Com. v. Madison, L. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S07035-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    LAWRENCE J. MADISON                        :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 820 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 21, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0000495-2016
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             DATE: April 29, 2021
    Appellant, Lawrence J. Madison, appeals pro se from the order entered
    in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as
    untimely his second petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
    December 16, 2016, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to possession
    of a firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, and
    receiving stolen property. That same day, the court sentenced Appellant to
    the negotiated aggregate sentence of 5 to 10 years of incarceration. Although
    Appellant sought, unsuccessfully, to withdraw his guilty plea, he did not seek
    ____________________________________________
    1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S07035-21
    direct review of his sentence.
    On September 13, 2018, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, alleging
    ineffective assistance of counsel, namely, counsel’s alleged failure to conduct
    pretrial investigation.   (See PCRA Petition, 9/13/18, at 2-3).        The court
    appointed counsel to assist Appellant with litigating his first PCRA petition, but
    counsel ultimately filed a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    518 Pa. 491
    , 
    544 A.2d 927
    (1988), and
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). After
    granting counsel’s petition, the court denied PCRA relief. This Court affirmed
    the denial of PCRA relief on December 12, 2019. See Commonwealth v.
    Madison, 
    225 A.3d 1154
    (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).
    Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    While his petition for allowance of appeal was still pending, Appellant
    filed the instant PCRA petition on February 20, 2020, alleging various grounds
    for relief, including “after discovered evidence,” ineffective assistance of
    counsel, and “newly discovered” knowledge of the United States Supreme
    Court’s decision in Garza v. Idaho, ___ U.S. ___, 
    139 S. Ct. 738
    , 
    203 L. Ed. 2d 77
    (2019). (See PCRA Petition, 2/20/20, at 1-12).
    On June 1, 2020, Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal was
    denied. See Commonwealth v. Madison, ___ Pa. ___, 
    235 A.3d 266
    (2020)
    (per curiam).   On June 30, 2020, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
    -2-
    J-S07035-21
    notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. On July 21, 2020,
    the court dismissed the petition as untimely. On August 4, 2020, Appellant
    timely filed a notice of appeal. Appellant filed a voluntary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    concise statement on September 23, 2020.
    Appellant now raises the following issues for our review:
    Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it found that
    Appellant’s second PCRA petition was untimely and
    dismissed the petition without a hearing?
    Whether Appellant’s trial counsel(s) rendered ineffective
    assistance, which caused Appellant to enter an involuntary
    guilty plea by way of inducement?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 3).
    As a prefatory matter,
    Pennsylvania law makes clear the trial court has no
    jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an
    appeal from the denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition
    in the same case is still pending on appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Lark,2 
    560 Pa. 487
    , 493, 
    746 A.2d 585
    ,
    588 (2000). See also Commonwealth v. Montgomery,
    
    181 A.3d 359
    , 364 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal
    denied, [647] Pa. [570], 
    190 A.3d 1134
    (2018) (reaffirming
    that Lark precludes consideration of subsequent PCRA
    petition while appeal of prior PCRA petition is still pending).
    A petitioner must choose either to appeal from the order
    denying his prior PCRA petition or to file a new PCRA
    petition; the petitioner cannot do both, i.e., file an appeal
    and also file a PCRA petition, because “prevailing law
    requires that the subsequent petition must give way to a
    pending appeal from the order denying a prior petition.”
    Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 
    148 A.3d 849
    , 852 (Pa.Super.
    2016). In other words, a petitioner who files an appeal from
    ____________________________________________
    2Lark was overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, ___
    Pa. ___, 
    238 A.3d 1267
    , 1281 (2020).
    -3-
    J-S07035-21
    an order denying his prior PCRA petition must withdraw the
    appeal before he can pursue a subsequent PCRA petition.
    Id. If the petitioner
    pursues the pending appeal, then the
    PCRA court is required under Lark to dismiss any
    subsequent PCRA petitions filed while that appeal is
    pending. Lark, supra.
    Commonwealth v. Beatty, 
    207 A.3d 957
    , 961 (Pa.Super. 2019).
    Instantly, at the time Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his
    petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the denial of
    his first PCRA petition, was still pending. Consequently, the PCRA court lacked
    jurisdiction to consider the petition and should have dismissed it outright
    pursuant to Lark.    See
    id. Accordingly, we affirm
    the denial of relief on
    Appellant’s current petition, albeit on other grounds. See Commonwealth
    v. Reese, 
    31 A.3d 708
    , 727 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc) (stating appellate
    court may affirm on any basis as long as ultimate decision is correct).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/29/2021
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 820 WDA 2020

Filed Date: 4/29/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/29/2021