United States v. Elwyn Has the Eagle, Sr. , 455 F. App'x 740 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                OCT 26 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 10-30355
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00038-SEH-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ELWYN HAS THE EAGLE, Sr., Elwyn
    Has The Eagle, Jack Has The Eagle,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 14, 2011
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: EBEL**, BERZON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant Elwyn Has the Eagle, Sr. (Has the Eagle) was
    convicted for urging Kari Lamere, a witness in his son’s double murder trial, to
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable David M. Ebel, Senior Circuit Judge for the Tenth
    Circuit, sitting by designation.
    give false testimony, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1503
     and 1512(b)(1). The
    district court sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, arguing
    that the district court abused its discretion during voir dire by refusing to ask, and
    prohibiting him from asking, prospective jurors about his son’s double murder
    trial; that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for acquittal; and
    that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
    1. We need not determine whether plain error or abuse of discretion review
    applies to the district court’s decision not to conduct or allow specific voir dire
    regarding Has the Eagle, Jr.’s double murder trial, because the district court did not
    err under either standard . United States v. Garcia-Rivera, 
    353 F.3d 788
    , 792 (9th
    Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Steele, 
    298 F.3d 906
    , 910 (9th Cir. 2002).
    Has the Eagle sought to ask whether prospective jurors had heard anything
    about his son’s murder trial. On its face, this question did not raise any issues of
    bias or prejudice into which investigation was essential, nor did counsel explain to
    the district court any such issues underlying the question. See United States v.
    Jones, 
    722 F.2d 528
    , 529-30 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (citing United States v.
    Robinson, 
    475 F.2d 376
    , 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Moreover, the record does not
    show that Has the Eagle sought to ask prospective jurors other questions directly
    probing potential prejudice. The record therefore does not show that the district
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    court erred. United States v. Haslam, 
    431 F.2d 362
    , 364 (9th Cir. 1970); see also
    United States v. Cutler, 
    806 F.2d 933
    , 937 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing
    United States v. Blosvern, 
    514 F.2d 387
    , 389 (9th Cir. 1975)).
    2. Has the Eagle also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
    his convictions. We review the district court’s denial of Has the Eagle’s Rule 29
    motion de novo, even though Has the Eagle did not renew the motion at the close
    of evidence, because so little evidence was put on following the district court’s
    denial of the motion that renewing it would have been an empty ritual. See United
    States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 
    484 F.3d 1221
    , 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2007).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there
    was sufficient evidence to convict Has the Eagle for obstruction of justice. See
    United States v. Rocha, 
    598 F.3d 1144
    , 1153 (9th Cir. 2010). Lamere testified that,
    on October 24, 2009, Has the Eagle threatened to “take [her] out” if she would not
    testify falsely. Has the Eagle impugns Lamere’s credibility, but the jury was
    entitled to credit her testimony over conflicting evidence. See United States v.
    Johnson, 
    229 F.3d 891
    , 894-95 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the threats to which
    Lamere testified were not necessary to support Has the Eagle’s conviction under
    § 1503, they were sufficient. See United States v. Ladum, 
    141 F.3d 1328
    , 1337-38
    (9th Cir. 1998).
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    There was also sufficient evidence to convict Has the Eagle for both counts
    of witness tampering. The October 19th and 20th recordings reveal that Has the
    Eagle repeatedly told Lamere to testify that Has the Eagle, Jr. heard voices and that
    the door to the murdered couple’s home was open on the night of the murders,
    even after Lamere made it clear that she believed Has the Eagle was asking her to
    lie. Lamere also testified that Has the Eagle had previously instructed her to give
    false testimony in Has the Eagle, Jr.’s double murder trial. Given such evidence, a
    rational jury could conclude that Has the Eagle’s recorded importunities violated
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    (b). See United States v. Khatami, 
    280 F.3d 907
    , 913-14 (9th Cir.
    2002).
    3. Finally, Has the Eagle challenges the reasonableness of his mid-
    Guidelines sentence. Although we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness
    for sentences within the suggested Guidelines range, “a correctly calculated
    Guidelines sentence will normally not be found unreasonable on appeal.” United
    States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). In light of all the
    relevant factors, Has the Eagle’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    4