that [Jesse’s] email address is the
designated email address for my account. I do not know how that
happened, but it certainly is concerning to me. I have attached to
this Affidavit as Exhibit A a copy of a screen shot of my EDMS
account.
I am simply asking that the Court allow me to participate in
this litigation. I had previously attempted to participate by making
several attempts to e-file an Answer, went to the courthouse to file
my response, and I spoke with the help desk to file my Answer.
Again, I believe I filed an Answer in this matter.
5
After the October 15 hearing on the motion to set aside default and
consolidation,2 the district court entered an order, which provides in part:
The burden is on Stephanie to show that good cause exists to
set aside the default judgment and parenting plan because of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable
casualty.
The court concludes that Stephanie has not carried her
burden. Stephanie was personally served with the petition and
original notice. The ten-day notice of intent to seek a default
judgment was mailed to the same address at which she was served
and at which she continued to reside at the time of this hearing.
....
The default parenting plan awarded primary physical care of
the child to Stephanie, following the parties’ pattern of parenting time
for most of the child’s life. The court does not find evidence of
surprise, mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect on the part of
Stephanie. Additionally, the court does not find any evidence to
suggest that Jesse tried to mislead Stephanie or otherwise
encouraged her to sleep on her rights.
The court agrees with Stephanie that the every-weekend
visitation provision of the parenting plan should be adjusted, likely
with a view toward accommodating Stephanie’s weekend work
schedule, so that Stephanie can have some weekend time with the
child.
With the exception of the every-weekend provision, the court
finds no reason to set aside the default judgment and parenting plan.
A support order was separately entered the same date, which was
calculated providing Jesse with credit for extraordinary visitation.
After an additional hearing, the court entered an order reinstating the
proposed parenting plan with every-weekend visitation.
Stephanie appeals, contending the court erred in not setting aside the
default due to excusable neglect and that the outcome of the default judgment was
not based on the best interests of the minor child. We agree.
2 The CRSU withdrew its resistance to consolidation at the hearing.
6
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977 provides that on “motion and for good
cause shown . . . , the court may set aside a default or the judgment thereon, for
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect[,] or unavoidable casualty.”
In ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the district court
is vested with broad discretion and will only be reversed if that
discretion is abused. We are bound by the district court’s factual
findings if supported by substantial evidence. The determination of
whether a movant has established good cause is not a factual
finding; rather, it is a legal conclusion and is not binding on us.
Sheeder v. Boyette, 764 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations
omitted). Our task is therefore to determine whether the circumstances of this
case meet the requirements in order to set aside a default judgment under rule
1.977.
Stephanie bears the burden to plead and prove good cause. See id. “Good
cause is a sound, effective, and truthful reason. It is something more than an
excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some justification, for the resulting effect.”
Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 513 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa
1994). The purpose of the rule is to allow determinations of controversies on their
merits, rather than on the basis of non-prejudicial inadvertence or mistake. Paige
v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1977). Taking a liberal approach
in interpreting inadvertence or mistake advances this principle. Cent. Nat. Ins.,
513 N.W.2d at 756.
[T]o uphold a denial of a motion to set aside a default and default
judgment, there must be substantial evidence that the defaulting
party willfully ignored or defied the rules of procedure. “Willfully” and
“defying” signal conduct that goes beyond negligent or careless
conduct. Such words indicate conduct on the part of the defaulting
party showing a deliberate intention to ignore, and resist any
adherence to, the rules of procedure.
7
Brandenburg v. Feterl Mfg. Co., 603 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Iowa 1999). We are more
reluctant to interfere with the grant of a motion to set aside a default than with its
denial. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 168 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Iowa
1969). “All doubts are resolved in favor of setting aside the default.” Wilson v.
Liberty Mut. Grp., 666 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa 2003).
We find good cause for setting aside the default judgment on grounds of
surprise and excusable neglect. Here, Jesse’s petition sought “liberal visitation”
and Stephanie and Jesse were in communication about Jesse’s petition, with
Stephanie asking Jesse for his help in how to respond to it. Stephanie obtained
counsel and moved to set aside the default less than twenty days after default was
entered. She testified at the hearing that she could not initially afford an attorney
and made attempts without the aid of counsel to answer the petition. Her attempts
included visiting the clerk’s office and contacting the help desk before becoming
frustrated.3 Significantly, Jesse’s application for default judgment asked for
“extraordinary visitation as set forth in his proposed parenting plan.”
Notwithstanding Stephanie and Jesse being in communication even after the filing
of the notice of intent, Stephanie had no knowledge of the specifics of Jesse’s
proposed parenting plan—the parenting plan was not on file until after the court
granted default. Stephanie was surprised upon learning there was a parenting
plan and quickly obtained an attorney and objected to the specifics of the plan
ordered. We agree with the district court that Jesse did not commit fraud, but he
3We acknowledge the electronic filing system is not perfect and is only as effective
as the information inputted.
8
was fully aware that Stephanie had expressed reliance upon him and wanted to
resolve the case in a realistic manner.
While our review of the ruling on the motion to set aside default is at law,
child custody matters are in equity and the best interests of the child is the driving
force. See Iowa Code § 598.41(1), (3); Lambert v. Everist, 418 N.W.2d 40, 42
(Iowa 1988) (“It is axiomatic that we are concerned above all else in child custody
cases with the best interests of the child.”).
The best interests of the child are not served by the terms of the parenting
plan, and the court abused its discretion in approving the plan. The district court
itself found the every-weekend visitation was not in the best interests of the child.
Nonetheless, the court entered an order to that effect. Moreover, other terms of
visitation such as eight weeks of summer visitation may also be improvident.
Extraordinary visitation also impacts the child support award. See Iowa Ct. R. 9.9.
We conclude the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the
default decree.4 Consequently, we reverse the denial of the motion to set aside
default and remand for further proceedings, and we deny Jesse’s application for
appellate attorney fees.5
We award Stephanie appellate attorney fees in an amount to be determined
by the district court on remand. We conclude her award is warranted due to the
4 In light of the circumstance that Jesse was seeking a default judgment against
the custodial parent, the district court might have been well advised to grant a
default for want of appearance, fix a hearing to determine what relief should be
granted, and command Stephanie’s appearance.
5 The order entered for support in the CSRU action shall remain in effect pending
further order and proceedings in the district court.
9
relative needs of the parties. See Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13. 26 (Iowa
2005).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.