Com. v. T.J.W., Jr. Appeal of: C.W. ( 2015 )

J-A30039-14
2015 Pa. Super. 97
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
T.J.W., JR.
APPEAL OF: C.W., A MINOR
No. 1351 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order April 1, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0002128-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY PLATT, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2015
Appellant, C.W., appeals from the order directing her counsel to
provide certain mental health treatment records for in camera inspection by
the trial court to determine if the materials at issue are privileged. Appellant
argues that the court erred because the records are protected from release
by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944, confidential communications to psychiatrists or
licensed psychologists. We find that the claim of privilege, to prevent in
camera inspection, was waived. The trial court properly ordered production
for in camera examination to determine whether privilege applies to prevent
further disclosure. Accordingly, we affirm the order and remand.
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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This is an interlocutory appeal.1 The underlying case has a somewhat
convoluted as well as protracted history. We summarize the facts most
pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal. (For a more detailed history of
the case, see Trial Court Opinion, 6/10/14, at 2-4; see also Trial Court
Opinion and Order, 4/05/13, at 1-9).
Appellee, T.J.W. Jr. (Appellee T.J.W.),2 is charged with rape by forcible
compulsion, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent
assault and related charges. Appellant, the complainant, is his natural
(biological) daughter. In 2011, Appellant, then nineteen, accused her father
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1
The parties do not dispute that the April 1, 2014 order, requiring the
production of Appellant’s mental health records, alleged to be confidential
and privileged, in a criminal matter, is appealable as a collateral order. See
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 719 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. Super. 1998);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 593 A.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Pa. Super. 1991); see
also Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, which provides in
pertinent part that:
A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the
main cause of action where the right involved is too important to
be denied review and the question presented is such that if
review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim
will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
2
The Commonwealth has also filed a brief in this appeal, urging this Court to
reverse the trial court. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11). Although the
Commonwealth has captioned its brief as “Brief for Appellee,” it also states
that it “joins as a co-appellant.” (See id. at 10). To avoid confusion of
terminology, we will refer to T.J.W. as Appellee T.J.W. and the
Commonwealth simply as the Commonwealth.
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of rape, sexual molestation, and related acts beginning when she was four-
and-a-half years old, until she was seventeen.3 The Pennsylvania State
Police trooper investigating Appellant’s charges had her sign releases and
obtained records from various psychiatric and mental health treatment
providers.
Appellant testified at a preliminary hearing that over the twelve year
time span, Appellee T.J.W., engaged in six to eight acts of oral, vaginal and
anal intercourse with her, as well as digital penetration and other
inappropriate touching, without her consent. (See N.T., Preliminary
Hearing, 6/08/12, at 11-28).
Appellant further testified that she always remembered the first
incident, when she was about four and her father had her perform oral sex
on him in his shower. (See id. at 43). However, on cross-examination, she
also testified that she blocked out the memories of the other later incidents
until she was nineteen. (See id. at 50). At that time, she began receiving
amorous emails from one of her college professors, who apparently was
trying to pursue her romantically (Appellant says he “hit on” her), telling her
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3
The caption designation of Appellant as a minor may be confusing without
a further clarification. Appellant was born in February of 1992. (See N.T.
Preliminary Hearing, 6/08/12, at 8). Therefore, while Appellant alleges
various sexual assaults by Appellee T.J.W. when she was a minor, by the
time she made the complaint on which these charges are based she had
attained the age of majority. (See id.; see also Trial Ct. Op., 6/10/14, at 1
n.1).
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she was beautiful and that she made his wife jealous. (Id. at 50-51; see
also Appellant’s Brief, at 37 n.8).
Appellant stated that these emails from a man about her father’s age
who also told her she was beautiful and treated her “in a sexual nature”
triggered memories by which she gradually recalled her father’s other sexual
assaults. (N.T. Preliminary Hearing, at 51; see also id. at 56-57).
Appellee T.J.W. denies the charges. He maintains that Appellant’s
recovered memories are false. He asserts that they were induced by
controversial techniques employed during Appellant’s course of
psychotherapy. He argues that the process of recovering repressed
memories of childhood sexual abuse is unproven and unreliable. 4 Appellee
also argues in his brief, as he did at oral argument, that Appellant’s
counsel’s agreement to a stipulated order, and subsequent refusal to submit
the documents to the trial court, raises the inference that “the files contain
exculpatory evidence that contradicts or undermines [Appellant’s] version of
the facts.” (Brief of [ ] Appellee [T.J.W.], at 34).
Appellee T.J.W. also filed an omnibus pre-trial motion and served
subpoenas on several of Appellant’s mental health treatment providers.
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4
We note that Judge Nagle granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to
exclude the testimony of Appellee T.J.W.’s proposed expert on the issue of
repressed memory, if “offered to challenge the credibility of” Appellant.
(Order, 9/06/13).
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(See Trial Ct. Op., 6/10/14, at 2). The Commonwealth filed a motion to
quash the subpoenas. (See Commonwealth’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas,
9/04/12). On November 30, 2012, counsel entered his appearance to
represent Appellant and filed another motion to quash on her behalf.
Appellee T.J.W. withdrew the subpoenas, but apparently served another set
later. Eventually, the parties to the litigation and counsel for Appellant
reached an agreement, and the court entered an order with accompanying
opinion on April 5, 2013. (See Opinion and Order of Court, 4/05/13).
On December 5, 2013, the trial court filed another order.5 This order
directed Appellant’s treatment providers to submit their records to her
counsel, who would redact any information asserted to be privileged, and
prepare a privilege log, both to be forwarded to the trial court. The court
directed counsel to forward a copy of the privilege log (only) to Appellee
T.J.W. and to the Commonwealth.
Counsel for Appellant eventually submitted a response.6 Appellee
T.J.W. filed a motion to strike, asserting that the submission was not
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5
The trial court notes that this order was based on a stipulation. (See Trial
Ct. Op., 6/10/14, at 3). The court also notes that at all times pertinent to
the stipulated order the parties and Appellant were represented by counsel.
(See id. at 3 n.5).
6
On January 24, 2014, this case was re-assigned from Senior Judge Ronald
C. Nagle to the Honorable Anne Marie Wheatcraft, who continues to preside
over the proceedings in the trial court. (See Order, 1/24/14; see also
Appellant’s Brief, at 9).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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compliant with the order. On April 1, 2014, after a hearing, the trial court
filed another order, the order on appeal here, directing Appellant’s counsel
to produce and deliver to the trial court redacted mental health treatment
records and privilege logs pursuant to the terms of the stipulated order of
December 5, 2013.7 (See Order, 4/01/14, at 1-2). Instead, counsel for
Appellant filed the instant timely appeal, on April 25, 2014.8
Appellant presents seven questions for our review:
1. Does the privilege contained in 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5944
prohibit the disclosure by a psychiatrist or psychologist of all
information acquired in the course of treatment of a patient
without the consent of the patient?
2. Does the privilege contained in 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5944
prohibit the disclosure by a psychiatrist or psychologist of
communications from the therapist to the patient during
treatment without the consent of the patient?
3. May the Commonwealth and/or the defendant in a
criminal case issue subpoenas to non[-]parties, including the
victim of a child sexual assault case and her mental health
treatment providers, for the sole purpose of obtaining pre-trial
discovery?
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
7
The order also directed, inter alia, that Appellant’s counsel provide a
privilege log, identifying any redactions and describing the basis for any
privilege asserted, to Appellee T.J.W. and to the Commonwealth. (See
Order, 4/01/14, at 1-2). The court impounded the order to protect the
identity of the complainant, Appellant. (See id. at 2, ¶ D).
8
Counsel filed a statement of errors on May 19, 2014. The trial court filed
an opinion on June 10, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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4. Where a proper [m]otion to [q]uash is filed, should a
subpoena directed to a treating psychologist or psychiatrist of a
crime victim be quashed as overbroad under circumstances
where the victim has not consented to disclosure, and the
subpoena explicitly requires the production of records protected
by 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5944?
5. Where a proper [m]otion to [q]uash is filed, should a
subpoena directed to a treating psychologist or psychiatrist of a
crime victim be quashed as overbroad under circumstances
where the victim has not consented to disclosure, and the
subpoena requires the production of extremely personal
information not limited with respect to time period or subject
matter to materials relevant to the criminal case for which they
were subpoenaed?
6. In a case where a treating psychiatrist or psychologist
has testified that the contents of their records of treatment of a
crime victim are protected by 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5944, and there is
no contrary evidence in the record, may the [c]ourt require the
disclosure of those records?
7. May a psychiatrist or psychologist who has provided
professional services on behalf of a patient be examined in a
criminal case about information acquired in the course of
treatment in the absence of the written consent of the client,
and over her explicit objection?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5).
Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s third, fourth, fifth and seventh
questions address whether the outstanding subpoenas should be quashed.
However, Appellant concedes that the trial court did not enter an order
concerning the motions to quash. (See id.).9
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9
Moreover, in the argument section for the seventh question, Appellant
concedes that “the issue is not presented in this case[.]” (Appellant’s Brief,
at 42-43).
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Therefore, none of these questions properly raise an issue concerning
a final, or otherwise appealable, order. An issue before this Court is moot if
in ruling on it the Court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or
effect. See In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 811 (Pa. Super. 2015). This Court
does not render advisory opinions. See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 341
(providing for appeals from final orders); Pa.R.A.P. 313 (providing for
appeals from collateral orders). Accordingly, these four questions are moot,
and we decline to address them.10
Appellant’s first, second and sixth questions all challenge the trial
court’s order, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944.11 (See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5).
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10
In any event, the over-arching claim, that the issuance of a subpoena in a
criminal case for pre-trial discovery is invalid, is of doubtful merit. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 107, Comment (“subpoena shall be used . . . for any . . . stage
of the proceedings when a subpoena is issuable”); see also
Commonwealth v. Berger, 96 A.3d 1049, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2014) (trial
courts have authority pursuant to subpoena power to order disclosure of files
in possession of third party); Miller, supra at 1311 (trial court had
authority by virtue of subpoena power to order non-party rape crisis center
to produce records pertaining to alleged victim).
11
Confidential communications to psychiatrists or licensed
psychologists
No psychiatrist or person who has been licensed under the
act of March 23, 1972 (P.L. 136, No. 52), to practice psychology
shall be, without the written consent of his client, examined in
any civil or criminal matter as to any information acquired in the
course of his professional services in behalf of such client. The
confidential relations and communications between a
psychologist or psychiatrist and his client shall be on the same
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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With minor variations, the three questions raise the same essential claim ─
that all information acquired by her psychiatrists or psychologists, including
communications from the therapist to Appellant as the patient, and records
of treatment, are protected by absolute privilege under section 5944. We
address these three questions together.
Where a case involves the proper construction of a statute, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See
Octave ex rel. Octave v. Walker, 103 A.3d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2014).
We begin by noting that “[t]he law is clear that a criminal defendant is
entitled to know about any information that may affect the reliability of the
witnesses against him.” Commonwealth v. Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d 870,
876 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Copeland, 723 A.2d
1049, 1051-52 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1999)).
Therefore, absent an applicable claim of privilege, if Appellee T.J.W. were
able to articulate a reasonable basis for his request, he would have a
colorable claim to seek evidence which might show that the complainant’s
memories were somehow impaired or otherwise unreliable.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
basis as those provided or prescribed by law between an
attorney and client.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5944 (footnote omitted).
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Tracking the language of section 5944, Appellant argues that the
privilege here asserted is “as impenetrable as the attorney-client privilege.”
(Appellant’s Brief, at 11). The trial court concluded that these claims are
waived. (See Trial Ct. Op., 6/10/14, at 5). After review, we agree.
A privilege can be waived. See Octave, supra at 1262 (holding
patient waived confidentiality protections under Mental Health Procedures
Act (MPHA) [50 P.S. § 7111] where, judged by an objective standard, he
knew or reasonably should have known his mental health, specifically
suicidal tendencies, would be placed directly at issue by filing lawsuit for
injuries suffered after he allegedly attempted to commit suicide by jumping
under tractor-trailer); see also Law Office of Douglas T. Harris, Esq. v.
Phila. Waterfront Partners, LP, 957 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(holding client implicitly waived attorney-client privilege when his attorney
failed to invoke or assert privilege before trial court, and raised issue for first
time on appeal).
Here, Appellant, through counsel, agreed to the stipulated order of
December 5, 2013. Notably, the trial court (then-presiding Judge Nagle)
expressly held that order in abeyance for three days to afford counsel an
opportunity to appeal the ruling prior to its entry into effect. (See Order,
12/05/13, at 2 ¶ 4). Appellant elected not to do so. (See Trial Ct. Op.,
6/10/14, at 5 n.6).
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Therefore, we conclude that Appellant waived her claim of privilege by
agreeing to the stipulated order in December of 2013, and not asserting
privilege until over four-and-a-half months later, after the instant order
directing compliance with the order from December.
Moreover, the claim would not merit relief. Our Supreme Court has
recently explained:
It must be emphasized that evidentiary privileges have
been viewed by this Court to be in derogation of the search for
truth, and are generally disfavored for this reason. See
Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Taylor,
576 Pa. 622, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting)
(“It is well established that evidentiary privileges . . . are
generally disfavored and should be narrowly construed.” (citation
omitted)); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 547 Pa. 277, 690 A.2d
195, 197 (1997) (discussing clergy-communicant privilege,
noting courts should accept privileges “ ‘only to the very limited
extent that . . . excluding relevant evidence has a public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth’ ” (citation omitted));
Hutchison v. Luddy, 414 Pa. Super. 138, 606 A.2d 905, 909
(1992) (“ ‘[E]xceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence
are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for the truth.’ ” (quoting Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115
(1979))). The effect of that concern in this case is obvious.
Accordingly, we hold a patient waives his confidentiality
protections under the MHPA where, judged by an objective
standard, he knew or reasonably should have known his mental
health would be placed directly at issue by filing the lawsuit.
Octave, supra at 1262 (footnote omitted).
Similarly here, from our review of the record we conclude that
Appellant should reasonably have known (or that counsel would have timely
advised her) that the long delay in reporting the persistent memory of the
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first incident and the recovery of memories of the intervening incidents,
would, inter alia, raise an issue of the reliability of the recovered memories.
Appellant argues that the privilege is absolute. (See Appellant’s Brief,
at 16). However, we conclude that especially in the circumstances of this
case, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive.
We recognize that some predecessor panels of this Court have
analyzed psychiatrist/psychologist-client confidentiality under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5944 using the “absolute privilege” terminology adopted here by
Appellant. (See id. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120,
123-25 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied, 541 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1988)) (trial
court properly denied defendant inspection of rape victim’s file of post-attack
counseling with licensed clinical psychologist or, alternatively, in camera
review by court)).
Appellant also argues that our Supreme Court has ruled similarly. She
cites Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 575 (Pa. 2005), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 838 (2006) (holding on direct appeal that trial court
properly refused capital murder defendant access to mental health records
of prosecution witness, his own thirteen year old daughter, to challenge her
competency to testify). (See Appellant’s Brief, at 15-16, 22, 27-28).
We note that the appellant, Dowling, asserted that the trial court erred
by denying him access to the mental health records of his thirteen year-old
daughter on the basis that he was on a “fishing expedition designed to
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attempt to discredit [his daughter] in any way possible.” Dowling, supra
at 575 (record citation omitted).
Dowling sought to assert a generalized challenge to his daughter’s
competency based on claimed diagnoses of depression, panic disorder and
agoraphobia. Our Supreme Court also noted that at trial Dowling could have
challenged his daughter’s mental health and competency to testify, “but
opted not to.” Id. at 576. On review, we find the facts and the holding in
Dowling distinguishable from this case, where Appellee T.J.W., before trial,
asserts a specific challenge to the recovered memories of his now-adult
daughter.
Furthermore, we note that even in the cases which adopt the “absolute
privilege” terminology, there is recognition, often expressly, that the
disposition of a claim of privilege involves an impartial assessment of the
competing claims. See Kyle, supra at 129 (concluding “that the balance
tips in favor of non-disclosure”) (emphasis added); see also
Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719 A.2d 284, 295 (Pa. 1998), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 836 (1999) (statutory privilege in section 5944 “not
outweighed by either a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-
examine a witness or his right to due process of law”) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
Additionally, in Simmons this Court concluded in pertinent part that
“files containing diagnoses, opinions, evaluations, and treatment plans . . .
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are not confidential communications from the client covered under § 5944.”
Simmons, supra at 344. Accord, Commonwealth v. Carter, 821 A.2d
601 (Pa. Super. 2003). In Carter, Judge (now Justice) Stevens explained:
In the case sub judice, we have no difficulty concluding
that the opinions, observations, diagnosis, and treatment
alternatives outlined by the professionals who interviewed
Appellant during his juvenile detention are not privileged under
Section 5944. Commonwealth v. G.P., 765 A.2d 363 (Pa.
Super. 2000) (holding that opinions formulated by a psychiatrist
based on observations are not privileged); Id. However, we
must proceed to determine whether the disclosures made by
Appellant to psychiatrists during his juvenile detention are
privileged. In doing so, it is necessary to determine to what
extent the disclosures were made during the treatment process.
Id.
Id. at 608-09 (also citing Simmons, supra at 341).
Here, as in Simmons and Carter, remand is required to implement
the order and allow the trial court to determine what communications are
protected by the privilege claimed. See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 61 (1987) (plurality) (permitting in camera review by trial court of
confidential records to determine if they contain material exculpatory to
defendant); Berger, supra at 1055 (remanding to trial court for rule to
show cause on in camera inspection of victim’s records to determine if
challenged materials were protected by privilege or discoverable as material
produced in support of Commonwealth’s investigation) (citing, inter alia,
Simmons and Ritchie).
Appellant admits in her brief that the trial court’s decision would be
supported by this Court’s decision in Simmons. (See Appellant’s Brief, at
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20). However, the brief endeavors to distinguish both Simmons and
Carter. (See id. at 21-22). Appellant’s arguments are unsupported by
reference to any other pertinent authority. (See id.). Therefore, we
conclude they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b). Furthermore, they
are unpersuasive.
Appellant argues in the alternative that Simmons and Carter should
be overruled. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 22). This Court is of course bound
by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we continue to
review appeals before us in accordance with currently controlling precedent.
See Dixon v. GEICO, 1 A.3d 921, 925-26 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing cases).
Even though our Supreme Court decided Octave based on the Mental
Health Procedures Act, rather than section 5944, we conclude here, after
review, that the same underlying principles of narrowly construing privileges
(as in derogation of the search for truth), and the possibility of waiver apply
in this case as well. Appellant’s claim of privilege is waived and would not
merit relief.
We emphasize for clarity that our decision responds exclusively to the
issues properly raised and argued before us in this collateral appeal. We
decline to address any other issues. Furthermore, we express no position on
the merits, vel non, of the underlying prosecution, or on any other collateral
issues not specifically addressed here, and none should be inferred.
Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/24/2015
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