Toshisada Onishi v. David Chapleau ( 2021 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted May 19, 2021*
    Decided May 20, 2021
    Before
    WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
    No. 20-1913
    TOSHISADA ONISHI,**                                Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                          Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
    South Bend Division.
    v.
    No. 3:19-cv-1048 DRL-MGG
    DAVID CHAPLEAU, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.                  Damon R. Leichty,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    After an Indiana court awarded primary custody of Toshisada Onishi’s minor
    son to his former spouse, Onishi brought this federal civil-rights suit against numerous
    *  We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
    and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
    not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    **Onishi purports to file his brief also on behalf of his mother Teruko Onishi. The
    district court, however, struck her as a putative plaintiff earlier in the proceedings
    because Onishi had not complied with relevant federal pleading rules. See FED. R. CIV.
    P. 11, 15(a), 20.
    No. 20-1913                                                                         Page 2
    St. Joseph County public officials involved in the state court’s proceedings. Protracted
    proceedings ensued, and the district court ultimately dismissed the suit after Onishi
    failed to justify his inability to file a proper complaint after two months of litigation.
    Because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
    we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.
    Onishi, a lawyer proceeding pro hac vice, initiated this suit by seeking both a
    temporary restraining order to stay the state court’s proceedings and a preliminary
    injunction to prevent the state court from enforcing any judgment. He followed that up
    with a 179-page complaint, in which he asserted that three St. Joseph County judges,
    four Indiana Court of Appeals judges, court clerks, prosecutors, and Indiana’s Attorney
    General violated his due-process and equal-protection rights. He asked the district court
    to declare unconstitutional Indiana laws and his custody judgment, and to award him
    compensatory and punitive damages. Onishi then withdrew his submissions and
    amended them to include a jury demand.
    The court denied his motions for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining
    order for a host of reasons. Not only were his requests barred under the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine and the domestic-relations exception to jurisdiction, but Onishi also failed to
    demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, his complaint lacked a short and
    plain statement of his claims, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), and his submissions did not redact his
    minor son’s name. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)(3). The court ordered him to file a rule-
    compliant complaint within two weeks and warned him that his case would be
    dismissed if he persisted in violating court rules.
    After moving four times within a seven-day period to extend the deadline to
    amend his complaint, Onishi filed his third-amended complaint, which the court
    ordered to be sealed because Onishi still had not redacted his minor son’s name. The
    court pointed out that the filing still failed to comply with court rules, requiring the
    court’s continued remedial action and sapping its time. The court ordered Onishi to file
    a properly redacted complaint within a week, and to show cause why the case should
    not be dismissed based on Onishi’s repeated violation of court rules and orders.
    Onishi refiled his complaint, but the court struck it for non-compliance. The
    court alluded to several exhibits in which his son’s name still appeared, unredacted,
    and other exhibits containing inappropriate nude photographs of the child. The status
    of Onishi’s case, the court said, would be addressed at the show-cause hearing.
    No. 20-1913                                                                          Page 3
    At the hearing, Onishi failed to persuade the court that he deserved a fifth
    opportunity to cure the defects in his complaint. In a thorough written order, the court
    recounted Onishi’s long list of rule violations, disregard for court warnings, and string
    of inappropriate and nonsensical emails sent to chambers. Onishi, the court said,
    offered no defense or justification for his conduct. The court highlighted the frivolous
    nature of Onishi’s claims (“gobbledygook and logorrhea”), the burden put upon the
    defendants to decipher them, and the enormous amount of time spent on this case by
    the court and other litigants. Based on Onishi’s numerous violations of rules and orders
    and his inability to show how further amendment would be meaningful, the court
    dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
    Onishi sought reconsideration based on what he understood to be misstatements
    and groundless accusations the court made against him. The court denied the request,
    concluding that his submission reflected a continuing disregard for court rules and that
    he was rehashing unsuccessful arguments.
    Onishi then moved under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 144
     and 155 to disqualify both the district
    judge and the magistrate judge, who had made some preliminary rulings. Onishi
    charged the judges with bias against him, citing (among other things) their purported
    role in denying him access to the electronic docket, their impolite responses to his
    emails, their potential ties to the defendants as fellow Indiana officials, and their “error”
    in dismissing the case for failure to submit a properly redacted complaint. In separate
    orders the judges denied the motion, spelling out in detail why Onishi’s arguments for
    recusal were unsupported or irrational.
    On appeal, Onishi generally challenges the dismissal of his case, arguing that the
    district court failed to account for his inexperience litigating in federal court and
    improperly denied his motions for reconsideration and recusal without holding a
    hearing. The defendants, for their part, reassert a jurisdictional challenge: that the court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over any claim
    seeking to override a state-court ruling on a custody issue.
    Our first step in any appeal is to confirm that both the district court and this
    court have jurisdiction over the case. Lennon v. City of Carmel, 
    865 F.3d 503
    , 506 (7th Cir.
    2017). Federal courts lack the power to hear cases “brought by state-court losers
    complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
    court proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, state-court losers must appeal in the
    state courts, then seek certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States; lower
    No. 20-1913                                                                             Page 4
    federal courts cannot overturn state-court decisions. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
    
    460 U.S. 462
    , 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    , 415–16 (1923). Although
    Onishi styled his complaint as a constitutional challenge to actions taken by Indiana
    courts and officials, the injury he seeks to redress—loss of custody—stems from a state
    court’s judgment. Because he does not seek any relief unrelated to the adverse custody
    judgment, he cannot avoid the force of Rooker-Feldman. See Golden v. Helen Sigman &
    Assoc., 
    611 F.3d 356
    , 361–62 (7th Cir. 2010); Holt v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 
    408 F.3d 335
    ,
    336 (7th Cir. 2005).
    We add that another jurisdictional basis also exists for dismissal—the domestic-
    relations exception to federal jurisdiction. That doctrine blocks federal adjudication of
    cases involving “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees,” Marshall v. Marshall,
    
    547 U.S. 293
    , 307–08 (2006), because state courts are better suited to adjudicate such
    cases. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 
    694 F.2d 489
    , 492 (7th Cir. 1982). Onishi’s challenge to the state
    court’s custody judgment falls in the core of cases contemplated by the domestic-
    relations exception. See Arnold v. Villareal, 
    853 F.3d 384
    , 387 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing
    Friedlander v. Friedlander, 
    149 F.3d 739
    , 740–41 (7th Cir. 1998)).
    Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, we
    VACATE the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.