Joseph Redman v. Chad Downs ( 2021 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted April 28, 2021*
    Decided May 11, 2021
    Before
    FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
    DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
    AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
    No. 20-1655
    JOSEPH G. REDMAN,                                 Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                         Court for the Central District of Illinois.
    v.                                          No. 18-cv-3288-EIL
    CHAD DOWNS, et al.,                               Eric I. Long,
    Defendants-Appellees.                         Magistrate Judge.
    ORDER
    After spending six days under suicide watch in the county jail, Joseph Redman, a
    pretrial detainee, hanged himself in the shower. Officers were able to revive him but
    did not get him medical attention for days. Redman sued the county sheriff and
    members of the jail staff, asserting that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights
    by denying him adequate health care and inhumanely isolating him without clothing
    and hygiene products. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . At screening, the district court dismissed
    * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
    record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
    significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 20-1655                                                                         Page 2
    Redman’s claims based on his conditions of confinement, and later it entered summary
    judgment for the defendants on Redman’s claim for inadequate medical care. But the
    court applied the incorrect standard when screening Redman’s conditions-of-
    confinement claim, and a reasonable jury could find that three officers who discovered
    Redman unconscious in the shower responded unreasonably to his suicide attempt. We
    therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings on those claims.
    Otherwise, we affirm.
    To the extent they concern claims dismissed at screening, we take the allegations
    in Redman’s complaint as true, see Schillinger v. Kiley, 
    954 F.3d 990
    , 994 (7th Cir. 2020),
    and we present the summary-judgment record in the light most favorable to Redman,
    see LaBrec v. Walker, 
    948 F.3d 836
    , 839 (7th Cir. 2020). Redman arrived at the Adams
    County Jail in Quincy, Illinois, on August 8, 2018. He told jail staff at his intake
    assessment that he was suicidal, he had attempted to kill himself the night before, and
    he wanted to see a doctor. Staff placed him on suicide watch in a segregated wing, gave
    him a mat and a blanket, and allowed him to wear only a “suicide smock” (designed so
    that the stiff fabric cannot be used for self-harm). He was not given soap, a toothbrush
    and toothpaste, or any other hygiene items. Eventually, another detainee on suicide
    watch was placed in Redman’s cell.
    Six days later, on August 14, Redman had not yet seen any medical provider. But
    Officer Nick Elbus opened the door to his cell and allowed him and his cellmate to walk
    down the hall and take a shower. Redman’s cellmate went first. When it was Redman’s
    turn, he entered the shower unattended, took a plastic trash bag from the wall, tied it
    into a noose, and hanged himself from a shower rod. Elbus found Redman and radioed
    for help; officers Dakota Downs and Deana Coleman responded. According to Elbus’s
    incident report, he and Dakota Downs were able to get Redman to “wake up and
    respond” with chest compressions and ammonia tablets (smelling salts). The three
    officers then put Redman in a restraint chair in the jail’s intake area with his smock on
    his lap and the ammonia tablets still in his nose as he faded in and out of consciousness.
    Dakota Downs joked that Redman could be “charged with chipping the paint” with his
    head. After a few hours, the officers returned Redman to his cell without his smock. For
    the next 10 days, he was naked, even when he went for meals, and although at least one
    officer, Blake Harper, told him to put something on, he was not given a new smock. He
    did not ask for one.
    Redman did not see a medical professional until August 24—10 days after the
    suicide attempt. At that point, a family-medicine nurse practitioner from a local medical
    No. 20-1655                                                                       Page 3
    group gave him a short examination; it is not clear whether this was a response to the
    suicide attempt or something more routine. She noted that Redman appeared
    depressed. Three weeks later, on September 17, Redman saw a psychiatrist who
    diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication. There is no evidence
    that any defendant brought about the psychiatrist’s visit. A month later, Redman was
    removed from suicide watch at his request by Chad Downs, a jail administrator. The jail
    continued to give Redman his medications and allow him to see the psychiatrist until he
    was transferred in March 2019.
    Redman sued Elbus, Coleman, Harper, Dakota Downs, and Chad Downs, as well
    as the county sheriff, Brian Vonderhaar, and two other officers—Brinton Finley and
    Scott Smith—under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . At “merit review,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a
    district judge dismissed Redman’s claims about his lack of clothing and hygiene
    products, concluding that he had not alleged a “sufficiently serious deprivation” or that
    jail officials were “deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm.”
    The parties later filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Redman’s
    medical-care claim, and the district court (Magistrate Judge Long, presiding by consent
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)) entered judgment for the defendants. It concluded that, even if
    they knew Redman was suicidal, jail staff acted reasonably by placing Redman on
    suicide watch, eventually providing him with mental-health care, and giving him his
    prescribed medication after that. Further, the court explained, no evidence showed that
    they prevented him from getting necessary care; they all “did what they could.”
    On appeal, Redman continues to press his conditions-of-confinement claims
    relating to the deprivation of basic hygiene products and, later, clothing. We agree that
    the district court erred by dismissing them at screening under a deliberate-indifference
    standard. To state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must
    allege only that the defendants purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly created
    conditions that were objectively unreasonable. See Hardeman v. Curran, 
    933 F.3d 816
    , 823
    (7th Cir. 2019); Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 
    900 F.3d 335
    , 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing
    Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 
    576 U.S. 389
     (2015)).
    Redman did so. Jails must provide detainees with “basic human needs,”
    including clothing and hygiene products. Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 825 (quoting DeShaney
    v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    489 U.S. 189
    , 200 (1989)). Here, Redman alleged
    that he was not provided with soap, a toothbrush, and toothpaste for at least 51 days.
    Further, he allegedly lacked something to cover himself (even a suicide smock) for at
    No. 20-1655                                                                         Page 4
    least 10 days after his suicide attempt and had to walk the halls naked, past jail staff, to
    get his meals. Although Officers Finley and Harper taunted him as he did so, they never
    gave him another smock and neither did any other officer. Finally, Redman alleged that
    the deprivations of clothing and hygiene products were demeaning and humiliating.
    See Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 
    850 F.3d 849
    , 855–58 (7th Cir. 2017) (detainees
    stated cognizable harm under the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that being denied
    underwear was “humiliating”). We note that “officials must be free to take appropriate
    action to ensure the safety of inmates.” Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
    , 547 (1979). But that
    potential explanation for the deprivation did not provide a basis to dismiss Redman’s
    claim at the pleadings stage. Further, it does not follow from the need to keep hygiene
    items out of the cell to prevent self-harm—if that is why Redman did not have soap or
    dental hygiene products—that a detainee may be altogether deprived of opportunities
    to wash himself or brush his teeth.
    Redman also challenges the district court’s summary-judgment ruling,
    maintaining that the defendants knew that he was suicidal yet failed to get him timely
    treatment. He further contends that the district court overlooked that the defendants left
    him unsupervised in the shower with the means to harm himself and failed to timely
    arrange medical care even after his suicide attempt.
    The Fourteenth Amendment also applies to claims of inadequate medical care
    brought by pretrial detainees. See James v. Hale, 
    959 F.3d 307
    , 318 (7th Cir. 2020). For his
    claim to survive summary judgment, Redman again needed evidence that jail staff
    acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when considering their response to his
    serious medical condition, Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353–54, and that their conduct was
    objectively unreasonable considering the relevant facts and circumstances. James,
    959 F.3d at 318. Mental-health disorders resulting in suicidal ideation are serious
    medical conditions. See Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349; Lord v. Beahm, 
    952 F.3d 902
    , 904
    (7th Cir. 2020). But even when jail staff respond unreasonably to such a condition, a
    detainee must prove that their conduct caused harm. See Pulera v. Sarzant, 
    966 F.3d 540
    ,
    550 (7th Cir. 2020); Lord, 952 F.3d at 905 (risk from suicidality “not compensable without
    evidence of injury”).
    The district court rightly determined that no reasonable jury could find that
    Harper, Smith, Vonderhaar, or Chad Downs did, or failed to do, anything objectively
    unreasonable with respect to Redman’s serious medical condition. There is no evidence
    of the sheriff’s involvement, nor that the other three officers participated in delaying
    No. 20-1655                                                                        Page 5
    medical or mental health care. So no jury could find them liable under § 1983. See Rasho
    v. Elyea, 
    856 F.3d 469
    , 478 (7th Cir. 2017); Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343–44.
    But summary judgment was premature with respect to Elbus, Coleman, and
    Dakota Downs because a finding of objectively unreasonable conduct was not
    foreclosed on this record. At summary judgment, Redmond argued that it was
    “inhumane” for Elbus to leave him “unguarded in an insecure area with means to make
    an attempt on his life” and for all three officers to return him to his cell without any
    mental health care that night or for weeks after. Further, he contended, his mental
    health deteriorated because of his suicide attempt and after it, and so his condition
    would not have progressed had the officers protected him from self-harm and promptly
    gotten him treatment. This court has repeatedly acknowledged that jail officials may
    violate the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect inmates from genuine threats of
    self-harm, see Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349, and by significantly and inexplicably delaying
    effective medical treatment for a serious condition where it exacerbates a detainee’s
    suffering, see Grieveson v. Anderson, 
    538 F.3d 763
    , 779–80 (7th Cir. 2008) (jury could find
    that one-and-a-half-day delay in treatment for serious condition without explanation
    violated Fourteenth Amendment). The sparse declarations of the defendants in support
    of summary judgment did not support a conclusion that they are not liable for failing to
    prevent Redman’s suicide attempt and the subsequent delay in treatment. Because the
    record is thin, however, we say nothing more than summary judgment was premature
    on the issue of whether any defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. The
    district court should consider this question—and the related issue of whether any
    defendant’s conduct caused harm to Redman—in the first instance. See Neely-Bey Tarik-
    El v. Conley, 
    912 F.3d 989
    , 1005 (7th Cir. 2019).
    We end with a note about discovery on remand. Because neither the district
    court’s opinion nor the defendants’ summary-judgment and appellate filings addressed
    Redman’s attempted suicide, the jail officials’ response to it, or any harm Redman
    suffered as a result, we question whether discovery on the issue was adequate. As
    discovery will likely be reopened to address Redman’s conditions-of-confinement
    claim, the district court may consider whether, in its discretion, further discovery could
    also be appropriate on Redman’s claims for inadequate medical treatment against
    Elbus, Coleman, and Dakota Downs. See Lewis v. McLean, 
    864 F.3d 556
    , 565 (7th Cir.
    2017) (noting that district court could consider reopening discovery on remand
    following reversal of decision granting summary judgment); Peate v. McCann, 
    294 F.3d 879
    , 885 (7th Cir. 2002) (same).
    No. 20-1655                                                                  Page 6
    We therefore VACATE the district court’s dismissal of Redman’s conditions-of-
    confinement claim, VACATE its entry of summary judgment in part with respect to the
    Fourteenth Amendment claims against Elbus, Coleman, and Dakota Downs, and
    REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this decision.