State v. Chase , 919 N.W.2d 207 ( 2018 )

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2018 S.D. 70IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
NATHAN D. CHASE, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE MATTHEW M. BROWN
Judge
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MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
MATTHEW W. TEMPLAR
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
ELLERY GREY
Grey & Eisenbraun Law Attorneys for defendant
Rapid City, South Dakota and appellant.
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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON
AUGUST 27, 2018
OPINION FILED 10/03/18
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] Nathan Chase was convicted of second-degree murder. He appeals the
circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an
investigatory stop. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] On January 23, 2017, at about 7:50 p.m., law enforcement responded
to a call from a Rapid City motel regarding an assault. Officers discovered the body
of Jeremy Little in the entrance to one of the motel rooms. He had been fatally
stabbed in the face and neck, and there was substantial blood at the scene. Captain
Tony Harrison of the Pennington County Sheriff’s Office reviewed security footage
of the hallway outside the room in which Little was found. He observed six people
entering and leaving the room that night. Five of the individuals were identified
and excluded as suspects. The sixth, an unidentified man, became the murder
suspect. From the footage, Harrison observed that the suspect was a male of
average weight and height wearing a black stocking cap, dark pants, dark shoes,
and a tan Carhartt jacket over a black hooded sweatshirt.
[¶3.] After completing the initial investigation around 2:00 a.m., Harrison
returned to the motel to search nearby dumpsters for the murder weapon. At about
3:15 a.m., he observed a man walking on the sidewalk about two blocks from the
motel. Harrison believed the man resembled the suspect from the security footage
based on height and weight. Harrison also noticed he was wearing a tan Carhartt
jacket similar to the coat worn by the suspect. Yet, in contrast, the pedestrian wore
his jacket over a white hooded sweatshirt rather than a black one. Additionally, his
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shoes were white rather than dark, and he had on different colored pants than those
worn by the suspect in the security footage. It was a cold evening and no one else
was moving on the streets.
[¶4.] Based on the man’s similar appearance—primarily his build and the
Carhartt jacket—and his proximity to the crime scene, Harrison decided to
investigate. He activated his emergency lights and stopped his unmarked vehicle
next to the man, later identified as Nathan Chase. Harrison exited the car,
introduced himself as a law enforcement officer, and informed Chase that he
wanted to ask about an “event” at the motel. Chase agreed to a search of his
person, and Harrison found a bloody knife in Chase’s pocket. Chase was taken into
custody and questioned. The blood on the knife was later matched to Little’s DNA.
[¶5.] Chase was indicted for second-degree murder. Prior to trial, he moved
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The circuit court denied
the motion, ruling that Harrison had reasonable suspicion to initiate the
investigatory stop. A jury found Chase guilty. He appeals the circuit court’s
decision. He does not challenge the circuit court’s findings of fact. He only
challenges the court’s legal conclusion that Harrison had reasonable suspicion for
the stop.
Decision
[¶6.] “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable
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searches and seizures.”1 State v. Walter, 2015 S.D. 37, ¶ 7, 864 N.W.2d 779, 782.
Although it is preferable for law enforcement to obtain a warrant before conducting
a search or seizure, a warrant is not necessary for less invasive intrusions, such as
an investigatory stop. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). “[W]hen a person is subject to an ‘investigative detention’
rather than a full-blown custodial arrest, the officer need only have reasonable
suspicion for the detention rather than the probable cause typically required.” Id.(quoting State v. De La Rosa, 2003 S.D. 18, ¶ 7, 657 N.W.2d 683, 686). That is
because “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity
or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may
be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” State v.
Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32, ¶ 13, 896 N.W.2d 669, 675 (quoting Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972)). Thus, “if police
have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a
person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” United States
v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). The
question whether an officer has reasonable suspicion is viewed under the totality of
the circumstances. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32, ¶ 13, 896 N.W.2d at 675.
[¶7.] Chase argues Harrison only had a “sixth sense” about Chase being the
perpetrator. He contends Harrison’s testimony at the suppression hearing confirms
1. The State does not dispute that the stop was a “seizure” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend IV.
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the stop was based on a mere “hunch.” However, Harrison’s testimony shows he
relied on his twenty years of experience as a law enforcement officer in determining
whether to stop an individual based upon all the information known to him at the
time. It is well settled that law enforcement “officers [may] draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about
the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained
person.’” State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 16, 841 N.W.2d 440, 445 (quoting State v.
Haar, 2009 S.D. 79, ¶ 23, 772 N.W.2d 157, 167).
[¶8.] Moreover, “[a]lthough a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable
suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is
necessary for probable cause.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S. Ct.
1683, 1687, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014) (first quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at
1883; then quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585,
104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989)). Here, Harrison’s suspicion was not grounded on a mere
hunch. He identified specific and articulable facts supporting his decision to stop
Harrison.
[¶9.] Chase next argues that even if the stop was not based on a mere
hunch, Harrison’s articulated facts did not support the quantum of suspicion
necessary to initiate an investigatory stop. He contends Harrison’s information was
stale because over seven hours had elapsed between the crime and the stop. He
also contends the description of the suspected perpetrator was too general because
the security footage only disclosed an individual of average height wearing a
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Carhartt-style jacket. Further, he claims that even if it was a good description,
Chase and his clothing did not match the suspect exactly. Chase also identifies
non-incriminating inferences or explanations for the incriminating facts and
circumstances Harrison relied upon for the investigative stop.
[¶10.] We acknowledge Chase’s point that seven and a half hours had elapsed
between the crime and the stop. We also recognize that Chase’s clothes were not
identical to those worn by the unidentified male in the security footage and
Harrison could not observe more specific physical attributes from the security
footage.2 But these facts alone do not foreclose reasonable suspicion. Rather, the
determination whether reasonable suspicion existed must consider all facts
available to Harrison at the time of the stop, viewed under the totality of the
circumstances. See Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32, ¶ 13, 896 N.W.2d at 675.
[¶11.] “Because the reasonable suspicion determination requires this Court to
‘look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining
officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing,’ a
review of the salient facts known to [the officer] is necessary.” State v. Johnson,
2011 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 795 N.W.2d 924, 926 (quoting State v. Herren, 2010 S.D. 101, ¶ 7,
792 N.W.2d 551, 554). The record reveals that Harrison observed firsthand the
suspect depicted in the motel’s security footage. He testified that the Carhartt
2. Chase claims that Captain Harrison’s observation of a suspect’s physical
attributes via a security footage should be scrutinized in the same way as a
physical description provided by an informant. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2006). We disagree. A physical
description relayed by a third party is wholly different than observations
made firsthand by an officer. Harrison was relying entirely on his own
observations when he stopped Chase, not a tip with questionable reliability.
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jacket particularly stood out to him in the footage. He further explained that he
observed an individual with the same build and jacket as the suspect walking alone
at three in the morning only two blocks from the crime scene during a “frigidly cold”
night. While he acknowledged Chase wore different colored clothing than shown in
the footage, Harrison explained that quickly verifying the man was “not our guy”
would have taken ten seconds and the man could be on his way. This was
reasonable because “[i]t is quite possible that mutable characteristics of a suspect,
such as attire . . . may vary significantly during a flight from apprehension.” State
v. Faulks, 2001 S.D. 115, ¶ 11, 633 N.W.2d 613, 617.
[¶12.] Ultimately, Chase’s arguments require isolating the facts from the
totality of the circumstances. However, Chase’s type of “divide-and-conquer”
analysis is not utilized in assessing reasonable suspicion. Haar, 2009 S.D. 79, ¶ 23,
772 N.W.2d at 167; accord District of Columbia v. Wesby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 588, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (“The totality-of-the-circumstances test
‘precludes [a] divide-and-conquer analysis.’”). Moreover, “[t]he Fourth Amendment
does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary
for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow . . . a criminal
to escape.” Adams, 407 U.S. at 145, 92 S. Ct. at 1923.
[¶13.] Indeed, an unapprehended murder suspect poses a serious threat to
public safety, and here, the circuit court found that law enforcement had no leads at
the time of the stop. When a crime involves a threat to public safety, law
enforcement’s interest in detaining the suspect as quickly as possible may
“outweigh the individual’s interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more
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extensive than permissible in the investigation” of the crime. Hensley, 469 U.S.
at 229, 105 S. Ct. at 680. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
substantial public safety interest in apprehending the homicide suspect that
remained at large, and the minimal intrusion created by Harrison’s stop, we
conclude that the investigatory stop was based on reasonable suspicion within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
[¶14.] Affirmed.
[¶15.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, KERN, JENSEN, and SALTER,
Justices, concur.
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