In Re: A.Q.M., a minor, Appeal of: A.M. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S20041-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: A.Q.M., III, A MINOR                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: A.M.
    No. 1920 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order of October 28, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Family Court at No.: TPR090-14
    IN RE: D.M.M., A MINOR                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: A.M.
    No. 1921 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order of October 28, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Family Court at No.: TPR091-14
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and WECHT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.:                           FILED MARCH 31, 2015
    A.M. (“Father”) appeals the October 28, 2014 order that terminated
    his parental rights to his son, A.Q.M., born in January 2010, and his
    daughter, D.M.M., born in March 2008 (collectively, “the Children”). 1 After
    review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    On October 28, 2014, the trial court also terminated the parental
    rights of R.M.T. (“Mother”). Mother has not appealed.
    J-S20041-15
    The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history as
    follows:
    [The Children] were adjudicated dependent on August 24, 2012
    and placed in the care of [the Allegheny County Office of
    Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”)] on February 1, 2013.
    [The Children] have been out of both parents’ care since
    February 1, 2013. CYF filed [petitions to terminate parental
    rights (“TPR”)] on May 28, 2014, [and] sought termination . . .
    pursuant to . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
    [Father] is single and has never been married. CYF records
    indicate that [Father] is listed on the birth certificates of both
    children as the father. [Father] signed an acknowledgement of
    paternity for both children.
    The conditions which led to the removal and placement of [the
    Children] were a long history of concerns with the parents’
    substance abuse, concerns with domestic violence in the home,
    mental health concerns for both parents, the need for stable
    housing and allegations of [Father’s] maltreatment and
    inappropriate physical discipline of [the Children] and their
    siblings.
    Specifically, [Father] failed to comply with the [family service
    plan (“FSP”)] goals established by CYF. Throughout the case,
    [Father] failed to complete Pyramid or any other [drug and
    alcohol] or dual diagnosis treatment programs. [Father] has
    repeatedly tested positive for substance [use] and failed to
    appear for urine screens when requested by CYF. [Father] has
    failed to obtain mental health treatment on a regular basis.
    [Father] has not completed a parenting program or domestic
    violence program and had been arrested twice in 2013 for
    domestic violence incidents.      In addition, [Father] failed to
    attend court-ordered psychological interactional evaluations with
    [the Children].
    Following the TPR hearing on October 15, 2014, and after review
    of exhibits, this court granted CYF’s TPR petition on October 28,
    2014.
    -2-
    J-S20041-15
    Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 12/19/2014, at 1-2 (minor modifications to
    punctuation).
    On November 26, 2014, Father filed his notice of appeal and concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On December 19, 2014, the trial court filed its Rule
    1925(a) opinion.
    Father presents one issue on appeal:
    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
    of law in concluding that termination of [Father’s] parental
    rights would serve the needs and welfare of the Children
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
    Father’s Brief at 7.
    We review the termination of parental rights in accordance with the
    following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
    when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
    termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
    standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
    they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    ,
    1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. Id.; In re: R.I.S., 
    36 A.3d 567
    , 572
    (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion). As has been often stated, an
    abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
    court might have reached a different conclusion. 
    Id.
     Instead, a
    decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
    demonstration     of     manifest   unreasonableness,     partiality,
    prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 
    Id.
    *    *    *
    -3-
    J-S20041-15
    [E]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is
    often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
    appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial
    court and impose its own credibility determinations and
    judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judge[] so long as
    the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s
    legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse
    of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066
    (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations
    modified; some citations omitted).    It is well-settled that a party seeking
    termination of a parent’s rights bears the burden of proving the grounds by
    clear and convincing evidence, a standard that requires evidence that is “so
    clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come
    to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
    issue.” In re T.F., 
    847 A.2d 738
    , 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
    This Court has explained the proper analysis for a termination petition,
    as follows:
    [U]nder Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
    process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus
    is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination
    must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s
    conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
    delineated in Section 2511(a). Only after determining that the
    parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental
    rights must the court engage in the second part of the analysis:
    [the] determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
    the standard of best interests of the child. Although a needs and
    welfare analysis is mandated by the statute, it is distinct from
    and not relevant to a determination of whether the parent’s
    conduct justifies termination of parental rights under the statute.
    One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the
    nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and
    child.
    -4-
    J-S20041-15
    In re Adoption of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
    (citations omitted).
    Father concedes that CYF established the grounds for termination
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).      Father’s Brief at 12.   Father only
    challenges the trial court conclusions regarding the second part of the
    inquiry, which is controlled by the following provision:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
    the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
    furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
    beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
    filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
    consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
    giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
    In reviewing the trial court’s decision regarding the needs and welfare
    of the child, we consider that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security,
    and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the
    child.”   In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
    omitted). The trial court must consider the nature and status of the parent-
    child bond, particularly the effect upon the child of permanently severing
    that bond. 
    Id.
     “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and
    rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her
    -5-
    J-S20041-15
    parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment
    of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re
    B.,N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
    Father argues that CYF presented insufficient evidence to prove that
    termination of Father’s parental rights served the Children’s needs and
    welfare.   Father claims that the trial court erred in relying upon the
    testimony of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who performed
    evaluations in this case, because Dr. Rosenblum had not evaluated Father.
    Father also asserts that the trial court focused upon Father’s lack of progress
    on his FSP goals instead of focusing upon the Children’s needs and welfare.
    Father’s Brief at 15-16.
    The Commonwealth presented evidence that termination best served
    the Children’s needs and welfare.     Claire Chiaverini, the CYF caseworker,
    testified that Father participated in only two visits with the Children between
    October 2013 and October 2014, despite having the opportunity for weekly
    visits. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/15/2014, at 57. Father’s last visit
    was March 9, 2014. 
    Id.
     Ms. Chiaverini observed that the Children initially
    had been responsive to Father, but, over time, they became less attached to
    Father. Id. at 60. Ms. Chiaverini opined that the Children were bonded with
    their foster mother and looked to her for attention and affection. Id. at 63.
    Dr. Rosenblum testified that he was unable to observe Father interact
    with the Children because Father did not attend his scheduled interview and
    never called to cancel or reschedule. Id. at 114. Dr. Rosenblum noted that
    -6-
    J-S20041-15
    D.M.M. witnessed substance abuse by Father and was physically disciplined
    by Father. Conversely, D.M.M. felt safe in her foster placement. Id. at 118.
    Dr. Rosenblum opined that the foster mother provided an environment that
    met the Children’s developmental and emotional needs. Id. at 119-20. Dr.
    Rosenblum recognized that D.M.M. has a residual attachment to Father, but
    observed that she looks to her foster mother to meet her needs. Id. at 120.
    Additionally, the remaining bond with Father is not positive.   According to
    Dr. Rosenblum, D.M.M. characterized Father as “mean and somewhat
    abusive.” Id. at 121. Dr. Rosenblum further opined that the Children have
    adjusted well to their foster placement and would not be adversely affected
    by the termination of their parents’ rights. Id. at 122.
    The testimony sufficed for the trial court to find that the Children’s
    needs and welfare are best served by terminating Father’s parental rights.
    The Children’s foster mother is providing for their emotional, physical, and
    developmental needs.     The Children look to their foster mother for love,
    comfort, and security. Father has had limited contact with the Children and
    chose not to participate in an interactional evaluation.     There was no
    evidence that termination of his relationship with the Children would affect
    them negatively.    Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    terminating Father’s parental rights.
    Order affirmed.
    -7-
    J-S20041-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/31/2015
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1920 WDA 2014

Filed Date: 3/31/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021