In re: Robert Cooper Brown, III and Laura Ann Brown ( 2017 )


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  •                                                              FILED
    MAR 27 2017
    1                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
    U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
    2                                                          OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    3                  UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
    4                            OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    5   In re:                         )      BAP No.    NV-16-1099-KuLJu
    )
    6   ROBERT COOPER BROWN, III and   )      Bk. No.    3:15-bk-51542
    LAURA ANN BROWN,               )
    7                                  )
    Debtors.        )
    8   _______________________________)
    )
    9   ROBERT COOPER BROWN, III;      )
    LAURA ANN BROWN,               )
    10                                  )
    Appellants,     )
    11                                  )
    v.                             )      AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
    12                                  )
    DAVID BEAVER; CATHERINE BEAVER,)
    13                                  )
    Appellees.      )
    14   _______________________________)
    15                  Argued and Submitted on February 24, 2017
    at Las Vegas, Nevada
    16
    Filed – March 27, 2017
    17
    Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
    18                         for the District of Nevada
    19            Honorable Gregg W. Zive, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
    20   Appearances:      Christopher Burke argued for Appellants; Amy N.
    Tirre argued for Appellees.
    21
    22   Before: KURTZ, LAFFERTY and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges.
    23
    24
    25
    26        *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication.
    27   Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may
    have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value.
    28   See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
    1                                INTRODUCTION
    2        Robert and Laura Brown appeal from an order dismissing their
    3   chapter 131 bankruptcy case with respect to Robert only.2    The
    4   bankruptcy court held that, at the time the chapter 13 petition
    5   was filed, Robert’s debt to David and Catherine Beaver was
    6   noncontingent and liquidated in an amount that exceeded
    7   § 109(e)’s eligibility limit for unsecured debt.
    8        On appeal, the Browns argue that a settlement agreement the
    9   parties entered into during the Browns’ prior chapter 7 case
    10   liquidated Robert’s debt in the amount of $171,000 and provided
    11   for an increase of that debt to $500,000 only upon the occurrence
    12   of an extrinsic event (Robert’s uncured default in making
    13   settlement payments).     Because this supposed triggering event did
    14   not occur before the Browns commenced their chapter 13 case,
    15   Robert contends only the lesser amount of $171,000 (less
    16   settlement payments made) should have been counted against the
    17   § 109(e) unsecured debt eligibility limit.
    18        We disagree with the Browns’ interpretation of the
    19   settlement.     Under the only reasonable interpretation of the
    20   settlement, the Beavers held a noncontingent claim against Robert
    21   liquidated in the amount of $500,000 (less settlement payments
    22   made) – an amount that exceeded the § 109(e) unsecured debt
    23
    24        1
    Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section
    references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 
    11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532
    , and
    25   all "Rule" references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
    26   Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. All "Civil Rule" references are to
    the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
    27
    2
    For ease of reference, we refer to Robert by his first
    28   name.     No disrespect is intended.
    2
    1   eligibility limit.
    2        Therefore, we AFFIRM.
    3                                  FACTS
    4        The dispute between Robert and the Beavers began over
    5   fifteen years ago when, according to the Beavers, Robert failed
    6   to build them a house as contracted and allegedly used the
    7   construction funds for his own purposes.   In 2004, the parties
    8   reached a settlement in the ensuing state court litigation
    9   pursuant to which “Brown promised to complete construction of
    10   the Beavers’ home within two years, at no further cost to
    11   Beavers.”   Third Amended Complaint (Feb. 23, 2011) at ¶ 46; see
    12   also Answer to Third Amended Complaint (Feb. 13, 2012) at ¶ 1
    13   (admitting ¶ 46 of the complaint).3
    14        Several years later, the parties reached a further impasse,
    15   so the Beavers returned to the state court with an amended
    16   complaint alleging a new cause of action for breach of the
    17   settlement agreement.   In 2010, the state court entered an order
    18   granting the Beavers partial summary adjudication, which did not
    19   determine Robert’s liability but did determine that the damages
    20   arising from Robert’s failure to build the Beavers’ home per the
    21   settlement agreement amounted to $626,568.66, “plus other sums to
    22   be determined at trial.”   Third Amended Complaint (Feb. 23, 2011)
    23   at ¶ 51; see also Answer to Third Amended Complaint (Feb. 13,
    24
    3
    These early facts are drawn from allegations that Robert
    25   admitted in the Beavers’ nondischargeability adversary proceeding
    26   (Adv. No. 11-05002) against Robert in the Browns’ first
    bankruptcy case, District of Nevada Bankruptcy Case No. 10-54665.
    27   The same facts are recited in the Stipulation for Entry of
    Nondischargeable Judgment executed by the parties and approved by
    28   court order in 2012.
    3
    1   2012) at ¶ 1 (admitting ¶ 51 of the complaint).
    2        In November 2010, on the same day the state court trial was
    3   scheduled to commence, the Browns commenced their chapter 7
    4   bankruptcy case.   The Beavers removed the state court lawsuit to
    5   the bankruptcy court and, with leave of court, filed their third
    6   amended complaint, which effectively converted that lawsuit into
    7   a nondischargeability action on multiple grounds.
    8        Nearly two years later, in 2012, the parties reached a new
    9   settlement.   This second settlement provided for Robert to make
    10   15 years of payments in the aggregate sum of $171,000.    The
    11   second settlement further provided that, if Robert defaulted on
    12   the payments or on his other obligations and did not cure the
    13   default within ten days of receipt of written notice of the
    14   default, the Beavers could cause to be entered and enforced a
    15   $500,000 stipulated nondischargeable judgment.
    16        If Robert had timely made all of the required settlement
    17   payments, the Beavers would have been required under the second
    18   settlement to file a “Satisfaction of Nondischargeable Judgment”
    19   and were prohibited from entering the $500,000 stipulated
    20   nondischargeable judgment.   But Robert defaulted on the required
    21   settlement payments, and the Beavers sent Robert the requisite
    22   notice of default.
    23        Before the cure period ran, the Browns filed their
    24   chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in late 2015.   Shortly thereafter,
    25   in January 2016, the Beavers filed a motion seeking relief from
    26   the automatic stay to permit entry of the $500,000
    27   nondischargeable judgment against Robert and seeking the
    28   dismissal of the case based on the debtors’ chapter 13
    4
    1   ineligibility under § 109(e).4
    2        Pursuant to the second settlement agreement, the Beavers
    3   asserted that Robert owed them $500,000 (less $9,000 in
    4   settlement payments made), so Robert’s unsecured debt exceeded
    5   the $383,175 unsecured debt eligibility limit.    In response,
    6   Robert argued that, at the time he and his wife filed their
    7   chapter 13 petition, he only owed $171,000 (less settlement
    8   payments made).
    9        The bankruptcy court disagreed with Robert.    As a
    10   preliminary matter, the court noted that it had presided over the
    11   settlement conference between the parties in the Brown’s prior
    12   chapter 7 case, that it also had presided over the hearing on the
    13   motion seeking approval of the second settlement, that it had
    14   signed the order approving the second settlement agreement and
    15   that it had reviewed the transcript from the settlement
    16   conference, at which time it had stated on the record, on behalf
    17   of the parties, the principal settlement terms.
    18        According to the court, the settlement provided for fifteen
    19   years of graduated payments totaling $171,000, “[b]ut the amount
    20   of the debt was clearly $500,000, which would be reduced to
    21   [$171,000] only if the $171,000 was actually paid.”    Hr’g Tr.
    22   (March 17, 2016) at 5:5-7.   Alternately stated, the court
    23   determined that, under the settlement agreement, “[t]here was a
    24   $500,000 non-dischargeable obligation that could be reduced to
    25
    26        4
    Whereas the Beavers initially sought dismissal against both
    27   debtors, the bankruptcy court denied without prejudice the motion
    to dismiss as against Robert’s wife Laura. That ruling is not at
    28   issue in this appeal.
    5
    1   $171,000 so long as the debtor, Mr. Brown, complied with the
    2   [payment] terms of the second settlement . . . .”    Hr’g Tr.
    3   (March 17, 2016) at 16:2-4.   In so determining, the court further
    4   concluded that the debt was neither contingent nor unliquidated
    5   at the time of the Browns’ chapter 13 bankruptcy filing.
    6        The bankruptcy court entered its order dismissing Robert
    7   from the chapter 13 case on March 30, 2016, and the Browns timely
    8   appealed.
    9                              JURISDICTION
    10        The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    11   §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A), and we have jurisdiction under
    12   
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    .
    13                                  ISSUE
    14        Did the bankruptcy court commit reversible error when it
    15   held that, at the time of the Browns’ chapter 13 petition filing,
    16   Robert was obligated to the Beavers for a liquidated and non-
    17   contingent debt in excess of the chapter 13 unsecured debt
    18   eligibility limit?
    19                           STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    20        The meaning of the statutory terms “liquidated” and
    21   “noncontingent” is a question of law we review de novo.    Nicholes
    22   v. Johnny Appleseed (In re Nicholes), 
    184 B.R. 82
    , 86 (9th Cir.
    23   BAP 1995).   Whether a particular debt fits within the statutory
    24   terms for debt eligibility purposes similarly is a question of
    25   law reviewed de novo.   Id.; see also Guastella v. Hampton
    26   (In re Guastella), 
    341 B.R. 908
    , 915 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)
    27   (“Whether a debt is liquidated involves an interpretation of the
    28   Bankruptcy Code and is reviewed de novo.”).
    6
    1        Both parties urge that the contingency and liquidation
    2   issues turn on the correct interpretation of the settlement
    3   agreement.   For interpretation purposes, settlement agreements
    4   are treated like contracts and generally are reviewed de novo.
    5   See Commercial Paper Holders v. Hine (In re Beverly Hills
    6   Bancorp), 
    752 F.2d 1334
    , 1338 (9th Cir. 1984); Pekarsky v.
    7   Ariyoshi, 
    695 F.2d 352
    , 354 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1982); Kittitas
    8   Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 
    626 F.2d 9
       95, 98 (9th Cir. 1980); see also NGA # 2 Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Rains,
    10   
    946 P.2d 163
    , 167 (Nev. 1997) (stating that construction of
    11   contractual terms is a question of law).
    12        We can affirm the bankruptcy court’s ruling on any ground
    13   supported by the record.   Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren),
    14   
    568 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2009).
    15                               DISCUSSION
    16        This appeal for the most part turns on a single issue:
    17   whether, at the time of the Browns’ chapter 13 bankruptcy filing,
    18   Robert’s debt to the Beavers was noncontingent and liquidated in
    19   an amount that exceeded the chapter 13 eligibility limit for
    20   unsecured debt.   At the time of the Browns’ chapter 13 filing,
    21   the applicable version of § 109(e) provided as follows:
    22        Only an individual with regular income that owes, on
    the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent,
    23        liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $383,175 and
    noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
    24        $1,149,525, or an individual with regular income and
    such individual's spouse, except a stockbroker or a
    25        commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing
    of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured
    26        debts that aggregate less than $383,175 and
    noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
    27        $1,149,525 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this
    title.
    28
    7
    1   (Footnote Omitted.)
    2        While the terms noncontingent and liquidated are not defined
    3   in the statute, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has given them
    4   fixed meanings.   “A claim is ‘contingent’ when ‘the debtor will
    5   be called upon to pay [it] only upon the occurrence or happening
    6   of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of the
    7   debtor to the alleged creditor,’” and “[a] claim is
    8   ‘unliquidated’ when it is not ‘subject to ready determination and
    9   precision in computation of the amount due.’”   Picerne Constr.
    10   Corp. v. Castellino Villas, A. K. F. LLC (In re Castellino
    11   Villas, A. K. F. LLC), 
    836 F.3d 1028
    , 1033 (9th Cir. 2016)
    12   (citing Fostvedt v. Dow (In re Fostvedt), 
    823 F.2d 305
    , 306 (9th
    13   Cir. 1987)).
    14        Before we consider whether Robert’s debt falls within the
    15   definition of these terms, we first must resolve a threshold
    16   issue.   Generally speaking, chapter 13 eligibility “should
    17   normally be determined by the debtor’s originally filed
    18   schedules, checking only to see if the schedules were made in
    19   good faith.”   Scovis v. Henrichsen (In re Scovis), 
    249 F.3d 975
    ,
    20   982 (9th Cir. 2001).    In Scovis, the Court of Appeals reversed a
    21   decision of this panel regarding chapter 13 eligibility because
    22   we did not adhere to this rule. 
    Id.
        Nonetheless, the Scovis
    23   rule is not absolute.   Scovis acknowledged that, when the good
    24   faith of the debtors in filing their schedules is challenged, the
    25   bankruptcy court can consider evidence beyond the schedules.
    26   Id.; see also In re Guastella, 
    341 B.R. at 918-21
     (applying good
    27   faith exception and looking beyond schedules to determine that
    28   debtor improperly listed debt at $0 for eligibility purposes).
    8
    1        More importantly, although it enunciated a simple rule, that
    2   the schedules govern for purposes of determining eligibility,
    3   Scovis also recognized an important exception: the schedules do
    4   not govern when it is clear to a legal certainty that a different
    5   result should obtain.    Scovis, 
    249 F.3d at 983-84
    .   In Scovis,
    6   one of the scheduled claims at issue was secured by a lien
    7   potentially avoidable as an impairment of the Scovis’s homestead
    8   exemption.   
    Id.
       Scovis held that it was appropriate to depart
    9   from the schedules’ listing of the claim as secured because the
    10   effect of the scheduled homestead exemption on the scheduled
    11   secured claim was “readily ascertainable” and was subject to “a
    12   sufficient degree of certainty.”       
    Id. at 984
    .
    13        In a similar vein, we do not construe Scovis as requiring
    14   the bankruptcy court, in reading the schedules for eligibility
    15   purposes, to ignore what it knows based on prepetition events
    16   that occurred before the same bankruptcy court in a prior
    17   bankruptcy case.    In the parlance of Scovis, if the undisputed
    18   occurrence of events during the prior bankruptcy case: (1) are
    19   “readily ascertainable”; (2) are subject to “a sufficient degree
    20   of certainty”; and (3) unequivocally establish that the claims as
    21   scheduled are wrong, then the bankruptcy court should not be
    22   bound to the face of the schedules for purposes of determining
    23   the debtors’ chapter 13 eligibility.
    24        Our reading of Scovis is bolstered by its observation –
    25   distilled from Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Pearson
    26   (In re Pearson), 
    773 F.2d 751
    , 756-57 (6th Cir. 1985) – that the
    27   rule for determining § 109(e) eligibility “is similar in nature
    28   to the subject matter jurisdiction context for purposes of
    9
    1   determining diversity jurisdiction.”    Scovis, 
    249 F.3d at 982
    .
    2   Discussing the test for determining the amount in controversy in
    3   the diversity jurisdiction context, the Supreme Court in St. Paul
    4   Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 
    303 U.S. 283
    , 288-90 (1938),
    5   articulated a test analogous to the Scovis test used in
    6   chapter 13 cases.    Under the St. Paul Mercury test, as restated
    7   in Pearson, “the amount claimed in good faith by the plaintiff
    8   controls unless it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is
    9   for less than the jurisdictional amount or the amount claimed is
    10   merely colorable.”   Pearson, 
    773 F.2d at 757
     (emphasis added)
    11   (citing St. Paul Mercury, 
    303 U.S. at
    288–90).
    12        As more fully explained in St. Paul Mercury:
    13        [I]f, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent,
    to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover
    14        the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is
    satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never
    15        was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim
    was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring
    16        jurisdiction, the suit will be dismissed. Events
    occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which
    17        reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit
    do not oust jurisdiction.
    18
    19   
    303 U.S. at
    288–90 (emphasis added).5
    20
    21        5
    Some courts have characterized the legal certainty
    exception to following the schedules as being subsumed within the
    22
    good faith inquiry. See, e.g., In re Smith, 
    419 B.R. 826
    , 829
    23   (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd in part, 
    435 B.R. 637
     (9th Cir.
    BAP 2010) (“Bad faith, in this context, exists when it appears to
    24   a legal certainty that the claim is not what the debtor
    reported.”). But we think it is more faithful to Scovis, Pearson
    25   and St. Paul Mercury to conceive of the legal certainty exception
    26   as a separate and independent inquiry that may affect whether it
    is appropriate to accept at face value the debtor’s schedules for
    27   § 109(e) eligibility purposes. As this panel determined in its
    decision affirming in part the Smith bankruptcy court’s ruling,
    28                                                      (continued...)
    10
    1        Indeed, when a rule of law would make it “virtually
    2   impossible” for the plaintiff to establish the requisite amount
    3   in controversy, the legal certainty rule permits the court to
    4   depart from the amount of damages alleged in the plaintiff’s
    5   complaint.    See Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc.,
    6   
    802 F.2d 362
    , 364 (9th Cir. 1986).    And the court “may go beyond
    7   the pleadings for the limited purpose of determining the
    8   applicability of the rule [of law].”    
    Id.
    9        Returning to the undisputed facts in the record before the
    10   bankruptcy court here, those facts established that Robert and
    11   the Beavers entered into the second settlement agreement which
    12   fixed the amount of Robert’s nondischargeable obligation to the
    13   Beavers.   Thus, figuring the amount and status of Robert’s debt
    14   at the time of the Browns’ chapter 13 bankruptcy filing is a
    15   relatively straightforward matter of construing the parties’
    16   rights and liabilities under the second settlement agreement.
    17       We apply Nevada law in interpreting the second settlement
    18   even though the agreement was brokered and approved in a
    19   bankruptcy court.    See Cannon v. Haw. Corp. (In re Haw. Corp.),
    20   
    796 F.2d 1139
    , 1143 (9th Cir. 1986); Commercial Paper Holders v.
    21   Hine (In re Beverly Hills Bancorp), 
    649 F.2d 1329
    , 1332–33 (9th
    22   Cir. 1981).   Under Nevada law, our contract interpretation
    23   efforts must strive to give effect to the parties’ intended
    24   meaning as manifested by the contract’s express terms.    Galardi
    25
    26        5
    (...continued)
    27   the “principle of certainty” may apply even if the debtor’s good
    faith in filing its schedules has not been challenged. 
    435 B.R. 28
       at 646-47.
    11
    1   v. Naples Polaris, LLC, 
    301 P.3d 364
    , 367-69 (Nev. 2013);
    2   Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 
    477 P.2d 870
    , 872 (Nev.
    3   1970).    That meaning typically is derived from the terms the
    4   parties chose and in light of the context in which the terms were
    5   used.    Galardi, 301 P.3d at 367; see also Mohr Park Manor, Inc.
    6   v. Mohr, 
    424 P.2d 101
    , 105 (Nev. 1967) (“A court should ascertain
    7   the intention of the parties from the language employed as
    8   applied to the subject matter in view of the surrounding
    9   circumstances.”).    The ordinary and reasonable meaning of
    10   contract terms is preferred.    Galardi, 301 P.3d at 368.
    11        Here, the patent meaning of the parties’ settlement
    12   agreement terms is straightforward.    By way of the second
    13   settlement, the parties sought to fully and finally resolve the
    14   questions regarding Robert’s liability to the Beavers and
    15   regarding the nondischargeability of that debt.    If Robert timely
    16   paid all of the required settlement payments in the aggregate
    17   amount of $171,000, his obligations to the Beavers would be
    18   treated as fully satisfied.    On the other hand, if Robert
    19   defaulted on his settlement payments – and did not timely cure
    20   the default – the Beavers were entitled to have entered against
    21   Robert a judgment for $500,000 in nondischargeable debt (less any
    22   settlement payments made).
    23        There is only one reasonable interpretation of these
    24   settlement agreement terms.    By way of the second settlement, the
    25   parties agreed that Robert’s debt to the Beavers would be
    26   nondischargeable in the amount of $500,000, subject to a
    27   condition subsequent: if Robert timely paid the $171,000 in
    28   settlement payments, the entire nondischargeable obligation would
    12
    1   be deemed satisfied.   The concept of a condition subsequent – a
    2   specific subsequent event that can extinguish a prior binding
    3   contractual obligation – is recognized under Nevada law.      See,
    4   e.g., Am. Bank Stationery v. Farmer, 
    799 P.2d 1100
    , 1102 (Nev.
    5   1990); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lamme, 
    425 P.2d 346
    , 348
    6   (Nev. 1967).
    7        The Browns contend on appeal that Robert’s nondischargeable
    8   obligation of $500,000 was not subject to a condition subsequent
    9   but rather was subject to a condition precedent: an uncured
    10   default in settlement payments.    We reject this interpretation of
    11   the second settlement as unreasonable.   The Browns point to the
    12   settlement term providing for the entry of a $500,000
    13   nondischargeable judgment only upon the occurrence of an uncured
    14   default.   However, this settlement term on its face deals with
    15   enforcement of the debt and not with its creation.
    16        More importantly, the Browns’ posited interpretation of the
    17   second settlement and their contention that the $500,000 debt was
    18   subject to a condition precedent is unreasonable because it would
    19   render invalid one of the key terms of the settlement – the term
    20   providing for entry of the $500,000 nondischargeable judgment.
    21   Under Nevada law, a contractual term providing for a $500,000
    22   debt as a consequence for not timely paying a $171,000 obligation
    23   typically would constitute an unenforceable penalty.    See
    24   generally Hubbard Bus. Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
    25   
    649 F.Supp. 1310
    , 1316–17 (D. Nev. 1986), aff’d, 
    844 F.2d 792
    26   (Mem. Dec.) (9th Cir. April 4, 1988) (applying Nevada law and
    27   holding that a so-called liquidated damages provision constituted
    28   an unenforceable penalty when the adverse party demonstrated that
    13
    1   the agreed liquidated damages were disproportionate with the
    2   actual damages suffered by the proponent).
    3        Nevada law requires us to prefer a contract interpretation
    4   that renders the contract’s terms lawful, valid and enforceable.
    5   Mohr, 
    424 P.2d at 104-05
    ; see also Restatement (Second) of
    6   Contracts § 203(a) (1981).   By interpreting the timely payment of
    7   the $171,000 in settlement payments as a condition subsequent
    8   that would extinguish the entire, pre-existing $500,000
    9   obligation, we comply with this contract construction
    10   requirement.
    11        Accordingly, on the date of the Browns’ chapter 13
    12   bankruptcy filing, the Beavers held a noncontingent claim
    13   liquidated in the amount of $500,000 (less $9,000 in settlement
    14   payments made).   This claim was not subject to a contingency
    15   within the meaning of § 109(e) because the parties to the second
    16   settlement did not contemplate that any further act or event was
    17   necessary to trigger the liability.   In re Fostvedt, 
    823 F.2d at
    18   306-07.   By its very nature, the condition subsequent was not
    19   necessary to trigger the liability.   Thus, the liquidated amount
    20   of this noncontingent debt exceeded the § 109(e) eligibility
    21   limits for unsecured debt, and the bankruptcy court correctly
    22   determined that Robert was ineligible to be a chapter 13 debtor.
    23                                CONCLUSION
    24        For the reasons set forth above, the bankruptcy court’s
    25   order dismissing Robert’s chapter 13 bankruptcy case is AFFIRMED.
    26
    27
    28
    14