In Re: K.R.G., Appeal of: B.M.L. ( 2020 )


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  • J. S34031/20
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: ADOPT. OF: K.R.G., A MINOR :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                   PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: B.M.L., NATURAL MOTHER :                   No. 584 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2020,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Orphans’ Court Division at No. 2019-0033a
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:              FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2020
    Appellant, B.M.L. (“Mother”), appeals from the order dated March 16,
    2020 and entered on March 17, 2020, granting the petition filed by R.L.G., Jr.,
    (“Paternal Grandfather”) and V.G. (“Paternal Grandmother”) (collectively,
    “Paternal Grandparents”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her
    male, special needs child, K.R.G. (“Child”) (born in May of 2007), pursuant to
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), so that Paternal Grandparents may adopt
    Child.1 We affirm.
    On March 15, 2019, Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for adoption
    and a petition for the termination of Mother’s parental rights regarding Child.
    On September 3, 2019, the trial court convened a hearing on the termination
    petition,   but    adjourned   to   allow   Mother   an   opportunity   to   have
    1R.L.G., III, Child’s father and Paternal Grandparents’ son, died in April of
    2014. (Trial court order, 3/17/20 at 2; notes of testimony, 10/10/19 at 38,
    82.)
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    court-appointed counsel.    (See trial court order, 3/17/20 at 1 n.1.)      On
    September 9, 2019, the trial court appointed Attorney Jennifer Galloway to
    represent Mother. The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the termination
    petition on October 10, 2019 and February 13, 2020.          At the hearings,
    Attorney Alexis Swope represented Paternal Grandparents, Attorney Galloway
    represented Mother, and Attorney Kelly McNaney represented Child as legal
    interests counsel and guardian ad litem (“GAL”).2
    At the hearing on October 10, 2019, Paternal Grandparents each
    testified. They also presented the testimony of K.G., their adult daughter. At
    2 At the time of the hearings Child was 12 years old, but he has special needs,
    having autism, and is non-verbal. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 
    161 A.3d 172
    (Pa. 2017) (plurality), in which our supreme court held that 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2313(a) requires that counsel be appointed to represent the legal interest
    of any child involved in a contested involuntary termination proceeding. The
    court defined a child’s legal interest as synonymous with his or her preferred
    outcome. See also In re T.S., 
    192 A.3d 1080
    (Pa. 2018), in which our
    supreme court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the children’s
    guardian ad litem to act as their sole representative during the termination
    proceeding because at two and three years old, they were incapable of
    expressing their preferred outcome.         At the close of the hearing on
    February 13, 2020, Attorney Kelly McNaney, Child’s legal interest counsel/GAL
    stated that she had seen Child in his home with Paternal Grandparents, where
    he is very comfortable, where all of his needs are being met. (Notes of
    testimony, 2/13/20 at 160.) He is in school and has a routine, and is doing
    well.
    Id. Attorney McNaney stated
    that the termination of Mother’s parental
    rights is in Child’s best interests.
    Id. We do not
    comment on the quality of
    her representation of Child. See In re: Adoption of K.M.G., 
    219 A.3d 662
    ,
    669 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (filed September 13, 2019) (limited appeal
    granted, December 9, 2019) (holding that this court has authority only to
    raise sua sponte the issue of whether the trial court appointed any counsel
    for the child, and not the authority to delve into the quality of the
    representation).
    -2-
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    the hearing on February 13, 2020, Mother presented the testimony of
    Letisha Bemis, a methadone counselor at Pyramid HealthCare; W.F., Child’s
    maternal   grandmother    (“Maternal    Grandmother”);   and   E.K.,   Mother’s
    significant other.    Mother also testified on her own behalf.         Maternal
    Grandmother also testified on her own behalf, and Mother’s counsel
    cross-examined her.
    In its termination order, based on the testimony and documentary
    evidence that the trial court found credible from the hearings, the court set
    forth the factual background and procedural history of this appeal as follows.
    The Child is autistic, having been diagnosed with
    Autism Spectrum Disorder at approximately fifteen
    months of age, and has special needs, including the
    need for round-the-clock care, assistance with
    activities of daily living (ADLs) and occupational
    therapy.
    Mother admits that she and Father became
    overwhelmed upon learning of this diagnosis and the
    [C]hild displaying developmental concerns such as
    limited verbal communication. Mother attributes such
    diagnosis as a precipitating factor in the parent’s
    engagement in illicit substance use.
    After Mother and Father became involved in using
    illegal drugs, they separated in 2012[,] with Father
    having majority custody of the Child.
    On January 28, 2013, Father and the Paternal
    Grandmother entered into an agreement by which
    [the] Paternal Grandmother was given temporary
    custody of the Child at the Paternal Grandparents’
    home [in Dover, Pennsylvania,] with the Paternal
    Grandmother having Father’s “permission to make all
    necessary decisions regarding (the Child’s) health,
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    welfare, education, and all other aspects of his
    well-being during this time.” [Petitioner’s] P-Ex. 1.
    Father died of a drug overdose [in April of 2014].
    On April 25, 2013, York County Children, Youth and
    Families [(“CYS”)] created a Safety Plan by which the
    Paternal Grandmother agreed that the Child would
    “not have unsupervised contact with (the parents)”
    and “reside with (her) from Monday to Friday and with
    [W.F.] on the weekends.” P-Ex. 2.
    On April 27, 2013, Mother, [the] Paternal
    Grandmother and [Maternal Grandmother] entered
    into an Authorization for Temporary Guardianship of
    Minor by which Mother gave [the] Paternal
    Grandmother and [Maternal Grandmother] full rights
    of guardianship of the Child. P-Ex. 3.
    On June 10, 2014, the Paternal Grandparents
    commenced a custody action in York County captioned
    as “[V.G. and R.G., Jr.] vs. [B.M.L.]” and docketed to
    File No. 2014-FC-001058-03. By Stipulated Order for
    Custody dated August 1, 2014, the Paternal
    Grandparents were awarded primary physical custody
    of the Child[,] with Mother having rights of partial
    physical custody[, and] with such rights being
    supervised by [Maternal Grandmother]. P-Ex. 6.
    Paternal Grandmother acknowledges Mother was
    living in a recovery house at the time and agreed to
    this custody arrangement so “she could get better.”
    [The] Paternal Grandparents have enjoyed custody of
    the Child since 2010 to present[,] with Mother seeing
    the Child “from time to time,” but not with any
    consistency or in accordance with the Stipulated Order
    for Custody.
    Except for one chance meeting during August of 2018,
    Mother has had no contact with the Child since June
    2017. Mother did not send the Child any cards, letters
    or gifts or speak with the Child by phone or any other
    electronic means in the intervening timeframe.
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    Mother has never provided any financial support for
    the Child.
    At all times relevant, Mother was able to contact [the]
    Paternal Grandparents, knowing their address and
    telephone number.
    Mother     has   never    contacted the Paternal
    Grandparents to make inquiry of the Child’s
    well[-]being since June 2017.
    The Paternal Grandparents never did anything to
    discourage Mother from being involved in the Child’s
    life.
    The Paternal Grandparents’ daughter, [K.G.], has
    been actively involved in the Child’s life during most
    of her lifetime, including seeing the Child daily through
    2017 and approximately once per month since then
    after moving to the Baltimore[, Maryland,] area. The
    Child has become very attached to her . . . and “treats
    her almost as a mother at times.” [See notes of
    testimony, 10/10/19 at 54.]
    The Paternal Grandparents have provided the Child
    with a safe and stable environment that attends to
    [his] financial, emotional, educational and physical
    needs[,] and the Child has been thriving under their
    care and custody.
    The Child has formed a strong emotional bond with
    the Paternal Grandparents, the prospective adoptive
    parents. The Child is affectionate with Paternal
    Grandmother[,] and their relationship is like a mother
    and child.
    The Paternal Grandparents wish to adopt the Child for
    a host of good and valid reasons, including: a) having
    become the Child’s parents and providers in Mother’s
    absence; b) it being time for them to become the
    Child’s parents legally; c) the Child’s continuing need
    to have the safety, stability and routine, existing and
    being provided in their intact family unit; d) Mother
    not being a part of the Child’s life; e) the Child not
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    really knowing [his] Mother; and (f) the fear of
    disruption, turmoil and harm to the Child if Mother is
    permitted to further process her efforts to regain
    custody of the Child.
    Conversely, Mother opposes termination of her
    parental rights, being of the belief that the Child was
    placed in the care of [the] Paternal Grandparents only
    temporarily while she addressed her substance abuse
    problem, she knew the Child was being well[-]cared
    for in her absence, and now, after treatment, she is
    positioned to re[-]acquaint herself and become
    involved in the Child’s life as his mother.
    Mother articulated her intent to reconcile in the threat
    of harm report dated February 23, 2019 by stating
    that, “her future goal with (the Child) is to be involved
    with his life but to avoid any major disruption due to
    his diagnosis of Autism.” [Id. at 128.]
    Mother testified her criminal record is the product of a
    substance abuse problem, she has participated in
    prison and in-patient treatment programs in an effort
    to cure the problem, and she has been “clean” for the
    last four years, except for a relapse in April 2018 when
    she entered White Deer Run for inpatient
    detoxification.
    Mother believes she was “blocked” from contacting
    the Paternal Grandparents in an effort to reestablish a
    relationship with the Child despite acknowledging
    never making any attempt to do so. Mother gave two
    explanations for such belief:    a) [the]     Paternal
    Grandmother blocked her from communicating with
    her on Facebook, which circumstance occurred prior
    to Father’s death in 2014; and b) [the] Paternal
    Grandfather posted some derogatory comments
    about her on Facebook, nothing more.
    As of February 2019, Mother admitted in the threat of
    harm report that she had not “seen (the Child) in
    approximately one year.” [Id. at 127.] Mother
    further stated in the report that, “she does not want
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    to interrupt (the Child’s) life, as ‘routine seems really
    important to him; I think that’s what he needs’.” [Id.]
    During that same timeframe, Mother reported being
    actively involved with her significant other’s daughter,
    [I.M.K.], age 3, and “enjoy(ing) family activities such
    as going to Tumble Town and playing My Little Pony
    with [I.M.K.],” with [I.M.K.] having become so
    attached to Mother that she calls her “mommy” and
    “display(s) separation anxiety from (other) adults.”
    Mother further reported that [I.M.K.] “is everything to
    (her).”
    Mother has been incarcerated during the Child’s
    lifetime at the York County Prison for sentences
    imposed at Docket Nos: CP-67-CR-0004226-2013 and
    CP-67-CR-0007740-2013 as follows:
    a.   From June 21, 2013 to July 3, 2013 –
    13 days.
    b.   From July 12, 2013 to August 3, 2013 -
    23 days.
    c.   From May 23, 2014 to July 9, 2014 -
    48 days.
    d.   From October 22, 2014 to November 3,
    2014 - 13 days.
    e.   From July 1, 2015 to November 20,
    2015. [sic] - 143 days.
    f.   From December 28, 2015 to January 18,
    2016 - 22 days.
    g.   From April 7, 2016 to April 21, 2016 -
    15 days.
    h.   From August 19, 2017 to November 6,
    2017 - 80 days.
    i.   From November 24, 2018 to February 21,
    2019 - 90 days.
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    j.   TOTAL - 447 days during the Child’s
    lifetime, 170 since 2017.
    Mother was admitted onto [sic] Drug Treatment Court
    on October 27, 2015 and [was] discharged
    unsuccessfully on April 21, 2016.
    Mother had the following Gagnon hearings: July 9,
    2014; May 24, 2016; August 30, 2016; December 6,
    2016; and April 3, 2017.
    Mother plead guilty to shoplifting for an incident that
    occurred in November 2018.
    Mother is currently on non-reporting probation.
    Mother’s relational history is as follows:
    a.   Prior to the Child’s birth, she was in a
    relationship with the Child’s [f]ather,
    [R.L.G.], III.      Mother reports that
    “incidents    of   physical  abuse      with
    [R.L.G., III,] began to occur with more
    frequency during (the final four years of
    their   relationship).”     The     parents
    separated in 2012[,] and [R.L.G., III,] died
    in 2014.
    b.   Mother thereafter met and became
    involved with [I.Q.-S.], whom she married
    [in August of 2016 and divorced in July of
    2019]. During the latter stage of Mother’s
    relationship with her former spouse,
    “increasing physical altercations between
    the two began to occur on a more frequent
    basis.”
    c.   In January 2019, Mother became involved
    and began residing with [E.K.], with whom
    she continues to reside. There have been
    no reports of physical altercations or abuse
    to date.
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    Mother’s treatment history is as follows:
    a.   In 2013, Mother entered inpatient
    detoxification and rehabilitation services
    for opiate use at White Deer Run in York,
    Pennsylvania.
    b.   In 2014, Mother returned to the White
    Deer     Run     inpatient   facility for
    detoxification for 21 days followed by
    residential services at a local recovery
    house upon discharge. She report [sic]
    admitting herself to White Deer Run for
    one or two other detoxification treatment
    episodes from 2014-2016.
    c.   In April 2018, she entered White Deer Run
    again for detoxification services due to
    opiate use. Mother then enrolled in the
    Pyramid Methadone Maintenance Program
    subsequent to discharge.
    d.   At present, Mother is receiving counseling
    treatment from Pyramid Healthcare, Inc.
    Outpatient Treatment Center.
    Earlier this year, Mother completed a formal parenting
    class and started watching videos regarding
    information on Autism Spectrum Disorder to be better
    able to relate to the Child.
    Latisha Bemis, Mother’s methadone counselor,
    testified that: a) she has known Mother since July
    2018; b) there was a gap in treatment due to
    incarceration[,] with Mother being discharged from
    the methadone program on December 26, 2018 and
    re[-]admitted on January 22, 2019; c) Mother is
    subject to random drug screens and has been fully
    compliant in treatment since re[-]admission; and
    d) during    counseling,    Mother    has   articulated
    reconciliation with the Child as being one of her goals
    since January 2019.
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    [W.F.], the Maternal Grandmother, testified she
    initially had the typical grandmother involvement with
    the Child[,] with both Mother and Father being doting
    parents. After the parents separated due to suffering
    from substance abuse issues, however, custody
    occurred as follows: in 2012, custody went back and
    forth between the parents and the Paternal
    Grandparents; as of April 2013, [the] Paternal
    Grandparents had the Child full[-]time and Maternal
    Grandmother exercised weekend custody[,] with
    Mother often being present, but that arrangement
    lasted only briefly, maybe 3-4 times; thereafter, she
    recalls Mother sometimes being allowed to have
    custody of the Child on her own for babysitting
    purposes, which stopped over three years ago when
    the Paternal Grandparents no longer needed
    childcare. She acknowledges having no contact with
    the Child during the last three years, explaining that
    she initially backed off to care for her husband’s health
    issues and having a busy work schedule.              She
    explained that she never attempted to renew her
    relationship with the Child due to some unexplained
    “contention,” but she would like to stay involved in the
    Child’s life. She and Mother discussed bringing an
    action for custody, but they could not afford to pursue
    it.       She acknowledges that [the] Paternal
    Grandmother has taken excellent care of the Child.
    [E.K.], Mother’s significant other, testified that: a) she
    and Mother have been in a relationship for two years;
    b) Mother is actively engaged in constructive steps of
    her recovery; c) the methadone program is working;
    c) Mother discussed reconciliation with the Child as a
    goal, but wanted to “sort our [sic] probation” and
    “make sure everything (was) stable before (the Child)
    came back into their lives” [notes of testimony,
    10/10/19 at 145;] and d) she and Mother decided as
    a couple that [E.K.] would retain counsel and pursue
    custody of [I.M.K.], which custody action was not
    settled as of May 2019, before Mother would pursue
    custody of and reconciliation with the Child.
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    Trial court order, 3/17/20 at 2-11 (paragraph numbers omitted; footnotes
    omitted; emphasis in original).
    On March 17, the trial court entered the order that terminated Mother’s
    parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), so that Paternal
    Grandparents may adopt Child. On March 30, 2020, the trial court entered a
    clarification order providing that Attorney Galloway’s representation of Mother
    continued through any appeals.
    On April 3, 2020, Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a statement
    of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)
    and (b).
    In her brief on appeal, Mother raises three issues, as follows:
    1.    Whether the lower court erred in finding that
    Mother evidenced a settled purpose of
    relinquishing her parental claim to the child and
    failed or refused to perform parental duties
    towards the child for a period in excess of six
    months preceding the petition.
    2.    Whether the trial court erred in failing to give
    appropriate weight and consideration to
    obstacles placed in the path of Mother which
    impacted her ability to exercise parental duties
    for the child.
    3.    Whether the trial court erred in finding that the
    best interest of the child would be served by
    terminating Appellant’s parental rights.
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    Mother’s brief at 4.3
    We will consider Mother’s first two issues together, as they are
    interrelated and concern whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion
    in terminating her parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). With regard to
    her first issue, Mother contends that the trial court failed to adequately
    consider her diligent and reasonable efforts to resume her parental duties after
    she was in a more stable position to resume them. Mother asserts that it is
    evident from the testimony that she has never stopped caring about Child.
    Mother claims that she has taken steps to obtain and maintain her sobriety,
    to get herself into a safe and stable relationship and home, to educate herself
    on how to raise a child with autism, and to position herself to resume her place
    in the life of her child. Mother states that she has never ceased doing what
    was required to get herself into a position to safely and fully exercise custody
    of Child. Mother asserts that she never relinquished her parental responsibility
    on a permanent basis.      Rather, Mother claims that she relied on Child’s
    maternal and paternal grandparents to help with the exercise of parental
    duties while she was either using drugs, incarcerated, or completing the
    process of getting herself to a safe and stable position to perform her parental
    duties. Mother states that the trial court failed to consider her sincere concern
    3 We note that Mother stated her issues somewhat differently in her concise
    statement, but we, nevertheless, find them sufficiently preserved for our
    review.
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    and concentrated effort to exercise her parental duties within the six-month
    statutory time period. (Mother’s brief at 10, 14-20.)
    Mother argues that the trial court failed to properly consider her
    explanation for her conduct of temporarily placing the majority of her parental
    duties with Paternal Grandparents. (Id. at 20-22.) Mother asserts that both
    she and Father abused drugs and relied heavily on assistance and support
    from both the Child’s maternal and paternal grandparents. Mother suggests
    that her willingness to allow Paternal Grandparents to continue to provide care
    for Child while she was incarcerated was “only natural.” Mother asserts that,
    when she was released from incarceration, she had no reason to believe that
    Paternal Grandparents would do anything more than continue to care for Child
    as she continued to get sober, and to secure a safe and stable home and
    relationship.   Mother states that she planned to resume her parental
    responsibilities when she was in a position to do so.
    Moreover, with regard to her second issue, Mother asserts that she also
    faced Paternal Grandparents’ sentiment that she was not needed in their lives
    and was “no good.”        Mother claims that her feelings from Paternal
    Grandparents’ sentiments about her, coupled with Child having autism and
    being a special needs child, “prevented [her] from initiating a custody action
    or jumping in to snatch her son out of the hands of [Paternal Grandparents]
    without an amicable transition.” (Id. at 10-11.) Mother alleges that Paternal
    Grandparents filed the termination petition at approximately the time that she
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    believed she was fit to perform her parental duties and was prepared to file a
    custody action against Paternal Grandparents “to regain her parenting
    responsibilities.” (Id. at 11-12.) Mother asserts that the trial court failed to
    properly accept her explanation for her conduct in not initiating a custody
    action sooner or not taking other action to more fully assert herself into the
    lives of Paternal Grandparents to interrupt their exclusive exercise of custody
    of Child. (Id. at 12-13.)
    In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
    adhere to the following standard:
    [A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
    standard       when    considering       a  trial court’s
    determination of a petition for termination of parental
    rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of
    review requires an appellate court to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
    trial court if they are supported by the record. In re:
    R.J.T., 
    608 Pa. 9
    , 
    9 A.3d 1179
    , 1190 (Pa. 2010). If
    the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
    review to determine if the trial court made an error of
    law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 
    36 A.3d 567
    ,
    572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often
    stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
    because the reviewing court might have reached a
    different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett
    v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 
    613 Pa. 371
    [, 455], 
    34 A.3d 1
    , 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 
    838 A.2d 630
    , 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be
    reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
    demonstration       of    manifest      unreasonableness,
    partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
    Id. As we discussed
    in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
    applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in
    these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts,
    appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
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    specific determinations on a cold record, where the
    trial judges are observing the parties during the
    relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous
    other hearings regarding the child and parents.
    
    R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190
    . Therefore, even where the
    facts could support an opposite result, as is often the
    case in dependency and termination cases, an
    appellate court must resist the urge to second guess
    the trial court and impose its own credibility
    determinations and judgment; instead we must defer
    to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
    supported by the record and the court’s legal
    conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an
    abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 
    650 A.2d 1064
    , 1066 (Pa. 1994).
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
    The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
    rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 
    985 A.2d 273
    , 276 (Pa.Super. 2009).
    Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing
    evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and
    convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
    Id., quoting In re
    J.L.C.,
    
    837 A.2d 1247
    , 1251 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    This court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination
    of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See
    In   re   B.L.W.,   
    843 A.2d 380
    ,   384   (Pa.Super.    2004)   (en   banc).
    Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) provides as follows:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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    (a)   General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
    to a child may be terminated after a petition
    filed on any of the following grounds:
    (1)    The parent by conduct continuing
    for a period of at least six months
    immediately preceding the filing of
    the petition either has evidenced a
    settled purpose of relinquishing
    parental claim to a child or has
    refused or failed to perform parental
    duties.
    ....
    (b)   Other       considerations.--The       court    in
    terminating the rights of a parent shall give
    primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child. The rights of a parent shall not be
    terminated solely on the basis of environmental
    factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be
    beyond the control of the parent. With respect
    to     any     petition     filed pursuant      to
    subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
    consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
    conditions described therein which are first
    initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
    the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).
    With respect to Subsection 2511(a)(1), our supreme court has held as
    follows.
    Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform
    parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing
    parental rights, the court must engage in three lines
    of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her
    conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
    parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect
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    of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant
    to Section 2511(b).
    In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 92 (Pa. 1988).
    Further, this court has stated:
    [t]he trial court must consider the whole history of a
    given case and not mechanically apply the six-month
    statutory provision. The court must examine the
    individual circumstances of each case and consider all
    explanations offered by the parent facing termination
    of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
    evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances,
    clearly warrants the involuntary termination.
    ....
    Parental duty requires that the parent act
    affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, and
    not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the
    parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
    ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must
    utilize all available resources to preserve the parental
    relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness
    in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining
    the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not
    preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient
    time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
    others provide the child with his or her physical and
    emotional needs.
    ....
    Where a non-custodial parent is facing termination of
    his or her parental rights, the court must consider the
    non-custodial parent’s explanation, if any, for the
    apparent neglect, including situations in which a
    custodial parent has deliberately created obstacles
    and has by devious means erected barriers intended
    to impede free communication and regular association
    between the non-custodial parent and his or her child.
    Although a parent is not required to perform the
    impossible, he must act affirmatively to maintain his
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    J. S34031/20
    relationship with his child, even in difficult
    circumstances. A parent has a duty to exert himself,
    to take and maintain a place of importance in the
    child’s life.
    In re B.,N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 854-856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
    The trial court stated the following with regard to Mother’s arguments
    regarding Section 2511(a)(1):
    Mother has not communicated with the Child either
    directly or via telephone, mail or any other means.
    There is no evidence Mother sent the [C]hild any gifts,
    presents, cards or letters.       In short, Mother
    consistently has failed to maintain contact with the
    Child.
    She, likewise, has not used the means available to her
    to attempt to overcome any obstacles, imagined or
    otherwise, impeding her relationship with him. For
    instance, the [trial court] is unpersuaded by Mother’s
    claim she was being “blocked” by the Paternal
    Grandparents from reconciling with the [C]hild[,] as
    there is no competent evidence of record to support
    such conclusion. Mother never contacted the Paternal
    Grandparents to initiate contact. Mother even drove
    by the Paternal Grandparents’ residence in the
    company of E.K., but never stopped to visit. Despite
    periods of incarceration and in-patient treatment,
    Mother never reached out to communicate with the
    Child at all. Likewise, Mother had no contact with
    [the] Child during the period of time she was not in
    jail, with Mother not otherwise attempting to contact
    [the] Child.
    Mother’s explanation for her conduct is woefully
    inadequate. The argument that she needed to recover
    from her opiate addiction before being a true mother
    to the Child is belied by the significant evidence of
    record that at times she was not incarcerated or in
    treatment, she chose to spend her time developing a
    significant relationship with [E.K.’s] child, [I.M.K.],
    instead. Even as of late February 2019, a few weeks
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    J. S34031/20
    before the pending petition was filed, Mother was still
    referring to her desire to reconcile with the Child as
    nothing more than an altruistic goal she was still
    contemplating.
    Mother’s post-abandonment contact between parent
    and child is all but nonexistent. Other than the
    singular chance encounter in August of 2018, Mother
    has had no contact with the Child since June of 2017.
    With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), therefore, the
    [trial court] concludes that Mother[,] by clear and
    convincing evidence of conduct continuing for a period
    of at least six months immediately preceding the filing
    of the petition[,] has evidenced a settled purpose of
    relinquishing her parental claim to the Child and has
    refused and failed to perform her parental duties.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
    Trial court order, 3/17/20 at 14-15 (paragraph numbers omitted).
    Upon review, we conclude that there is competent evidence in the record
    that supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother evidenced a settled
    purpose of relinquishing parental claim to Child or has refused or failed to
    perform parental duties in the six-month period preceding the filing of the
    termination petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). Throughout the six months
    preceding the filing of the termination petition, Mother failed to show even a
    passing interest in Child’s development.
    Id. We find this
    failure troubling,
    especially considering Child’s special needs. Mother failed to exert herself to
    take and maintain a place of importance in Child’s life, and to act affirmatively
    with good faith interest and effort to maintain her relationship with Child. She
    had no contact with Child.    We find the trial court’s credibility and weight
    determinations concerning her explanations for her lack of contact with Child
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    J. S34031/20
    to be supported by competent evidence in the record. We, therefore, conclude
    that there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s termination of
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
    Next, we proceed to review whether the trial court properly determined
    that the requirements of Subsection (b) were satisfied. See In re Adoption
    of C.L.G., 
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). This court has
    stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a) is
    on the parent, but pursuant to Section 2511(b), the focus is on the child.
    Id. at 1008.
    In   reviewing   the   evidence   in   support   of   termination   under
    Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:
    [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
    are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
    the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
    welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The
    emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
    properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
    love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [
    620 A.2d 481
    , 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the
    determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
    requires consideration of the emotional bonds
    between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
    should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
    permanently severing the parental bond. In re 
    K.M., 53 A.3d at 791
    .
    In re: T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013).
    When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
    expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
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    J. S34031/20
    well.    Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
    evaluation.”    In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
    citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
    make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where
    direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
    necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762 (Pa.Super. 2008).
    We note, “[t]he mere existence of an emotional bond [with a natural
    parent] does not preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re K.M., 
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa.Super. 2012) (some citations omitted). Also, “whether a
    child’s primary emotional attachment is with a foster parent rather than a birth
    parent is a significant factor in evaluating the child’s developmental and
    emotional needs and welfare.”
    Id. (concluding that, although
    the child once
    had a bond with mother, terminating mother’s parental rights best served the
    child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare because the
    child had not seen the mother in over one year and the child’s primary
    parent-child bond lies with his foster parents). See In re 
    K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764
    (stating “the bond between [the child] and [foster mother] is the primary
    bond to protect, given [the child’s] young age and his very limited contact
    with [m]other”).
    In regard to her third issue, concerning 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), Mother
    asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider and give appropriate
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    J. S34031/20
    weight to the fact that no “new” familial unit would be formed by terminating
    Mother’s parental rights for Paternal Grandparents to adopt Child.         Mother
    argues that, by the termination of her parental rights, Child loses the potential
    for financial support, benefit, and inheritance from Mother’s side of the family.
    Mother contends that the trial court also failed to adequately consider the age
    and physical health of Paternal Grandparents. Mother urges that Child is a
    pre-adolescent boy with severe special needs, and it will take physical strength
    to properly parent him. (Id. at 13.) Mother states that the trial court failed
    to establish how it is in the best interest of Child to terminate her parental
    rights, as Mother is younger and healthier than Paternal Grandparents, who
    have known health problems.        Mother suggests that she will likely outlive
    Paternal Grandparents. Mother asserts that Paternal Grandparents’ adoption
    of Child is not in Child’s best interest, and thus, that the trial court should not
    have terminated her parental rights. (Id., 22-25.)
    The trial court stated the following with regard to Mother’s arguments
    regarding Section 2511(b).
    Mother believes her chance encounter with the Child
    in August 2018 proves he knows that Mother is his
    mother and he continues to have feelings for her, but
    we have been instructed that, concluding a child has
    a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the
    child harbors affection for the parent is not only
    dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings
    were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the
    analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics
    as it is the rare child who, after being subject to
    neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the
    emotional wreckage and completely disavow a
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    J. S34031/20
    parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion that the
    biological connection between [the parent] and the
    children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in
    connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
    establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The
    psychological aspect of parenthood is more important
    in terms of the development of the child and [his or
    her] mental and emotional health than the
    coincidence of biological or natural parenthood. In re
    K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 535 (Pa.Super. 2008)
    (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    The [trial court] concludes that no meaningful bond
    exists between Mother and the Child. Such bond may
    have begun formulating during the first two (2) years
    of the Child’s life, but it has been severed during the
    last ten years.
    The [trial court] next specifically considered whether
    the Child has developed a meaningful bond with the
    Paternal Grandparents.
    The [trial court] concludes that at this point, the Child
    has established a strong emotional parent-child with
    [the] Paternal Grandparents, who have provided
    stability, safety, and security regularly and
    consistently to the Child over an extended period of
    time, that is, since the Child was age two and
    continuing ever since.
    Finally, the [trial court] is not unmindful of[,] and took
    into serious consideration[,] the argument of Mother’s
    counsel that, if the adoption is granted, by law[,] the
    Child will be engrafted with a new parental parentage
    in the form of Paternal Grandparents[,] and be
    severed from Mother’s natural family tree with all ties
    to that side of the family potentially being eradicated.
    Commonwealth ex rel. Dogole v. Cherry, 
    196 Pa. Super. 46
    , 48, 
    173 A.2d 650
    , 651 (1961); Faust
    v. Messinger, 
    345 Pa. Super. 155
    [161, 
    497 A.2d 1351
    , 1353] (1985). Since the prospective adoptive
    parents are the Paternal Grandparents, who have
    been in the Child’s life since infancy, arguably there is
    only a net loss and no real gain. The [trial court]
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    J. S34031/20
    believes, nevertheless, the case should be decided
    based upon the Child[’s] needs and best interests, not
    some perceived loss [regarding] Mother’s side of the
    family. Under the Section 2511(b) analysis, the [trial
    court] concludes that placement with Mother would be
    contrary to Child’s best interests and safety needs.
    In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762 (Pa.Super. 2008).
    “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody
    and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the
    failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s
    right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the
    child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
    environment.” In re B.,N.M., [
    856 A.2d 847
    , 856
    (Pa.Super. 2004)] (internal citations omitted).
    Based upon all of the foregoing, the [trial court]
    concludes that it is in the best interest of the Child to
    terminate Mother’s parental rights.
    Trial court order, 3/17/20 at 17-19 (paragraph numbers omitted).
    After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the trial court’s
    factual, credibility, and weight determinations are supported by competent
    evidence. In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 826-827
    . Although there were
    no social workers who testified on behalf of Paternal Grandparents, the
    competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the
    termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of Child.
    The trial court did not err or commit an abuse of discretion in determining that
    the termination of Mother’s parental rights would provide Child with
    permanency and stability by being adopted by his pre-adoptive Paternal
    Grandparents, who have had custody of him. Paternal Grandparents have
    provided for Child’s special needs, and have provided him with safety,
    permanency, and security.      Child has lived with Paternal Grandparents for
    - 24 -
    J. S34031/20
    most of his young life, and it is they with whom he has his strong emotional
    bond, when compared with Mother, with whom he has had little contact
    because of her inability at times, and lack of desire at other times, to parent
    him. See In re: 
    T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269
    ; In re 
    K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764
    .
    Accordingly, for the reasons expressed by the trial court, we affirm the trial
    court order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 09/28/2020
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