In re Richard M. , 2017 ME 211 ( 2017 )

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 211 Docket: And-17-244
Submitted
On Briefs: October 24, 2017
Decided: October 31, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE RICHARD M.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] The mother and father of Richard M. appeal from the District
Court’s (Lewiston, Dow, J.) judgment terminating their parental rights to their
son, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2016).
The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
findings on parental unfitness and its discretionary finding that termination is
in their son’s best interest. Contrary to the parents’ contentions, competent
record evidence supports the court’s findings and its discretionary
determination; therefore, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The court found that, despite the parents having made marginal
progress toward reunification, they have failed to take responsibility for their
son; they are unwilling or unable to protect him from jeopardy within a time
reasonably calculated to meet his needs; they have failed to make a good faith
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effort toward reunification; and termination of their parental rights is in the
child’s best interest.1 See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv); In re Alana S.,
2002 ME 126, ¶¶ 13, 21-23, 802 A.2d 976. After over a year, the parents’
minimal progress toward reunification was totally inadequate to address the
jeopardy facing the child were he to return to their care. The court based this
determination on the following findings of fact:
[The father] has a history of violence and mental health
concerns that present a risk to his son. . . . There are concerns
about sexually deviant behavior over a period of years by [the
father]. [The father’s] continued substance abuse presents a risk
of harm to his child.
. . . .
[The father] has been very inconsistent in visiting his child
[and] has missed visits for reasons the court finds utterly
inadequate justification for missing visits. . . . [The majority of the
father’s] intellectual abilities were in the borderline range [and]
make it likely that [he] is likely to need significant support in
order to meet a child’s daily living needs.
. . . .
[The father] has also failed to attend random drug
screenings, failed to engage in mental health counseling, failed to
consult with a psychiatrist. . . . All the while he has maintained an
attitude that there is nothing about him that needs fixing or
changing.
1 At the time of the termination hearing, the child had been in foster care for over a year.
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[The mother] has ongoing mental health issues that pose a
risk to her consistent parenting of the baby. [She] has a history of
low intellectual functioning that has impaired her parenting of
older children and presents a risk for this baby. . . . [She]
consented to [a] petition to terminate her rights regarding [her
older son] . . . .
. . . [The mother] went along while [the father] stayed in the
house night after night in violation of the [initial] safety plan. She
stuck with him as he called out of visits with the child and blew off
his counseling. . . . She has consistently chosen [the father] over
the child. [The mother] has also failed, independently of [the
father], to make progress necessary to alleviate jeopardy and take
responsibility for the child. She failed to complete drug screens.
She failed to be in individual counseling for much of the duration
of the case.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶3] Competent record evidence supports each of the three bases for
termination found by the court and its determination of the child’s best
interest. We review the court’s findings on parental unfitness for clear error
and its conclusion that termination is in the child’s best interest for an abuse
of discretion. See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶¶ 3, 5, 155 A.3d 430. The
court rationally found that the parents’ deficits make serious harm to their
son highly probable and that termination of their parental rights is in his best
interest.
[¶4] The mother and father, relying on In re Hope H., 541 A.2d 165,
166-67 (Me. 1988), argue that the court failed to properly link their parenting
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deficiencies to specific risks of harm to their son. However, the parents’
reliance on In re Hope H. is misplaced because here the court drew numerous
connections between their parenting deficiencies and the attendant risks to
their son’s well-being. Cf. Id.; see In re Sarah C., 2004 ME 152, ¶ 13,
864 A.2d 162.
[¶5] In addition, the lack of a sexual abuse conviction on the father’s
record and the legal status of recreational marijuana—which the parents
suggest are inoculants for some of their deficiencies—are irrelevant to a
court’s inquiry into the jeopardy that these behaviors pose to a child.
See In re Serena C., 650 A.2d 1343, 1345 (Me. 1994); In re Jesse B., 2017 ME 90,
¶¶ 6-8, 160 A.3d 1187. The mother and father have refused to acknowledge
the risks to their son that stem from allegations of the father’s sexually
deviant behavior and their continued substance abuse. Given the support of
competent evidence in the record for all of the court’s findings, the court did
not err in its determination of unfitness nor did it err or abuse its discretion in
determining that termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights, with
a permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest.
See In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶¶ 3, 5, 155 A.3d 430.
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The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Lorne Fairbanks, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant mother
Richard Charest, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2015-60
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY