Antonio Guerra-Gonzalez v. Jefferson Sessions , 707 F. App'x 860 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTONIO GUERRA-GONZALEZ, AKA No. 15-70850
Antonio Guerra Gonzales,
Agency No. A087-901-304
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Guerra-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his motion to suppress,
finding him removable, and denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the denial of a motion to
suppress, Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011), and we
review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Silaya v. Mukasey,
524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not err by admitting the Form I-213, where it was probative
and its admission was fundamentally fair. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d
814, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the
government met its burden of proof by establishing Guerra-Gonzalez’s alienage by
clear and convincing evidence. See United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929, 931 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“[R]easonable inferences from th[e] facts are the province of the trier
of fact.”).
Contrary to Guerra-Gonzalez’s contentions, the BIA did not misconstrue the
IJ’s decision or Guerra-Gonzalez’s contentions regarding the Form I-213.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Guerra-Gonzalez
failed to establish that any harm he fears in Mexico will be on account of a
protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”); INS v.
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Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we
must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it[.]”).
In light of this dispositive determination, we do not address Guerra-Gonzalez’s
contention that he established an objectively reasonable well-founded fear. Thus,
Guerra-Gonzalez’s withholding of removal claim fails.
We reject Guerra-Gonzalez’s contention that he warrants remand pursuant to
our decision in Flores-Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2015). We also reject
Guerra-Gonzalez’s contentions that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding or
applied an incorrect legal standard in its analysis of his political opinion claim.
Even considering the BIA’s alleged mischaracterization of Guerra-
Gonzalez’s evidence, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Guerra-Gonzalez failed to establish it is more likely than not he will be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See
Silaya, 524 F.3d at 1073.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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