State v. Jones ( 2021 )


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  •                            NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
    No. 122,756
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
    STATE OF KANSAS,
    Appellee,
    v.
    RYAN L. JONES,
    Appellant.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; KEVIN M. SMITH, judge. Opinion filed June 11, 2021.
    Affirmed.
    Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
    Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
    attorney general, for appellee.
    Before GREEN, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and WALKER, S.J.
    PER CURIAM: Ryan L. Jones pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia with
    intent to distribute or manufacture drugs. Before sentencing, Jones challenged his
    criminal history and argued his prior juvenile adjudications for burglary and
    misdemeanor theft should decay and not be scored. The district court denied relief and
    found Jones' juvenile adjudications were precluded from decay because Jones did not
    meet the requirements under the decay statute, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5). On
    appeal, Jones contends the district court erred in interpreting the statute and argues
    statutory construction is required to determine legislative intent. However, we find the
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    district court did not err in interpreting the statute because it is plain and unambiguous,
    and Jones does not meet one of the three requirements that would permit decay of his
    juvenile adjudications.
    FACTS
    As part of a plea agreement with the State, Jones pled guilty to the charge of
    possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to distribute or manufacture drugs, a
    severity level 5 drug felony. That crime was committed on July 15, 2017. In addition to
    the agreement recommending the high number in the appropriate guidelines grid box for
    sentencing, the parties also agreed to recommend the court "follow the presumption,
    which is believed to be probation."
    Jones' presentence investigation report indicated he had a criminal history score of
    D. The report showed four prior items on the criminal history worksheet, two of which
    were adult convictions and two of which were juvenile adjudications:
    • June 20, 2012: burglary adjudication, coded as a juvenile person felony.
    • June 20, 2012: theft adjudication, coded as a juvenile nonperson misdemeanor.
    • September 18, 2015: no proof of insurance conviction, coded as an unscored adult
    misdemeanor.
    • September 18, 2015: illegal tag conviction, coded as an unscored adult
    misdemeanor.
    Before sentencing, Jones challenged the use and scoring of the juvenile
    adjudications on the worksheet, arguing they should be allowed to decay under K.S.A.
    2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5), which would permit the juvenile adjudications to decay if
    three requirements are met. Jones argued the unscored 2015 convictions for driving with
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    no insurance and an illegal tag should not count as convictions barring decay under
    K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5).
    In response, the State argued Jones did not meet the requirements for decay
    because he acquired new convictions within five years of his juvenile adjudications,
    regardless of whether the new offenses could be scored as part of his criminal history.
    The district court heard arguments on the challenge at sentencing and ultimately
    denied Jones' motion challenging his criminal history because it found Jones did not meet
    the requirements for decay under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5)(B). The district court
    found the statute was unambiguous and required that all three of the conditions had to be
    satisfied.
    Upon finding Jones' criminal history score was D, the district court sentenced
    Jones to 26 months' imprisonment. The district court also granted Jones' motion for
    border box findings and placed him on probation.
    Jones has timely appealed from the district court's decision overruling the
    challenge to his criminal history.
    ANALYSIS
    In his appeal, Jones contends the only disputed question is whether his 2015
    convictions for driving with no proof of insurance and an illegal tag are "convictions" for
    purposes of preventing the decay of prior juvenile adjudications. Jones contends that his
    2015 convictions "are not the type of 'new conviction' the legislature intended to preclude
    prior adjudications from decaying" when calculating criminal history. As a result, Jones
    believes the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score. In response, the
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    State argues the district court properly scored Jones' criminal history because the statute
    prohibited decay of his juvenile adjudications.
    Resolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation, which presents a question
    of law over which we have unlimited review. State v. Alvarez, 
    309 Kan. 203
    , 205, 
    432 P.3d 1015
     (2019).
    The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
    Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. State v. LaPointe, 
    309 Kan. 299
    ,
    314, 
    434 P.3d 850
     (2019). Thus our first task must be to ascertain legislative intent
    through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings.
    State v. Ayers, 
    309 Kan. 162
    , 163-64, 
    432 P.3d 663
     (2019).
    When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we cannot speculate about the
    legislative intent behind that clear language, and we must refrain from reading something
    into the statute that is not readily found in its words. 309 Kan. at 164. Where there is no
    ambiguity, we need not resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language or
    text is unclear or ambiguous do we use canons of construction or legislative history to
    construe the Legislature's intent. State v. Pulliam, 
    308 Kan. 1354
    , 1364, 
    430 P.3d 39
    (2018).
    "'To the extent we are called upon to interpret the statute, we first attempt to give
    effect to the intent of the legislature as expressed through the language of the statutory
    scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to
    express language, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Stated
    another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not
    speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add
    something not readily found in the statute. Stated yet another way, a clear and
    unambiguous statute must be given effect as written. If a statute is clear and
    unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to statutory construction or employ any of
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    the canons that support such construction.'" Ayers, 309 Kan. at 163-64 (quoting State v.
    Robinson, 
    281 Kan. 538
    , 539-40, 
    132 P.3d 934
     [2006]).
    The statute at issue here is K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5), which dictates the
    rules for inclusion or exclusion of juvenile adjudications as part of the criminal history
    worksheet in an adult felony presentence investigation report:
    "A juvenile adjudication will not be considered and scored if:
    "(A) The current crime of conviction is committed at least five years after the
    date of the prior adjudication;
    "(B) the offender has no new adjudications or convictions during such five-year
    period; and
    "(C) the juvenile adjudication is for an offense that would be a nondrug severity
    level 5 through 10 felony, drug felony, nongrid felony or misdemeanor, if committed by
    an adult." (Emphasis added.)
    Jones argues the italicized language of subsection (B) is unclear and ambiguous
    and asks us to ponder: "Did the legislature mean any conviction of any sort, including
    traffic infractions, or did it mean any scorable convictions for criminal history purposes?"
    At the outset we note that this query is based on a false premise, because Jones'
    convictions for driving with no insurance and driving with an illegal tag are
    misdemeanors, not traffic infractions.
    Believing the statute to be ambiguous, Jones employs the canons of statutory
    construction to argue the district court erred in interpreting the statute—and calculating
    his criminal history—because the district court's holding leads to "an absurd result that
    the legislature almost certainly did not intend." Jones concedes that "[w]hile read on its
    own, devoid of any context, the plain meaning of the term 'new adjudication or
    conviction,' might have the plain meaning of any conviction, no matter how minor." Even
    so, he argues the statute is not plain and unambiguous because this interpretation "ignores
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    the location of the terms within the whole act" and "would lead to absurd results."
    Conversely, the State argues the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The
    State contends a plain reading of the statute "does not lead to unreasonable results"
    because "[p]eople are expected to follow the law."
    Jones concedes that words should be understood in their ordinary meaning, but
    contends the issue here is different because the phrase "no new adjudication or
    conviction" has a "technical meaning." See K.S.A. 77-201 ("Words and phrases shall be
    construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language, but technical
    words and phrases, and other words and phrases that have acquired a particular and
    appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to their peculiar and appropriate
    meanings."). Based on Jones' belief that the statute has words of technical meaning, he
    argues the ordinary meaning should not control, but rather K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(a)
    should define which prior convictions the Legislature intended to score.
    The statute which establishes the scoring rules for criminal history, K.S.A. 2017
    Supp. 21-6810(a), states:
    "Criminal history categories contained in the sentencing guidelines grids are
    based on the following types of prior convictions: Person felony adult convictions,
    nonperson felony adult convictions, person felony juvenile adjudications, nonperson
    felony juvenile adjudications, person misdemeanor adult convictions, nonperson class A
    misdemeanor adult convictions, person misdemeanor juvenile adjudications, nonperson
    class A misdemeanor juvenile adjudications, select class B nonperson misdemeanor adult
    convictions, select class B nonperson misdemeanor juvenile adjudications and
    convictions and adjudications for violations of municipal ordinances or county
    resolutions which are comparable to any crime classified under the state law of Kansas as
    a person misdemeanor, select nonperson class B misdemeanor or nonperson class A
    misdemeanor. A prior conviction is any conviction, other than another count in the
    current case, which was brought in the same information or complaint or which was
    joined for trial with other counts in the current case pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3203, and
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    amendments thereto, which occurred prior to sentencing in the current case, regardless of
    whether the offense that led to the prior conviction occurred before or after the current
    offense or the conviction in the current case."
    Jones contends the Legislature intended for subsection (a) to define which types of
    adjudications and convictions would prevent a juvenile adjudication from decaying under
    K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5)(B). He argues this technical definition of the phrase
    should control over the general definition of "conviction" contained in the criminal code.
    See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111(d) (defining "'[c]onviction'" as including "a judgment of
    guilty entered upon a plea of guilty").
    Based on these definitions, it appears to us that Jones is arguing his 2015
    convictions for driving with no insurance and an illegal tag should not prevent decay of
    his earlier juvenile adjudications simply because they are not scorable under K.S.A. 2017
    Supp. 21-6810(a) and thus cannot be considered in determining his criminal history.
    Jones' argument is not persuasive to us because he did not establish a nexus
    linking the definition in subsection (a) of the felony criminal history scoring protocol and
    the phrase at issue in subsection (d)(5) of the juvenile offense decay rules. Under
    subsection (a), the Legislature delineated which types of prior adult convictions are to be
    used to determine an offender's criminal history category. Conversely, under subsection
    (d)(5), the Legislature delineated which juvenile adjudications would not be considered
    and scored. Put a different way, subsection (a) delineates which prior adult convictions
    and juvenile adjudications must be included in establishing criminal history, whereas
    subsection (d)(5) overrides that and permits the exclusion of certain prior juvenile
    adjudications that would otherwise be included in calculating the appropriate category.
    But to be excluded, or decayed, to use the term of art under the exclusion statute, the
    prior juvenile adjudications must pass the three-pronged test under subsection (d)(5);
    otherwise they are automatically included in criminal history scoring by operation of law.
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    Thus, we believe Jones' interpretation and construction of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-
    6810 attempts to create ambiguity in a plainly unambiguous statute. As the State argues,
    Jones' interpretation reads something into the statute that is not readily found in its words.
    Jones argues we should construe the statute so that it effectively reads that an offender
    may have "'no new scorable adjudications or convictions'" within five years for a juvenile
    offense to decay. (Emphasis added.) But by giving common words their ordinary
    meanings, Jones' contention is without merit.
    When used as an adjective, the word "no" is defined as "not any; not a; not one."
    Webster's New World College Dictionary 991 (5th ed. 2014). As mentioned, the criminal
    code defines conviction as including "a judgment of guilty entered upon a plea of guilty."
    K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5111(d). Similarly, Webster's New World College Dictionary
    defines the noun "conviction" as "a convicting or being convicted," and the transitive
    verb "convict" as "to prove (a person) guilty." Webster's New World Dictionary 326 (5th
    ed. 2014). The noun "adjudication" is a reflection of the language in the revised Kansas
    Juvenile Justice Code. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 38-2356(b) ("If the court finds that the
    juvenile committed the offense charged or a lesser included offense . . . the court shall
    adjudicate the juvenile to be a juvenile offender and may issue a sentence as authorized
    by this code.").
    Giving effect to the express words of the statute, the Legislature's use of the words
    "no new" shows it only intended to allow decay if the defendant had "not any; not a; not
    one" new conviction or adjudication in the five years since the previous juvenile
    adjudications. Moreover, the use of the words "adjudication" and "conviction" show the
    Legislature intended to include any offenses—juvenile or adult and regardless of
    severity—as preclusions to decay.
    We hold that prior convictions cannot decay under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-
    6810(d)(5)(B) if the defendant has any adjudication or conviction within five years from
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    the prior juvenile adjudication. Nothing in the statute indicates the Legislature intended
    that only certain adjudications or convictions would qualify for exclusion under the
    language "no new adjudications or convictions during such five-year period." K.S.A.
    2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5)(B). Jones' interpretation does not give the statute "effect as
    written," but rather requires us to speculate as to the legislative intent by reading the
    language "so as to add something not readily found in the statute." Ayers, 309 Kan. at
    164.
    Because the district court did not err in interpreting the statute, the district court
    correctly found Jones did not meet the requirements for decay of his prior juvenile
    adjudications under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(5). Jones' 2015 misdemeanor
    convictions, while not scorable in criminal history on their own, do preclude decay of his
    earlier juvenile adjudications under subsection (d)(5)(B) because those misdemeanors
    were committed within the five years after the date of the prior juvenile adjudications. As
    a result, the district court did not err in calculating Jones' criminal history.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 122756

Filed Date: 6/11/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/11/2021