Nexis Bellorin Umanzor v. Merrick Garland ( 2021 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 10 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NEXIS DAVID BELLORIN UMANZOR,                   No.    20-70279
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A216-574-808
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted April 14, 2021
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District Judge.
    Concurrence by Judge KORMAN
    Nexis David Bellorin Umanzor, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitions
    for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the
    Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    ,1 and we deny the petition for review.
    Where the BIA “affirmed the results of the decision below pursuant to 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.1
    (e)(4) …. [w]e review the IJ’s decision as the final agency
    determination.” Singh v. Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 1081
    , 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation
    marks omitted). “We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal
    questions de novo.” Guerra v. Barr, 
    974 F.3d 909
    , 911 (9th Cir. 2020).
    1.    Bellorin Umanzor challenges the IJ’s conclusion that he failed to demonstrate
    past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution for purposes of his
    asylum claim. “In order to establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past
    persecution, an applicant must show … an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level
    of persecution ….” Navas v. INS, 
    217 F.3d 646
    , 655 (9th Cir. 2000).
    Bellorin Umanzor argues that the threats he received were sufficient by
    themselves to establish past persecution. The record, however, does not compel the
    conclusion that these threats make this case one of the “small category of cases
    [where] … the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or
    harm” sufficient to constitute past persecution. Marcos v. Gonzales, 
    410 F.3d 1112
    ,
    1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    1
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case,
    we recite only those facts necessary to decide the appeal.
    2
    Bellorin Umanzor also contends that his case is analogous to Ruano v.
    Ashcroft, 
    301 F.3d 1155
     (9th Cir. 2002), and thus the harassment he experienced,
    cumulatively considered, constitutes past persecution. When compared to the facts
    in Ruano, 
    301 F.3d at 1157, 1158, 1160
     (where petitioner received between thirty
    and thirty-five individualized death threats at home and work, was driven to quit his
    job, and was repeatedly chased by the same armed men over the span of four years),
    the record here does not compel the conclusion that the cumulative effect of Bellorin
    Umanzor’s mistreatment is sufficient to establish past persecution. Accordingly, the
    record does not compel the conclusion that Bellorin Umanzor suffered past
    persecution.
    Bellorin Umanzor further argues that the country conditions evidence in the
    record, together with his testimony, demonstrate he has an objectively reasonable
    fear of future persecution and that the country conditions evidence established a
    “pattern or practice” of persecution against similarly situated individuals. But
    Bellorin Umanzor focuses on country conditions evidence from a time period
    preceding the country conditions relevant to the IJ’s decision. As a result, that
    evidence does not undermine the IJ’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence
    to show the Nicaraguan government was still rounding up members of the political
    opposition at the time of the hearing. Additionally, the IJ correctly observed that
    there is no record evidence that any of the 30 other individuals who participated in
    3
    the same work stoppage protest as Bellorin Umanzor have faced mistreatment or
    threats. The record evidence does not compel the conclusion that he has a well-
    founded fear of future persecution. Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
    denial of Bellorin Umanzor’s asylum claim.
    2.    Bellorin Umanzor argues that he is eligible for withholding of removal. But
    “[a]n applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard for asylum necessarily fails to
    satisfy the more demanding standard for withholding of removal, which involves
    showing by a ‘clear probability’ that the petitioner’s life or freedom would be
    threatened in the proposed country of removal.” Davila v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 1136
    ,
    1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
    3.    Bellorin Umanzor contends that the IJ failed to consider relevant country
    conditions evidence in concluding that Bellorin Umanzor was not eligible for CAT
    relief generally, and specifically with respect to the IJ’s finding regarding his ability
    to relocate internally. But Bellorin Umanzor relies on country conditions evidence
    from a time frame earlier than that which was relevant to the IJ’s analysis and fails
    to point to record evidence compelling the conclusion that he would “‘more likely
    than not’ … be tortured” based on the conditions in Nicaragua around the relevant
    time of the IJ’s decision. Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1053 (9th Cir. 2009)
    (citation omitted). The IJ’s conclusion that Bellorin Umanzor is not eligible for CAT
    relief is supported by substantial evidence.
    4
    The petition for review is DENIED.
    5
    FILED
    Bellorin Umanzor v. Garland, No. 20-70279
    MAY 10 2021
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    Korman, D.J., concurring.                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I write separately to express my concern that deporting petitioner would be a
    grave injustice with potentially serious consequences. Bellorin Umanzor was a 27-
    year-old protester fleeing deadly political repression in Nicaragua inflicted by a
    ruthless authoritarian regime bent on silencing any whisper of political dissent.
    Paramilitary forces retaliated against Bellorin Umanzor for his participation in
    protests against this regime. Armed men menaced his family, deployed smoke
    bombs against them, and in one instance attempted to force Bellorin Umanzor off
    the road.
    The hostility that Bellorin Umanzor faced did not occur in a vacuum. The
    Nicaraguan government has engaged in “extrajudicial killings; enforced
    disappearances; obstructions to access to medical care; widespread arbitrary or
    illegal detentions; prevalent ill-treatment and instances of torture and sexual violence
    in detention cent[ers]; violations of freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression,
    including the criminalization of social leaders, human rights defenders, journalists
    and protesters considered critical of the Government.” Certified Admin. Record
    (“CAR”) 320 (Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights
    Violations and Abuses in the Context of Protests in Nicaragua). The government
    1
    deployed national police and parapolice forces to shoot “high-caliber weapons from
    concealed, elevated and distant locations at protesters,” and forensic investigations
    “suggested [that] the shooters specifically aimed to kill.” Id. at 281 (U.S. State
    Dep’t, Nicaragua 2018 Human Rights Report). Indeed, “[t]here were credible
    reports [that] the government killed some police officers for refusing to follow orders
    to suppress protests.” Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
    This is a country where an unknown number of people have vanished into the
    hands of the state or its accomplices. CAR 340. A country where families often
    learn of the deaths of their missing loved ones from an invitation to identify their
    bodies at a morgue administered by the very government that murdered them. Id.
    Tragically, those families may have been the lucky ones—others found the corpses
    of their family members “strewn about city streets.” Id. at 282. The government
    inflicted these abuses intentionally and systematically, adopting a “policy of ‘exile,
    jail, or death’” for anyone perceived as a political opponent of the “highly
    centralized, authoritarian political system” dominated by President Daniel Ortega
    and the Sandinista party. Id. at 280.
    Although Bellorin Umanzor escaped Nicaragua—at least temporarily—the
    sickening conduct of the regime has continued unabated. The State Department
    country conditions report for 2019 had not been issued by the time the BIA ruled on
    Bellorin Umanzor’s asylum claim, but that document found continued human rights
    2
    abuses, including “extrajudicial killings . . . ; forced disappearance[s] by parapolice
    forces; . . . and arbitrary detentions by police and parapolice.” The report for 2020,
    released earlier this year, found that “[p]arapolice and individuals linked to the
    Ortega regime carried out a campaign of harassment, intimidation, and violence
    toward perceived enemies of the regime” like Bellorin Umanzor. Both reports found
    that Ortega failed to take any serious steps “to identify, prosecute, or punish officials
    who committed human rights abuses, including those responsible for at least 325
    killings and hundreds of disappearances during the prodemocracy uprising of April
    2018,” and has instead “actively strengthened impunity for human rights abusers
    who were loyal to him.” Although the agency did not consider these reports because
    they had not yet been released by the time of decision, they provide strong evidence
    that Nicaragua is no safer today for those who have strayed from the Sandinista line
    than it was when Bellorin Umanzor fled.
    While the demanding standard of review determines the outcome we reach in
    this very close case, the Attorney General’s discretion is not so constrained. Indeed,
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement recently issued interim guidance on the
    Administration’s enforcement and removal policies to reflect the “baseline values
    and priorities” set forth by the President. Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration
    Enforcement       and      Removal        Priorities    1      (Feb.     18,      2021),
    https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2021/021821_civil-immigration-
    3
    enforcement_interim-guidance.pdf. It is hard to see what value would justify
    treating Bellorin Umanzor—an asylum seeker who poses no threat to national
    security, border security, or public safety—as a priority for removal.
    Although Bellorin Umanzor failed to assemble a record compelling the
    conclusion that he is eligible for asylum, the Attorney General is not required to
    ignore the possibility that removing him to Nicaragua may bring him to harm. As
    the Attorney General wrote in his prior position as a federal judge, “‘[t]here comes
    a point where . . . Court[s] should not be ignorant as judges of what [they] know as
    men’ and women.” ACLU v. CIA, 
    710 F.3d 422
    , 431 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Garland,
    C.J.) (quoting Watts v. Indiana, 
    338 U.S. 49
    , 52 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.)). If this is
    true for a federal judge, then so much more for the Attorney General of the United
    States.
    Bellorin Umanzor’s failure to establish eligibility for relief does not
    demonstrate that returning him to a country where he may be in danger is the prudent
    public policy choice, nor the good or moral one. Those choices, however, are for
    others to make. We may be “unable to grant [Bellorin Umanzor] relief,” but the
    Court is “not obligated to become a silent accomplice to what may be an injustice.”
    Friedman v. Rehal, 
    618 F.3d 142
    , 161 (2d Cir. 2010).
    4