U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC. VS. JUSTO SANTOS (F-020056-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4149-19
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE
IN TRUST FOR THE
REGISTERED HOLDERS OF
CHASE FUNDING MORTGAGE
LOAN, ASSET-BACKED
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-2,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUSTO SANTOS,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ELVA SANTOS, her heirs,
devisees and personal
representatives and his, hers, their
or any of their successors in right,
title and interest, RONALD
SANTOS, MRS. SANTOS,
spouse of RONALD SANTOS,
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
_______________________________
Submitted April 12, 2021 – Decided May 5, 2021
Before Judges Currier and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No.
F-020056-17.
Justo Santos, appellant pro se.
Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Richard Nalbandian, III, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this foreclosure action, defendant Justo Santos appeals from the April
20, 2020 Chancery Division order denying his motion to vacate final judgment
entered on April 4, 2019. After reviewing the contentions in light of the record
and applicable legal principles, we affirm.
We glean these facts from the record. On March 11, 2004, Elva Santos,
defendant's late wife, executed a promissory note to Chase Manhattan Mortgage
Corporation (Chase) for $288,000. To secure the note, defendant and his wife
executed a non-purchase money mortgage to Chase on the same day against
property located on Grove Avenue in Verona. Defendants defaulted on the loan
on May 1, 2007.
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On June 26, 2007, Chase assigned the mortgage to Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
which assignment was recorded on July 9, 2007. On February 24, 2017, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. S/B/M 1 Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) assigned the
mortgage to plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee In Trust For
The Registered Holders Of Chase Funding Mortgage Loan, Asset-Backed
Certificate, Series 2004-2, which assignment was recorded on March 20, 2017.
On August 25, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure. 2 After
default was entered, plaintiff moved for final judgment, which was entered on
April 4, 2019. Plaintiff's motion was accompanied by a February 21, 2019
certification of an officer of its mortgage servicer, averring that "[p]laintiff,
directly or through an agent, has possession of the [n]ote . . . ."
On March 2, 2020, eleven months after the entry of final judgment,
defendant moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 4:50-1, arguing plaintiff
lacked standing to foreclose because it failed to demonstrate ownership or
control of the original note. In an order entered on April 20, 2020, the Chancery
judge denied the motion. In an accompanying statement of reasons, the judge
1
S/B/M refers to successor by merger.
2
It is unclear from the record exactly when Elva Santos passed away. However,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include defendant as heir to Elva Santos.
The amended complaint is not included in the record.
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determined plaintiff established and demonstrated standing based on its
possession of the note and assignment of the mortgage prior to the filing of the
complaint.
On appeal, defendant renews his argument that plaintiff lacked standing
to foreclose on the mortgage and asserts the judge "erroneously denied his
[m]otion to [v]acate [f]inal [j]udgment." We disagree.
Under Rule 4:50-1,
the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment
. . . for the following reasons: (a) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly
discovered evidence which would probably alter the
judgment or order and which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment
or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been
satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or
order upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment or order should have prospective application;
or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment or order.
Motions made under Rule 4:50-1 must be filed within a reasonable time,
and motions based on subsections (a), (b), and (c) must be filed within a year of
the judgment. R. 4:50-2; see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Angeles,
428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012) (citation omitted). However, the
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one-year limitation for subsections (a), (b), and (c) does not mean that filing
within one year automatically qualifies as "within a reasonable time." Orner v.
Liu, 419 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div. 2011).
A motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 should be granted sparingly and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not
be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). "[A]buse of discretion only arises on
demonstration of 'manifest error or injustice,'" Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6,
20 (2008) (quoting State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 572 (2005)), and occurs when
the trial court's decision "is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."
Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467 (citation omitted).
Here, we discern no abuse of discretion. In order to have standing, the
"party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt."
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ford, 418 N.J. Super. 592, 597 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 418 N.J. Super. 323, 327-28 (Ch. Div.
2010)). Standing is conferred by "either possession of the note or an assignment
of the mortgage that predated the original complaint." Angeles, 428 N.J. Super.
at 318 (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 216
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(App. Div. 2011)). "Thus, a plaintiff need not actually possess the original note
at the time of filing in order to have standing to file a foreclosure complaint."
Capital One, N.A. v. Peck, 455 N.J. Super. 254, 258 (App. Div. 2018).
Moreover, "[s]tanding is not a jurisdictional issue in New Jersey." Id. at
259 (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Russo, 429 N.J. Super. 91, 101 (App.
Div. 2012)). Thus, "[d]epending on the equities of the particular proceeding, a
foreclosure judgment may not be reversed, even if some irregularities in the
foreclosure process are demonstrated by the defendant." Ibid. As a result, "a
foreclosure judgment obtained by a party that lacked standing is not 'void' within
the meaning of Rule 4:50-1(d)." Ibid.Here, we are satisfied plaintiff had standing to foreclose based on the
assignment of the mortgage from Wells Fargo prior to the filing of the
foreclosure complaint. That fact is undisputed in the record. Accordingly, the
final judgment was properly entered.
Affirmed.
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