United States v. Gustavo Leon-Ramos , 619 F. App'x 889 ( 2015 )


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  •               Case: 15-10034     Date Filed: 07/31/2015   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10034
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00289-TWT-JFK-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    GUSTAVO LEON-RAMOS,
    a.k.a. Juan Carlos Serna-Ruiz,
    a.k.a. Juan Cruz Serna,
    a.k.a. Martin Tapiafranco,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 31, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
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    Gustavo Leon-Ramos appeals his 37-month sentence, imposed after
    pleading guilty to one count of reentry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
    § 1326(a), (b)(2). In imposing this sentence, the district court granted Leon-
    Ramos’s motion for a downward departure based on the time he had already spent
    in state custody, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, application note 8, departing from
    the guideline range of 70 to 87 months. On appeal, Leon-Ramos argues that the
    sentence is unreasonable because the district court misapplied the Guidelines when
    it: (1) imposed a 16-level enhancement, under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), for
    being previously deported following a conviction for a drug offense for which the
    sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; and (2) assessed 2 additional criminal
    history points, under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), for having committed the instant
    offense while under a criminal sentence. After thorough review, we affirm.
    We review the interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo, and
    the underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    732 F.3d 1299
    , 1305 (11th Cir. 2013).       However, “it is not necessary to decide
    guidelines issues or remand cases for new sentence proceedings where the
    guidelines error, if any, did not affect the sentence.” United States v. Keene, 
    470 F.3d 1347
    , 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). To determine whether an
    alleged error was harmless, we must consider: (1) whether the district court would
    have reached the same result if it had decided the guidelines issue in the
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    Case: 15-10034        Date Filed: 07/31/2015       Page: 3 of 5
    defendant’s favor; and (2) assuming the guidelines issue had been decided in the
    defendant’s favor, whether the sentence imposed was reasonable in light of the §
    3553(a) factors. 
    Id. When reviewing
    the sentence a district court imposes for
    “reasonableness,” we “merely ask[] whether the trial court abused its discretion.”
    United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 351 (2007)).
    In this case, we need not reach the question of whether the Guidelines were
    properly applied because any error in the application of the Guidelines was
    harmless. As the record shows, the district court expressly said that it would have
    imposed the same sentence absent the enhancements. Thus, the first-prong of the
    harmless error inquiry set forth in Keene is satisfied.
    In addition, because Leon-Ramos’s sentence was reasonable, the second part
    of the test is also satisfied. In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a]
    sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the
    “‘totality of the circumstances.’” 
    Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190
    (quoting Gall v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)).            The district court must impose a sentence
    “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a).1 “[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that
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    The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
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    the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor ... as long as the sentence
    ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.”
    United States v. Snipes, 
    611 F.3d 855
    , 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration
    and emphasis omitted). We will vacate a sentence only if we “are left with the
    definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
    judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
    outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
    States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted).
    While we do not automatically presume that a sentence falling within the
    guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect that sentence to be reasonable.
    United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The reasonableness of
    a sentence may also be indicated when the sentence imposed is well below the
    statutory maximum. United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir.
    2008).     The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
    unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Here, even if the guideline issues had been resolved in his favor, Leon-
    Ramos’s 37-month sentence is substantively reasonable. The record reveals that
    offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
    protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
    or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
    pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
    sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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    Case: 15-10034    Date Filed: 07/31/2015   Page: 5 of 5
    without the errors he alleges, he would have had a criminal history category of IV
    and a total of 17 offense points, resulting in a guideline range of 37 to 46 months.
    See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table, Ch.5, Pt. A. Thus, his 37-month sentence would
    have been at the very bottom of the guideline range -- a sentence we ordinarily
    would expect to be reasonable. Moreover, his 37-month sentence is well below the
    20-year statutory maximum penalty.       Indeed, it is the very sentence that he
    requested.
    The record also indicates that the district court considered all of the §
    3553(a) factors in imposing the sentence and concluded that the 37-month sentence
    was “fair and reasonable” in light of these factors. Under the circumstances,
    particularly given the fact that he had previously been deported nine times, but
    continued to reenter the country, the record supports the conclusion that the 37-
    month sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to accomplish the
    sentencing goals set forth in § 3553(a) -- principally, the need to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, the need to deter him from reentering the country for an
    eleventh time, and the need to promote respect for the law. In short, because his
    37-month sentence would have been reasonable even without the errors he alleges,
    any error the district court may have committed in applying the Guidelines was
    harmless, and we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
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