Winhaven Court Apartments v. Sally Carney ( 2015 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A14-1819
Winhaven Court Apartments,
Respondent,
vs.
Sally Carney,
Appellant.
Filed August 31, 2015
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge
Winona County District Court
File No. 85-CV-14-1601
Angela V. Lallemont, Price, McCluer & Plachecki, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent)
Brian N. Lipford, Michael Hagedorn, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.,
Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and
Hooten, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Appellant-tenant challenges her eviction from respondent-landlord’s apartment
building, arguing that the district court (1) erred by denying her motion to dismiss the
eviction action because her notice of lease termination violated a federal regulation and
was insufficient to enable her to prepare a defense and (2) abused its discretion by
granting respondent’s motion to reopen the trial record to include evidence of her
posttrial behavior. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Sally Carney rented an apartment from respondent Winhaven Court
Apartments under a written lease agreement and received Section 8 housing assistance.
In April and May 2014, Carney received written warnings about violating Winhaven
policies by removing items from Winhaven’s recycling bins and depositing cat litter in
Winhaven’s trash room. In June 2014, Carney received notice that her lease would be
terminated effective July 31, 2014, and she was directed to vacate the premises. The
termination notice stated that the lease termination was due to “material non-compliance
[with] the provisions of the Lease Agreement, and other good cause,” including
repeated minor violations of the lease that (a) disrupt the
livability of the project[,] (b) adversely affect the health or
safety of any person or the right of any tenant to the quiet
enjoyment [of] the leased premises and related project
facilities, [and] (c) interfere with the management of the
project.
The termination notice specified that Carney violated her lease by “[d]isturbing or
harassing . . . other residents,” committing “[v]erbal or physical assault on the owner or
his agent” and “on another resident,” and “[r]emoving items from recycling bins and/or
trash from trash containers.” The termination notice stated that Carney had the right to
submit written comments concerning the lease termination and to meet with a Winhaven
representative.
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Carney did not vacate the premises, and Winhaven commenced this eviction
action. Winhaven alleged in its complaint that Carney “engaged in repeated minor
violations of the lease, including . . . removing items from recycling bins and/or trash
from the trash receptacles,” “violating the pet rules at [Winhaven by failing] to deposit
her kitty litter in the outside trash bin,” screaming at and harassing another tenant and
Winhaven management, and “interfering with the management of Winhaven.”
At an initial hearing, Carney denied some allegations, contended that the others
were insufficient to terminate a subsidized-housing tenant, and moved for dismissal of
the eviction action. The district court scheduled the matter for trial. When the parties
appeared for trial, Carney reasserted her motion to dismiss. She argued that dismissal
was appropriate because Winhaven failed to comply with a Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) regulation requiring that a termination notice “state the
reasons for [lease termination] with enough specificity [so] as to enable the tenant to
prepare a defense.” Winhaven argued that Carney’s attorney had met with Winhaven’s
attorney and manager, was given Carney’s entire rental file, and had adequate
information and time to prepare a defense.
The district court determined that the termination notice was sufficient, and the
case proceeded to trial. At the end of trial, the district court took the matter under
advisement and instructed Carney “not to go digging through the garbage anymore and to
take your kitty litter out to the dumpster and not to be abusive to any other tenants or any
other people in management.”
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Two weeks after trial, Winhaven moved to reopen the trial record to include
evidence of Carney’s posttrial behavior. Winhaven maintained that Carney continued to
“dig[] in the trash and recycling bins” and to “undermine management and engage in
abusive behavior that is disruptive to the facility.” The district court granted the motion
to reopen and had Carney testify about her posttrial behavior, stating, “This goes directly
to . . . Carney’s credibility which is still a matter under advisement, and I’m still waiting
to resolve, so we’ll find out what she has to say about this now.”
The district court later directed entry of judgment for Winhaven and ordered
Carney to vacate the premises. The district court found that Carney repeatedly violated
her lease by digging through the trash and recycling bins in the trash room, by depositing
cat litter in the trash room inside her apartment building rather than taking it outside to
the dumpster, and by verbally abusing other tenants and Winhaven employees. The
district court further found that Carney continued to dig through the trash and recycling
bins and to deposit cat litter inside the building even after the court directed her not to do
so. The district court concluded that Carney was in material noncompliance with the
terms of her lease. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Carney argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss the
eviction action due to a deficient termination notice. A HUD regulation states:
[A] landlord’s determination to terminate [a] tenancy
shall be in writing and shall: (1) [s]tate that the tenancy is
terminated on a date specified therein; (2) state the reasons
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for the landlord’s action with enough specificity so as to
enable the tenant to prepare a defense; (3) advise the tenant
that if he or she remains in the leased unit on the date
specified for termination, the landlord may seek to enforce
the termination only by bringing a judicial action, at which
time the tenant may present a defense; and (4) be served on
the tenant . . . .
24 C.F.R. § 247.4(a) (2015) (emphasis added); see also 24 C.F.R. § 247.1 (2015) (stating
that the provisions of section 247 governing subsidized projects apply to all decisions by
a landlord to terminate the occupancy of a tenant in a Section 8 subsidized housing
project). A lease termination is invalid if it does not accord with the requirements of
section 247.4. 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a) (2015). The interpretation of an administrative
regulation and the application of a regulation to undisputed facts are questions of law that
are reviewed de novo. City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2008)
(regulation application); In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit
Issuance, 731 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 2007) (regulation interpretation).
The parties dispute the level of specificity needed to meet the requirement in 24
C.F.R. § 247.4(a) that a termination notice contain “enough specificity so as to enable the
tenant to prepare a defense.” There is no Minnesota caselaw interpreting or applying this
regulatory language, but courts of this state have applied similar language in other
contexts. The supreme court has stated that a petition alleging professional misconduct
by a judge or an attorney must “be sufficiently clear and specific, in the light of the
circumstances of each case, to afford the respondent an opportunity to anticipate, prepare,
and present his defense.” Complaint Concerning Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn.
1984) (quotation omitted). “[F]ormal allegations” are not required because information
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will continue to develop as a case progresses, but the allegations must be “sufficiently
definite to apprise respondent of the nature of the charge.” In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124,
129-30, 28 N.W.2d 168, 173 (1947) (quotation omitted). Applying these principles, the
supreme court has concluded that petitions were sufficient when they generally described
the alleged misconduct and stated the rule or rules allegedly violated. See, e.g., In re
Disciplinary Action Against Michael, 836 N.W.2d 753, 760-61 (Minn. 2013) (stating that
the petition discussed the attorney’s conduct while representing her clients and listed the
professional rules allegedly violated); In re Disciplinary Action Against Murrin, 821
N.W.2d 195, 206 (Minn. 2012) (stating that the petition recounted the attorney’s abuse of
the litigation process and listed the professional rules allegedly violated).
And in the criminal context, courts have stated that a complaint must inform a
defendant of the “nature and cause of the accusation” by “contain[ing] such descriptions
of the offense charged as will enable him to make his defense” and “to protect him from
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” State v. Chauvin, 723 N.W.2d 20, 29-30
(Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Waukazo, 269 N.W.2d 373, 375
(Minn. 1978) (stating that the allegations against the defendant must not be “so vague
under the circumstances as to make it impossible for a defendant to prepare his defense”).
A complaint “should recite the essential facts which constitute the elements of the crime
and which bring the activity within the scope of the criminal statute.” State v. Jannetta,
355 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985). “Other
facts beyond the material elements of the offense [a]re available through discovery
procedures.” State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 486-87 (Minn. 1988); see also State v.
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Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012) (“Criminal defendants have a broad right
to discovery in order to prepare and present a defense.”).
Based on these interpretations and applications of similar language in similar
contexts, we conclude that, at least with respect to the allegation that Carney removed
items from recycling bins and trash from trash containers, the termination notice that
Carney received contained “enough specificity so as to enable [her] to prepare a defense.”
This allegation was sufficiently definite to apprise Carney of this reason for terminating
her lease and to afford her an opportunity to anticipate, prepare, and present a defense.
Carney argues that the notice was not sufficiently specific because it did not
identify the items taken from bins or containers, state when the items were taken, and
describe the locations of the bins and containers. But all Winhaven residents had been
given a notice that stated:
Once in the trash bins the trash is not to be disturbed and no
one is permitted to open someone else’s trash bag for any
reason. NO RESIDENT or NON-RESIDENT UNDER ANY
CIRCUMSTANCES ARE TO REMOVE ANY TRASH OR
RECYCLABLE ITEMS FROM THESE ROOMS. Any
resident found doing so will be in violation of Community
Rules and will therefore be issued a lease violation.
Under this rule, no item was to be taken from any bin or container at any time.
The essential fact that constituted a lease violation was that any trash or recyclable item
was removed from any bin. We do not interpret the requirement for “enough specificity
so as to enable the tenant to prepare a defense” to mean that the termination notice must
provide enough information to enable the tenant to respond to whatever evidence of a
violation the landlord possesses. Such an interpretation would mean that the notice
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would need to describe all of the landlord’s evidence. That level of specificity is not
required even in a criminal proceeding where the accused faces the possibility of
incarceration.
The termination notice informed Carney that Winhaven had decided to terminate
her tenancy, in part, because she had removed items from the trash and recycling bins,
and Carney had the opportunity to discover further information related to her defense
during a meeting with Winhaven’s representatives and by examining her rental file.1 The
district court did not err by denying Carney’s motion to dismiss the eviction action.
II.
Carney argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting Winhaven’s
motion to reopen the trial record to include evidence of her posttrial behavior. “Allowing
a party to reopen his case for the purpose of presenting additional testimony is a matter
within the discretion of the [district] court, and [that] action will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion.” King v. Larsen, 306 Minn. 546,
546, 235 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1975); see also Sports Page, Inc. v. First Union Mgmt., Inc.,
438 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. App. 1989) (determining that a district court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing a party to reopen its case where no inadvertence, forgetfulness,
lack of preparation, or bad faith was exhibited and where the reopening did not prejudice
the opposing party).
1
Because removing items from trash and recycling bins was a sufficient basis for
terminating Carney’s lease, we will not separately address the other reasons for
termination stated in the termination notice.
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The issues presented at trial were whether Carney committed the behavior alleged
by Winhaven and whether her behavior justified lease termination and eviction. The
alleged posttrial behavior—that Carney dug through trash and recycling bins, improperly
disposed of cat litter, undermined Winhaven management, and engaged in abusive
behavior—was the same type of behavior that was alleged in the complaint and that was
at issue during trial. Evidence that further incidents occurred after trial, despite the
district court’s warning to Carney at the end of trial, was relevant to the district court’s
decision about whether lease termination and eviction were justified. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by granting Winhaven’s motion to reopen the record.
Affirmed.
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