Adoption of: V.R.C., minor, Appeal of: J.C. ( 2017 )

J-S69044-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: V.R.C., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.C., NATURAL MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1096 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree July 3, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
22 in Adoption 2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 13, 2017
Appellant, J.C. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the decree dated June
28, 2017, and entered July 3, 2017, in the Erie County Court of Common
Pleas, granting the petition of Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”)
and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent
daughter, V.R.C. (“Child”), born in March 2015, pursuant to the Adoption Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 After review, we affirm the
trial court’s decree.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child’s father, J.R. (“Father”), signed a voluntary consent to adoption on
March 1, 2017. Petition to Confirm Consent to Adoption, 3/8/17. The court
confirmed Father’s consent to adoption, and Father’s parental rights were
terminated by decree dated April 12, 2017, and entered April 17, 2017.
Decree, 4/17/17.
J-S69044-17
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history
as follows:
. . .The Child, along with her three siblings, was adjudicated
dependent on February 23, 2016.[2] The Child is the youngest of
the four siblings. . . .The Child that is the subject of this appeal
remains in foster care, initially with a permanency goal of
reunification while [OCY] worked to identify her biological father,
then later with a permanency goal of adoption, after her biological
father was identified and elected to voluntarily relinquish his
parental rights.
The Dependency Petition alleges that the Child was without
proper care or control and therefore dependent based on the
following stipulated facts, as amended:
1(a) It is averred that [Mother] has an extensive
history with the Agency due to concerns regarding
physical abuse, sexual abuse, poor home conditions,
failure to follow through with services and being
uncooperative with the Agency. It is averred that the
Mother [] is not an indicated or founded perpetrator
of abuse; and
(b) It is averred that [Mother] has multiple pending
criminal charges including arson-danger of death or
bodily injury, arson-intent to collect insurance, risking
catastrophe, recklessly endangering another person,
false/fraud/incomplete insurance claim, and
insurance/intent to defraud.
Based upon the above findings, Mother, who has been
represented by legal counsel throughout these proceedings,
stipulated to the adjudication of dependency for the Child.
However, OCY essentially argues that[,] since the adjudication
hearing, Mother has conducted herself as though paragraph 1(a)
does not apply. That is to say, she has refused to participate in
court-ordered services, particularly mental health evaluation
services and parenting classes, asserting she has no mental health
diagnosis, and no need for parenting classes. By her refusal to
____________________________________________
2Upon review of the docket, this order was not entered until March 1, 2016.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 4.
-2-
J-S69044-17
cooperate, and due to her incarceration, OCY argues Mother has
deprived herself and the Child of timely reunification.
According to Juvenile Dependency Court Summaries and
Orders, all of which were admitted into evidence without limitation
or objection at the IVT [involuntary termination] trial, a
dispositional hearing was held on March 21, 2016. The Court
Summary for that date notes that Mother was incarcerated and
the biological [f]ather was unknown. It appears the man listed as
father on the Child’s birth certificate, J.W., was incarcerated at all
times near the date of conception, and would undergo paternity
testing. The Court Summary also notes that J.W. is an indicated
perpetrator of sexual assault in 2010. In the same year, he pled
no contest to a charge of corruption of minors. The Child’s
Permanency Plan attached to the Court Summary, reveals that
OCY recommended a complete mental health assessment for
Mother while incarcerated, but Mother refused to sign the
permanency plan. After the hearing, an Order dated March 23,
2016, was entered requiring Mother to complete a mental health
assessment while incarcerated, and participate in any
rehabilitative and parenting classes available while incarcerated.
A follow-up permanency review hearing was scheduled for June
29, 2016, then rescheduled for July 26, 2016.
According to the Court Summary for the July 26, 2016
hearing, which bears the original June 29, 2016[] hearing date,
the caseworker met with Mother at the Erie County Prison in April
of 2016. Mother reported to the caseworker that she did not
require mental health services, or parenting or rehabilitation
classes, and she declined a mental health assessment. After the
review hearing, which Mother attended represented by counsel,
this [c]ourt found there had been no compliance with the
permanency plan by Mother, and no progress toward alleviating
the circumstances that necessitated the original placement. The
resulting Order continued the goal of reunification and
requirement of a mental health evaluation, and rehabilitation and
parenting classes. Notably, there is no evidence that Mother was
desirous of pursuing the permanency plan, but having difficulty
doing so for reasons beyond her control, as she now argues. The
material statements in the Court Summary were corroborated by
OCY caseworker testimony at the IVT trial.
The next review hearing was scheduled for October 7, 2016,
then rescheduled to November 21, 2016. Mother was in
attendance with her legal counsel. During this review period,
-3-
J-S69044-17
Mother had been briefly released from incarceration on August 15,
2016. The criminal trial on her arson-related charges occurred in
the latter part of September. She was found guilty on all charges,
and re-incarcerated by Order dated September 23, 2016. During
her brief release, the OCY caseworker met with Mother and the
three older siblings on September 8, 2017 to discuss the family’s
treatment plans. A visit with the Mother and Child was to occur
separately. According to the Court Summary, which bears the
original October 7, 2016[] hearing date, the September 8, 2016
visit did not go well. Mother did not use the time to connect with
her children, or address progression through the permanency
plan. Instead, she engaged the older siblings in inappropriate
discussions about the merits of their respective fathers, and her
upcoming criminal trial. She was found using one of the sibling’s
mobile phones to research her criminal charges and access social
media. She refused to sign a new treatment plan adapted for her
release from prison, and continued to deny the need for OCY
services. Due to Mother’s failure or inability to appropriately
engage with her children, the caseworker canceled the next visit,
and elected not to schedule a separate visit for Mother and the
Child. The material statements in the Court Summary were
corroborated by caseworker testimony at the IVT trial.
Shortly after the September 8, 2016[] meeting with the
older siblings, the criminal trial occurred. Mother was convicted
on all charges and re-incarcerated, where she remains to date.
During this review period, OCY continued its efforts to identify the
Child’s biological father. Another person, J.R., was identified for
paternity testing, and an older sibling’s father, C.H., was excluded
through paternity testing.
At the November 21, 2017[] permanency review hearing[,]
it was brought to the [c]ourt’s attention that the Child’s kinship
caregivers, friends of the family, were no longer willing to serve
as an adoptive resource for the Child. By January 25, 2017, the
Child was placed in the pre-adoptive home where she remains to
date. Paternity testing established that J.R. was in fact the Child’s
biological father. J.R. communicated his desire to voluntarily
relinquish his parental rights, and by Order dated February 15,
2017, the Child’s permanency goal was changed to adoption.[3]
____________________________________________
3Upon review of the docket, this order was not entered until February 16,
2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 10.
-4-
J-S69044-17
The next review hearing occurred May 5, 2017. At that
time, Mother remained incarcerated, and father’s parental rights
were terminated by voluntary relinquishment Order dated April
12, 2017. The Court Summary for this review period indicates
that the OCY caseworker made contact with Mother on March 8,
2017 to discuss the Child’s permanency goal change to adoption,
and though Mother disagreed with the decision, she also indicated
she would not participate in the OCY treatment plan for the Child
upon her eventual release from prison. Regarding Mother’s ability
to articulate an understanding of how her actions have impacted
her children, which is a routine requirement in most permanency
plans, the caseworker made the following note, corroborated by
her testimony at the IVT trial:
[Mother] denies any issues with her parenting and
projects blame onto others for the current situation.
Specifically, [Mother] reported that prior to her
incarceration, there were no issues with her parenting
as there were no abuse allegations. She reported that
her children were always taken care of in her care.
She does not take responsibility for being incarcerated
and stated that she was wrongfully convicted and that
she is innocent. Further, [Mother] threatened to sue
the agency for violating her constitutional rights by
terminating her parental rights and ripping her family
apart. She also reported to this worker that upon her
release from incarceration, she will go to the court
house to file a motion to get all four of her children
back into her care. She also alleges that all four
children are not getting their needs met in their
placements and that the children who have been
closed by the agency should be re-opened. She stated
that her children may not have physical harm done to
them, but that they have internal cigarette burns and
psychological damage done to them by being in
placement. [Mother] continues to have no change in
her thoughts of having responsibility for her children’s
placement.
Mother’s conception of a stable, healthy home, ripped apart by the
injustice of the criminal and dependency court systems is belied
by the evidence in this case. . . .
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 8/11/17, at 1-5 (citations to record omitted)
-5-
J-S69044-17
OCY filed a petition to terminate parental rights on May 16, 2017. The
trial court held a hearing on June 22, 2017. In support thereof, OCY presented
the testimony of Jamie Sansone, OCY intake specialist and former caseworker;
and Stephanie Mumford, OCY caseworker. OCY further offered Exhibits 1
through 9, which were admitted without objection. Notes of Testimony
(“N.T.”), 6/22/17, at 6. In addition, Mother, who was present and represented
by counsel, testified on her own behalf.4
By decree dated and entered June 28, 2017, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On July 21, 2017, Mother, through
appointed counsel, filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error of law when it concluded that the agency had established,
by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds for termination
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §[] 2511(a)(1),(2),(5), and (8), where
Appellant established her release date from incarceration,
established that services were unavailable to her, and where no
____________________________________________
4 The Guardian Ad Litem, Catherine Allgeier, Esquire, after requesting and
being granted permission to serve as Counsel for Child, noting Child’s young
age and a lack of conflict between Child’s legal and best interests, also
participated in the proceeding. N.T. at 3. At the close of the hearing, Ms.
Allgeier argued in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 57-
58. While Ms. Allgeier sent a letter dated October 9, 2017, and filed October
11, 2017, referencing the comprehensive trial court opinion and noting her
joinder in OCY’s brief, we observe that OCY did not file a brief. Letter,
10/11/17.
-6-
J-S69044-17
assessment of the bond between Child and Mother was
completed?
2. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion and/or
error or law when it concluded that the termination of [J.C.]’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests under 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).5
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at [325-
26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our
deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d
1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free
____________________________________________
5 We observe that Mother states her issues somewhat differently than in her
Rule 1925(b) statement filed with her notice of appeal, but find that she has
preserved all issues. Despite being stated broadly and without reference to
Section 2511(a) and (b) in her Rule 1925(b) statement, we determine that
Mother was challenging the sufficiency of evidence of grounds for termination
under Section 2511(a) and (b). See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d
1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007) (holding that this Court erred in determining that the
appellant had failed to adequately develop, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, the
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction).
-7-
J-S69044-17
to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even
if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
-8-
J-S69044-17
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long
held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
-9-
J-S69044-17
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In In re Adoption of S.P., supra, our Supreme Court, in addressing
Section 2511(a)(2), concluded that
incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor,
in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under §
2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a
parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without
- 10 -
J-S69044-17
essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes
of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
Id., 47 A.3d at 828; see also In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014)
(holding that incarceration prior to the child’s birth and until the child was at
least age seven renders family reunification an unrealistic goal and the court
was within its discretion to terminate parental rights “notwithstanding the
agency’s failure” to follow court’s initial directive that reunification efforts be
made). The Court in S.P. further stated,
[W]e now definitively hold that incarceration, while not a litmus
test for termination, can be determinative of the question of
whether a parent is incapable of providing “essential parental
care, control or subsistence” and the length of the remaining
confinement can be considered as highly relevant to whether “the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent,” sufficient to provide
grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2).
See e.g. Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d [883, 891 (Pa. 1986)] (“[A]
parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”); [In
re] E.A.P., 944 A.2d [79, 85 (Pa.Super. 2008)](holding
termination under § 2511(a)(2) was supported by mother’s
repeated incarcerations and failure to be present for child, which
caused child to be without essential care and subsistence for most
of her life and which cannot be remedied despite mother’s
compliance with various prison programs).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830 (footnote omitted).
- 11 -
J-S69044-17
In the instant matter, in finding the evidence supported grounds for
termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded as
follows:6
As noted above, Mother has been incarcerated since shortly
before the Child’s adjudication in February 2016, except for a brief
release in August of 2016, during which she had no contact with
the Child. On November 3, 2016, she was convicted of several
arson-related charges, including reckless endangerment, risking
catastrophe, and insurance fraud.[7] Appeal of those convictions
is pending. Neither party presented evidence, credible or
otherwise, of when Mother will be release from prison. Mother
asserted that her earliest release date is November 9, 2017, but
admitted she has no specific information regarding an actual
release date. OCY argued that Mother’s release may be delayed
due to a subsequent conviction for welfare fraud, and two
instances of misconduct during incarceration. Thus, to the extent
Mother asserts that the [c]ourt ignored “credible evidence”
pertaining to a certain, or even fairly certain, release date, that
assertion is inaccurate.
Further, even if all agreed Mother will be released on or near
her minimum sentence date, there is no evidence to suggest she
would then cooperate with OCY and engage in court-ordered
service[]s for the benefit of the Child. Mother has never admitted
the need for court-ordered services, even though there is
substantial evidence that the services ordered, especially a
complete mental health evaluation, are necessary to any plan that
would reunify her with the Child. As of the date of the goal change
____________________________________________
6 The court does not frame its discussion in terms of Section 2511(a)(2), but
rather in terms of Mother’s release from incarceration and participation in
reunification services, as Mother did in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Given
that we interpret Mother’s first two issues raised in her Rule 1925(b)
statement as to release from incarceration and participation in reunification
services as challenges, in part, to grounds for termination under Section
2511(a)(2), we interpret the court’s analysis of these issues as such.
7 A review of criminal docket reveals that Mother was found guilty on
September 21, 2016 and sentenced on November 3, 2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit
7.
- 12 -
J-S69044-17
Order in February of 2017, Mother has done nothing to further the
permanency plans, not because, as she states in her second error
on appeal, the circumstances of her incarceration prevented her
from doing so, but solely because she denies the need for services.
Through her own testimony at the IVT trial, and her counsel’s
cross-examination of OCY witnesses, it was obvious that Mother
remains adamant she has no mental health issues and, therefore,
would continue to refuse a mental health assessment upon her
release from prison.
At the IVT trial, Mother testified she was unable to comply
with the permanency requirements due to repeated transfers from
facility to facility during incarceration, leaving insufficient time at
any one facility to engage in services. The [c]ourt rejects this
testimony based on her past refusal to cooperate with OCY; her
current testimony inferring that since she has never had a mental
health diagnosis she does not require a mental health
assessment; the fact that she’s been at SCI Cambridge Springs
since February of 2017; yet did nothing to pursue the [c]ourt[-]
ordered mental health evaluation; and her failure to alert OCY
and/or the [c]ourt at any time that she was desirous of pursuing
the permanency plan, but being prevented from doing so due to
circumstances beyond her control.
...
OCY sought termination of parental rights under
§§2511(a)(1),(2),(5),(8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23
Pa.C.S.A. §§2101-2910. Based upon the evidence summarized
above, the [c]ourt found that OCY met its burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence on all grounds. Unfortunately,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the [c]ourt is
convinced that Mother simply cannot or will not remedy the
conditions that led to placement, or meet the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Child[] in the
foreseeable future. . . .
T.C.O. at 7-8, 10 (emphasis in original).
Mother, however, argues that OCY failed to present sufficient evidence
of neglect, incapacity, refusal, or abuse and that the causes thereof cannot or
will not be remedied. Mother’s Brief at 13-15. Mother states:
- 13 -
J-S69044-17
[OCY] cannot establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
J.C. cannot or will not remedy the conditions that led to incapacity,
abuse, neglect, or refusal. The children came into placement due
to Mother’s arrest and incarceration, and the alleged mental
health issues. [OCY], however, has never been able to identify
any actual mental health diagnoses, and therefore that is not a
condition that led to placement, as it does not exist. These facts
alone are insufficient to establish that the child suffered from
neglect, incapacity, or refusal. And they certainly do not amount
to abuse. [OCY] is attempting to utilize the Mother’s then-pending
charges and subsequent incarceration as short-hand for parenting
deficiencies. With no other evidence of record to establish these
grounds, [OCY] has failed to meet its burden.
Id. at 14-15.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s determination of a basis
for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Significantly, Mother has been
incarcerated since Child was committed and placed in February 2016, except
for approximately one month when released on bail. N.T. at 9, 11, 19, 38.
Mother has not seen or had any contact with Child throughout this entire time.
Mother has had no visitation with Child. Id. at 9, 12, 14, 30. Likewise, Mother
has sent no cards, letters, or gifts to Child. Id. at 14, 21. While Mother sent
correspondence to OCY, former OCY caseworker, Jamie Sansone,
characterized this correspondence as rambling. Id. at 21-22. He explained
as follows when questioned by counsel for OCY:
Q. And is it safe to say that the purpose of those was asking
about the welfare or whereabouts or well-being of her child?
A. No, it’s not safe to say that, they kind of rambled.
Q. Okay. And in what way? Can you be a little more specific
about why --
- 14 -
J-S69044-17
A. She spoke a lot about her criminal trial, you know, the
conditions of the prison. . . .
Id. Mr. Sansone did acknowledge that Mother asked about her children, and
that she requested visitation with Child.8, 9 Id. at 22. Further, as reported by
Mr. Sansone and OCY caseworker, Stephanie Mumford, Mother failed to
cooperate with any aspect of her treatment plan, denying the necessity of any
services,10 and failed to accept any responsibility for Child’s placement. Id.
at 10-11, 13, 16, 30, 32-33; Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, Court Summary 5/5/17, at
9, 11-12; Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, Court Summary 6/29/16 at 13. Importantly,
____________________________________________
8 Mother testified that she contacted Child’s foster parents for pictures or
information, but was “ignore[d].” N.T. at 46. She did, however, acknowledge
receipt of two mailings, including a set of photographs. Id. Mother further
stated that she begged OCY monthly for information and visitation. Id.
9 Mr. Sansone confirmed that visitation with Child was not feasible while
Mother was incarcerated in Erie County. N.T. at 9. He further testified to his
opinion that prison visitation was unsuitable for Child. Id. at 22, 25. Notably,
as to the brief period during which Mother was not incarcerated and out on
bail, Mr. Sansone indicated that Mother’s visit with her three older children
was inappropriate, and that visitation with Child was not appropriate. Id. at
12, 13, 22-23; Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, Court Summary 10/7/16, at 13.
10 Mother was required to “complete a mental health assessment while
incarcerated and follow any recommendations regarding the use of
psychotropic medications, and to participate in any rehabilitative and
parenting classes available while incarcerated.” N.T. at 9; see also
Petitioner’s Exhibit 5, Dispositional Order, 5/23/16. When released on bail,
this plan was amended. Id. at 19. Mother refuted the denial of services and
blamed her lack of participation on being moved from facility to facility. Id.
at 37, 44-45. She testified that she was currently taking a parenting class.
Id. at 44-45.
- 15 -
J-S69044-17
both caseworkers testified to the need for services based on their
observations. Id. at 12-13, 27, 34.
Moreover, Mother was sentenced to twenty to forty months’
imprisonment. Id. at 14, 43, 53; Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 at 4. She testified that
her earliest possible or minimum release date is November 9, 2017. Id. at
43-44. However, while Mother completed a victim’s awareness class and was
currently engaged in a parenting class, she was still on the waiting list for a
living safely course which she was required to complete.11 Id. at 44-45. In
addition, Mother admitted to recently pleading guilty to charges stemming
from 2012 for welfare fraud. Id. at 53; Petitioner’s Exhibit 8 at 2. Further,
at the time of the termination hearing, Mother was in solitary confinement for
an altercation with another inmate and had prior disciplinary issues while
incarcerated in Erie County.12 Id. at 53-55. More importantly, whenever
released, given Mother’s attitudes and behaviors, it is speculative whether
Mother will then, or ever, be in a position to care for Child. This prospect is
simply unacceptable for Child, who was almost two and a half years old and
already in the custody of OCY for approximately year and a half at the time of
the termination hearing. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be
held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
____________________________________________
11 Mother indicated that these classes were not available to her until her
processing and transfer to SCI Cambridge Springs. N.T. at 44-45. She stated
that she arrived at Cambridge Springs in February 2017 and started classes
in May 2017. Id. at 45.
12 Mother acknowledged her behavior impacted her release date. N.T. at 54.
- 16 -
J-S69044-17
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be
without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical
and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272.
Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id. As noted
above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) before
assessing the determination under Section 2511(b), and we, therefore, need
not address any further subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843
A.2d at 384.
We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d
781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. &
L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court
held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent
and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
- 17 -
J-S69044-17
re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed below, evaluation
of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, in determining that termination of Mother’s
parental rights favors the Child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b) of
the Adoption Act, the trial court reasoned as follows:
- 18 -
J-S69044-17
Mother argues that the [c]ourt erred by finding that no bond exists
between Mother and Child without supporting evidence. Child-
parent bond issues are generally considered under the “other
considerations” provisions of the IVT statute, at 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(b). That section states in pertinent part that in terminating
the rights of a parent, the [c]ourt, “shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” Our [a]ppellate [c]ourts have construed
this provision to require an assessment by the [c]ourt of the effect
that severing the parent-child bond would have on the child, under
the particular facts of each case[] . . .; and the [c]ourt must
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” Additionally, the [c]out must consider the
importance of other intangibles, such as continuity of
relationships, and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
. . .[T]his [c]ourt relied upon the particular facts before it to
conclude that no parent-child bond exists, and that termination of
Mother’s parental rights serves the Child’s best interests.
Specifically, the [c]ourt considered the young age of the Child
when she went into placement (10 months[]old);[13] the length of
time since the Child had been in the Mother’s presence
(approximately 18 months, from infancy to toddlerhood); and the
credible opinions of the OCY caseworkers and the Child’s attorney
that the Child is doing well with her pre-adoptive family,14 and
terminating Mother’s parental rights to facilitate permanency with
the pre-adoptive family is in the Child’s best interests. To the
extent Mother argues that out law requires an expert opinion, or
formal bonding assessment as a matter of course in every case,
that argument is rejected. While there are certainly cases where
formal assessment is essential, there are many like the case at
____________________________________________
13 There is some disparity in the record as to whether Child came into care at
ten or eleven months old. N.T. at 8, 27-28; Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, Court
Summary 5/5/17, at 4; Petitioner’s Exhibit 6, Court Summary 3/21/16, at 7.
14 Ms. Mumford testified that Child is placed with a pre-adoptive resource to
whom Child is bonded and is meeting Child’s needs. N.T. at 31. Ms. Mumford
further opined that Child would be negatively impacted if removed from this
home. Id. at 31-32.
- 19 -
J-S69044-17
bar, where bonding issues are adequately addressed by those
working closely with the [c]hild.
T.C.O. at 8-9 (citations omitted).
Mother, however, takes issue with the failure to conduct a bonding
assessment. She avers as follows:
In this matter[,] it is uncontested that no bonding assessment,
even an informal one, was completed. In fact, the initial
caseworker indicated that, despite the [c]ourt’s established goal
of “reunification,” he took it upon himself to usurp the [c]ourt’s
judgment and refrain from a bonding assessment because he felt
that the child should not see the Mother. Once again, other than
her incarceration, no actual evidence was introduced at trial that
the Mother acted contrary to the child’s best interests. The [c]ourt
was unable to ascertain whether it was destroying a necessary
and beneficial relationship between Mother and child, as there is
simply not enough evidence upon which that evaluation could be
made.
Mother’s Brief at 18 (citation to record omitted) (emphasis in original).
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor termination
of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient
evidence to allow the trial court to make a determination of Child’s needs and
welfare, and as to the lack of a bond between Mother and Child such that, if
severed, would not have a detrimental impact on her. We discern no abuse
of discretion, and for the reasons set forth by the trial court, termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) was proper.
While Mother may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
- 20 -
J-S69044-17
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation
omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/13/2017
- 21 -