ERIC APPERMAN VS. VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION OF WESTFIELD(DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5446-15T3
ERIC APPERMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
VISITING NURSE ASSOCIATION
OF WESTFIELD,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued October 11, 2017 - Decided October 30, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti, Carroll and Leone.
On appeal from New Jersey Department of Labor
& Workforce Development, Division of Workers'
Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2004-12557.
Pablo N. Blanco argued the cause for appellant
(Livingston DiMarzio, LLP, attorneys; Mr.
Blanco, on the brief).
David P. Kendall argued the cause for
respondent (New Jersey Manufacturers
Insurance Co., attorneys; Ann DeBellis, of
counsel; Mr. Kendall and Brittney Kern, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
In this workers' compensation case, the judge of compensation
interpreted N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 to limit the payment of dependency
benefits to an incapacitated adult child to 450 weeks. On appeal,
petitioner Eric Apperman challenges that interpretation, which
resulted in the denial of his application to enforce a settlement
order that would have continued benefits to his disabled adult son
beyond the statutory 450-week period. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
I.
The essential facts are undisputed. Phyllis Apperman was
employed by respondent Visiting Nurse Association when she
tragically died in a motor vehicle accident in December 2003.
Respondent was insured by New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.
(NJM) for workers' compensation and admitted the fatal accident
was work related.
Phyllis was survived by her husband, Eric, and their adult
disabled son, Harold. Harold was thirty-four years old when the
accident occurred, and had been adjudicated an incapacitated
person in 1988.
Eric Apperman filed a claim petition in April 2004, seeking
dependency benefits for himself and Harold. The parties reached
a negotiated settlement on February 23, 2007. On the record,
NJM's counsel stated:
Your Honor, this is a dependency claim where
dependency benefits had been paid to [Eric]
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who has since remarried and his claim has been
completed.
However, we are here today as he [has]
requested benefits for his son as a dependent,
and we do stipulate that the son is
incompetent and should receive dependency
benefits at the amount of [fifty] percent of
Phyllis Apperman's wages of $800. So, he will
get $400 per week for 450 weeks and continuing
as long as he remains incompetent. Payments
shall date back to March 4, 2005.
[(Emphasis added).]
The compensation judge entered an order approving the
settlement. The order contained an executed addendum stating that
Harold's dependency benefits "shall continue for 450 weeks and
shall be paid thereafter pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b) et seq."
NJM terminated Harold's dependency benefits on October 17,
2013, after 450 weeks of payment. On February 25, 2014, NJM
notified Eric that "[n]o further benefits are payable at this
time."
Eric then filed an application to enforce the order of
settlement and compel NJM to resume payment of Harold's dependency
benefits. Eric argued that the terms of the settlement were
specifically negotiated to protect Harold for life, and that both
parties interpreted the dependency statute to provide for lifetime
dependency benefits. NJM opposed the application, arguing it had
no legal obligation to pay dependency benefits past the statutory
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450-week period, and that inclusion of the language regarding
continued benefits thereafter was a mistake of law.
Because the compensation judge who approved the 2007
settlement had retired, the matter was assigned to another
compensation judge, who denied the application. In a detailed
written opinion, the judge found that N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 controlled
the payment of dependency benefits, and "reveal[ed] no provision
whatsoever for the extension of the 450[-]week dependency benefit
period for a disabled child." Although the judge was "persuaded
that the plain language of the statute as written does not provide
for [lifetime] dependency benefits to an incapacitated child," she
looked to the legislative history of the Workers' Compensation Act
since its initial adoption in 1911. The judge "conclude[d] that
the [L]egislature has repeatedly amended this statute to increase
benefits. None of these amendments address[] the issue of lifetime
benefits for incapacitated children . . . [and] there was no
legislative intent to create such a benefit."
The compensation judge further noted that N.J.S.A. 34:15-
12(b) addresses benefits payable to an injured employee and not
his or her dependents. As such, the judge found the reference to
that statute in the addendum to the settlement order was erroneous,
and "that NJM's agreement to pay dependency benefits to Harold
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Apperman post the 450 weeks and continuing as long as he remains
incompetent was a mistake of law." This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of factual findings by a judge of compensation is
limited. Renner v. AT&T, 218 N.J. 435, 448 (2014) (citing Close
v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). "However,
'interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'"
Ibid. (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,
140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Both parties agree that this case
turns on an issue of law, namely the interpretation of N.J.S.A.
34:15-13(i) and (j) regarding the payment of dependency benefits
to an incapacitated adult. Accordingly, our review is de novo.
Williams v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., 449 N.J. Super. 559, 562
(App. Div. 2017) (citing Sentinel Ins. Co. v. Earthworks Landscape
Constr., L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86 (App. Div. 2011)).
In determining the meaning of a statute, as we are required
to do here, the first step is always to consider its plain
language. Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 193 N.J. 558, 568
(2008). We construe that language in light of the entire statute
and the overall statutory scheme. Cty. of Bergen Emp. Benefit
Plan v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 412 N.J. Super.
126, 132 (App. Div. 2010). "When the language in a statute 'is
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clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one
interpretation,' we presume the Legislature meant what it said and
that the plain meaning governs." Ibid. (quoting Burnett v. Cty.
of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)).
N.J.S.A. 34:15-13, in pertinent part, provides:
(i) In computing compensation to those
[dependents] named in this section . . . only
those under 18 or over 40 years of age shall
be included[,] and then[,] only for that
period in which they are under 18 or over 40;
provided, however, that payments to such
physically or mentally deficient persons as
are for such reason dependent shall be made
during the full compensation period of 450
weeks.
(j) The compensation shall be paid, in the
case of a surviving spouse . . . during the
entire period of survivorship or until such
surviving spouse shall remarry and, in the
case of other dependents, during 450 weeks and
if at the expiration of 450 weeks there shall
be one or more dependents under 18 years of
age, compensation shall be continued for such
dependents until they reach [the age of
majority].
[(Emphasis added).]
On appeal, Eric Apperman argues that under N.J.S.A. 34:15-
13, Harold is entitled to continued dependency benefits for as
long as he is disabled. He recognizes that the statute does not
explicitly provide for benefits for life, but argues the
Legislature's use of the phrase "full compensation period" was a
reference to N.J.S.A. 34:15-12(b). He contends that otherwise
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there would be an unintentional omission in the statute because
subsection (i) permits payment of dependency benefits to both
minor children and mentally or physically deficient persons, while
subsection (j) provides for continuation of benefits beyond 450
weeks for minor dependents who continue in minority but not for
adult children who remain incapacitated. Eric contends the
Legislature did not intend to terminate benefits for adult
incompetent dependents such as Harold based on this gap in the
statute.
Eric's argument fails to recognize that "[t]he court's task
is to construe the [statute] as written." U.S. Bank, N.A. v.
Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 199 (2012). As written, section 13(j)
unambiguously limits dependency benefits for dependents (including
incapacitated dependents) still above the age of majority to 450
weeks, while section 13(i) allows benefits for incapacitated
dependents still under the age of majority at the close of 450
weeks to continue until the age of majority is attained.
Furthermore, the phrase "the full compensation period of 450 weeks"
does not confer benefits beyond 450 weeks, or refer to N.J.S.A.
34:15-12(b), which addresses injured employees not
dependents. Based on the statute's plain language, Eric's
contention regarding a statutory omission warrants no further
discussion.
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We further conclude that this interpretation of the
dependency statute does not conflict with the overall statutory
scheme embodied in the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-
1 to -142 (the Act). As Eric correctly points out, because of its
remedial nature, the Act must be construed liberally. Wood v.
Jackson Twp., 383 N.J. Super. 250, 253 (App. Div. 2006) (citation
omitted). Nonetheless, in Wood we further observed:
The Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) is
"humane social legislation designed to place
the cost of a work connected injury upon the
employer who may readily provide for it as an
operating expense." . . . Thus, the Act has
consistently been accorded liberal
construction. That being said, the preference
toward liberal construction must nevertheless
"be constrained by the plain meaning of the
statute and the underlying purpose of the
legislature."
[Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).]
We have also recently observed that:
It is, of course, axiomatic that "the Workers'
Compensation Court [now Division] is
statutory, with limited jurisdiction."
Connolly v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 317
N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div. 1998).
Because its jurisdiction is statutory, it "is
limited to that granted by the Legislature and
therefore 'cannot be inflated by consent,
waiver, estoppel or judicial inclination.'"
Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324,
327 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Riccioni v.
American Cyanamid Co., 26 N.J. Super. 1, 5
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 13 N.J. 289
(1953)).
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[Williams, supra, 449 N.J. Super. at 562
(emphasis added).]
The compensation judge correctly ruled that Harold's
dependency benefits were limited to 450 weeks pursuant to N.J.S.A.
34:15-13. Neither party has cited any authority, nor have we
found any, that would confer jurisdiction on the Division of
Workers' Compensation to sanction the payment of dependency
benefits for a period exceeding that authorized by statute. In
our view, it is irrelevant whether the settlement agreement that
permitted continuation of those benefits beyond the 450-week
period was borne out of respondent's benevolent generosity or the
parties' mutual mistake of law.
In either event, both parties agree the compensation judge
lacked authority to enforce a settlement order that would extend
Harold's benefits beyond the statutory limit. See, e.g., Lynch
v. Newark, 43 N.J. Super. 546, 550 (Cty. Ct. 1957) (stating "the
balancing of equities has no place in this dispute. The Workmens'
Compensation Division is a purely statutory tribunal whose
jurisdiction has been precisely defined by the Legislature. No
equity jurisdiction was conferred to it[.]").
Under the terms of the settlement, Harold concededly received
the maximum amount of dependency benefits authorized by law during
the 450-week period. The sole relief Eric sought was to enforce
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the settlement order and compel NJM to continue paying dependency
benefits to Harold. Notably, Eric does not seek to void the
settlement agreement predicated on the parties' mutual mistake of
law or on any other basis. In any event, even were Eric successful
in voiding the settlement, ultimately Harold could not receive
more than the 450 weeks of dependency benefits at $400 per week
he has already been paid in accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-13.
We are not insensitive to the fact that Harold remains
incapacitated, and the result we reach effectively terminates his
dependency benefits. We are sympathetic, but the judiciary is not
at liberty to subordinate the requirements of the law to the
natural influences of sentiment and benevolence. Thus, any gap
or omission in N.J.S.A. 34:15-13, which Eric urges us to correct,
is best left to the Legislature to address.
Affirmed.
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