Com. v. Mackrides, G. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • J-S05029-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    GEORGE MACKRIDES III                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1290 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2020,
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002467-2019
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                              FILED: MAY 21, 2021
    George Mackrides III appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, following his
    convictions, after a bench trial, of one count each of robbery of a motor vehicle
    (F-1),1 robbery—take property from other/force (F-3),2 and theft by unlawful
    taking or disposition (F-3);3 five counts of simple assault (M-2);4 eleven
    counts of recklessly endangering another person (REAP) (M-2);5 six counts of
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. § 3702(a).
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v).
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).
    4   18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a).
    5   18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
    J-S05029-21
    the summary offense of harassment;6 and four counts each of criminal
    attempt—robbery of a motor vehicle (F-1)7 and criminal attempt—theft by
    unlawful taking (F-3).8 After careful review, we vacate and remand for a new
    trial.
    Mackrides’ convictions arose from of a ten-hour crime spree, in March
    2019, where he committed a vehicle theft and several attempted vehicle thefts
    in Whitpain Township.9 Mackrides aggressively forced his way into the victims’
    vehicles while the victims were either inside or immediately outside of their
    respective vehicles.
    Mackrides was represented at trial by Assistant Public Defender Denise
    Marone, Esquire, who entered her appearance in the matter on June 12, 2019,
    and remained as the attorney-of-record throughout sentencing. Beginning in
    July 2019,10 and continuing until after sentencing in June 2020, Mackrides
    ____________________________________________
    6   18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1).
    7   18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
    8   18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
    9 See Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/22, at 1-5 (providing detailed account of facts
    underlying case).
    10 On July 5, 2019, the court rescheduled a pre-trial conference upon the
    defense’s request. On August 8, 2019, the court, upon the request of the
    defendant, amended the pre-trial conference order and scheduled the call of
    the trial list for September 2019.
    -2-
    J-S05029-21
    filed several pro se letters with the Montgomery County Clerk of Courts11 and
    the trial judge indicating his displeasure with trial counsel’s representation.12
    In one of those letters, dated September 11, 2019, Mackrides stated:
    ____________________________________________
    11The clerk of courts forwarded those pro se filings to counsel pursuant to
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(A)(4).
    12   Those letters included the following sentiments toward counsel:
    •   he is “asking that [she] help him with this case at hand and give [him]
    100% because it seems that [she] didn’t want to help at all. [I] am
    asking for what I am due[,] that is[,] for you to help me with this
    situation. [She has] been [his] public defender for all over [sic] 2
    months [and he] spoke to [her] 1 time;”
    •   he “would like [his] public defender removed from [his] case because
    [they’re] not seeing eye to eye about how he would like to approach [his
    case],” . . . and it seems to [him that] she isn’t trying to help [him with]
    anything;”
    •   he notes that “it is imperative that this is noted on [the] record[] that
    [he] would like to relieve Ms. Denise Marone of her duties, as her
    strategies are not to the best of [his] interest [and] it is pertinent to
    note that [he] ha[s] tried to contact Ms. Marone and ha[s] filed
    motions[] which benefit [him] and [his] defense that Ms. Marone has
    blatantly ignored[. Therefore, he] ask[s] the Honorable Judge to honor
    [his] request and appoint [him] new counsel;”
    •   he “would like to releave [sic] Ms. Denise Marone of her duties and get
    a court[-]appointed law[y]er [because] she isn’t handling [his] case to
    the best of her duties [where he] asked her to put motions in [and] . .
    . tried to contact her multiple times through the consults [sic] which she
    never returns my calls;”
    •   he “do[esn’t] feel right going to trial wit[h] her [where she] isn’t
    following the steps [he] would like her to[],” [and so] ‘I am . . . asking
    that you help me with this case at hand and give me 100% because it
    seems that you do not want to help at all[;]’” “for all o[f] [two] months
    [he] spoke to [Marone one] time and [she told him] about a deal that
    was not appropriate;”
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -3-
    J-S05029-21
    It is imperative that this is noted on record, that I would like to
    relieve Ms. Denise Marone of her duties, as her strategies are not
    to the best of my interest. It is pertinent to note that I have tried
    to contact Ms. Marone, and have filed motions, which benefit me
    and my defense that Ms. Marone has blatantly ignored. I ask the
    Honorable Judge to honor my request and appoint me new
    counsel, court[-a]ppointed preferable. Thank you for your time
    and help in this matter.
    Letter to Montgomery County Clerk of Courts, 9/11/19.
    Immediately prior to proceeding to his waiver trial, Mackrides moved for
    a continuance to secure private counsel. The following exchange took place,
    on the record, between Mackrides and the trial judge, regarding the
    continuance request:
    THE COURT: All right, well the attorneys tell me now that
    you asked for a continuance. I deny that request. We’ll
    proceed to trial.
    Do you want a jury or a bench trial today?
    [ATTORNEY MARONE]: Your Honor, the reason he is asking
    for a continuance is so his family can hire private counsel.
    THE COURT: That request is denied. This is the day of trial.
    Do you want a bench or a jury trial?
    [MACKRIDES]: I’ll take the bench, because you [are] pushing me
    against the wall. I’ll take the bench.
    ____________________________________________
    •   he asks Attorney Marone to “put in [his] appeal . . . and get cop[ie]s of
    the transcripts of the bench trial [and that he] would like [her] help in
    the matter;” and
    •   he “would like it duly noted on record” that he “asked Denise Marone to
    file [his] appeal[,] but [he] s[aw that] she didn’t so [he’s] asking for a
    court[-]appointed law[yer] or public defender in the matter[.]’”
    See Pro Se Letters, 7/17/19, 8/8/19, 9/17/19, 10/14/19, 12/12/19,
    6/1/20, 6/6/20.
    -4-
    J-S05029-21
    THE COURT: [Counsel] has to go over some paperwork with you.
    And if I don’t get this resolved in about five minutes, we’ll bring
    up a jury and pick a jury.
    [MACKRIDES]: You can’t pick a jury without me. I’m supposed
    to be able to pick certain[. . .]
    THE COURT: I’m just asking you: Do you want a jury or do you
    want a bench trial?
    [MACKRIDES]: I’m asking you – it seem[s] to me -- can I
    say something, sir? I asked to get another counsel.
    THE COURT: That request is denied. It’s not timely. There
    is case law that suggests that that’s improper to grant a
    continuance under those circumstances.
    [MACKRIDES]: I[‘ve] been asking about it.           I have been
    saying stuff about it for the last six months.
    THE COURT: Well, that’s enough. I guess we’ll pick a jury. That’s
    what you want, a jury brought up here?
    [MACKRIDES]: You can’t pick a jury without me.         I have my
    rights. You have to follow the law.
    THE COURT: Well, let me tell you something. If you act up and
    disrupt --
    [MACKRIDES]: I’m not acting up in any degree.
    THE COURT: -- when I bring these people up here, I’ll have you
    removed and we’ll have the trial without you.
    [MACKRIDES]: Sir, I’m only speaking on what I’m due.
    That’s it. I’m due []effective counsel, and I said something
    about this for six months. I’m not acting up. I’m not saying
    anything wrong. I’m saying what is due to me.
    You’re making it seem like [. . . ]
    THE COURT: Miss Marone will represent you at this trial.
    And if you speak up like you are doing now during the time when
    we have the jurors in the room, then I’ll have you removed until
    you behave.
    -5-
    J-S05029-21
    [MACKRIDES]: That’s what you[‘re] probably going to have to do,
    because you’re not giving me a fair shot. You don’t do that to
    anybody else.
    THE COURT: So you’re telling me I’ll probably have to have you
    removed?
    [MACKRIDES]: No, that’s what you’re saying. You’re saying
    I’m not allowed to speak up about my rights. These are my
    rights. How can I not speak up about my rights? It’s the
    law. You have to follow the law.
    THE COURT: Well, sir, as I told you before, Miss Marone will
    represent you, unless you want to represent yourself.
    [MACKRIDES]: Sir, I’ve been asking her to step down to
    give me another appointed counsel.
    THE COURT: That won’t happen. That request is denied.
    That’s an improper request.
    [MACKRIDES]: How? You’re not giving me a fair shot at trial.
    THE COURT: All right, then bring the jury up, please.
    [MACKRIDES]: I asked for a bench trial. I didn’t ask for a jury
    trial.
    N.T. Bench Trial, 12/9/19, at 9-13 (emphasis added).
    After denying the continuance request, the court proceeded to a non-
    jury trial on December 9, 2019, after which Mackrides was found guilty of the
    aforementioned offenses. Mackrides was sentenced to an aggregate term of
    -6-
    J-S05029-21
    7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment.13                The court also ordered Mackrides pay
    $4,978.39 in restitution14 and the costs of prosecution.15
    Mackrides filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.16 After seeking and
    receiving an extension, newly-appointed appellate counsel filed a timely court-
    ____________________________________________
    13 Mackrides was sentenced to 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment on count 1
    (robbery), a concurrent sentence of 1 to 5 years on count 2 (robbery-taking
    property from other/force), a concurrent sentence of 2½ to 5 years’
    imprisonment on counts 28-30 (criminal attempt), and a consecutive sentence
    of 2½ to 5 years on count 27 (criminal attempt). Counts 3-7, 8-11, 13-14,
    and 31-34 merged for sentencing purposes. The Commonwealth did not
    proceed on the remaining counts.
    14 The restitution represented the insurance deductible ($3,978.39) and cost
    of repairs on one of the victim’s vehicles ($1,000).
    15  The trial court’s June 17, 2020 order “determining costs” solely lists the
    amount of restitution Mackrides was ordered to pay; there is no specific
    amount set forth for the costs of prosecution. However, the court’s December
    9, 2019 sentencing order specifically states that “Defendant is sentenced to
    pay the costs of prosecution and restitution of $4,978.39 . . . within the
    first 48 months of supervision in monthly installments as directed, and as
    authorized by law.” See Sentencing Order, 12/9/19, at 2 (emphasis added).
    16 Mackrides filed two pro se notices of appeal—one on June 23, 2020, and
    the other on July 17, 2020. There is nothing on the docket indicating that
    Attorney Marone had been relieved of her duties at the time Mackrides filed
    his pro se notices of appeal. In fact, the docket shows that a copy of
    Mackrides’ June 23, 2020 notice of appeal was “forward[ed] to Attorney on
    Record[,] Denise Marone, Esq. 06/24/20.” Docket Entry, 6/23/20. However,
    on June 1, 2020, Mackrides wrote a letter to the trial judge stating that he
    “would like it duly noted on [the] record [that he had] asked Denise
    Marone to file [his] appeal, but [that he] see[s] she didn’t.” Letter,
    6/1/20 (docketed by Montgomery County Clerk of Courts on 7/17/20)
    (emphasis added). Interestingly, on June 25, 2020, the court granted
    Mackrides’ pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis with regard to his filing
    fee for his appeal and request of transcript, sending those orders directly to
    Mackrides in jail and not to Attorney Marone. Notably, on July 7, 2020, Lee
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -7-
    J-S05029-21
    ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal.17 Mackrides raises the following issues for our consideration:
    (1)    Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in denying [Macrkrides’] request
    for a continuance so that his family could hire private
    counsel?
    (2)    Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in imposing costs of prosecution
    without considering [Mackrides’] ability to pay and his
    restitution obligation?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 2.
    In his first issue on appeal, Mackrides contends that the trial court erred
    in denying his request for a continuance so that his family could hire private
    counsel for his trial. Specifically, Mackrides argues that he told the trial judge
    that current counsel was ineffective, but that the court did not inquire into the
    reasons why Mackrides believed that counsel’s performance was subpar or
    why he was requesting a continuance to hire new counsel. Id. at 9. Finally,
    Mackrides claims that such a hasty decision to deny his request was an abuse
    of discretion where he had been asking to obtain new counsel for six months
    prior to trial.
    ____________________________________________
    Awbrey, Esquire, from the Montgomery County Public Defendant’s Office,
    entered her appearance on behalf of Mackrides.
    17 On June 23, 2020, Mackrides sought, pro se, and was granted in forma
    pauperis (IFP) status. In his verified IFP statement, he stated that he was
    “unable to seek financial assistance from family and friends.” IFP Petition,
    6/23/20. Although this statement seems contrary to his assertion at trial that
    his family would hire private counsel for him, this statement was verified six
    months after trial and, as duly noted, it does not relieve the court from
    conducting an inquiry into how and when Mackrides planned to secure private
    counsel.
    -8-
    J-S05029-21
    Appellate review of a trial court’s continuance decision is
    deferential. “The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is
    within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
    only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. As we have
    consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an error
    of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when ‘the law is
    overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly
    unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
    as shown by the evidence or the record[.]’” Commonwealth v.
    Randolph, [] 
    873 A.2d 1277
    , 1281 (Pa. 2005) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. McAleer, [] 
    748 A.2d 670
    , 673 (Pa. 2000)
    (internal citations omitted)).
    Commonwealth v. Brooks, 
    104 A.3d 466
    , 469 (Pa. 2014).
    In Commonwealth v. Broitman, 
    217 A.3d 297
     (Pa. Super. 2019), our
    Court noted that “a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice is
    not absolute and ‘must be weighed against[,] and may be reasonably
    restricted by[,] the state’s interest in the swift and efficient administration of
    criminal justice.’” Id. at 300 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Moreover, “[a] trial court has ‘wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel
    of choice against the needs of fairness . . . and against the demands of its
    calendar.’” Id. (citation omitted). In that vein, our Court has noted that a
    defendant’s right to choose private counsel “must be exercised at a reasonable
    time and in a reasonable manner.” Commonwealth v. Rucker, 
    761 A.2d 541
    , 542-43 (Pa. 2000).
    In Commonwealth v. Prysock, 
    972 A.2d 539
     (Pa. Super. 2009), our
    Court expounded on the erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s Sixth
    Amendment right to private counsel, stating:
    where a criminal defendant makes a showing that he has been
    erroneously deprived of the right to representation of the counsel
    -9-
    J-S05029-21
    of his choice, he is neither required to demonstrate that he was
    prejudiced nor that the deprivation did not constitute harmless
    error. Rather, . . . such a violation is a structural error which
    pervades an entire trial.
    
    Id. at 542
    , citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
    548 U.S. 140
    , 148-50,
    (2006).    In Prysock, 
    supra,
     this Court set forth the following factors to
    consider on appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a continuance motion to obtain
    private representation: (1) whether the court conducted an extensive inquiry
    into the underlying causes of the defendant’s dissatisfaction with current
    counsel; (2) whether the defendant’s dissatisfaction with current counsel
    constituted irreconcilable differences; (3) the number of prior continuances;
    (4) the timing of the motion for continuance; (5) whether private counsel had
    actually been retained; and (6) the readiness of private counsel to proceed in
    a reasonable amount of time.        
    Id. at 543
    .    See Pa.R.Crim.P. 106 (D) (“A
    motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be made not later
    than 48 hours before the time set for the proceeding. A later motion shall be
    entertained only when the opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the
    defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or the interests of
    justice require it.”).
    Analyzing the Prysock factors, the record reveals that the court did not
    inquire at all, let alone “extensive[ly],” into Mackrides’ dissatisfaction with trial
    counsel or whether his dissatisfaction with counsel constituted irreconcilable
    differences and did not discuss the number of prior continuances that had
    been granted in the matter. Prysock, 
    supra at 543
    . However, the record
    - 10 -
    J-S05029-21
    shows that the court considered the fact that Mackrides waited until the day
    of trial to request a continuance so that his family could hire private counsel.18
    In Brooks, supra, our Supreme Court reversed our Court’s decision
    that reversed the defendant’s judgment of sentence and remanded the case
    for a new trial on the basis that the trial court had denied the defendant’s
    request for a continuance so that he could prepare to proceed to trial pro se.
    On discretionary review, the Supreme Court noted that the record revealed,
    among other things, that the trial court “had the benefit of specific
    reassurances from trial counsel” regarding any unresolved issues counsel and
    the defendant had. Id. at 539. Specifically, “[c]ounsel represented that he
    had discussed such matters related to his representation with [the defendant],
    and after questioning counsel, the court determined that counsel indeed was
    well-prepared; counsel, an officer of the court, in fact pronounced himself
    ‘extraordinarily well prepared.’” Id. at 539-40 (citations to record omitted).
    Citing to a United States Supreme Court case, Morris v. Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    (1983), the Brooks Court noted that “[i]n the face of the unequivocal and
    uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court that he was
    fully prepared and ‘ready’ for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to
    deny a continuance.” 
    Id.
     at 540 (citing Morris, 
    supra at 12
    ).
    ____________________________________________
    18 The fact that Mackrides asked for a continuance so his family could retain
    private counsel seems to suggest that private counsel had not yet, in fact,
    been retained.
    - 11 -
    J-S05029-21
    In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    364 A.2d 665
     (Pa. 1976), our
    Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when
    a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer
    must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in
    the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is
    denied.” Id. at 594 (emphasis added; citation omitted). With this scope in
    mind, we must fully examine the tenor and content of the discourse that
    occurred regarding Mackrides’ continuance request. See supra at 4-6.
    Here, the trial judge never gave Mackrides an opportunity to present his
    reasons for asking for a continuance. Robinson, supra. Cf. Morris, 
    supra at 544
     (noting trial court’s awareness of circumstances surrounding
    defendant’s request for continuance where court colloquied defendant and had
    extensive exchange with counsel).       Additionally, Attorney Marone never
    indicated that she had discussed with her client the issues he had been having
    regarding her representation or indicated to the court that she was fully
    prepared to represent Mackrides at trial. Cf. Brooks, supra. In fact, the trial
    judge never even questioned counsel about her relationship with Mackrides.
    The trial court’s instantaneous ruling, without any measured weighing of
    Mackrides’ right to choose his own counsel against the state’s interest in the
    swift and efficient administration of criminal justice, is hardly a “careful
    consideration of the matter.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 
    77 A.3d 663
    , 672 (Pa. Super. 2013). The trial judge never inquired into Mackrides’
    long-standing displeasure with his trial counsel; in fact, the court cut
    - 12 -
    J-S05029-21
    Mackrides off every time he tried to explain his situation. The court’s conduct
    is especially egregious where, for over four months preceding trial, Mackrides
    had repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with counsel’s representation in
    pro se correspondence sent to the court and the clerk of courts and no hearing
    was held to determine whether, in fact, court-appointed counsel should be
    replaced. Cf. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 
    45 A.3d 1050
     (Pa. 2012) (where
    defendant filed single pro se petition for withdrawal of counsel two months
    prior to trial, different trial judge held an in camera hearing on petition prior
    to trial).
    Additionally, there was no on-the-record determination by the trial
    judge, prior to ruling on the continuance motion, that Attorney Marone had
    adequately represented Mackrides up to and until the time of trial.            Cf.
    Sandusky, supra (where trial court notes defense team “was assuredly
    capable”); Brooks, supra at 535 (trial judge noted on record at time of
    continuance request that defendant’s appointed trial counsel had “obtained a
    lot of evidence, a lot of discovery and had prepared for trial”). In fact, three
    of the four filings initiated by Attorney Marone19 prior to trial were precipitated
    by Mackrides filing a pro se petition or motion of the same ilk, which he sent
    to counsel and asked her to file on his behalf. See Pro Se Motion to Reduce
    Bail, 7/22/19; Pro Se Petition to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial/Rule 600,
    ____________________________________________
    19 On her own initiative, Marone filed a request for pre-trial discovery,
    pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 572, and an omnibus pre-trial motion to suppress on
    June 12, 2019.
    - 13 -
    J-S05029-21
    9/10/19; Pro Se Rule Petition for Nominal Bail for Lack of Speedy Trial,
    9/17/19.     Finally, there is also nothing in the record showing that the
    Commonwealth opposed the requested continuance or indicated that it would
    suffer prejudice if a continuance were granted.20 Cf. Broitman, supra.
    While the timing of a continuance request, particularly within the 48
    hours preceding trial, may support a trial judge’s determination to deny the
    request, the decision “must [also] be combined with other circumstances.”
    Morris, 
    supra at 544
    ; Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D). Here, the trial court’s sole reason
    for denying the continuance was the fact that it had been requested on the
    day of trial and, therefore, it “was not timely.”     See N.T. Non-Jury Trial,
    12/9/19, at 9-13.          The court never discussed any other factors or
    circumstances that went into its snap decision to deny the request.
    Specifically, the court did not discuss prior continuance requests made by
    Mackrides, did not determine that the case had been unreasonably delayed to
    that point, or inquire into how soon and by what means Mackrides’ family
    would be able to secure private counsel for him. Cf. Brooks, supra at 543-
    44 (“[T]he record in this case reveals that the trial court did more than just
    simply deny the request for a continuance.         The court was aware of the
    circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] request; the court’s colloquy of
    ____________________________________________
    20 In its brief, the Commonwealth contends that Mackrides’ “differences with
    appointed counsel were not irreconcilable[] and he was not prejudiced by the
    denial of the continuance.” Appellee’s Brief, at 14. However, there is nothing
    in the record evidencing the tenor of the attorney-client relationship or how
    Mackrides would have prepared differently had he been given alternative
    counsel.
    - 14 -
    J-S05029-21
    appellee, and its exchanges with counsel, properly informed its exercise of
    discretion.”). Similarly, in Prysock the trial court relied on a single factor in
    making its decision to deny the defendant’s requested continuances. Id. at
    544. Specifically, the record reflected that the trial court failed to make any
    inquiry whatsoever into the nature of the dispute between the defendant and
    appointed counsel, and only based its decision on one reason—the fact of a
    prior continuance. Id. In vacating the defendant’s judgment of sentence and
    remanding for a new trial, our Court highlighted the fact that the trial court
    “failed to make the type of detailed factual findings that we have previously
    commended and in their absence [we] have found an abuse of discretion.”
    Id. at 544-45.
    In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial judge discussed how trial had
    originally been scheduled for September 16, 2019, and how “[Mackrides] had
    never previously informed th[e c]ourt of his wish to hire private counsel . . .
    despite his representation that he has wanted to replace his current
    counsel for about six months.”           Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/20, at 9
    (emphasis added).      It seems reasonable that the court’s knowledge of
    Mackrides’ longstanding issues with counsel’s representation would have
    prompted some sort of inquiry or hearing prior to the start of trial. The court
    also cites Rule 106(D) in its opinion to support its conclusion that Mackrides’
    request was “untimely [and] not exercised at a reasonable time or in a
    reasonable manner,” id., and states that “to grant the request and to postpone
    the trial would have created an undue burden for the ten Commonwealth
    - 15 -
    J-S05029-21
    witnesses who were present and ready to proceed.” Id. Notably, these are
    after-the-fact justifications given by the trial court for denying Mackrides’
    continuance request prior to trial. As previously stated, the Commonwealth
    did not object on the record to Mackrides’ continuance request at or prior to
    trial.
    The trial court cites to Commonwealth v. Boettcher, 
    459 A.2d 806
    (Pa. Super. 1983), to support its decision to deny Mackrides’ request for a
    continuance. The facts of that case, however, differ from the instant case. In
    Boettcher, while the defendant was also represented up until trial by the
    public defender and his request for a continuance was made on the day trial
    was scheduled to begin, our Court stated that it was “clear from a review of
    the record that the public defender was well-prepared for trial and afforded
    [the defendant] a vigorous and well-conceived defense.”              
    Id. at 810
    .
    Moreover, our Court noted that “the trial court carefully considered other
    significant factors in denying [the] continuance request[,]” including:       trial
    commenced only 29 days before expiration of the Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 run date;
    the Commonwealth was ready to proceed with its witnesses, several of whom
    were not local residents, on the first day of the scheduled trial; and the
    defendant’s proposed private attorney appeared in the courtroom during jury
    selection, but declined to participate in the trial when the court advised him
    he could do so immediately. 
    Id.
    Here, the trial judge explained on the record at trial that his reason for
    denying Mackrides’ continuance request was because of its untimeliness. The
    - 16 -
    J-S05029-21
    trial judge also told Mackrides that Attorney Marone would represent
    Mackrides unless he wanted to represent himself. Id. at 10, 12. The trial
    judge, however, neither commented on Attorney Marone’s general trial
    competence or her representation of Mackrides up to that point, nor sought
    to ascertain whether the attorney-client relationship “had deteriorated to the
    point that [Attorney Marone] could not effectively represent him.” Keaton,
    supra. Rather, in post hoc reasoning offered in his Rule 1925(a) opinion, the
    trial judge states that Mackrides never informed the court, prior to the day of
    trial, that he wished to hire private counsel. Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/20, at
    9 (trial court noting “[r]ather[, Mackrides] waited until immediately prior to
    the trial’s commencement in which to request a continuance in order to hire
    private counsel”) (emphasis in original).
    Here,   Mackrides asserts that “[t]he trial court’s reasoning is flawed
    insofar as it focused exclusively on the court’s interest in the swift
    administration of justice and did not inquire into [his] interest to the right to
    counsel of his choosing.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. Mackrides also complains
    that “the court never permitted [him] to articulate anything more detailed
    than the basic request to hire new counsel [despite the fact that he] tried
    several times to continue to speak to the court about his request . . . and each
    time the court informed [him] that he needed to stop speaking up and
    disrupting [the] proceedings.”    Id. at 14.    We are inclined to agree with
    Mackrides’ argument.
    - 17 -
    J-S05029-21
    Mackrides was represented up until trial by Attorney Marone,21 an
    assistant public defender. The trial court is correct in stating that our courts
    have repeatedly condemned waiting until the day of trial to request a
    continuance for purposes of retaining new counsel. See Broitman, supra
    (where defendant requested new counsel and continuance on eve of trial,
    request was not made within reasonable time or in reasonable manner);
    Commonwealth v. Nicolella, 
    452 A.2d 1055
     (Pa. Super. 1982) (same);
    Commonwealth Kittrell, 
    427 A.2d 1380
     (Pa. Super. 1981) (same).
    Additionally, where Mackrides’ motion was made less than 48 hours before
    trial, he was required to prove that he is entitled to a continuance under Rule
    106 by alleging that the opportunity to seek a continuance to hire private
    counsel did not previously exist or that he was not aware of the grounds for
    moving for a continuance. Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D).
    Based on the facts of record, however, we believe that the trial court’s
    denial of a continuance was an abuse of discretion. The trial court made its
    decision without any inquiry, even minimal, into the reasons behind Mackrides’
    long-standing dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, counsel’s effectiveness
    up to the date of trial, whether the Commonwealth would suffer prejudice
    were the continuance granted, whether delaying trial would “unduly disrupt”
    ____________________________________________
    21 The docket entries indicate that Attorney Marone entered her appearance
    for Mackrides on June 12, 2019, and represented him through sentencing.
    - 18 -
    J-S05029-21
    the efficient administration of justice,22 and how long it would take and what
    means he would use to secure new counsel.               The court’s dismissive tone
    deprived Mackrides of his right to a fair trial with counsel of his choice. In
    sum, the record reveals that the court’s decision on the request was anything
    but considered; rather, it was based on a single factor—the untimeliness of
    the request. Where a trial court denies a request for continuance, discretion
    is abused “where the defendant’s right outweighs the Commonwealth’s need
    for efficient administration.” Commonwealth v. Pantano, 
    836 A.2d 948
    ,
    950 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
    Although case law is clear that a defendant’s constitutional right to
    counsel of his own choice is not absolute, it “must be weighed against and
    may be reasonably restricted by the state’s interest in the swift and efficient
    administration of criminal justice.”           Robinson, supra (emphasis added).
    Here, the trial court failed to conduct “an extensive inquiry” into the underlying
    causes of Mackrides’ dissatisfaction with Attorney Marone, of which it had been
    aware for months prior to trial, and forced him to proceed to trial. Under such
    circumstances, we conclude that the court’s actions constituted an abuse of
    discretion. Cf. Broitman, supra (court properly denied continuance request
    where trial court conducted inquiry into defendant’s dissatisfaction with
    ____________________________________________
    22 In fact, only six months had elapsed from the time that Mackrides was
    charged in the criminal information until the commencement of trial. Cf.
    Commonwealth v. Novak, 
    150 A.2d 102
     (Pa. 1959) (where defendant had
    two years in which to procure counsel of his liking, defendant’s right to choose
    was not exercised in reasonable time and manner, when he waited until day
    of trial to select new counsel).
    - 19 -
    J-S05029-21
    counsel, which only amount to legal advice he did not want to accept and court
    concluded postponing trial would create undue burden for Commonwealth’s
    witnesses who were present and ready to proceed and delay would have
    caused “too great of an imposition” on Commonwealth and trial court’s
    “already crowded schedule”); Sandusky, 
    supra
     (trial court’s decision to deny
    continuance not arbitrary where it “denote[d] a careful consideration of the
    matter” and “d[id] not reflect a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the
    face” of request).
    Here, Mackrides has shown that he has been erroneously deprived of
    the right to representation of the counsel of his choice, which amounts to a
    structural error that pervaded his entire trial. Prysock, 
    supra;
     Gonzalez-
    Lopez, 
    supra.
     Under such circumstances, he is entitled to a new trial.23
    ____________________________________________
    23 Although we are remanding for a new trial, we note that Mackrides would
    not be entitled to relief on his final claim on appeal in which he contends that
    the sentencing court was required to consider his ability to pay prior to
    imposing court costs where he is indigent. On March 23, 2021, this Court
    issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
    2021 PA Super 51
     (Pa.
    Super. 2021) (en banc). Like Mackrides, Lopez challenged the trial court’s
    imposition of mandatory court costs without first holding a hearing to
    determine his ability to pay, asserting that such a hearing is required under
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(c) and Commonwealth v. Martin, 
    335 A.2d 424
     (Pa.
    Super. 1975) (holding court must hold ability-to-pay hearing when imposing
    fine), as well as sections 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2) of the Sentencing Code.
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2). In rejecting Lopez’s claim,
    this Court concluded that “[w]hen the sections of Rule 706 are read
    sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of statutory construction direct, it
    becomes clear that [s]ection C only requires a trial court to determine a
    defendant’s ability to pay at a hearing that occurs prior to incarceration, as
    referenced in [s]ections A and B.” Lopez, supra at *5. While the trial court
    maintains the discretion to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing prior to imposing
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    - 20 -
    J-S05029-21
    Judgment of sentence vacated.               Case remanded for new trial.24
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/21/21
    ____________________________________________
    costs, “nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Sentencing Code[,] or
    established case law takes that discretion away from the trial court unless and
    until a defendant is in peril of going to prison for failing to pay the costs
    imposed on him.” Id. at *11. Accordingly, Mackrides is entitled to no relief
    on his claim regarding costs.
    24 At his new trial, if Mackrides again expresses his dissatisfaction with
    counsel, the trial judge shall conduct “an extensive inquiry” including, but not
    limited to, the underlying cause of this dissatisfaction and whether that
    dissatisfaction with counsel constitutes irreconcilable differences entitling him
    to new counsel, whether appointed or retained.
    - 21 -