Tiffany Boone v. Federico Ramirez (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                       FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               Jan 30 2020, 10:07 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                         CLERK
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                           Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    APPELLANT PRO SE
    Tiffany Boone
    Syracuse, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Tiffany Boone,                                            January 30, 2020
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JP-1823
    v.                                                Appeal from the Hamilton
    Superior Court
    Federico Ramirez,                                         The Honorable Jonathan M.
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                      Brown, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29D02-1810-JP-1857
    Bradford, Chief Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020                    Page 1 of 16
    Case Summary
    [1]   Tiffany Boone (“Mother”) and Federico Ramirez (“Father”) are the biological
    parents of A.R. (“Child”). Child was born on January 15, 2018. On August 1,
    2018, Father initiated proceedings to establish paternity and resolve issues
    relating to custody, visitation, and child support. After Father’s paternity was
    established, the juvenile court issued an order (1) indicating that Mother and
    Father would share joint legal and physical custody of Child; (2) setting forth a
    parenting time schedule; (3) establishing Father’s child support obligation,
    including an amount retroactive to the date paternity was established; (4)
    ordering Father to pay certain birth-related expenses; (5) establishing the
    Child’s last name as Ramirez; (6) rejecting Father’s request to find Mother in
    contempt; and (7) ordering Mother to pay $12,000.00 of Father’s attorney’s
    fees. Mother challenges portions of this order on appeal. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Child was born on January 15, 2018. In or about early-April 2018, Mother
    informed Father that he was the biological father of Child and began allowing
    Father to exercise parenting time with Child. On or about April 26, 2018,
    Father and Child submitted DNA for testing, the results of which revealed a
    99.9998% probability of paternity.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 2 of 16
    [3]   On or about June 15, 2018, Mother’s partner, Tiffany Householder, filed an
    adoption petition in the juvenile court in Hamilton County.1 Father was not
    provided with notice of the adoption petition. Father filed a petition to
    establish paternity in the Elkhart Circuit Court on August 1, 2018. On August
    28, 2018, the Elkhart Circuit Court issued an order establishing Father as
    Child’s legal father and awarding Father “parenting time and temporary
    physical custody with [Child] each Saturday for a period of four (4) hours
    between 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 29. The
    Elkhart County case was subsequently consolidated with the Hamilton County
    adoption case in the juvenile court. The juvenile court denied Mother’s request
    to set aside the August 28, 2018 paternity order after Father submitted the DNA
    test results indicating a “99.9998%” probability of paternity. Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II p. 51. At some point, Mother and Father agreed to increase Father’s
    parenting time to ten hours “every other alternating Saturday or Sunday from
    8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.”
    [4]   On July 8, 2019, the juvenile court issued its “Final Decree of Paternity.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 14–24. In this order, the juvenile court ordered
    that “Mother and Father shall share joint legal and joint physical custody” of
    1
    The record seems to indicate that each of the involved parties resided in Northern Indiana at the time the
    adoption petition was filed. It is unclear from the record why the adoption petition was filed in Hamilton
    County.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020                  Page 3 of 16
    Child. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. With regard to parenting time, the
    juvenile court ordered that
    23. Upon execution of this Order, Father shall exercise
    parenting time beginning July 13, 2019, and every other weekend
    thereafter, beginning on Saturdays at 9:00 a.m. and concluding
    Sundays at 6:00 p.m., and on Wednesday afternoons from 3:00
    p.m. - 6:00 p.m. and on Friday afternoons from 3:00 p.m. - 6:00
    p.m. Father shall have the opportunity to pick up [Child] from
    daycare earlier than 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday/Friday afternoons
    should his work schedule allow him to do so;
    24. Beginning January 3, 2020, Father shall exercise parenting
    time every other weekend, beginning on Friday afternoons no
    later than 6:00 p.m., and concluding Sundays at 6:00 p.m., and
    on Wednesday afternoons from 3:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. Father
    shall have the opportunity to pick up [Child] from daycare earlier
    than 3:00 p.m. should he be available to do so, as set forth in
    paragraph 23 above, and this applies to the Friday afternoon
    every other weekend pickups as well;
    25. … Holidays, special days, and extended parenting time
    shall occur pursuant to the [Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines]
    as appropriate for a child age 5 and up from the date this order is
    executed (including overnights), despite the fact the minor child
    is currently under the age of five (5)[.]
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 18–19 (underlining in original). As for child
    support, the juvenile court ordered that “the child support obligation is Two
    Hundred Sixty Seven Dollars ($267.00) per week. Beginning on January 3,
    2020, the child support obligation is Two Hundred Forty Three Dollars
    ($243.00) per week as Father will have more overnights with [Child].”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. In addition,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 4 of 16
    Father shall pay directly to Mother, as retroactive child support,
    $267.00/week for 46 weeks, which totals the sum of $12,282.00.
    This amount reflects child support back to August 28, 2018, the
    date Father established paternity. Father shall pay Mother an
    additional $20.00/week towards the child support arrears, in
    addition to his basic child support obligation[.]
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 21–22. The juvenile court also (1) denied Father’s
    request to find Mother in contempt, (2) ordered Father to pay one-half of all
    medical bills associated with Child’s birth, (3) ordered that Mother and Father
    shall alternate the tax credit for Child, and (4) ordered Mother to pay
    $12,000.00 of Father’s attorney’s fees.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   “Where, as here, the appellee has failed to submit a reply brief, we need not
    develop an argument on the appellee’s behalf.” Twin Lakes Reg’l Sewer Dist. v.
    Teumer, 
    992 N.E.2d 744
    , 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Trinity Homes, LLC v.
    Fang, 
    848 N.E.2d 1065
    , 1068 (Ind. 2006). “Instead, we will reverse the trial
    court’s judgment if the appellant’s brief presents a case of prima facie error.” 
    Id. at 746–47.
    “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first
    appearance, or on the face of it.’” 
    Id. at 747
    (quoting Trinity 
    Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068
    ). “We will affirm if the appellant is unable to meet this burden.” 
    Id. [6] In
    appealing the juvenile court’s July 8, 2019 order, Mother appears before the
    court as a pro se litigant.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 5 of 16
    It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal
    standards as licensed attorneys. [Twin 
    Lakes, 992 N.E.2d at 747
    .]
    This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the
    established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the
    consequences of their failure to do so. Shepherd v. Truex, 
    819 N.E.2d 457
    , 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). These consequences
    include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal.
    
    Id. While we
    prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the
    appellant’s noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial
    as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the
    alleged errors waived. Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 
    25 N.E.3d 103
    , 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015), cert. denied
    (2015). We will not become an “advocate for a party, or address
    arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or
    expressed to be understood.” 
    Id. Basic v.
    Amouri, 
    58 N.E.3d 980
    , 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
    [7]   Mother’s appellate brief is deficient in numerous respects. Specifically, her
    statement of the case does not comply with Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), which
    indicates that this section shall “briefly describe the nature of the case, the
    course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the
    disposition of these issues by the trial court or Administrative Agency. Page
    references to the Record on appeal or Appendix are required in accordance with
    Rule 22(C).” Mother’s statement of the case does not refer to the record or
    appendix and includes only one sentence, which reads: “Appellant-
    Respondent, Tiffany Boone (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order, FINAL
    DECREE OF PATERNITY.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 6 of 16
    [8]   Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) requires that a statement of the relevant facts “be
    supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in
    accordance with Rule 22(C).” Mother has failed to comply with this subsection
    as her statement of the facts is completely devoid of any citation to specific
    pages in either the record or her appendix.
    [9]   Finally, Mother’s argument section does not comply with Appellate Rule
    46(A)(8)(a), which provides that each argument must contain contentions
    supported by cogent reasoning and citation to relevant authority and relevant
    portions of the record. Mother raises four contentions on appeal. As the party
    with the burden of establishing error on appeal, Mother is required to cite
    pertinent authority and develop reasoned arguments supporting her
    contentions. See 
    Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 985
    . Her brief, however, is completely
    devoid of citations to the record and largely devoid of citations to relevant
    authority supporting her allegations. While Mother refers to one case and a few
    statutes in connection to her first contention, she does not develop a cogent
    argument as to how these authorities support her argument. She additionally
    fails to cite to any relevant authority in connection to her other contentions.
    Despite these deficiencies, we will attempt to review the merits of each of
    Mother’s contentions.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 7 of 16
    I. Parenting Time
    [10]   Mother takes issue with the portion of the juvenile court’s order relating to
    parenting time and custody, arguing that the order did not consider Child’s best
    interests.
    We initially observe that in all parenting time controversies,
    courts are required to give foremost consideration to the best
    interests of the child. Downey v. Muffley, 
    767 N.E.2d 1014
    , 1017
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When reviewing a trial court’s
    determination of a parenting time issue, we grant latitude and
    deference to the trial court and will reverse only when the trial
    court abuses its discretion. Gomez v. Gomez, 
    887 N.E.2d 977
    , 981
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial
    court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
    and circumstances before it. 
    Id. If there
    is a rational basis for the
    trial court’s determination, then no abuse of discretion will be
    found. 
    Downey, 767 N.E.2d at 1017
    . Therefore, on appeal, it is
    not enough that the evidence might support some other
    conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion
    contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.
    Duncan v. Duncan, 
    843 N.E.2d 966
    , 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
    Further, we may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility
    of the witnesses. 
    Downey, 767 N.E.2d at 1017
    .
    In re Paternity of C.H., 
    936 N.E.2d 1270
    , 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
    [11]   In arguing that the juvenile court failed to consider Child’s best interests when
    awarding Father parenting time and joint custody, Mother stated her belief that
    Father did not act fast enough to establish his paternity, arguing that he “should
    have immediately taken legal action to gain rights to” Child after Mother
    informed him that he was Child’s biological father. Appellant’s Br. p. 15. The
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 8 of 16
    record reveals that Father initiated DNA testing within one month of Mother
    informing him that he was Child’s father and soon thereafter initiated legal
    proceedings to establish paternity. Furthermore, the juvenile court explicitly
    disagreed with Mother’s assertion that Father sat on his rights and waited too
    long before initiating paternity proceedings. Specifically, in its January 2, 2019
    order, the juvenile court found
    27. In the instant case, [Father] demonstrated his commitment
    by not taking matters into his own hands, but by seeking the
    assistance of the Court in order to establish paternity and
    parenting time with his child. Simply because [Householder] has
    denied him parenting time, does not mean he hasn’t taken steps
    to show his commitment to parenthood to this Court.
    …
    30. [Father] has not sat on his rights. He filed a paternity
    action to regain his parenting time with [Child]. The Indiana
    General Assembly favors the public policy of establishing
    paternity if a child is born out of wedlock. I.C. § 31-14-1-1.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 58–59.
    [12]   Mother also claims that the juvenile court failed to consider known
    communication issues between her and Father, including disagreements
    relating to the location of Child’s daycare facility, Mother’s wish to relocate to a
    house located less than thirty minutes from where she had been living, and
    Father’s alleged hesitation to change weekends with Mother. Contrary to
    Mother’s claim, the juvenile court’s July 8, 2019 order indicates that the court
    considered the alleged communication issues.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 9 of 16
    [13]   The parenting time ordered by the juvenile court reflects an increase on the
    amount of parenting time previously agreed to by Mother and Father. Mother
    claims that she believes that this increased parenting time will negatively impact
    Child’s growth because it has caused a disruption of Child’s routine and
    schedule. Mother specifically takes issue with the fact that the juvenile court
    awarded Father overnight visitation with Child. While the increased parenting
    time and overnight visitation may result in a brief adjustment period for all
    involved, Mother has failed to point to any evidence to support her claim that
    the increased parenting time with Father is not in Child’s best interest.
    [14]   Given the record before us on appeal, we cannot say that the juvenile court
    abused its discretion in awarding Father joint custody of or increased parenting
    time with Child. Mother’s claims relating to the custody and parenting time
    issues amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See
    In re 
    C.H., 936 N.E.2d at 1273
    .
    II. Child Support
    [15]   Mother also takes issue with the portion of the juvenile court’s order relating to
    Father’s child-support obligation. “The paramount concern of a court in any
    case involving child support must be focused on the best interests of the child.”
    Ward v. Ward, 
    763 N.E.2d 480
    , 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “A trial court’s
    calculation of child support is presumptively valid.” Young v. Young, 
    891 N.E.2d 1045
    , 1047 (Ind. 2008). “We will reverse a trial court’s decision in child support
    matters only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 
    Id. “A decision
    is
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 10 of 16
    clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances that were before the trial court.” 
    Id. [16] Mother
    asserts that the juvenile court erred in ordering that Father’s retroactive
    child-support obligation date back to the date that his paternity was formally
    established by the Elkhart Circuit Court. Although the DNA testing proving
    that Father is Child’s biological father was completed on May 1, 2018, the
    Elkhart Circuit Court did not formally establish Father’s paternity until August
    24, 2018. Mother cites to no case law indicating that the juvenile court should
    have applied the May 1, 2018 test-completion date in imposing Father’s
    retroactive child-support obligation instead of the date the court formally
    established paternity. We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in this regard.
    [17]   Mother also asserts that the juvenile court “has abused its discretion in allowing
    Father to pay his retroactive child support obligation of $12,282.00 over a 46-
    week period, leaving Father in a continuing cycle of being 46 weeks behind in
    current child support at all times.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. Mother, however,
    seems to misunderstand the juvenile court’s order. The juvenile court found
    that Father’s child-support obligation commenced upon the establishment of
    paternity and, as a result, he was in arrears for a forty-six-week period, i.e., the
    time between the establishment of paternity and the entry of the juvenile court’s
    final order. The juvenile court further determined that the arrearage for that
    period equaled $12,282.00. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, however, the
    juvenile court did not order that Father would pay off this amount in a manner
    that would leave him continually behind in child support. Instead, it ordered
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 11 of 16
    him to pay an additional $20 per week, on top of his current obligation, to be
    applied towards the arrearage. Mother argues that the juvenile court should
    have ordered Father to pay the entire $12,282.00 retroactive child support
    obligation “within 60 days.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. Mother, however, has
    pointed to nothing in the record to suggest that such was possible, let alone to
    establish that the juvenile court erred by failing to order Father to do so.
    [18]   Mother also requests that we “review the weekly amount of child support to be
    paid to Mother.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. In making this request, Mother does
    not point to any alleged error by the juvenile court or cite to any authority
    suggesting that the juvenile court erred in setting Father’s child-support
    obligation. We therefore conclude that Mother has waived her challenge to the
    amount of Father’s weekly child support obligation. See 
    Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984
    .
    III. Name Change
    [19]   Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting
    Father’s petition to change Child’s surname from Boone to Ramirez.
    A biological father seeking to obtain a name change of his
    nonmarital child bears the burden of persuading the trial court
    that the change is in the child’s best interests. Petersen v. Burton,
    
    871 N.E.2d 1025
    , 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Absent evidence of
    the child’s best interests, the father is not entitled to obtain a
    name change. J.T. v. S.W. (In re Paternity of Tibbitts), 
    668 N.E.2d 1266
    , 1267–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. We review the
    trial court’s order in such cases under an abuse of discretion
    standard. In re Paternity of M.O.B., 
    627 N.E.2d 1317
    , 1318 (Ind.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 12 of 16
    Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). A trial court abuses its
    discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances before the court or is contrary to law.
    
    Petersen, 871 N.E.2d at 1028
    .
    C.B. v. B.W., 
    985 N.E.2d 340
    , 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [20]   Mother claims that changing Child’s surname to Ramirez would require that
    certain identification and legal documents be changed to reflect Child’s new
    surname. She suggests that the juvenile court should have instead ordered that
    Child’s surname be changed to Boone-Ramirez, to reflect his connection to
    both parents. Mother claims, without providing any citations to supporting
    authority, that such a change would not require similar changes to
    identification and legal documents as changing Child’s surname to Ramirez.
    Mother has failed to establish that the change of Child’s surname ordered by the
    juvenile court will result in any detriment to the Child or that the juvenile court
    abused its discretion by finding that the name change was in Child’s best
    interests.
    IV. Attorney’s Fees
    [21]   Mother also takes issue with the portion of the juvenile court’s order that she
    pay $12,000.00 of Father’s attorney’s fees. Indiana Code section 31-14-18-
    2(a)(2) provides that a juvenile court “may order a party to pay … a reasonable
    amount for attorney’s fees.”
    In making such an award, the court must consider the parties’
    resources, their economic conditions, their respective earning
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 13 of 16
    abilities, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the
    award. In re Paternity of S.A.M., 
    85 N.E.3d 879
    , 890 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2017); G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 
    80 N.E.3d 264
    , 272 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2017), trans. denied. The court may also consider any misconduct
    by one party that causes the other party to directly incur fees.
    
    S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d at 890
    ; 
    G.G.B.W., 80 N.E.3d at 272
    .
    Moreover, when one party is in a superior position to pay fees
    over the other party, an award of attorney’s fees is proper.
    
    G.G.B.W., 80 N.E.3d at 272
    .
    Benefiel v. Stalker, 
    119 N.E.3d 1133
    , 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “We review a
    trial court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.”
    
    S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d at 890
    . “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
    decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” 
    G.G.B.W., 80 N.E.3d at 272
    .
    [22]   In this case, Mother claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
    ordering her to pay Father’s attorney’s fees because the court did not find her in
    contempt and “gave no reason as to why Father has been awarded $12,000.00
    in attorney fees.” Appellant’s Br. p. 24. We disagree.
    [23]   On January 2, 2019, the juvenile court issued an order which discussed
    Mother’s request to set aside the August 28, 2018 paternity determination and
    Father’s standing to contest Householder’s adoption petition. While the order
    indicated that it was taking Father’s request for attorney’s fees under
    advisement pending resolution of the case, it outlined misconduct by Mother
    and Householder, providing, in relevant part, as follows:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 14 of 16
    19. Specifically, in rhetorical paragraph 5 of the Petition for
    Adoption filed under this cause, [Householder] states under oath
    “there is not an acknowledged putative father.” That statement
    is not disputed. However, [Householder] went on to state under
    oath in the same paragraph “the mother of the child having not
    disclosed the identity or whereabouts of the father of the child,
    but that the child were [sic] conceived in the State of Indiana.”
    The additional clauses are either patently false or not personally
    known to the affiant. [Father] testified he met [Householder] at
    one of his parenting time exchanges with the child, when he was
    permitted to leave with the child with [Mother’s] blessing.
    Further, [Householder] could only know where the child was
    conceived based upon hearsay from [Mother] (unless she was
    present for conception and no evidence was presented to the
    Court on this issue by any of the parties).
    20. Based upon the evidence that [Householder] knew
    [Father] was the father of the child, the Court finds her statement
    in rhetorical paragraph 5 of the Petition for Adoption to be false
    and misleading. Based upon the Court’s observations of [Mother
    and Householder], and the evidence presented, the Court has
    concerns about the contents of the petition for adoption and finds
    Householder and [Mother] lack credibility.
    …
    28. [Mother and Householder] have effectuated a fraud upon
    this Court with the filing of the petition for adoption with their
    lack of disclosure. [Mother and Householder] have made a
    material misrepresentation to this Court by claiming another
    man may be the biological father of the child when they knew or
    should have known such a statement was false, particularly in
    light of the fact [that Mother] was aware of the DNA test that
    [Father] submitted to the Elkhart Circuit Court in order to obtain
    his paternity decree.
    …
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 15 of 16
    33. This Court acknowledges that notice was not required to
    be given to [Father] for the adoption proceeding, yet it is
    [Mother’s] argument she did not get proper notice herself in
    order to contest the paternity action properly. [Mother and
    Householder’s] manner of litigating is either dishonest or in bad
    faith, and not in the best interests of the minor child. There is a
    certain degree of irony in that [Mother] is seeking equitable relief
    from this Court with regards to the August 28, 2018 judgment,
    but one must do equity to receive equity.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 56–61 (emphasis omitted). When read together,
    the juvenile court’s January 2 and July 8, 2019 orders provide an explanation
    for the award. Given the juvenile court’s determination that Mother lacked
    credibility, effectuated a fraud on the court, and her “manner of litigating is
    either dishonest or in bad faith, and not in the best interests of [Child],”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 59, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its
    discretion in ordering Mother to pay $12,000.00 of Father’s attorney’s fees.
    [24]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JP-1823 | January 30, 2020   Page 16 of 16