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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 21-10627
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00392-TFM-M-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH LEON LANDRUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(June 3, 2021)
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Joseph Leon Landrum appeals his 11-month sentence imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Landrum
contends his sentence is substantively unreasonable and the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a condition of supervised release that prohibits him from
having contact with his girlfriend. After review,1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Sentence
Before imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release, the
district court is required to consider several factors set forth in
18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court shall impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the need for the sentence imposed to
deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed
educational, vocational, medical, or other correctional treatment.
Id.
§§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D), 3583(e). In addition, the district court must consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the
1
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez,
524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
Reasonableness review “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion” based on the
“totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotations omitted). We review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Carpenter,
803 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015).
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Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
the need to provide restitution to the victim.
Id. §§ 3553(a)(1), (4)-(7), 3583(e).
A district court abuses its discretion when it: (1) fails to consider all factors
that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor
significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the
proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc). Although the district court must consider all the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors, it does not have to give all of them equal weight and it may in its
sound discretion attach “great weight to one factor over others.” United States v.
Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
Landrum’s 11-month sentence is reasonable. The record demonstrates the
district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, as it discussed the severity and
history of Landrum’s domestic violence offenses, and discussed the importance of
Landrum respecting the conditions of supervised release. This last factor is
particularly salient because Landrum had violated his supervised release twice
before. The district court also discussed Landrum’s health needs, specifically
directing him to have mental health counseling as a condition of supervised
release. Finally, the term of imprisonment was within the Guidelines range, which
is another factor weighing in favor of reasonableness. See United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining although we do not automatically
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presume a sentence falling within the advisory Guidelines range is reasonable, we
ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable). Accordingly, we affirm as to
this issue.
B. Special Condition
A district court may order special conditions of supervised release so long as
each condition: (1) is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate
deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the defendant
with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment in an effective
manner; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary
to accomplish the goals of deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitation; and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(l)-(3); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B)-(D). Each relevant § 3553(a) factor is weighed independently, so it is not
necessary for a special condition to be supported by each factor. United States v.
Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 2010).
A district court may, in its discretion, impose conditions of supervision
including that a defendant “refrain . . . from associating unnecessarily with
specified persons.”
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6). The right of association may be
restricted where “doing so is necessary to protect the public.” United States v.
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Moran,
573 F.3d 1132, 1140 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted) (holding the
district court did not plainly err in restricting defendant’s contact with minors
without written approval of the probation officer where he had previous incidents
involving minors).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving a no-contact
condition. In revoking his supervised release, the court specifically found that
Landrum struck his girlfriend, Shantae Harris. That, combined with the previous
domestic incident with Harris, shows a reasonable relation between the offense and
condition of release. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3). Such an order protects the
victim in this case, Harris. See Moran,
573 F.3d at 1140. It is also not a greater
deprivation of liberty than reasonable because, while it restricts his ability to see
Harris, with his history of domestic violence in general, and his history of domestic
violence against Harris in particular, it is needed to protect her from future abuse.
Although Landrum testified he did not strike Harris, and Harris later denied
being struck by Landrum, the district court appears to have found Mobile Police
Department Officer Paul Lee more credible, as the court specifically found that
Landrum had struck Harris. See United States v. Clay,
376 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2004) (“We accord great deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations.” (quotations omitted)). Also, while Landrum and Harris desire to
maintain their relationship, their relationship status does not change the fact that
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Landrum has been violent against Harris multiple times, even though they are
dating. Moreover, Landrum’s involvement with Harris has been the subject of two
separate violations of Landrum’s supervised release. Because one of Landrum’s
violations of his supervised release was his domestic violence against Harris and
he violated the terms of his previous term of supervised release by harassing and
threatening Harris, the condition of release is reasonably related to the offense and
not more restrictive than reasonably necessary.
II. CONCLUSION
The district court’s imposition of an 11-month sentence was reasonable as
the district court properly weighed the relevant factors, including Landrum’s prior
violations of supervised release and his medical needs. Additionally, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Landrum not to have contact with
Harris because of his history of domestic violence in general and his history of
violence against Harris in particular. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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