Cruz v. Arizona ( 2023 )

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CRUZ v. ARIZONA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
No. 21–846. Argued November 1, 2022—Decided February 22, 2023
Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz was found guilty of capital murder by
an Arizona jury and sentenced to death. Both at trial and on direct
appeal, Cruz argued that under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S.
154, he should have been allowed to inform the jury that a life sentence
in Arizona would be without parole. The trial court and Arizona Su-
preme Court held that Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme did not
trigger application of Simmons. After Cruz’s conviction became final,
this Court held in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (per curiam), that it
was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in
Arizona. Id., at 615. Cruz then sought to raise the Simmons issue
again in a state postconviction petition under Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32.1(g), which permits a defendant to bring a successive pe-
tition if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if appli-
cable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s
judgment or sentence.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after
concluding that Lynch was not “a significant change in the law.”
Held: The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Lynch was not a signif-
icant change in the law is an exceptional case where a state-court judg-
ment rests on such a novel and unforeseeable interpretation of a state-
court procedural rule that the decision is not adequate to foreclose re-
view of the federal claim. Pp. 7–14.
(a) This Court does not decide a question of federal law in a case if
the state-court judgment “rests on a state law ground that is independ-
ent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729. In this case the Court fo-
cuses on the requirement of adequacy; whether Arizona’s “state proce-
dural ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law” Beard v.
Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 60. A state procedural ruling that is “ ‘firmly
established and regularly followed’ ” will ordinarily “be adequate to
2 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Syllabus
foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee v. Kemna, 534 U. S. 362, 376.
This case is an exception, however, implicating this Court’s rule that
“an unforeseeable and unsupported state-court decision on a question
of state procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude
this Court’s review of a federal question.” Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U. S. 347, 354.
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that Cruz’s
motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy Arizona Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 32.1(g) because Lynch did not result in “a significant
change in the law.” That court reasoned that Lynch was not a signifi-
cant change in the law because it relied on Simmons, which was clearly
established law at the time of Cruz’s trial. It so held even though
Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent foreclosing Simmons relief
for Arizona capital defendants, and even though the Arizona Supreme
Court had previously explained that the “archetype” of a “significant
change in the law” is the overruling of “previously binding case law.”
State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178. While the
court reasoned that a significant change in the application of a law is
not the same as a significant change in the law itself, Arizona can point
to no other Rule 32.1(g) decision supporting that distinction. This in-
terpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and conflicts with prior Ar-
izona case law. The novelty arises from the way in which the Arizona
Supreme Court disregarded the effect of Lynch on Arizona law. Ordi-
narily, Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) focus on how a decision
changes the law that is operative in the State. Here, however, the Ar-
izona Supreme Court disregarded the many state precedents overruled
by Lynch, focusing instead on whether Lynch had wrought a signifi-
cant change in federal law. Because the Arizona Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation is so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an ad-
equate state procedural ground for the challenged decision.
Arizona’s interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other
similarly situated capital defendants that only serves to compound its
novelty. To obtain relief under Rule 32.1(g), a defendant must estab-
lish not just a significant change in the law but also that the law in
question applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288.
Prior to the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision below, it was possible to
show that Lynch both was a “significant change in the law” and satis-
fied retroactivity because it merely applied Simmons. On the inter-
pretation adopted below, however, the argument that Lynch applied
“settled” federal law for retroactivity purposes also implies that Lynch
does not represent a “significant change in the law.” Earlier Rule
32.1(g) decisions did not generate this catch-22. Given the Court’s con-
clusion that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g)
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Syllabus
to Lynch is so novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an ade-
quate state procedural ground, it is unnecessary for the Court to de-
termine whether the decision below is also independent of federal law.
Pp. 7–11.
(b) Counterarguments presented in this case offer various reformu-
lations of the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in
the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but they fail to grapple with the
basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding Arizona Supreme
Court precedent. The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not
justify the Arizona Supreme Court in treating Lynch differently than
other transformative decisions of this Court. Although Lynch did not
change this Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the oper-
ation of Simmons by Arizona courts in a way that matters for Rule
32.1(g). And it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal
law. The analytic focus of Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) has
always been on the impact to Arizona law. Nor does this Court’s inter-
pretation forestall Arizona’s ability to develop its Rule 32.1(g) jurispru-
dence in new contexts. That the Arizona Supreme Court had never
before applied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal did not present a
new context in this case. Finally, no effective parallel can be drawn
between Rule 32.1(g) and very different procedural rules governing
federal prisoners, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f),(h). Pp. 11–14.
251 Ariz. 203, 487 P. 3d 991, vacated and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ.,
joined.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–846
_________________
JOHN MONTENEGRO CRUZ, PETITIONER v.
ARIZONA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARIZONA
[February 22, 2023]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz, a defendant sentenced
to death, argued at trial and on direct appeal that his due
process rights had been violated by the trial court’s failure
to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Ari-
zona would be without parole. See Simmons v. South Car-
olina, 512 U. S. 154, 161–162 (1994) (plurality opinion); id.,
at 178 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Those courts
rejected Cruz’s Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly,
that Arizona’s sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger
application of Simmons. See State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149,
160, 181 P. 3d 196, 207 (2008).
After the Arizona Supreme Court repeated that mistake
in a series of cases, this Court summarily reversed the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613(2016) (per curiam), and held that it was fundamental error
to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. 578
U. S., at 615.
Relying on Lynch, Cruz filed a motion for state postcon-
viction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
2 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
32.1(g). That Rule permits a defendant to bring a succes-
sive petition if “there has been a significant change in the
law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would proba-
bly overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” Ariz.
Rule Crim. Proc. 32.1(g) (Cum. Supp. 2022); see also ibid.
(Cum. Supp. 2017).
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after conclud-
ing that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law.”
251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). The Arizona
Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite having re-
peatedly held that an overruling of precedent is a signifi-
cant change in the law. See id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994
(The “ ‘archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate
court overrules previously binding case law’ ”).
The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Ari-
zona Supreme Court’s holding that Lynch was not a signif-
icant change in the law for purposes of Rule 32.1(g) is an
adequate and independent state-law ground for the judg-
ment. It is not.
I
A
Cruz argued at trial and on direct appeal that the trial
court violated his due process rights under Simmons by not
allowing him to inform the jury that the only sentencing al-
ternative to death in his case was life without parole.
Prior to Cruz’s trial, this Court had repeatedly reaffirmed
Simmons’ holding. In case after case, the Court explained
that when “a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at
issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death availa-
ble to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, due process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the
jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction
or in arguments by counsel.’ ” Shafer v. South Carolina, 532
U. S. 36, 39 (2001) (quoting Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U. S.
156, 165 (2000) (plurality opinion)); see also Kelly v. South
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Opinion of the Court
Carolina, 534 U. S. 246, 248, 251–252 (2002).
The same year this Court decided Simmons, Arizona
amended its parole statute to abolish parole for all felonies
committed after 1993. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41–
1604.09(I)(1) (1994). Nevertheless, Arizona’s capital sen-
tencing statute continued to list two alternatives to death:
(1) “natural life,” which barred release “on any basis,” and
(2) “life” with the possibility of “release” after at least 25
years. §13–751(A). Because of the elimination of parole,
however, the only “release” available to capital defendants
convicted after 1993 was, and remains, executive clemency.
Despite the elimination of parole for capital defendants,
the Arizona Supreme Court held, in a series of cases com-
mencing with Cruz’s direct appeal, that Simmons did not
apply in Arizona because the State’s sentencing scheme was
sufficiently distinct from the one at issue in Simmons.1
That line of cases culminated in State v. Lynch, 238 Ariz.
84, 357 P. 3d 119 (2015). There, the Arizona Supreme
Court refused to apply Simmons on the ground that Lynch
could have received a life sentence under §13–751(A) and
thus been eligible for “executive clemency” after 25 years.
238 Ariz., at 103–104, 357 P. 3d, at 138–139.
This Court summarily reversed in Lynch v. Arizona, 578
U. S. 613, holding that Simmons applies with full force in
Arizona. The Court noted that “Simmons expressly re-
jected the argument that the possibility of clemency dimin-
ishes a capital defendant’s right to inform a jury of his pa-
role ineligibility.” 578 U. S., at 615. The Court also
observed that Simmons foreclosed the State’s alternative
argument that relied on the potential for future legislative
reforms to Arizona’s parole statute. 578 U. S., at 616.
——————
1 See, e.g., State v. Benson, 232 Ariz. 452, 465, 307 P. 3d 19, 32 (2013);
State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 293, 283 P. 3d 12, 24 (2012); State v. Chap-
pell, 225 Ariz. 229, 240, 236 P. 3d 1176, 1187 (2010); State v. Hargrave,
225 Ariz. 1, 14–15, 234 P. 3d 569, 582–583 (2010); State v. Garcia, 224
Ariz. 1, 18, 226 P. 3d 370, 387 (2010).
4 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
B
In 2005, Cruz was convicted and sentenced to death for
the murder of a Tucson police officer. Cruz’s conviction oc-
curred over a decade after the decision in Simmons, but be-
came final before the decision in Lynch.
At trial, Cruz repeatedly sought to inform the jury of his
parole ineligibility. Citing Simmons, Cruz expressed con-
cern that unless he had “the opportunity to present the mit-
igating factor that he will not be released from prison,” ju-
rors would be left to “speculate” about Arizona’s capital
sentencing scheme and whether it allows for parole. App.
28–29. The trial court “conclude[d] that Simmons is distin-
guishable” and did not act on Cruz’s concern. Id., at 41.
Cruz also informed the trial court of his intent to call as
a witness the chairman of the Arizona Board of Executive
Clemency to testify that the board no longer had authority
to parole any capital defendants. In response, the State
sought to prevent Cruz from offering evidence as to “the
prospects of parole for an inmate sentenced to life impris-
onment.” Id., at 45. The trial court precluded the testi-
mony.
During the aggravation/mitigation phase of an Arizona
capital trial, the jury must first determine whether an ag-
gravating circumstance exists. The jury here found a single
aggravating factor that Cruz knowingly killed a police of-
ficer. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(F)(10) (2003) (re-
numbered as §13–751(F)(8)). The jury then heard from 16
defense witnesses who testified to Cruz’s good behavior in
prison, his abuse and neglect as a child, his posttraumatic
stress disorder, and his history of drug use, including
around the time of the offense.
After counsel made closing arguments, the judge in-
structed the jury that Cruz was eligible for three penalties:
(1) “Death by lethal injection”; (2) “Life imprisonment with
no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
Opinion of the Court
basis”; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of pa-
role or release from imprisonment” after 25 years. App. 94.
The reference to parole was plainly wrong. See Lynch, 578
U. S., at 615 (the only “release” available under Arizona law
is executive clemency, not parole). The judge further in-
structed the jury that its only choice was whether or not to
sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death,
the judge would then choose between the two remaining
possible sentences. The jury sentenced Cruz to death.
Three jurors, unprompted by Cruz, issued a press release
the next day. The jurors explained that this had been a
“gut-wrenching decision” and that “[t]here was not one per-
son on the jury who did not cry.” App. 144. They reported
that they would rather have voted for life without the pos-
sibility of parole, but that they were not given that option.
A fourth juror later stated in a declaration: “If I could have
voted for a life sentence without parole, I would have voted
for that option.” Id., at 269.
Cruz thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing that the
instructions did not give the jury “an accurate and complete
understanding of the consequences of a non-death verdict.”
Id., at 137. The trial judge denied the motion. He con-
cluded, erroneously, that the jury had been “correctly in-
structed on the law,” and found it “entirely speculative”
whether Cruz would be considered for parole after 25 years.
Id., at 169–170.
On direct appeal, Cruz again pressed his Simmons claim.
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected it. Repeating the
same legal error made by the trial court, the court reasoned
that Simmons was distinguishable because “[n]o state law
would have prohibited Cruz’s release on parole after serv-
ing twenty-five years.” Cruz, 218 Ariz., at 207, 181 P. 3d,
at 160.
Having raised his Simmons claim on direct review, Cruz
was precluded from raising it again in his initial state post-
conviction petition. See Ariz. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(a)(2).
6 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
C
After Cruz’s conviction became final, this Court decided
Lynch, thereby reaffirming that Simmons applies in Ari-
zona. Cruz then filed a successive motion for state postcon-
viction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a successive petition for
postconviction relief if “there has been a significant change
in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would
probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.”
Cruz argued that Lynch was a significant change in the law
because it “had transformative effects on previously bind-
ing Arizona law.” App. 387.
The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after holding
that Lynch was “not a significant change in the law.” 251
Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. As the Arizona Supreme
Court itself noted, it had interpreted Rule 32.1(g) to require
“ ‘some transformative event, a clear break from the past.’ ”
Id., at 206, 487 P. 3d, at 994 (quoting State v. Shrum, 220
Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009)). “ ‘The arche-
type of such a change occurs when an appellate court over-
rules previously binding case law.’ ” Ibid. Nevertheless, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that Lynch was not a signifi-
cant change in the law because “the law relied upon by the
Supreme Court in [Lynch]—Simmons—was clearly estab-
lished at the time of Cruz’s trial . . . despite the misapplica-
tion of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at 206,
203 P. 3d, at 994.
In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz’s
argument that Lynch should qualify as a significant change
in the law under Rule 32.1(g) “because it significantly
changed how Arizona applied federal law.” 251 Ariz., at
207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The Arizona Supreme Court re-
sponded, without citation to any of its prior cases, that Rule
32.1(g) requires “a significant change in the law, whether
state or federal—not a significant change in the application
of the law.” Ibid. (emphasis in original).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
Opinion of the Court
This Court granted Cruz’s petition for certiorari, 596
U. S. ___ (2022), limited to the question whether the Ari-
zona Supreme Court’s holding that Rule 32.1(g) precluded
postconviction relief is an adequate and independent state-
law ground for the judgment.
II
“This Court will not take up a question of federal law in
a case ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law
ground that is independent of the federal question and ade-
quate to support the judgment.’ ” See Lee v. Kemna, 534
U. S. 362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501U. S. 722, 729 (1991) (emphasis added in Kemna)). Here
the Court focuses on the second of these requirements: ad-
equacy.
“The question whether a state procedural ruling is ade-
quate is itself a question of federal law.” Beard v. Kindler,
558 U. S. 53, 60 (2009). Ordinarily, a violation of a state
procedural rule that is “ ‘firmly established and regularly
followed’ . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal
claim.” Lee, 534 U. S., at 376. Nevertheless, in “exceptional
cases,” a “generally sound rule” may be applied in a way
that “renders the state ground inadequate to stop consider-
ation of a federal question.” Ibid. This is one of those ex-
ceptional cases.
In particular, this case implicates this Court’s rule, re-
served for the rarest of situations, that “an unforeseeable
and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state
procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to pre-
clude this Court’s review of a federal question.” Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347, 354 (1964). “Novelty in
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart re-
view in this Court applied for by those who, in justified re-
liance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts
of their federal constitutional rights.” NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457 (1958). This Court has
8 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
applied this principle for over a century. See, e.g., Enter-
prise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U. S.
157, 165 (1917) (holding that a state ground was adequate
where it was not “without fair support, or so unfounded as
to be essentially arbitrary, or merely a device to prevent a
review of the other [federal] ground of the judgment”). And
this Court has continued to reaffirm this important rule.
See Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state
ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when ‘discre-
tion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable
requirements without fair or substantial support in prior
state law’ ” (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996)
(Wright & Miller))).
At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision
that Cruz’s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). Rule 32.1(g)
allows defendants to file a successive or untimely postcon-
viction petition if there has been “a significant change in
the law.” Arizona courts have interpreted that phrase to
require a “transformative event, a ‘clear break from the
past.’ ” Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 1178 (quoting
State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 182, 823 P. 2d 41, 49 (1991)
(some internal quotation marks omitted)). “The archetype
of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules
previously binding case law.” Ibid.Straightforward application of these principles should
have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “significant
change in the law” under Rule 32.1(g). Lynch overruled
binding Arizona precedent. Before Lynch, Arizona courts
held that capital defendants were not entitled to inform the
jury of their parole ineligibility. After Lynch, Arizona
courts recognize that capital defendants have a due process
right to provide the jury with that information when future
dangerousness is at issue. It is hard to imagine a clearer
break from the past.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
Opinion of the Court
Instead of reaching that conclusion, however, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that Lynch was not “a significant
change in the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. It
reasoned that Lynch could not be a significant change be-
cause Lynch relied on Simmons, and Simmons “was clearly
established at the time of Cruz’s trial . . . despite the mis-
application of that law by the Arizona courts.” 251 Ariz., at
206, 487 P. 3d, at 994. The court added that it was not
enough that Lynch changed how Arizona courts applied fed-
eral law because “Rule 32.1(g) requires a significant change
in the law . . . not a significant change in the application of
the law.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (emphasis in
original).
This interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and in
conflict with prior Arizona case law. The State points to no
other instance in which the overturning of binding Arizona
precedent failed to satisfy Rule 32.1(g)’s “significant change
in the law” requirement. Nor has the State identified any
other Rule 32.1(g) decision distinguishing between a
“change in the law” and a “change in the application of the
law.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). The application of Rule
32.1(g) below is thus the opposite of firmly established and
regularly followed.
What makes the interpretation so novel is the way in
which it disregards the effect of Lynch on the law in Ari-
zona. Ordinarily, Arizona courts applying Rule 32.1(g) fo-
cus on how a decision changes the law that is operative in
Arizona, regardless of whether the intervening decision is a
state or federal one. See, e.g., Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203
P. 3d, at 1179 (holding that a state decision did not satisfy
Rule 32.1(g) because it did not “overrule any prior opinion”);
State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 208–209, 386 P. 3d 392,
394–395 (2016) (finding a “significant change in the law”
where a precedent of this Court changed the law applied in
Arizona); State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 540, 260 P. 3d
1102, 1105 (App. 2011) (same); see also State v. Bigger, 251
10 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
Ariz. 402, 412, 492 P. 3d 1020, 1030 (2021) (determining
that a decision of this Court was not a “significant change
in the law” in part because it did not “effec[t] a change in
Arizona law”). Here, however, the Arizona Supreme Court
considered only whether there had been a significant
change in federal law, disregarding the fact that Lynch
overruled binding Arizona Supreme Court precedents, to
dramatic effect for capital defendants in Arizona.
The consequences of the interpretation below compound
its novelty. Arizona requires a petitioner seeking Rule
32.1(g) relief to establish not just a “significant change in
the law,” but also that the law in question applies retroac-
tively under this Court’s analysis in Teague v. Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989). See, e.g., State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386,
389, 64 P. 3d 828, 831 (2003) (applying Teague). Under Ar-
izona’s longstanding Rule 32.1(g) precedents, it is possible
to satisfy both criteria. See, e.g., State v. Rose, Order in No.
CR2007–149013–002 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., Aug.
14, 2020) (determining in another case, prior to the decision
below, that Lynch was both a “significant change in the law”
and satisfied retroactivity because it “merely applied the
rule of Simmons”). On the interpretation adopted below,
however, it is impossible for Cruz, and similarly situated
capital defendants, to obtain relief. To show retroactivity,
Cruz argued before the Arizona Supreme Court that Lynch
applied “settled” federal law. Under the decision below,
however, that same argument implies that Lynch was not
a “significant change in the law.” The fact that the Arizona
Supreme Court’s decision in this case generates this catch-
22, whereas earlier Rule 32.1(g) decisions did not, further
underscores the novelty of the decision and its departure
from pre-existing Arizona Supreme Court law.
Under these unusual circumstances, the Arizona Su-
preme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) to Lynch was so
novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate
state procedural ground. It is therefore not necessary to
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 11
Opinion of the Court
reach the further issue whether the decision below is inde-
pendent of federal law.2
III
The State and the dissent offer various reformulations of
the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in
the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but each fails to grapple
with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding
Arizona Supreme Court precedent.
Both the State and the dissent argue that the Arizona
Supreme Court was justified in treating Lynch differently
than other transformative decisions of this Court, such as
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), and Padilla v. Ken-
tucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), because Lynch was a summary
reversal and so did not “impos[e] a new or changed inter-
pretation of state or federal law.” Brief for Respondent 12.
As the dissent puts the argument: Lynch “did not change
the law in Arizona.” Post, at 5 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).
These arguments miss the point. While Lynch did not
change this Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did
change the operative (and mistaken) interpretation of Sim-
mons by Arizona courts. Lynch thus changed the law in
Arizona in the way that matters for purposes of Rule
32.1(g): It overruled previously binding Arizona Supreme
Court precedent preventing capital defendants from in-
forming the jury of their parole ineligibility.3
——————
2 The Court also does not need to reach Cruz’s additional arguments
that the decision below reflects an attitude of hostility toward Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion), and Lynch v.
Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), and impermissibly discrimi-
nates against federal law by nullifying Cruz’s rights under Simmons.
3 At oral argument, the State also argued that Lynch, at the very least,
was not a “significant” change in the law. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–36. By any
measure, though, Lynch was a “transformative event,” State v. Shrum,
220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009), in Arizona. In fact, the
State conceded Lynch was a “clear break” from the past in Arizona
courts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36.
12 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
Contrary to the dissent, post, at 3, it makes no difference
that Lynch did not alter federal law. While Arizona Su-
preme Court decisions applying Rule 32.1(g) to federal de-
cisions such as Ring and Padilla have understandably
noted the effect those decisions had on both federal and
state law, the analytic focus of Arizona courts has always
been on the impact to Arizona law. See supra, at 9–10; see
also Towery, 204 Ariz., at 390, 64 P. 3d, at 832 (Ring “im-
poses a new burden on the state. Thus we conclude that
Ring [satisfies Rule 32.1(g)]”). That focus is unsurprising
given that Rule 32.1(g) is a state procedural rule governing
the availability of state postconviction relief in state court.
The State next objects that a decision against it would
forestall Arizona’s ability to “flesh out” its Rule 32.1(g) ju-
risprudence in new contexts. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. That is
incorrect. The Arizona Supreme Court is free to extend its
prior Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence, including by applying the
Rule to new situations as they arise. What the Arizona Su-
preme Court cannot do is foreclose federal review by adopt-
ing a “ ‘novel and unforeseeable’ ” approach to Rule 32.1(g)
that lacks “ ‘fair or substantial support in prior state law.’ ”
Walker, 562 U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B Wright & Miller
§4026, at 386).
The dissent argues that this case did present a new con-
text because the Arizona Supreme Court had never before
applied Rule 32.1(g) to a summary reversal. There was no
reason, however, to treat this case any differently than past
cases. Whereas the Arizona Supreme Court had previously
looked to the effect of an intervening federal or state deci-
sion on Arizona law, supra, at 9–10, here it focused exclu-
sively on whether there had been a change in federal law.
The court thus disregarded that Lynch overruled “previ-
ously binding case law” in Arizona, the “archetype” of a sig-
nificant change in the law. Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 13
Opinion of the Court
P. 3d, at 1178).4
Finally, the dissent attempts to draw a parallel between
Rule 32.1(g) and certain procedural rules governing federal
prisoners seeking to file delayed or successive §2255 mo-
tions. See 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f ), (h). The parallel breaks
down, however, because the rules are different. Unlike
§2255(h)(2), which requires “a new rule of [federal] consti-
tutional law,” and §2255(f )(3), which requires a right
“newly recognized by the [U. S.] Supreme Court,” the rele-
vant portion of Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g) simply requires “a
significant change in the law.” As the Arizona Supreme
Court has repeatedly interpreted that Rule, Lynch should
qualify because it overruled binding Arizona precedent, cre-
ating a clear break from the past in Arizona courts. The
Arizona Supreme Court’s contrary decision was unprece-
dented and unforeseeable. Only violations of state rules
that are “ ‘firmly established and regularly followed’ . . . will
be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Lee, 534
U. S., at 376. That standard is not met here.
——————
4 The Arizona Supreme Court claims it was acting consistently with its
Shrum decision in this case. 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. That
assertion does not stand up under inspection. In Shrum, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that an Arizona decision did not constitute a “sig-
nificant change in the law” because it “did not change any interpretation
of Arizona constitutional law . . . and no precedent was overruled, all of
which meant ‘the law remained precisely the same.’ ” 251 Ariz., at 207,
487 P. 3d, at 995 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 119, 203 P. 3d, at 1179).
In this case, the court reasoned it was acting consistently with Shrum
because Lynch “did not change any interpretation of federal constitu-
tional law . . . and no Supreme Court precedent was overruled or modi-
fied.” 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995. The language used, however,
reveals the inconsistency. While in Shrum the Arizona Supreme Court
looked for a change in Arizona law, including whether any “precedent
was overruled,” in this case the court instead asked only whether federal
law had changed or whether federal “Supreme Court precedent was over-
ruled.” No precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States was
overruled, but precedent of the Arizona Supreme Court certainly was.
Under the Arizona Supreme Court’s ordinary approach, then, there was
a “significant change in the law.”
14 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
Opinion of the Court
* * *
In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests
on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural deci-
sion lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law,
that decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal
question. The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g)
in a manner that abruptly departed from and directly con-
flicted with its prior interpretations of that Rule. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is va-
cated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
BARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–846
_________________
JOHN MONTENEGRO CRUZ, PETITIONER v.
ARIZONA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARIZONA
[February 22, 2023]
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE
ALITO, and JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting.
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is
the product of two fundamental features of our jurisdiction.
First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court’s inter-
pretation of its own law. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall.
590, 636 (1875). We thus cannot disturb state-court rulings
on state-law questions that are independent of federal law.
Second, Article III empowers federal courts to render judg-
ments, not advisory opinions. Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409(1792). So if an independent state ground of decision is ad-
equate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over
the entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative fed-
eral grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the
case and would therefore be advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U. S. 117, 126 (1945).
The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court’s appli-
cation of Rule 32.1(g) is inadequate to support the judgment
below. That assertion is jarring, because the bar for finding
inadequacy is extraordinarily high. When, as here, the ar-
gument is based on the state court’s inconsistent or novel
application of its law, the bar is met only by a decision so
blatantly disingenuous that it reveals hostility to federal
rights or those asserting them. See Walker v. Martin, 562
U. S. 307, 321 (2011). Given the respect we owe state
2 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
BARRETT, J., dissenting
courts, that is not a conclusion we should be quick to draw—
and ordinarily, we are not quick to draw it.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson illustrates how un-
principled a state-court decision must be before we treat it
as inadequate. 357 U. S. 449 (1958). There, the NAACP
asked the Alabama Supreme Court to vacate a civil con-
tempt order as unconstitutional. That court denied review
on the ground that the NAACP had improperly pursued a
writ of certiorari, when it should have sought a writ of man-
damus. Id., at 454–455. We held this procedural ruling
inadequate because it was irreconcilable with the Alabama
Supreme Court’s “past unambiguous holdings.” Id., at 456.
Though a multitude of that court’s own precedents contra-
dicted its ruling, one in particular stood out: The court had
evaluated similar constitutional claims brought by a peti-
tioner in cahoots with the Ku Klux Klan, even though he
had also pursued a writ of certiorari. Id., at 456–457. The
subtext of the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision unmis-
takably revealed its hostility toward the NAACP’s federal
rights. See also Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 425 (1991)
(Georgia Supreme Court decision was inadequate because
it applied precedent that was inapplicable “by its own
terms”); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149–150
(1964) (South Carolina Supreme Court ruling was inade-
quate because that court had proceeded differently in an
“identical” case a few weeks later).
Today’s Court, while admitting that the novelty prong of
inadequacy is “reserved for the rarest of situations,” ante,
at 7, concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of Rule 32.1(g) falls in the same category as Patterson.
I respectfully disagree. Unlike the state courts in cases like
Patterson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not contradict its
own settled law. Instead, it confronted a new question and
gave an answer reasonably consistent with its precedent.
The ordinary rule in Arizona is that criminal defendants
must present any constitutional challenges on direct review
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
BARRETT, J., dissenting
or in a timely postconviction-review petition. Ariz. Rule
Crim. Proc. 32.2(a), 32.4(b)(3)(A) (2020). Rule 32.1(g) al-
lows a second or delayed bite at the postconviction-relief ap-
ple when “there has been a significant change in the law
that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably
overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.”
On several occasions, the Arizona Supreme Court has ad-
dressed whether an intervening judicial decision consti-
tutes a “significant change in the law” for purposes of Rule
32.1(g). For instance, it has considered whether this
Court’s decisions significantly changed the content of fed-
eral law. E.g., State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 412, 492 P. 3d
1020, 1030 (2021) (a decision that “affirmed the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence” was not a significant change); State
v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 209, 386 P. 3d 392, 395 (2016);
see also State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 540, 260 P. 3d 1102,
1105 (App. 2011). It has also analyzed whether intervening
state-court decisions significantly changed Arizona law.
E.g., State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 119–120, 203 P. 3d
1175, 1179–1180 (2009); State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174,
179, 182, 823 P. 2d 41, 46, 49 (1991); State v. Rendon, 161
Ariz. 102, 104, 776 P. 2d 353, 355 (1989).
Cruz’s case, however, raised a question of first impres-
sion: whether a “significant change” occurs when an inter-
vening decision reaffirms existing law, but rectifies an er-
roneous application of that law. That was the effect of
Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), which
corrected the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Sim-
mons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality
opinion), and its progeny. An intervening decision like
Lynch, which undisputedly did not change any legal doc-
trine, has no analog in Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence.
See ante, at 6 (Lynch “reaffirm[ed] that Simmons applies in
Arizona” (emphasis added)). So the Arizona Supreme Court
devised a rule: “Rule 32.1(g) requires a significant change
in the law, whether state or federal—not a significant
4 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
BARRETT, J., dissenting
change in the application of the law.” 251 Ariz. 203, 207,
487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021). By that standard, Lynch did not
satisfy Rule 32.1(g). 251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995.
The Court criticizes the “novelty” of the Arizona Supreme
Court’s law versus application-of-law distinction, as it does
not appear in any other Arizona precedent. Ante, at 9. A
point that deserves emphasis at the outset: Novelty does
not mean that a rule is inadequate merely because a state
court announced it for the first time in the decision under
review, and I do not understand the Court to suggest other-
wise. Legal systems based on precedent depend on cases to
present novel fact patterns, which enable courts to articu-
late new principles of law or to clarify old ones with greater
precision. Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. 53, 65 (2009) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). We do a disservice to that mode of
legal development when we “disregard a state procedural
ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case
when it was first announced”—unless, of course, the deci-
sion demonstrates “a purpose or pattern to evade constitu-
tional guarantees.” Ibid. That is why we have been careful
to explain that, in the inadequacy context, a decision is
“ ‘novel’ ” only when it was wholly “ ‘unforeseeable’ ” and
lacked any “ ‘fair or substantial support in prior state law.’ ”
Walker, 562 U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller,
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4026, p. 386
(2d ed. 1996)).
The Court’s real objection is that it thinks the Arizona
Supreme Court violated its own Rule 32.1(g) precedent by
holding that Lynch is not a significant change in law. For
one, the Court says, the Arizona Supreme Court has previ-
ously explained that “ ‘ [t]he archetype ’ ” of a significant
change occurs “ ‘ when an appellate court overrules previ-
ously binding case law, ’ ” and Lynch overruled binding Ari-
zona case law. Ante, at 8 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118,
203 P. 3d, at 1178). In isolation, that language does suggest
that Lynch is a “significant change” for purposes of Rule
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
BARRETT, J., dissenting
32.1(g). Context, however, shows there is more to the story:
Shrum illustrated its point with the example of Ring v. Ar-
izona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), which was a significant change
because it overruled our contrary decision in Walton v. Ari-
zona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). 220 Ariz., at 118–119, 203 P. 3d,
at 1178–1179 (citing State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 390, 64
P. 3d 828, 832 (2003)). Unlike Lynch, Ring changed the
governing legal doctrine, not a mistaken application of that
doctrine. So Shrum’s reasoning is not inconsistent with the
result below.
The Court also asserts that Arizona courts typically ana-
lyze how an intervening decision affects the law in Arizona,
so by that logic, decisions like Lynch that change the law’s
on-the-ground application in Arizona constitute grounds for
relief under Rule 32.1(g). Ante, at 9–10. I do not read the
Arizona Supreme Court’s “past unambiguous holdings” to
say as much. Patterson, 357 U. S., at 456. The closest ex-
ample the Court offers is State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206,
386 P. 3d 392 (2016), in which the Arizona Supreme Court
considered whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460(2012), constituted a significant change in law. 241 Ariz.,
at 208, 386 P. 3d, at 394. The court observed that pre-Mil-
ler, “Arizona law” allowed trial courts to impose life sen-
tences on juveniles “without distinguishing crimes that re-
flected ‘irreparable corruption’ rather than the ‘transient
immaturity of youth.’ ” Valencia, 241 Ariz., at 209, 386
P. 3d, at 395. Miller, in holding that trial courts must weigh
such considerations before imposing a life sentence on juve-
niles, changed Eighth Amendment doctrine and therefore
changed the law in Arizona. 241 Ariz., at 209, 386 P. 3d, at
395; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. 190, 208,
212 (2016). Lynch, by contrast, did not change the content
of federal law and therefore did not change the law in Ari-
zona.
If the Arizona Supreme Court’s distinction between a
change in law and a change in the application of law seems
6 CRUZ v. ARIZONA
BARRETT, J., dissenting
familiar, it should—federal habeas law draws the same
line. Take everything about this case and transplant it to
federal court: A federal defendant is wrongfully denied a
Simmons instruction, the Court of Appeals’s understanding
of Simmons is later summarily reversed in Lynch, and the
defendant (now a prisoner) then tries to obtain the benefit
of Lynch through a successive or delayed motion for post-
conviction relief.* In this scenario, the federal prisoner
faces the same dilemma that Cruz faces in Arizona. Pre-
Lynch, the Court of Appeals was unreceptive to the Sim-
mons claim. Post-Lynch, the prisoner’s claim is procedur-
ally barred: Lynch is not “a new rule of constitutional law”
or a “newly recognized” right because it merely applies an
old rule, Simmons. 28 U. S. C. §§2255(f )(3), (h)(2). If fed-
eral law limits a prisoner’s Simmons claim to an initial,
timely motion, we should not be surprised that Arizona has
made a similar choice. And we have cautioned before that
“[f ]ederal habeas courts must not lightly ‘disregard state
procedural rules that are substantially similar to those to
which we give full force in our own courts.’ ” Johnson v. Lee,
578 U. S. 605, 609 (2016) (per curiam) (quoting Kindler, 558
U. S., at 62).
The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its own precedent is wrong. If I
were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree. But
that call is not within our bailiwick. Our job is to determine
whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision is defensi-
ble, and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in
making that judgment. Cases of inadequacy are extremely
rare, and this is not one. I respectfully dissent.
——————
*This hypothetical is inapposite to Cruz’s pending federal habeas ac-
tion, which appears to be a timely, initial federal filing. See Cruz v.
Ryan, 2018 WL 1524026, *3 (D Ariz., Mar. 28, 2018), appeal docketed
sub nom. Cruz v. Credio, No. 21–99005 (CA9, Apr. 22, 2021).