State v. Lloyd ( 2021 )


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  • IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE,
    Plaintiff,
    LD.: 1710006739
    vV.
    ERIC LLOYD,
    Defendants.
    ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION
    TO CORRECT LEGAL SENTENCE
    Having considered Defendant’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, the
    State’s response, and the Court’s review of the appropriate portions of the record,
    it appears to the Court that:
    1. On October 18, 2019 the Defendant was found guilty and
    subsequently sentenced as follows:
    ID No. Charge Sentence
    IN19-04-1252 RACKETEERING (F) | 25 years L5; pursuant to 11 Del.C.
    4204(k), the L5 shall be served
    without benefit of any form of early
    release
    IN19-04-1257 CONSP. 2%? (F) 1 year LS suspended for 1 year at L3
    IN19-04-1265 MONEY LAUNDER | 1 year L5 suspended for 1 year at L3
    IN19-04-1259 DEFEAT TAX (F) 5 years L5; pursuant to 11 Del. C.
    4204(K); the L5 shall be served
    without benefit of any form of early
    release.
    Dee Defendant has filed a motion pursuant to Superior Court Rule 35 to
    correct what he calls is an illegal sentence focusing on that portion of the sentence
    where the Sentencing Judge attached the 11 De/.C. §4204(k) designation to the
    sentences for Racketeering and Tax Offence. Where §4204(k) is imposed, the
    sentence is served without the benefit of any form of early release. The Sentencing
    Judge did in fact attach this designation to those two charges. The 2019 SENTAC
    Benchbook provides that, for sentences of incarceration where Section 4204(k) is
    imposed, the ‘reason for the departure must be stated on the record and included
    in the sentencing order.” According to Defendant the sentencing judge did not
    comply with SENTAC by failing to state the reason for the imposition of section
    4204(k) or by stating the reason for the imposition of the sentence in the sentencing
    order.
    3. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a), the court may
    “correct an illegal sentencing at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in
    an illegal manner within [90 days after the sentence is imposed].' Rule 35(a)
    provides a narrow function to correct illegal sentences, “not to re-examine errors
    occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of the sentence.”
    Under Rule 35(a), a sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double
    jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be
    served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute,
    1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).
    2 Edward Brittingham, v. State of Delaware, 
    705 A.2d 577
    , 578 (Del. 1998).
    is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did
    not authorize.’
    4. In the direct appeal of his case the Defendant raised an issue
    regarding his sentence maintaining that thirty years of incarceration without the
    option of early release violates his constitutional protection against cruel and
    unusual punishment. In addressing this argument, the Supreme Court wrote:
    The jury convicted Lloyd of Criminal Racketeering,
    Conspiracy to Commit Criminal Racketeering,
    Conspiracy to Deal Cocaine, Money Laundering,
    Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, and
    Attempting to Evade or Defeat Tax. Before imposing the
    sentence, the Superior Court addressed Lloyd directly and
    explained its sentence as follows:
    I did preside over the trial, so I’m familiar with the
    facts in the case, and to [Lloyd’s counsel’s] words,
    there are a lot of blurring of facts and
    responsibilities and involvement, but the bottom
    line is that the State prove[d] there is beyond a
    reasonable doubt ne large sprawling — I'll call it
    dangerous racketeering enterprise. And I say
    “dangerous” because so many drugs were involved,
    and when we speak of victims, who knows who
    could ever guess ow many victims there were of
    either becoming addicted, or aggravating their
    addiction, of persons who were addicted
    committing crimes. It’s just a great big tangled
    kind of web, these drug operations . . . were talking
    not just about crime, but the business of crime.
    kK
    3 State of Delaware v. David T. Yarborough, 
    2020 WL 502386
    , at *3 (Del. Super. Jan. 30, 2020) (quotations
    omitted) (citing Brittingham, 
    705 A.2d at 578
    ).
    You made the choice after serving a 14 year Federal
    sentence for re-engaging in the drug racketeering
    business. And as [the State] pointed out, it
    preceded your going back into prison for a
    relatively short Violation of Probation stay.
    2 RK
    What’s most concerning to [the court], ... is after
    you served a lengthy prison sentence... for a drug
    charge, you came back, and you made the voluntary
    decision to reimmerse yourself into the drug world.
    2 A 6
    Here, a 14-year sentence didn’t get that message to
    you, and if one of the functions of a sentence is to
    keep the streets of Delaware and elsewhere safe,
    it’s to put behind bars and into jail people who
    might be likely to re-offend when they get out.*
    The judge also observed that Lloyd was “highly, highly
    involved, if not a kingpin in this.”
    Eric C. Lloyd v. State of Delaware, 
    2011 WL 1163917
    , at 31-33 (Del. 2021).
    5. The above passages clearly contain the sentencing Judge’s reasons
    for the imposition of Section 4204(k) to the crimes of Racketeering and Tax
    Offense. While Defendant is correct that the reasons for imposing Section 4204(k)
    are not contained within the four corners of the Sentencing Order this omission, in
    and of itself, does not result in an illegal sentence. So long as the reasons for the
    4 App. To Opening Br. At A1503-06.
    5 
    Id.
    5 Dwayne White v. State of Delaware, 
    243 A.3d 381
    , 412 (Del. 2020); Brandon S. Gibson v. State of Delaware,
    
    2020 WL 7213227
     (Del. 2020); Melvin D. Mayes y. State of Delaware, 
    604 A.2d 839
     (Del. 1992); Brvan Brochu
    v. State of Delaware, 
    2016 WL 690650
     (Del. 2016).
    sentence can be determined from the entirety of the record — particularly from oral
    statements made by the judge at sentencing, like those which the Supreme Court
    quoted in its decision on Lloyd’s direct appeal — the sentence will stand.’
    6. SENTAC’s guidelines are not per se mandatory. The purpose behind
    SENTAC policies 29 and 30 is to provide sufficient information for the Supreme
    Court be too able to carry out its appellant function in reviewing the sentence.®
    Under well settled Delaware law the Supreme Court’s review of a sentence of this
    Court is limited. The review is limited to whether: (1) the basis of the sentence is
    constitutional; (2) the factual predicates are false, impermissible, or lack the
    minimum reliability; (3) the sentence is the result of judicial vindictiveness, bias,
    the product of a judicial officer’s closed mind; and (4) there some any other
    illegality.?
    7. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the sentence in this case. Its
    decision makes it plain that it had no difficulty carrying out its review of the
    sentence. Implicit in the Supreme Court’s decision on the direct appeal is that the
    explanation by the Sentencing Judge was sufficient to allow the Supreme Court to
    complete the review it was required to conduct. In other words, the Sentencing
    ? Dwayne White v. State of Delaware, 
    243 A.3d 381
    , (Del. 2020); Frank Davenport v. State of Delaware, 
    2016 WL 6146171
     (Del. 2016); Bryan Brochu vy. State of Delaware, 
    2016 WL 690650
     (Del. 2016).
    8 Dwayne White v. State of Delaware, 
    243 A.3d 381
    , (Del. 2020), footnote 158.
    ® Michael F. Siple v. State of Delaware, 
    701 A.2d 79
     (Del. 1997); Luis Morales v. State of Delaware, 
    696 A.2d 390
     (Del. 1997).
    Judge’s words at the time of sentencing was a sufficient explanation for the
    imposition of section 4204(k).
    WHEREFORE, Defendant’s Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentencing
    be and hereby is DENIED this 10" day of June, 2021.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    [S| Puanets Y. Youes, Ur.
    Francis J. Jones, Jr. Judge
    ce: Original to the Prothonotary
    Mark Denney, Jr., Deputy Attorney General
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1710006739

Judges: Jones J.

Filed Date: 6/10/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/11/2021