Elder v. Williams , 2020 CO 88 ( 2020 )


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    ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
    December 21, 2020
    
    2020 CO 88
    No. 19SC1009 Elder v. Williams—Civil Rights—Employment Practices—
    Governmental Immunity—Statutory Construction.
    This case principally requires the supreme court to decide whether claims
    against a governmental entity for compensatory relief under the Colorado
    Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”), section 24-34-405, C.R.S. (2020), are barred by
    operation of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”), section
    24-10-106, C.R.S. (2020). The court is also asked to decide whether subsection
    24-34-405(8)(g) of CADA, which allows for compensatory damages against “the
    state,” should be read to include political subdivisions of the state of Colorado and
    whether front pay is compensatory in nature, lies in tort, and is therefore barred
    by the CGIA.
    The court now concludes that (1) claims for compensatory relief under
    CADA are not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes
    of the CGIA and therefore public entities are not immune from CADA claims
    under the CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), includes
    political subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions are not immune
    from claims for compensatory damages based on intentional unfair or
    discriminatory employment practices; and (3) front pay is equitable and not
    compensatory in nature under CADA, and age discrimination and retaliation
    claims seeking front pay do not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes.
    The court therefore affirms the judgment of the division below.
    The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
    2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
    
    2020 CO 88
    Supreme Court Case No. 19SC1009
    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
    Court of Appeals Case No. 18CA1987
    Petitioners:
    Bill Elder, as Sheriff of El Paso County, Colorado; and
    El Paso County Sheriff’s Office,
    v.
    Respondent:
    Timothy Williams.
    Judgment Affirmed
    en banc
    December 21, 2020
    Attorney for Petitioners:
    Bryan E. Schmid, Senior Assistant County Attorney
    Colorado Springs, Colorado
    Attorneys for Respondent:
    Livelihood Law, LLC
    Rachel E. Ellis
    Euell B. Thomas
    Denver, Colorado
    Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Plaintiff Employment Lawyers
    Association:
    Cornish & Dell’Olio, P.C.
    Ian D. Kalmanowitz
    Bradley J. Sherman
    Colorado Springs, Colorado
    JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissents, and CHIEF JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE
    BOATRIGHT join in the dissent.
    2
    ¶1       This case requires us to address the interplay between two statutes—the
    Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”), section 24-34-405, C.R.S. (2020), and
    the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”), section 24-10-106, C.R.S.
    (2020)—each of which serves substantial public policy objectives. In particular, we
    must resolve three issues of apparent first impression for this court. First, we must
    decide whether claims against a governmental entity for compensatory relief
    under CADA are barred by operation of the CGIA. This, in turn, requires us to
    determine whether CADA claims for compensatory relief “lie in tort or could lie
    in tort” for purposes of the CGIA because if they do, then governmental entities
    would be immune under the CGIA from such claims. Second, we must decide
    whether subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) of CADA, which allows for compensatory
    damages against “the state,” should be read to include political subdivisions of the
    state of Colorado. And finally, we must decide whether front pay is compensatory
    in nature, lies in tort, and is therefore barred by the CGIA.1
    1   Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:
    1. Whether the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act bars an
    employee’s claim seeking compensatory relief against a
    governmental entity under section 24-34-405, C.R.S. (2019) of the
    Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
    2. Whether section 24-34-405(8)(g), C.R.S. (2019), exempts public
    sector employers that are a political subdivision, commission,
    3
    ¶2    We now conclude that (1) claims for compensatory relief under CADA are
    not claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of the
    CGIA and therefore public entities are not immune from CADA claims under the
    CGIA; (2) “the state,” as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), includes political
    subdivisions of the state and thus political subdivisions are not immune from
    claims for compensatory damages based on intentional unfair or discriminatory
    employment practices; and (3) front pay is equitable and not compensatory in
    nature under CADA, and age discrimination and retaliation claims seeking front
    pay do not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA purposes.
    ¶3    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the division below.
    department, institution, or school district of the state from
    compensatory damages for an intentional unfair or discriminatory
    employment practice under the Colorado Governmental
    Immunity Act, §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. (2019).
    3. Whether front pay damages for claims that sound in tort are
    compensatory in nature and therefore excluded from age
    discrimination claims pursuant to section 24-34-405(3)(g), C.R.S.
    (2019), and retaliation claims pursuant to section 24-34-405(8)(g),
    C.R.S. (2019).
    4
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    ¶4    Because the matter before us arises from an order on a motion to dismiss
    Timothy Williams’s claims, for purposes here, we take the facts from the
    allegations of Williams’s complaint.
    ¶5    Williams began working at the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office in 2002 and,
    after multiple promotions over the course of his career, reached the rank of
    lieutenant.   In March 2016, Sheriff Bill Elder ordered a mandatory survey
    requesting, among other things, retirement eligibility dates from all employees.
    Williams, who then would have been eligible for full retirement benefits on June 1,
    2018, completed this survey and reported that he expected to retire within the next
    five years.
    ¶6    Thereafter, Williams was assigned to a team that conducted investigations
    into alleged misconduct by personnel in his office. Apparently, Sheriff Elder was
    unhappy with Williams’s investigation and the sanctions that Williams
    recommended, and he confronted Williams in a meeting about it. In this same
    meeting, Sheriff Elder went on to criticize Williams’s job performance and
    indicated that Williams should be concerned about his job security. Then, several
    days later, Sheriff Elder held a lengthy lieutenants’ meeting, at which he
    demanded that all employees, including Williams, “step up or step out” and
    5
    stated, “[I]f you can’t cut it then check out.” Sheriff Elder allegedly looked at
    Williams when he made this last statement.
    ¶7    A few days later, Sheriff Elder demoted Williams to the rank of senior
    deputy, a significant change in rank, pay, and duties that resulted in substantial
    adverse retirement benefit consequences for Williams.           To avoid these
    consequences, Williams retired the following day, ultimately to be replaced by a
    younger and purportedly less qualified employee.
    ¶8    Based on the foregoing events, Williams filed age discrimination and
    retaliation charges against the El Paso County Sheriff’s Office with the Colorado
    Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (for
    convenience, we will refer to Sheriff Elder and his office collectively as the
    “Sheriff’s Office”).
    ¶9    While these discrimination charges were pending, the Sheriff’s Office
    received and responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request for certain
    documents. In its response, the Sheriff’s Office stated that Williams had been
    responsible for the requested documents but when he retired, he had removed
    items from his office and the documents in question could not be located. Williams
    claimed that this response, which was publicly available, was false and amounted
    to a public shaming for Williams’s having filed discrimination charges against the
    Sheriff’s Office.
    6
    ¶10   The Colorado Civil Rights Division ultimately issued a Notice of Right to
    Sue, and Williams filed a complaint against the Sheriff’s Office in the El Paso
    County District Court, alleging claims of age discrimination and retaliation under
    CADA, section 24-34-402, C.R.S. (2020). In his complaint, Williams demanded
    judgment for any and all damages permissible by law, including, as pertinent here,
    front pay and compensatory damages.
    ¶11   The Sheriff’s Office moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that
    Williams’s claims for front pay and compensatory damages under CADA lie in
    tort and therefore are barred by the CGIA. Specifically, the Sheriff’s Office argued
    that although prior case law from this court had concluded that CADA claims
    were not subject to the CGIA, this case law was announced before the General
    Assembly amended CADA to include front pay and compensatory damages and
    was therefore inapposite. Instead, the Sheriff’s Office contended that because front
    pay and compensatory damages claims arise out of conduct that is either tortious
    in nature or that constitutes the breach of a duty recognized in tort law, and
    because such claims seek relief in the form of compensation for injury, these claims
    lie in tort or could lie in tort for CGIA purposes and are therefore barred. The
    Sheriff’s Office further argued that any claim for compensatory damages
    associated with Williams’s alleged age discrimination claim must be dismissed
    under the plain language of subsection 24-34-405(3)(g), which limits a plaintiff’s
    7
    recovery for age discrimination claims to equitable relief under CADA and to the
    relief prescribed by federal law.
    ¶12   The district court ordered supplemental briefing on whether CADA’s more
    recently available remedies for front pay and compensatory damages lie in tort
    and thus are barred under the CGIA. Williams responded that (1) front pay is an
    equitable remedy under both the plain language of subsection 24-34-405(2) and
    federal case law interpreting Title VII and (2) when reading CADA’s remedies
    provisions as a whole, an award of compensatory damages is permitted under that
    statute and is not subject to the CGIA. The Sheriff’s Office replied that (1) whether
    front pay is considered equitable relief is not dispositive of whether a claim lies in
    tort and is thus subject to the CGIA; (2) all claims for compensatory damages lie in
    tort and are subject to the CGIA; and (3) Williams’s compensatory damages and
    front pay claims alleged elements that are common to multiple intentional torts.
    Thus, the Sheriff’s Office asserted that all of Williams’s claims were barred by the
    CGIA.
    ¶13   The district court ultimately agreed with Williams and denied the Sheriff’s
    Office’s motion to dismiss. In so concluding, the district court observed that front
    pay under CADA is an equitable remedy and under this court’s prior case law,
    claims for equitable relief are not claims for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in
    tort and thus are not barred by the CGIA. The court likewise concluded that
    8
    Williams’s claims for compensatory damages for age discrimination and
    retaliation under CADA were not barred by the CGIA. In the court’s view, reading
    CADA’s remedies provisions as a whole, a consistent and sensible reading permits
    the recovery of such damages against the state and other public entities.
    ¶14   The Sheriff’s Office appealed, and, in a unanimous, published decision, a
    division of the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Williams v.
    Elder, 
    2019 COA 172
    , __ P.3d __. As pertinent here, the division agreed that
    Williams’s claims for front pay and for compensatory damages based on
    retaliation could proceed. 
    Id.
     at ¶¶ 21–29. The division, however, concluded that
    under the express language of subsection 24-34-405(3)(g), Williams could not
    recover compensatory damages in connection with his age discrimination claim.
    Williams, ¶¶ 12–20, 29.
    ¶15   The Sheriff’s Office petitioned this court for certiorari, and we granted that
    petition.
    II. Analysis
    ¶16   We begin by setting forth the applicable standards relating to statutory
    interpretation. We then proceed to discuss the relationship between CADA and
    the CGIA, ultimately concluding that a claim brought pursuant to CADA does not
    and could not lie in tort and is therefore not barred by the CGIA. Next, we consider
    whether the language of subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) evinces a legislative intent to
    9
    bar, under the CGIA, compensatory damages claims against a political subdivision
    of the state, and we conclude it does not. Last, we address whether claims for front
    pay under CADA are compensatory in nature and lie in tort, and are therefore
    barred by the CGIA. We conclude that they are not and that Williams may
    therefore pursue his claims for front pay.
    A. Applicable Legal Standards
    ¶17   We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Dep’t of Revenue v.
    Agilent Techs., Inc., 
    2019 CO 41
    , ¶ 16, 
    441 P.3d 1012
    , 1016.
    ¶18   In construing a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the General
    Assembly’s intent. 
    Id.
     In doing so, we apply words and phrases in accord with
    their plain and ordinary meanings. 
    Id.
     In addition, we look to the entire statutory
    scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its
    parts, and we avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases
    superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results. 
    Id.
     If the statute is
    unambiguous, then we apply it as written and need not resort to other rules of
    statutory construction. 
    Id.
     If the statute is ambiguous, however, then we may look
    to the legislature’s intent, the circumstances surrounding the statute’s adoption,
    and the possible consequences of different interpretations to determine the
    statute’s proper construction. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez,
    10
    
    2019 CO 3
    , ¶ 19, 
    433 P.3d 22
    , 28. A statute is ambiguous when it is reasonably
    susceptible of multiple interpretations. 
    Id.
    B. CADA Claims Do Not Lie in Tort
    ¶19   The Sheriff’s Office contends that employment discrimination claims
    seeking compensatory damages pursuant to section 24-34-405 of CADA lie or
    could lie in tort and that the CGIA bars such claims when asserted against
    governmental entities. We are not persuaded.
    ¶20   The CGIA provides, in pertinent part, “A public entity shall be immune
    from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless
    of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the
    claimant,” subject to exceptions not pertinent here. § 24-10-106(1). The CGIA’s
    legislative declaration of policy makes clear that one of the CGIA’s purposes is to
    protect the state and its political subdivisions from unlimited financial liability
    because “the state and its political subdivisions provide essential public services
    and functions” and “unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively
    expensive the provision of such essential public services and functions.”
    § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2020). In addition, we note that because the CGIA derogates
    Colorado’s common law, we must strictly construe its immunity provisions but
    broadly construe its waiver provisions. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs,
    
    2018 CO 10
    , ¶ 22, 
    410 P.3d 1236
    , 1240.
    11
    ¶21   In deciding whether a claim lies or could lie in tort, we have made clear that
    the form of the complaint is not determinative. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div.,
    
    179 P.3d 998
    , 1003 (Colo. 2008). Instead, we consider both the nature of the injury
    and the relief sought. 
    Id.
    ¶22   With respect to the nature of the injury, we have said, “When the injury
    arises either out of conduct that is tortious in nature or out of the breach of a duty
    recognized in tort law, and when the relief seeks to compensate the plaintiff for
    that injury, the claim likely lies in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA.”
    
    Id.
     We have further stated that the CGIA “encompasses all claims against a public
    entity arising from the breach of a general duty of care, as distinguished from
    contractual relations or a distinctly non-tortious statutorily-imposed duty.” Colo.
    Dep’t of Transp. v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 
    182 P.3d 687
    , 691 (Colo. 2008).
    ¶23   With respect to the relief sought, we have opined that the nature of the relief
    requested is not dispositive as to whether a claim lies in tort, although it may
    inform our understanding of the nature of the injury and the duty allegedly
    breached. Robinson, 179 P.3d at 1003. This is particularly true in the case of a
    statutory claim without origins in common law in which, for example, the
    legislature intended to address constitutionally based concerns of equality rather
    than compensation for personal injuries. Id. at 1006; see also Brown Grp. Retail,
    182 P.3d at 690 (noting that “we have distinguished some statutorily created
    12
    duties, despite their general and non-contractual nature, on the basis of their broad
    policy rather than compensatory goals”).
    ¶24   CADA is just such a statutory claim. CADA derives from the Colorado Civil
    Rights Act (“CRA”), which the legislature enacted in 1963 and which created a
    statutory duty prohibiting employers from engaging in a variety of discriminatory
    employment practices. See ch. 177, sec. 3, § 80-24-6, 
    1963 Colo. Sess. Laws 625
    ,
    627–28; § 24-34-402. Neither the CRA nor CADA has origins in the common law.
    Nor do claims under these statutes arise from the breach of a general duty of care.
    Rather, “the legislature adopted these anti-discrimination provisions to fulfill the
    ‘basic responsibility of government to redress discriminatory employment
    practices on the basis of race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin, or ancestry.’”
    City of Colo. Springs v. Conners, 
    993 P.2d 1167
    , 1174 (Colo. 2000) (quoting in part
    Colo. C.R. Comm’n ex rel. Ramos v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 
    759 P.2d 726
    , 731
    (Colo. 1988)). Accordingly, the CRA and CADA were “not designed primarily to
    compensate individual claimants but rather to eliminate discriminatory practices
    as defined by [those statutes].” 
    Id.
     As a result, any benefits to an individual
    claimant resulting from a claim under CADA (and under the CRA before it) are
    “merely incidental” to those statutes’ greater purposes of eliminating workplace
    discrimination. See Brooke v. Rest. Servs., Inc., 
    906 P.2d 66
    , 71 (Colo. 1995); Agnello v.
    Adolph Coors Co., 
    689 P.2d 1162
    , 1165 (Colo. App. 1984).
    13
    ¶25   Several provisions of CADA reinforce our view of its non-compensatory
    purpose. For example, subsection 24-34-405(3)(d) provides for a capped damages
    structure that, in conjunction with the damages available under Title VII, limits
    compensatory damages awards based on the size of the employer and the
    egregiousness of the intentional discriminatory or unfair employment practice, not
    based on the claimant’s injury. See § 24-34-405(3)(d); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2018).
    This statutory scheme confirms CADA’s focus on discriminatory or unfair
    employment practices, and not on ensuring full compensation for claimants.
    ¶26   In addition, in our view, CADA’s provision allowing a prevailing plaintiff
    to recover reasonable attorney fees effectively creates a mechanism by which
    claimants act as private attorneys general, seeking to vindicate the rights secured
    by CADA. Subsection 24-34-405(5) authorizes a court to award attorney fees to all
    prevailing plaintiffs but restricts awards of defense fees and costs to cases in which
    the plaintiff’s claims are found to be frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. Such a
    structure encourages private actions that are more akin to civil prosecutions in the
    public interest of eliminating employment discrimination than to actions designed
    primarily to compensate an individual for personal injury.          See Gudenkauf v.
    Stauffer Commc’ns, Inc., 
    158 F.3d 1074
    , 1081 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that (1) under
    Title VII’s private enforcement provisions, individual Title VII litigants act as
    private attorneys general; (2) it is in society’s interest to ensure that equality of
    14
    opportunity in the workplace is not undermined by unlawful discrimination; and
    (3) even small victories advance that interest).
    ¶27   For these reasons, we conclude that CADA claims derive from statutory
    duties designed to implement the broad policy of eliminating intentional
    discriminatory or unfair employment practices, rather than to compensate an
    individual for personal injuries. Accordingly, CADA claims do not and could not
    lie in tort, and Williams’s claims under CADA are not barred by the CGIA.
    ¶28   In so concluding, we acknowledge that our decision in Conners, the viability
    of which no party in this case has challenged, appears to have engendered some
    confusion in the aftermath of the 2013 amendments to CADA. We, however, see
    no inconsistency between that case and the case now before us.
    ¶29   In Conners, 993 P.2d at 1168, we addressed the question of whether claims
    for non-compensatory equitable relief under CADA’s predecessor, the CRA, were
    claims for injuries that lie in tort or could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. We
    concluded that they were not, distinguishing between actions seeking
    compensatory damages for personal injuries and those in which any benefits to an
    individual claimant are incidental to the CRA’s greater purpose of eliminating
    workplace discrimination. Id. at 1173–74.
    ¶30   Notwithstanding the Sheriff’s Office’s assertion to the contrary, our
    discussion in Conners was not so narrow as to address solely claims for equitable
    15
    relief. Rather, Conners is properly understood as more broadly addressing a
    statute with no foundation in common law that principally served a societal
    purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination. It was in this context that we
    concluded that claims under the CRA were not barred by the CGIA, and we apply
    the same analysis and reach the same conclusion here.
    ¶31   In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by the Sheriff’s Office’s
    contention that the 2013 amendments to CADA changed the focus of that statute
    such that claims brought under it (including equitable claims) now lie or could lie
    in tort for CGIA purposes. Contrary to the Sheriff’s Office’s position, we perceive
    nothing in the 2013 amendments suggesting a legislative intent to alter CADA’s
    fundamental purpose of eliminating workplace discrimination and to substitute a
    regime focused on compensation for claimants. Nor do we perceive anything in
    those amendments signaling a legislative intent to override our decision in Conners
    and to bring CADA claims within the immunity afforded by the CGIA. To the
    contrary, we read the legislature’s inclusion in the amendments of the private
    enforcement and capped damages provisions discussed above as reflecting the
    legislature’s desire to advance CADA’s central purpose of eliminating workplace
    discrimination while, at the same time, including within CADA itself provisions
    protecting public entities from unlimited financial liability, which, as noted above,
    is one of the CGIA’s purposes.
    16
    ¶32   Nor are we persuaded by the Sheriff’s Office’s argument that by referring to
    the CGIA in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) of CADA, the General Assembly intended
    to signal that a CADA claim is a tort covered by the CGIA and that CGIA
    immunity should be waived, but only as to the state and not any of its political
    subdivisions. The Sheriff’s Office has cited no authority or legislative history
    supporting such a premise, and we have seen no such authority or history.
    Accordingly, we are unwilling to infer such a legislative intent. Were we to infer
    any legislative intent from the statutory language, however, it would be solely that
    the legislature sought to ensure consistency with our ruling in Conners (which
    concluded that remedies under CADA’s predecessor statute were not barred by
    the CGIA) while at the same time seeking to ensure governmental immunity from
    punitive damages claims. See § 24-34-405(3)(b)(I).
    ¶33   Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Sheriff’s Office’s argument that federal
    case law interpreting Title VII suggests that claims brought under CADA lie or
    could lie in tort. As an initial matter, we note that the federal case law on which
    the Sheriff’s Office relies does not address CADA or its intent, nor does any of such
    case law contradict our understanding of CADA’s central purpose of eliminating
    workplace discrimination. Moreover, although some federal cases at times refer
    to Title VII claims as statutory torts, other cases focus on Title VII’s overriding
    purpose of promoting equality and prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the
    17
    workplace, analyzing Title VII much as we have analyzed CADA here. Compare
    Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
    490 U.S. 228
    , 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
    (referring to a Title VII claim as a statutory employment “tort”), with Griggs v. Duke
    Power Co., 
    401 U.S. 424
    , 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress in the enactment
    of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
    employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
    favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”), and
    
    29 C.F.R. § 1608.1
    (b) (2020) (“Congress enacted title VII in order to improve the
    economic and social conditions of minorities and women by providing equality of
    opportunity in the work place.”).
    ¶34   In addition, we note that none of the federal cases describing Title VII claims
    as statutory torts do so in the context of discussing governmental immunity.
    Instead, to the extent that these cases discuss tort principles, they appear to do so
    in connection with defining the element of causation in Title VII claims. See, e.g.,
    Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
    570 U.S. 338
    , 346 (2013) (“This case requires
    the Court to define the proper standard of causation for Title VII retaliation
    claims.”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
    , 175–76 (2009) (framing the
    primary issue as determining the meaning of the words “because of”).
    ¶35   Lastly, we note that federal case law interpreting Title VII specifically allows
    for compensatory damages against governmental entities while precluding the
    18
    recovery of punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (permitting awards of
    compensatory damages against any respondent while prohibiting awards of
    punitive damages against the government, a government agency, or a political
    subdivision); Baker v. Runyon, 
    114 F.3d 668
    , 671–72 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
    Title VII’s damages provision reinforces the clear statutory intent that
    compensatory damages are available against federal, state, and local
    governmental defendants to the same extent that they are available against private
    sector defendants but that punitive damages are not recoverable); see also 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-16 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
    national origin in the federal government).
    ¶36   Given that section 24-34-405(6) of CADA expressly requires that we
    construe, interpret, and apply section 24-34-405 consistently with the standards
    established through judicial interpretation of Title VII, among other federal laws,
    the fact that federal case law interpreting Title VII expressly allows compensatory
    damages claims against governmental entities further confirms the conclusion that
    we reach today.
    ¶37   For all of these reasons, we conclude that Williams’s claim seeking
    compensatory relief against the Sheriff’s Office under section 24-34-405 does not
    and could not lie in tort and therefore is not barred by the CGIA.
    19
    C. Subsection 24-34-405(8)(g)
    ¶38   The Sheriff’s Office next contends that although subsection 24-34-405(8)(g)
    provides that certain CADA claims for compensatory damages against “the state”
    are not subject to the CGIA, because the Sheriff’s Office is a state agency and not
    “the state,” Williams’s compensatory damages claims here are subject to the CGIA.
    We are not persuaded.
    ¶39   As an initial matter, for the reasons noted above, compensatory damages
    claims under CADA do not and could not lie in tort, and therefore, such claims are
    not barred by the CGIA as against any public entity.
    ¶40   In any event, we do not agree that “the state,” as that term is used in
    subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), excludes state agencies like the Sheriff’s Office.
    ¶41   Subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) provides, “A claim filed pursuant to this
    subsection (8) by an aggrieved party against the state for compensatory damages
    for an intentional unfair or discriminatory employment practice is not subject to
    the [CGIA].” The term “the state,” however, is undefined.
    ¶42   The Sheriff’s Office contends that this term refers to the state of Colorado
    and only the state of Colorado, and that it does not include state agencies or
    political subdivisions. In support of this contention, the Sheriff’s Office observes
    that elsewhere in CADA, the General Assembly has distinguished between “the
    state” and “any political subdivision, commission, department, institution, or
    20
    school district of the state.” See, e.g., § 24-34-405(3)(b)(I). The Sheriff’s Office thus
    asserts that had the legislature intended for “the state” to include any state
    agencies or political subdivisions, it would have said so expressly.
    ¶43   Williams, in contrast, argues that the term “the state,” as distinguished from
    “the state of Colorado,” generally includes state agencies and political
    subdivisions. He further argues that, in his view, “the state” must be read to
    include state agencies and political subdivisions in order to construe all of the
    provisions of CADA harmoniously. See, e.g., § 24-34-401(3), C.R.S. (2020) (defining
    an “employer” to include “the state of Colorado or any political subdivision,
    commission, department, institution, or school district thereof, and every other
    person employing persons within the state”); § 24-34-405(3)(b)(I) (precluding
    punitive damages awards against “the state or any political subdivision,
    commission, department, institution, or school district of the state”).
    ¶44   In our view, both of these competing interpretations are reasonable.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the term “the state” as used in subsection
    24-34-405(8)(g) is ambiguous, and we therefore look to the legislature’s intent, the
    circumstances surrounding the statute’s adoption, and the possible consequences
    of different interpretations to determine that provision’s proper construction.
    Martinez, ¶ 19, 433 P.3d at 28. Doing so persuades us that, as used in subsection
    24-34-405(8)(g), “the state” includes both the state of Colorado and also state
    21
    agencies and political subdivisions of the state. We reach this conclusion for
    several reasons.
    ¶45    First, we note that interpreting subsection 24-34-405(8)(g) as referring solely
    to the state of Colorado would render subsection 24-34-405(3)(b) largely
    superfluous. Subsection 24-34-405(3)(b)(I) states, in pertinent part, that “a plaintiff
    may recover punitive damages against a defendant, other than the state or any
    political subdivision, commission, department, institution, or school district of the state,”
    if the enumerated criteria are demonstrated. (Emphasis added). If “the state,” as
    used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), is read to refer solely to the state of Colorado,
    such that compensatory damages against state agencies and political subdivisions
    are barred, then the legislature would have had no reason to exclude punitive
    damages awards against state agencies or political subdivisions in subsection
    24-34-405(3)(b) (because there would be no basis for an award of punitive damages
    against such entities, given their immunity from compensatory damages claims).
    See Ferrer v. Okbamicael, 2017 CO 14M, ¶ 44, 
    390 P.3d 836
    , 848 (“Exemplary
    damages do not present a separate, distinct cause of action, but rather, depend on
    an underlying claim for actual damages.”); Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc.,
    
    529 P.2d 656
    , 659 (Colo. App. 1974) (“It is settled law that an award of exemplary
    damages cannot stand unless there has been an award of ‘actual damages.’”)
    (citations omitted); § 13-21-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020) (providing for an award of
    22
    exemplary damages in civil actions in which compensatory damages are assessed,
    if certain conditions are satisfied). As noted above, we cannot construe a statute
    so as to render any provision superfluous. Agilent Techs., ¶ 16, 441 P.3d at 1016.
    ¶46   Second, the fiscal note accompanying the proposed 2013 amendments to
    CADA stated, “The size of potential damages allowed will depend on the size of
    the local governments involved and cannot be estimated.”           Fiscal Note on
    HB 13-1136, at 5, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 2013) (emphasis added).
    This acknowledgement that damages could be assessed against local governments
    reflects a contemporaneous understanding that local governments are, in fact,
    subject to such damage awards.
    ¶47   Finally, given CADA’s primary goal of eliminating employment
    discrimination in the workplace, it would be illogical for us to infer that in
    attempting to broaden the tools available to those who have suffered workplace
    discrimination, the legislature, at the same time, excluded from CADA’s reach a
    broad swath of workers employed by the state’s political subdivisions and
    agencies. As noted above, we must avoid such illogical statutory constructions.
    See Agilent Techs., ¶ 16, 441 P.3d at 1016.
    ¶48   Accordingly, we conclude that “the state,” as used in subsection
    24-34-405(8)(g), includes both the state of Colorado and any state agency or
    political subdivision.
    23
    D. Front Pay
    ¶49   Finally, the Sheriff’s Office argues that claims for front pay in connection
    with alleged age discrimination and retaliation are compensatory in nature and
    thus lie or could lie in tort for CGIA purposes.
    ¶50   As an initial matter, we emphasize that the issue before us concerns only
    whether Williams’s demand for front pay in connection with his discrimination
    claims is compensatory and thus barred under the CGIA. We did not grant
    certiorari to review, and we therefore do not review, the conclusion of the division
    below that CADA itself expressly bars claims for compensatory damages in
    connection with an age discrimination claim. See § 24-34-405(3)(g).
    ¶51   Because we have concluded that CADA claims do not and could not lie in
    tort, Williams’s claims for front pay under CADA likewise do not lie in tort and
    thus are not barred by the CGIA. In any event, under CADA’s plain language,
    front pay is equitable in nature, and for that reason as well, claims for such relief
    are not compensatory, as the Sheriff’s Office contends.           See § 24-34-405(2)
    (establishing that back pay, front pay, or “[a]ny other equitable relief” is available
    against an employer who is found to have engaged in an unfair or discriminatory
    employment practice) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Sheriff’s Office appears to
    have conceded this fact when, in its opening brief, it described equitable relief
    under CADA as including front pay.
    24
    ¶52   We therefore conclude that Williams’s claims for front pay under CADA are
    not barred by the CGIA.
    III. Conclusion
    ¶53   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that CADA claims seeking
    compensatory damages do not and could not lie in tort and therefore are not
    barred by application of the CGIA. We further conclude that the term “the state,”
    as used in subsection 24-34-405(8)(g), subsumes both the state of Colorado and its
    agencies and political subdivisions. Finally, we conclude that front pay under
    CADA is equitable and not compensatory in nature and that age discrimination
    and retaliation claims seeking front pay do not lie and could not lie in tort for CGIA
    purposes.
    ¶54   Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the division below.
    JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissents, and CHIEF JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE
    BOATRIGHT join in the dissent.
    25
    JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, dissenting.
    ¶55   Without question, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, §§ 24-34-401
    to -406, C.R.S. (2020) (“CADA”), serves to fulfill a “basic responsibility of
    government to redress discriminatory employment practices on the basis of race,
    creed, color, sex, age, national origin, or ancestry,” maj. op. ¶ 24 (quoting City of
    Colo. Springs v. Conners, 
    993 P.2d 1167
    , 1174 (Colo. 2000)). But claims under CADA
    are claims for “injuries which lie in tort or could lie in tort” and therefore are
    barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S.
    (2020) (“CGIA”). While it may well be that the compensatory damages remedy
    afforded by CADA should, as a policy matter, be extended to employees of
    Colorado’s political subdivisions, I cannot agree that the 2013 amendments to
    CADA waived governmental immunity to accomplish that.
    ¶56   The majority holds today that claims brought under CADA fall entirely
    outside of the scope of the CGIA. Maj. op. ¶¶ 19–37, 53. The majority reaches this
    conclusion by relying on and extending the reasoning of our opinion in Conners.
    There, we held that “the CGIA does not provide the government immunity from
    claims for relief under the [Colorado Civil Rights Act]1 when such claims are not
    1Conners addressed a prior version of CADA known as the Colorado Civil Rights
    Act, or CRA.
    1
    based on providing compensatory relief to individuals but instead focus on the
    anti-discrimination purposes of the statute.” Conners, 993 P.2d at 1176–77.
    ¶57    I believe that this court’s opinion in Conners strayed significantly from the
    plain text of the CGIA, and the majority’s extension of our erroneous holding in
    that case continues down that errant path.            Under the CGIA, governmental
    immunity extends to all claims that “lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of . . . the
    form of relief chosen by the claimant.” § 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. (2020) (emphasis
    added). Conners squarely contravened this statutory language by focusing on the
    forms of relief available under the CRA to conclude that claims brought under that
    Act were “non-compensatory” in nature, and therefore, did not and could not lie
    in tort. In so doing, the opinion erroneously reasoned that the relief afforded or
    sought drives whether the claim “lie[s] in tort or could lie in tort” for purposes of
    the CGIA.
    ¶58    Today, the majority further deviates from the scope of government
    immunity set forth in section 24-10-106(1) by grafting an exception for statutory
    claims that “principally serve[] a societal purpose.” See maj. op. ¶ 30. Not only
    does the majority’s reading of the CGIA find no purchase in the statutory text, it
    also creates a vague standard against which other statutory causes of action must
    now be measured.
    2
    ¶59   Fidelity to the text of the CGIA demands that we apply the “lie[s] in tort or
    could lie in tort” standard as written to determine whether CGIA immunity
    encompasses claims under CADA. Because the injuries that give rise to CADA
    claims can serve as the basis for common law tort claims, such as wrongful
    discharge in violation of public policy or tortious interference with an employment
    contract, see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 
    823 P.2d 100
    , 109 (Colo. 1992); Brooke v.
    Rest. Servs., Inc., 
    906 P.2d 66
    , 68 (Colo. 1995), claims under CADA plainly “could
    lie in tort.” Accordingly, CGIA immunity extends to CADA claims unless the
    General Assembly has expressly waived immunity. There is no such waiver
    applicable here. While the General Assembly may have effectuated a waiver of
    CGIA immunity for claims for compensatory damages brought against the state in
    section 24-34-405(8)(g), C.R.S. (2020), it did not do so for claims against political
    subdivisions.
    ¶60   Though perhaps this omission was mere oversight, we cannot be sure; as I
    explain in my dissent today in Houchin, there are rational, fiscal reasons to protect
    local governments from compensatory damages claims under CADA. See Denver
    Health v. Houchin, 
    2020 CO 89
    , ¶¶ 32–35, __ P.3d __ (Márquez, J., dissenting). But
    even assuming it was oversight, we cannot fix the legislature’s mistakes by reading
    language into section 24-34-405(8)(g) that isn’t there. Maj. op. ¶¶ 2, 44, 48, 53
    3
    (construing statutory reference to “the state” to include “state agencies and
    political subdivisions of the state”). Thus, I respectfully dissent.
    I. The Approach Adopted by Conners and the Majority is
    Contrary to the Text and Purpose of the CGIA
    ¶61   The approach used by Conners and the majority looks to the nature of relief
    afforded by a statute and sought by a claimant to determine whether statutory
    claims fall within the CGIA. Such an approach runs directly counter to the plain
    text and intent behind the scope of immunity set forth in section 24-10-106(1).
    Further, despite offering an array of justifications for its conclusion that CADA
    claims do not fall within the CGIA, the majority fails to articulate a real test to
    determine whether other statutory claims for injury come within the CGIA’s
    ambit.
    A. The General Assembly Intended the “Could Lie in
    Tort” Standard to be Interpreted Expansively
    ¶62   For nearly a century after statehood, Colorado and its political subdivisions
    were immune from suit under the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
    See Evans v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 
    482 P.2d 968
    , 970 (Colo. 1971). In 1971, this court
    abrogated the doctrine in Evans and two companion cases, Proffitt v. State, 
    482 P.2d 965
     (Colo. 1971), and Flournoy v. School District No. One in City & County of Denver,
    
    482 P.2d 966
     (Colo. 1971). But we made clear that “[i]f the General Assembly
    4
    wishes to restore sovereign immunity and governmental immunity in whole or in
    part, it has the authority to do so.” Evans, 482 P.2d at 972.
    ¶63   Two months later, the General Assembly responded by enacting the CGIA.
    See ch. 323, sec. 1, §§ 130-11-1 to -17, 
    1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1204
    , 1218. The CGIA
    broadly reestablished governmental immunity, allowing suit against public
    entities “only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by
    this article.” See § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2020); see also Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J,
    
    2014 CO 32
    , ¶ 31, 
    325 P.3d 571
    , 581 (“The CGIA was designed to specifically
    define—and thus limit—the circumstances when immunity is waived by public
    entities.”).2 To this end, the Act provides that public entities “shall be immune
    2 The majority opines that, “because the CGIA derogates Colorado’s common law,
    we must strictly construe its immunity provisions.” Maj. op. ¶ 20. This is not the
    first time this court has cited this notion when dealing with the CGIA. See
    Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 
    2018 CO 10
    , ¶ 22, 
    410 P.3d 1236
    , 1240;
    Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 
    13 P.3d 794
    , 798 (Colo. 2000). But this
    interpretative canon makes no sense in the context of the CGIA. As noted, the
    common law for nearly a century was that the government enjoyed sovereign
    immunity. And when we abrogated the doctrine in Evans, we expressly invited
    the legislature to re-establish governmental immunity in whole or in part. The
    legislature did so almost immediately. Thus, it is somewhat misleading to suggest
    that the CGIA “derogates the common law,” when at most that “common law”
    absence of sovereign immunity existed for a few weeks. Moreover, when we
    invited the legislature in Evans to reestablish governmental immunity, we stated
    that the “full authority” to determine the scope of immunity belongs “in the hands
    of the General Assembly.” 482 P.2d at 972. Accordingly, when determining the
    scope of immunity granted under the CGIA, “our touchstone remains the intent
    of the legislature,” not judicially adopted interpretive canons. See St. Vrain Valley
    5
    from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of
    whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant
    except as provided otherwise in this section.” § 24-10-106(1) (emphases added).
    ¶64    Although the CGIA’s “could lie in tort” concept is somewhat nebulous, we
    have recognized that the CGIA “broadly encompasses all claims against a public
    entity arising from the breach of a general duty of care, as distinguished from
    contractual relations or a distinctly non-tortious statutorily-imposed duty.” Colo.
    Dep’t of Transp. v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 
    182 P.3d 687
    , 691 (Colo. 2008); see also State
    Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 
    752 P.2d 559
    , 563 (Colo. 1988) (“The clear import of this language
    is that the [CGIA] was intended to apply to all actions against public entities or
    their employees which lie, or could lie, in tort but not contract.”).
    ¶65    Tellingly, nearly all of the cases in which we have held that a claim did not
    and could not “lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA involved contractual claims.
    See City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada Police Dep’t v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 
    2017 CO 97
    , ¶¶ 41–42, 
    403 P.3d 609
    , 617 (unjust enrichment arising out of a contract
    dispute); Denny Constr., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver ex rel. Bd. of Water Comm’rs,
    
    199 P.3d 742
    , 750 (Colo. 2009) (lost profit damages in a breach of contract claim);
    Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. A.R.L. by & through Loveland, 
    2014 CO 33
    , ¶ 12, 
    325 P.3d 1014
    ,
    1019.
    6
    Berg v. State Bd. of Agric., 
    919 P.2d 254
    , 259 (Colo. 1996) (promissory estoppel); Bd.
    of Cnty. Comm’rs v. DeLozier, 
    917 P.2d 714
    , 717 (Colo. 1996) (promissory estoppel);
    Julesburg Sch. Dist. No. RE-1 v. Ebke, 
    562 P.2d 419
    , 421 (Colo. 1977) (breach of
    contractual duty).
    ¶66   By contrast, we have generally determined that claims arising from non-
    contractual injuries fall within the CGIA’s broad ambit. See, e.g., Brown, 182 P.3d
    at 692 (claims for contribution, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief); Lloyd,
    752 P.2d at 563 (retaliatory discharge claim under a state employee protection
    statute); Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 
    179 P.3d 998
    , 1010 (Colo. 2008) (contract
    and unjust enrichment claims that “could alternatively be pleaded and remedied
    through a tort claim”). Conners stands as a rare exception to these trends.3
    3 To my knowledge, the only other instance in which this court has determined
    that a non-contractual claim does not and could not lie in tort for purposes of the
    CGIA was in Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 
    532 P.2d 346
     (Colo. 1975). There,
    we held that claims brought pursuant to the Liability of Peace Officers Act,
    § 29-5-111, C.R.S. (2020), were not subject to the CGIA because “liability of a
    municipality’s police has traditionally existed despite the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity,” and thus “the legislature’s enactment of the [CGIA] was without effect
    on a peace officer’s vulnerability to liability.” Antonopoulos, 532 P.2d at 349.
    Additionally, although this court has never been squarely presented with the
    issue, we acknowledged in Lloyd that inverse condemnation and property damage
    claims brought pursuant to the just compensation clause, Colo. Const. art. II, § 15,
    may not lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA. See 752 P.2d at 563 n.6 (citing SRB v.
    Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 
    601 P.2d 1082
     (Colo. App. 1979); and Hayden v. Bd. of Cnty.
    Comm’rs, 
    580 P.2d 830
     (Colo. App. 1978)).
    7
    B. Conners Misapplied the CGIA’s “Could Lie in Tort”
    Standard
    ¶67     In Conners, this court determined that claims brought pursuant to the CRA
    “neither lie in tort nor could lie in tort for the purposes of the CGIA.” 993 P.2d at
    1174.    We reached this conclusion by centering our analysis largely on the
    equitable and non-compensatory forms of relief available under the CRA,
    emphasizing that the CRA “does not provide monetary compensation for tort-like
    personal injuries for those who are the victims of prohibited discrimination.” Id.
    at 1176. We reasoned that these limited forms of relief were aimed at “eliminating
    workplace discrimination, not compensating individuals for their particular
    injuries arising from violations of the CRA.” Id. at 1175. Working backwards from
    the relief available under the statute, we concluded that that the claims themselves
    were “equitable and non-compensatory in nature,” and therefore such actions
    “neither lie in tort nor could lie in tort for the purposes of the CGIA.” Id. at 1174.
    We even instructed that a trial court “must consider the nature of the relief sought
    to determine whether a particular action ‘lies in tort or could lie in tort’” for
    purposes of the CGIA, openly acknowledging that to do so was “arguably
    inconsistent with the CGIA’s language.” Id. at 1176. Nonetheless following this
    approach, we relied on the non-compensatory and equitable relief afforded under
    the CRA to conclude that the claims brought under that Act were not for injuries
    which “lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA. Id.
    8
    ¶68    Although we later retreated somewhat from Conners in Robinson to say that
    the nature of the relief requested is not dispositive, we reiterated that the nature
    of the relief serves to inform our understanding of the injury and the duty
    breached to determine if a claim lies or could lie in tort. 179 P.3d at 1006.
    ¶69    Notably, the majority now overlooks the absence of compensatory relief so
    critical to our holding in Conners. Maj. op. ¶ 29. The majority ultimately concludes
    that it is solely CADA’s “societal purpose,” rather than the absence of
    compensatory damages, that takes CADA claims outside of the scope of the CGIA.
    See id. at ¶¶ 29–31. But in addition to ignoring the core rationale for our holding
    in Conners, the majority’s analysis repeats the broader error underlying our
    opinion in that case; by focusing on the nature of relief provided by the CRA rather
    than the type of injuries underlying the claims brought, Conners ignored the
    legislature’s mandate that governmental immunity applies to “all claims for injury
    which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of . . . the form of relief chosen by the
    claimant.” § 24-10-106(1) (emphases added).
    ¶70    At no point did Conners, nor does the majority today, explain why the
    injuries underlying CADA claims cannot lie in tort. As we have more recently
    made clear, “[t]he nature of the injury alleged—not the relief requested—is the
    primary inquiry to determine whether the CGIA applies to [a] claim.” Open Door
    Ministries v. Lipschuetz, 2016 CO 37M, ¶ 16, 
    373 P.3d 575
    , 579 (emphasis added).
    9
    To determine whether a claim “could lie in tort” for purposes of the CGIA, we
    should look to whether the claimant is asserting injuries arising out of a “breach
    of a general duty of care,” Brown, 182 P.3d at 691, “regardless of whether that may
    be . . . the form of relief” provided by the cause of action in question or sought by
    the claimant at bar, § 24-10-106(1).
    C. The Majority Has Articulated No Real Test to
    Determine Whether Statutory Claims Fall Outside of the
    CGIA
    ¶71   The majority offers two main justifications to support its conclusion that
    CADA claims are not subject to the CGIA. Neither is persuasive nor offers
    workable guidance for determining whether other statutory causes of action are
    subject to the CGIA.
    ¶72   First, the majority opines that, because CADA serves “greater purposes”
    that are in the “public interest,” it is primarily non-compensatory in nature and
    thus cannot be subject to the CGIA. See maj. op. ¶¶ 24, 26. But many causes of
    action that are subject to the CGIA implicate public policy. By their very nature,
    claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy have public interest
    implications, Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109, but are still torts subject to the CGIA.
    And in Lloyd we determined that a claim brought pursuant to the state employee
    whistleblower statute, which clearly implicates the public interest, is nevertheless
    subject to the CGIA. See 752 P.2d at 565. I am concerned that the majority’s
    10
    approach amounts to little more than an ad hoc inquiry in which courts determine
    which policy goals are in the “public interest” and thus outside the scope of the
    CGIA. Such a process gives the appearance of judicial policymaking. 4 Instead,
    such determinations can and should be made by the General Assembly in the form
    of an express waiver of CGIA immunity.
    ¶73   Second, the majority suggests that CADA claims may not be subject to the
    CGIA because they do not have “origins in the common law.” Maj. op. ¶ 24. But
    we have never before required a claim to have common law origins to come within
    the scope of the CGIA. Indeed, we have held the exact opposite in Brown. 182 P.3d
    at 690–91 (“[W]e have never suggested that coverage of the Act is limited to claims
    that are capable of being recast as common-law torts by the party bringing the
    claim. Most especially, we have never suggested that claims for relief developed
    and historically administered by courts of chancery or equity, rather than courts
    of law, necessarily fall outside the coverage of the Act.”). And we have determined
    that other statutory claims that have no common law analogue fall within the
    4That the majority makes such a determination here with reference only to judicial
    decisions—rather than, say, a legislative declaration—makes this approach all the
    more concerning. See maj. op. ¶¶ 24, 26.
    11
    scope of the CGIA.     See Lloyd, 752 P.2d at 565 (holding that claims brought
    pursuant to a whistleblower statute were subject to the CGIA).
    ¶74   I fear the majority’s opinion leaves the legislature and courts with no clear
    or workable standard as to what statutory causes of action fall outside of the CGIA.
    Perhaps any statutory claim that does not “ensur[e] full compensation for claimants”
    has a primarily “non-compensatory purpose” and is thus outside the scope of the
    CGIA. See maj. op. ¶ 25 (emphasis added). Or perhaps this is only true for claims
    that do not have “origins in the common law.” Id. at ¶ 24. Alternatively, maybe
    the CGIA applies to all statutory claims other than those that “address
    constitutionally based concerns,” id. at ¶ 23, or fulfill a “basic responsibility of
    government,” id. at ¶ 24 (quoting Conners, 993 P.2d at 1174). All are equally
    plausible readings of the majority’s opinion.
    II. CADA Claims Could Lie in Tort
    ¶75   Looking simply to the broad “could lie in tort” language used by the
    legislature in section 24-10-106(1), CADA claims clearly fall within the scope of the
    CGIA. CADA claims involve an assertion of a “breach of a general duty of care”
    to not discriminate against employees and thus plainly “could lie in tort.” See
    Brown, 182 P.3d at 691; maj. op. ¶ 24 (noting that CADA creates “a statutory duty
    prohibiting employers from engaging in a variety of discriminatory employment
    12
    practices”).5 The scope of the CGIA “is not limited to claims that are presented, or
    are capable of being presented, directly by the claimant as tort claims.” Brown,
    182 P.3d at 691. However, if “the pleaded allegations . . . could be alternatively
    pleaded in tort” this strongly suggests a statutory claim is subject to the CGIA.
    Robinson, 179 P.3d at 1006.
    ¶76   The same injuries that underlie CADA claims could be alternatively pleaded
    as tort claims. An employee who is terminated in violation of “a clearly expressed
    public policy relating to . . . the employee’s right or privilege as a worker” could
    plead a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Martin
    Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109.6 The same employee could bring a claim for tortious
    interference with employment. See Brooke, 906 P.2d at 68. As we have made clear,
    5 The majority asserts, without explanation, that this statutory duty not to
    discriminate is not a general duty of care. See maj. op. ¶ 24. Why? Because it only
    applies to employers? Because the duty does not have common law origins? It is
    not clear. As with its failure to establish a clear test for determining whether
    statutory claims fall within the CGIA, I fear the majority’s unexplained statement
    here may sow confusion.
    6 In Middleton v. Hartman, 
    45 P.3d 721
     (Colo. 2002), we later hinted that claims
    involving such conduct are subject to the CGIA. Noting that the plaintiff had
    conceded that her retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 215
     (1994), could lie in tort for purposes of the CGIA, we cited to Martin Marietta
    for the notion that “a retaliatory discharge claim is a common law tort claim.”
    Middleton, 45 P.3d at 730 n.6.
    13
    both tort claims remain viable as alternative causes of action even after the
    enactment of CADA. See id. at 70 n.4.
    ¶77   Even if the majority is correct that CADA claims themselves are not torts, it
    fails to address why the injuries underlying those claims could not lie in tort.
    CADA claims involve breach of a general duty to not engage in discriminatory
    employment practices. Breach of this duty can form the basis of either a CADA
    claim or a common law tort claim. Thus, CADA claims “could lie in tort,” and
    claims against governmental entities are barred under section 24-10-106 unless the
    General Assembly has expressly waived immunity.
    III. The General Assembly Did Not Waive Immunity for
    Political Subdivisions
    ¶78   In enacting the CGIA, the General Assembly expressly intended to
    “includ[e] within one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its
    political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be
    liable” to plaintiffs. § 24-10-102. To that end, section 24-10-106(1) provides that “a
    public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort
    or could lie in tort . . . except as provided otherwise in this section.” The provision
    goes on to state that “[s]overeign immunity is waived” in specific, enumerated
    instances set forth in subsection (1). § 24-10-106(1).
    ¶79   In the past, when the General Assembly has sought to alter or waive
    immunity for claims, it has amended section 24-10-106 to reflect the change. See,
    14
    e.g., ch. 280, sec. 1, § 24-10-106(1)(g), 
    2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1056
    , 1056 (waiving
    immunity for injuries resulting from operation and maintenance of a qualified
    state capital asset); ch. 434, sec. 4, § 24-10-106(1)(h), 
    2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 2224
    ,
    2226–27 (waiving immunity for injuries resulting from a failure to perform an
    education employment background check); ch. 212, sec. 3, § 24-10-106(1)(i),
    
    2015 Colo. Sess. Laws 773
    , 776 (waiving immunity for injuries resulting from a
    police officer interfering with the lawful recording of a police incident); see also
    ch. 280, sec. 1, § 24-10-106(1.5), 
    2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 63
    , 63 (removing waiver of
    immunity for backcountry landing facilities).
    ¶80   The General Assembly’s consistent practice in this regard, coupled with the
    CGIA’s stated goal of establishing all bases for governmental liability within one
    article, strongly suggests that when the legislature intends to waive immunity, it
    does so through section 24-10-106.7 Yet the General Assembly did not amend
    7 Although we have never squarely determined the issue, it may be possible for
    the General Assembly to alter governmental immunity outside of
    section 24-10-106 if it does so clearly and unambiguously. In Norsby v. Jensen,
    
    916 P.2d 555
    , 560 (Colo. App. 1995), for example, a division of the court of appeals
    determined that a statute limiting liability for Department of Corrections “boot
    camp” programs acted to amend CGIA liability even though the relevant waiver
    provision in section 24-10-106 was not altered. We cited Norsby approvingly in
    Brighton Sch. Dist., ¶ 18, 
    325 P.3d at 577
    , noting that the statute at issue in Norsby
    was in “truly irreconcilable conflict” with the CGIA.
    15
    section 24-10-106(1) to waive liability for CADA claims as a part of the 2013
    amendments.
    ¶81   The General Assembly likewise did not waive immunity for political
    subdivisions anywhere in CADA. CADA provides that a claim “against the state
    for compensatory damages . . . is not subject to the [CGIA],” but does not provide
    that the same holds true for a claim against a political subdivision. § 24-34-405(8)(g)
    (emphasis added).     Although the term “state” is not defined in CADA, the
    legislature clearly treated “the state” as distinct from “political subdivisions” by
    consistently using the phrase “the state or any political subdivision” throughout
    CADA when it sought to refer to both the state and local governments. See
    §§ 24-34-401(3), 24-34-405(3)(b)(I), 24-34-405(8)(b). Accordingly, we must assume
    the legislature’s lone use of the term “state” in section 24-34-405(8)(g) was
    intentional.   Standing alone, we must read the term “state” in section
    24-34-405(8)(g) to unambiguously exclude political subdivisions.8
    ¶82   Unlike the majority, see maj. op. ¶¶ 38–48, I cannot plausibly read “state” to
    encompass political subdivisions in section 24-34-405(8)(g) when the term plainly
    8Notably, the CGIA, to which subsection (8)(g) cites, defines “state” as excluding
    any “county, municipality, city and county, school district, special district, or any
    other kind of . . . political subdivision.” § 24-10-103(7), C.R.S. (2020).
    16
    means something different throughout the remainder of CADA, including
    elsewhere within section 24-34-405 itself.      See Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer,
    
    758 P.2d 153
    , 161 (Colo. 1988) (“[W]hen, as here, the legislature employs the same
    words or phrases in different parts of a statute, . . . the meaning attributed to the
    words or phrases in one part of the statute should be ascribed to the same words
    or phrases found elsewhere in the statute.”). Because the reference to “state” in
    subsection (8)(g) unambiguously excludes political subdivisions, we need not
    resort to legislative history to determine the meaning of the word “state.” See maj.
    op. ¶¶ 44–46.
    ¶83   The    majority     posits   that   interpreting    the   term    “state”   in
    section 24-34-405(8)(g)   to   exclude    political   subdivisions   would    render
    section 24-34-405(3)(b)(I) “largely superfluous” because there is no need to
    preclude punitive damages against political subdivisions if all claims against such
    entities are barred under the CGIA. Maj. op. ¶ 45. But the majority’s interpretation
    renders section 24-34-405(8)(g) similarly superfluous; if all CADA claims fall
    outside of the CGIA, what purpose does subsection (8)(g) serve? In truth, the 2013
    amendments to CADA added internally inconsistent language, perhaps in an
    attempt to grapple with our unclear holding in Conners. Given the vague test
    established by the majority today, I suspect we will be confronted with similar
    challenges of statutory interpretation in the future.
    17
    ¶84   If the General Assembly intended to waive immunity for political
    subdivisions, it did not effectuate that intent in the language of CADA as enacted.
    Neither section 24-10-106(1) of the CGIA nor CADA contains any express waiver
    of sovereign immunity, and we cannot “read into a statute language that is not
    there.” In re Marriage of Gromicko, 
    2017 CO 1
    , ¶ 23, 
    387 P.3d 58
    , 62. Absent such a
    waiver of immunity from liability for political subdivisions, claims brought
    against such entities are barred under the CGIA.
    IV. Conclusion
    ¶85   I fully agree with the majority that CADA serves a fundamental role in
    eliminating workplace discrimination. But I cannot read language into the Act
    that does not exist. CADA claims plainly “could lie in tort,” and the General
    Assembly has not waived immunity for such claims with respect to political
    subdivisions. Accordingly, Williams’s claim against the Sheriff’s Office is barred
    under the CGIA. Thus, because I would reverse the judgment of the court of
    appeals, I respectfully dissent.
    I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE COATS and JUSTICE
    BOATRIGHT join in this dissent.
    18
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19SC1009

Citation Numbers: 2020 CO 88

Filed Date: 12/21/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2020

Authorities (18)

Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc. , 158 F.3d 1074 ( 1998 )

74-fair-emplpraccas-bna-160-70-empl-prac-dec-p-44760-mitzi-baker , 114 F.3d 668 ( 1997 )

Young v. Brighton School District 27J , 325 P.3d 571 ( 2014 )

Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz , 373 P.3d 575 ( 2016 )

In re the Marriage of Gromicko , 387 P.3d 58 ( 2017 )

City of Arvada ex rel. Arvada Police Department v. Denver ... , 403 P.3d 609 ( 2017 )

Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc. , 529 P.2d 656 ( 1974 )

Hayden v. BOARD OF CTY. COMMISSIONERS , 580 P.2d 830 ( 1978 )

Srb v. Board of Cty. Com'rs, Cty. of Larimer , 601 P.2d 1082 ( 1979 )

Agnello v. Adolph Coors Co. , 689 P.2d 1162 ( 1984 )

Norsby v. Jensen , 916 P.2d 555 ( 1995 )

v. Martinez , 433 P.3d 22 ( 2019 )

Denver Health v. Houchin , 2020 CO 89 ( 2020 )

nt of Revenue v. Agilent Technologies , 441 P.3d 1012 ( 2019 )

Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 91 S. Ct. 849 ( 1971 )

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 109 S. Ct. 1775 ( 1989 )

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , 129 S. Ct. 2343 ( 2009 )

v. Elder , 2019 COA 172 ( 2019 )

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