State v. Medicine Eagle , 835 N.W.2d 886 ( 2013 )

#26346-aff in part, rev & rem in part-DG
2013 S.D. 60
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
GABRIEL DARRYN
MEDICINE EAGLE, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
TRIPP COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE JOHN L. BROWN
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
KIRSTEN E. JASPER
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
PAUL E. JENSEN of
Jensen & Massa
Winner, South Dakota
Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
ARGUED MARCH 19, 2013
OPINION FILED 08/07/13
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] M.E.H. alleges she was kidnapped and raped by Gabriel Darryn
Medicine Eagle, Junior, on September 23, 2000. In 2001, Medicine Eagle was
indicted, but the charges were later dismissed when DNA testing failed to implicate
Medicine Eagle. In 2008, the case was reopened and the evidence obtained in 2000
was retested using a new method of DNA testing. This time, the testing revealed
the presence of Medicine Eagle’s DNA. On December 3, 2009, the grand jury
indicted Medicine Eagle on various charges stemming from the alleged rape.
Further, a Part II Information was filed charging Medicine Eagle as a habitual
offender pursuant to SDCL 22-7-7. At trial, the court admitted evidence of an
incident involving Medicine Eagle and S.M., which allegedly occurred in 2003, as
other acts evidence pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)). Additionally, the trial
court permitted the State to elicit testimony from a forensic DNA analyst regarding
the results of DNA testing performed in 2008 and 2011, even though some steps of
the testing were performed by nontestifying analysts. The jury found Medicine
Eagle guilty of one count of rape in the second degree, one count of rape in the third
degree, sexual contact with a child under age 16, and kidnapping. In a separate
trial, the jury found that Medicine Eagle was a habitual offender. Medicine Eagle
appeals.
FACTS
[¶2.] On September 23, 2000, 15-year-old M.E.H. was in Winner, South
Dakota, to attend a funeral. M.E.H. was staying with her grandmother, who lived
in a housing development just outside of Winner. At approximately 6:00 p.m.,
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M.E.H. had sexual intercourse with her 16-year-old boyfriend Patrick Red Bird
while the two were alone at the house. Shortly thereafter, M.E.H., her brother, her
cousin, and her friend left the house and walked to town. At approximately 10:30
p.m., M.E.H. began walking home in order to make her 11:00 p.m. curfew.
[¶3.] M.E.H. alleges that while she was walking home, 23-year-old Medicine
Eagle and his passenger approached her in Medicine Eagle’s van and offered to give
her a ride home. M.E.H. recognized the passenger, and accepted the ride. M.E.H.
claims Medicine Eagle proceeded to drop the passenger off at his home. After
dropping the passenger off, M.E.H. claims Medicine Eagle drove back into town to
buy beer at a gas station and then drove to the bowling alley so M.E.H. could look
for her cousin. When M.E.H. was unable to locate her cousin, she got back in
Medicine Eagle’s vehicle so that he could take her home. At this point, M.E.H.
alleges Medicine Eagle began driving erratically. Despite her repeated requests to
be taken home, M.E.H. asserts Medicine Eagle drove to a desolate field outside of
Winner. Upon reaching the field, M.E.H. alleges she tried to run away from the van
to get help. However, M.E.H. claims Medicine Eagle caught her and dragged her
back to the van by her hair. M.E.H. alleges Medicine Eagle then forced her into the
van and raped her. According to M.E.H., Medicine Eagle threatened her
throughout the incident. M.E.H. claims Medicine Eagle drove her home after the
rape. Medicine Eagle disputes these allegations.
[¶4.] When M.E.H. arrived at home, she told her mother she had been
raped. At 2:00 a.m. on September 24, 2000, M.E.H. was taken to the hospital,
where she was examined and a rape kit was collected. The rape kit evidence and
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M.E.H.’s clothing were subsequently sent to the South Dakota State Forensic
Laboratory for testing. After M.E.H. was discharged from the hospital, she was
interviewed by law enforcement. At this point in time, she did not inform law
enforcement that she had sexual intercourse with Red Bird prior to the alleged
rape. In 2001, Medicine Eagle was indicted on charges stemming from the alleged
rape.
[¶5.] At the South Dakota State Forensic Laboratory, criminalist Stacy
Smith conducted serology testing to check for the presence of bodily fluids on the
evidence. While conducting the testing, Smith established the presence of bodily
fluids on the vaginal swab and the underwear that were collected as part of
M.E.H.’s rape kit. However, prior to 2002, the South Dakota State Forensic
Laboratory did not do DNA testing. As a result, Smith sent M.E.H.’s vaginal swab,
Medicine Eagle’s buccal swab, and M.E.H.’s blood sample to the Orchid Cellmark
(formerly known as GeneScreen) lab in Texas for DNA testing.
[¶6.] At the time, Amber Moss worked at Orchid Cellmark (Cellmark) as a
forensic scientist. In August 2001, Moss received the evidence sent by Smith. Moss
performed DNA testing on the vaginal swab, and compared it to the DNA profiles
obtained from Medicine Eagle’s buccal swab and M.E.H.’s blood sample. The only
DNA profile Moss was able to obtain during the testing was consistent with
M.E.H.’s DNA profile. Moss sent these results to Smith at the South Dakota State
Forensic Laboratory.
[¶7.] Shortly thereafter, Smith sent a cutting from M.E.H.’s underwear to
Cellmark for DNA testing. Moss performed DNA testing on the sample and
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compared the DNA profiles obtained from the underwear cutting to the DNA
profiles of M.E.H. and Medicine Eagle. Medicine Eagle was not implicated by the
results of this round of DNA testing. Instead, the only male DNA profile Moss was
able to obtain was from an unknown male individual. Upon completion of the
testing, Cellmark retained the extractions from M.E.H.’s vaginal swab and M.E.H.’s
underwear cutting in a secured area at the lab.
[¶8.] Because the DNA testing failed to implicate Medicine Eagle and
instead revealed the presence of DNA from an unidentified male, the charges
against Medicine Eagle were dismissed. In 2008, the case was reopened after law
enforcement learned M.E.H. had been sexually involved with Red Bird on the day of
the alleged rape. Using the DNA index system known as CODIS, Smith was able to
match the DNA profile of the unidentified male that was obtained by Cellmark in
2001 to Red Bird. Smith then made inquiries about whether a new DNA-testing
method known as Y-STR testing, which was unavailable when the evidence was
originally tested in 2001, might produce additional results. The South Dakota State
Forensic Laboratory did not do Y-STR testing at this point in time, so Smith
contacted Cellmark to perform the testing.
[¶9.] In 2008, Cellmark was asked to perform Y-STR testing on the vaginal
swab DNA extract and the underwear cutting DNA extract that Cellmark had
retained from the 2001 DNA testing and to compare those extracts to Red Bird’s
DNA profile and Medicine Eagle’s DNA profile. Barbara Leal, a forensic DNA
analyst, performed the quantitation, dilution, and amplification steps on the
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extracts. 1 As Cellmark used a team approach to DNA testing, the additional steps
associated with the Y-STR testing were performed by other analysts. The results of
the Y-STR testing revealed that Medicine Eagle could not be excluded as a
contributor to the non-sperm cell fraction of the vaginal swab or the non-sperm cell
fraction of the underwear cutting. 2 In May 2011, Cellmark was also asked to
perform Y-STR testing on M.E.H.’s bra, which Cellmark received from Smith. Leal
performed the dilution and amplification steps of the Y-STR testing on the bra
sample. Additionally, Leal completed the analysis of the results and wrote a report
containing her conclusions. The results of the Y-STR testing of the bra sample
established that Medicine Eagle could not be excluded as a contributor to the
1. At trial, Moss generally described the DNA testing process. She testified that
the first step in the process is known as extraction, which is the process by
which DNA present in the sample is purified. She indicated that the second
step is quantitation, which establishes the amount of DNA present in the
sample. Moss explained that the third step is amplification, which is the
process by which millions of copies of the segments of DNA being tested are
made. Moss testified that after amplification, the amplified product is put
into a genetic analyzer, and analysis software is used to produce the DNA
profile associated with the sample. Moss explained that the same process is
then repeated with the known samples from the suspect and victim to
produce those DNA profiles. After obtaining DNA profiles from the evidence
and the known samples, the profiles are then compared to determine if there
is a match, and if there is a match, statistical analysis is performed. Leal
testified that the Y-STR testing process is similar to the process Moss
described. Leal explained that the two main differences associated with Y-
STR testing are that in Y-STR testing only the male DNA is quantitated, and
during the copying portion of Y-STR testing, only the Y chromosomes are
examined. Additionally, with regard to the DNA testing process, Leal
testified that the dilution step is performed to dilute any DNA with water
prior to amplification.
2. Leal did not write the original report in 2008 containing these results.
However, Leal later independently reviewed the report, analyzed the results,
and reached her own conclusions regarding whether Medicine Eagle or Red
Bird could be excluded as contributors to the samples.
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sample. As to each of these samples, Leal’s statistical analyses indicated that
although Medicine Eagle could not be excluded as a contributor, 99.97 percent of
paternally unrelated males would be excluded as contributors to the samples.
[¶10.] On December 3, 2009, the grand jury indicted Medicine Eagle on four
counts of second-degree rape, three counts of third-degree rape, one count of sexual
contact with a child under age 16, and four counts of kidnapping as a result of the
incident that allegedly occurred between Medicine Eagle and M.E.H. in September
2000. Additionally, on July 14, 2010, the State filed a Part II Information charging
Medicine Eagle as a habitual offender pursuant to SDCL 22-7-7, because Medicine
Eagle had a prior felony conviction. Medicine Eagle was arraigned on the charges
on August 3, 2010, and pleaded not guilty.
[¶11.] Prior to trial, the parties filed various motions. On July 21, 2011, the
State filed a motion to introduce other acts evidence pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5
(Rule 404(b)), based on an incident that allegedly occurred between Medicine Eagle
and thirteen-year-old S.M. on January 29, 2003. S.M. alleged that on that date
Medicine Eagle called her home at approximately 4:00 a.m. looking for her sister.
According to S.M., Medicine Eagle told her that her mother needed help at work.
S.M. claimed Medicine Eagle said he was at the house next door and offered to give
her a ride. S.M. did not personally know Medicine Eagle, but she accepted the ride
because Medicine Eagle knew her sister. S.M. claimed Medicine Eagle’s driving
was erratic, and that he forced her to drink vodka while they were driving.
Additionally, instead of taking S.M. to her mother, S.M. alleged Medicine Eagle
drove to a field outside of town. Once the vehicle stopped and S.M. tried to run
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away, S.M. claimed Medicine Eagle grabbed her, dragged her back to his vehicle by
her hair, and engaged in sexual contact with her. S.M. asserted the attack ended
when she told Medicine Eagle she was going to tell her mom about what happened,
and she became physically ill. S.M. claimed Medicine Eagle then drove her home.
However, S.M. asserted Medicine Eagle threatened to kill her if she told anyone
about the incident. The trial court granted the State’s motion and allowed the State
to present this evidence to the jury pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b))’s plan
exception.
[¶12.] On September 29, 2011, the State filed a notice of its intent to offer
witness testimony regarding the DNA evidence. In addition to testimony from
Smith, Moss, and other witnesses, the State sought to introduce testimony from
Leal regarding the Y-STR testing performed in 2008 and 2011. Medicine Eagle
objected to this testimony, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him because other analysts that performed some
steps of the DNA testing in 2008 and 2011 were not being called as witnesses. The
trial court rejected Medicine Eagle’s objections to this testimony.
[¶13.] Medicine Eagle’s jury trial commenced on October 11, 2011. On
October 18, 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding Medicine Eagle guilty of one
count of rape in the second degree, one count of rape in the third degree, sexual
contact with a child under age 16, and kidnapping. On October 24, 2011, the State
filed an Amended Part II Information for Habitual Offender alleging that Medicine
Eagle had a second prior felony conviction. Medicine Eagle was then rearraigned on
the Amended Part II Information. However, the State later dismissed the Amended
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Part II Information after discovering that the second “prior” felony conviction
actually occurred after the principal offense. 3 The State then proceeded to trial on
the original Part II Information, to which Medicine Eagle made no objection. The
jury returned a verdict on January 27, 2012, finding that Medicine Eagle was a
habitual offender.
[¶14.] On February 13, 2012, Medicine Eagle filed a motion to vacate the part
II proceedings, arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the part II
proceedings. Medicine Eagle claimed the State’s filing of the Amended Part II
Information dismissed the original Part II Information. Thus, he asserted that
because the State failed to file a second Amended Part II Information or refile the
original Part II Information, no part II information even existed at the time of the
habitual offender jury trial. The trial court denied the motion. Medicine Eagle
received sentences of 25 years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary for rape in
the second degree, 15 years for sexual contact with a child under age 16, and life
imprisonment for kidnapping. Medicine Eagle appeals the trial court’s admission of
the other acts evidence, admission of Leal’s testimony regarding the results of the
Y-STR testing conducted in 2008 and 2011, and its denial of his motion to vacate
the part II proceedings.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶15.] 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of the incident involving S.M. as other acts
evidence pursuant to SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)).
3. The State’s dismissal of the Amended Part II Information explicitly stated
that “[t]he State does not dismiss the original Part II and intends to proceed
with that original Part II at the trial on such matter.”
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[¶16.] “A trial court’s determination to admit other acts evidence will not be
overruled absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Mattson, 2005 S.D. 71, ¶ 21, 698
N.W.2d 538, 546 (quoting State v. Anderson, 2000 S.D. 45, ¶ 93, 608 N.W.2d 644,
670). “An abuse of discretion is ‘discretion exercised to an end or purpose not
justified by and clearly against, reason and evidence.’” State v. Big Crow, 2009 S.D.
87, ¶ 7, 773 N.W.2d 810, 812 (quoting State v. Machmuller, 2001 S.D. 82, ¶ 9, 630
N.W.2d 495, 498). The admission of other acts evidence is governed by SDCL 19-12-
5 (Rule 404(b)), which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
[¶17.] “To determine the admissibility of other acts evidence, the court must .
. . determine: (1) whether the intended purpose is relevant to some material issue in
the case, and (2) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” State v. Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 56, 789 N.W.2d
283, 301 (quoting State v. Janklow, 2005 S.D. 25, ¶ 34, 693 N.W.2d 685, 697). This
Court has previously determined that SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) is a rule of
inclusion, as opposed to exclusion. 4 State v. Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d
4. Specifically, in State v. Wright, this Court acknowledged SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule
404(b)) was previously viewed as a rule of exclusion, as opposed to inclusion.
1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d at 797-98 (explaining that “[i]n the past, we
stressed that ‘generally, evidence of crimes or acts other than the ones with
which the defendant is charged are inadmissible, unless an exception
applies’”). However, in Wright, this Court clarified that SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule
404(b)) is a rule of inclusion, stating that “no preliminary showing is
(continued . . .)
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792, 798. “[O]nce a circuit court finds other acts evidence relevant, ‘the balance tips
emphatically in favor of admission.’” Huber, 2010 S.D. 63, ¶ 59, 789 N.W.2d at 302
(quoting Janklow, 2005 S.D. 25, ¶ 38, 693 N.W.2d at 698). Further, “[m]ere damage
to a defendant’s position is not a basis for exclusion[.]” Id. Essentially, “[a]ll that is
prohibited under § 404(b) is that similar act evidence not be admitted ‘solely to
prove character.’” Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 17, 593 N.W.2d at 800 (quoting
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1500, 99 L. Ed. 2d
771 (1988)).
[¶18.] This Court has previously recognized that evidence of other acts can be
admitted under the plan exception “not only where the charged and uncharged acts
are part of a single continuing conception or plot, but also where the uncharged
misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are
manifestations of a common plan, design, or scheme . . . .” Big Crow, 2009 S.D. 87,
¶ 8, 773 N.W.2d at 812 (citing State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 842 (S.D.
1988)). “[W]here the defendant denies doing the charged act, evidence of a common
plan or scheme to achieve the act is directly relevant to refute this general denial.”
State v. Ondricek, 535 N.W.2d 872, 875 (S.D. 1995) (citing United States v.
Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978)).
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(. . . continued)
necessary before such evidence may be introduced for a proper purpose.” Id.
¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d at 798. Thus, Wright rejects the view previously taken in
State v. Chamley (and subsequently utilized in State v. Reyes, 2005 S.D. 46, ¶
14, 695 N.W.2d 245, 251), which required a showing that “the probative value
of the proffered evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair
prejudice” prior to the admission of other acts evidence (and in essence
treated SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) as a rule of exclusion). 1997 S.D. 107, ¶¶
9-10, 568 N.W.2d 607, 611-12.
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[¶19.] The existence of a plan need not be proven with direct evidence, but
instead “can be shown circumstantially[,] with evidence that the defendant
committed a series of similar but ‘unconnected’ acts.” Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 19,
593 N.W.2d at 801 (citing People v. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757, 768-69 (Cal. 1994)).
Essentially, “[a]ll that is required to show a common plan is that the charged and
uncharged events ‘have sufficient points in common.’” Id. ¶ 19, 593 N.W.2d at 800
(citing United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d 1308, 1320 (7th Cir. 1990)). However,
the other acts evidence “must demonstrate ‘not merely a similarity in results, but
such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be
explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual
manifestations.’” Id. ¶ 19, 593 N.W.2d at 801 (quoting Ewoldt, 867 P.2d at 770).
[¶20.] In this case, the trial court concluded that evidence of the incident
involving S.M. was admissible under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) to show Medicine
Eagle’s plan, common scheme, and modus operandi. In admitting the evidence, the
trial court concluded that the incidents involving M.E.H. and S.M. were “strikingly
similar,” and that the incident involving S.M. was relevant to prove that Medicine
Eagle “had a common plan or scheme to kidnap, rape, and assault young girl
victims he could take advantage of after isolating them by use of his deception,
physical threats, and intimidation.” Furthermore, the trial court concluded that the
incident involving S.M., which occurred approximately two and one-half years after
M.E.H. was allegedly kidnapped and raped, was not too remote so as to exclude its
admission from trial. Finally, the trial court determined that admission of evidence
regarding the incident involving S.M. was not unfairly prejudicial.
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[¶21.] On appeal, Medicine Eagle argues that evidence of the incident
involving S.M. was inadmissible for two reasons. First, Medicine Eagle argues that
evidence of the incident involving S.M., which allegedly occurred two and one-half
years after Medicine Eagle’s commission of the crimes against M.E.H., cannot be
used to prove that Medicine Eagle had a plan in 2000. However, this Court has
previously recognized that “[o]ther act evidence does not have to be a prior act to be
admissible under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)).” State v. Toohey, 2012 S.D. 51, ¶ 20,
816 N.W.2d 120, 129. Further, in State v. White, this Court acknowledged that
other jurisdictions have admitted evidence of acts occurring subsequent to the
charged offense to prove common plan or scheme. 538 N.W.2d 237, 244 (S.D. 1995)
(discussing State v. Downing, 511 P.2d 638 (Ariz. 1973) and State v. Morgan, 485
P.2d 1371 (Kan. 1971), in which the Supreme Courts of Arizona and Kansas held
that evidence of rapes committed after the rapes the defendants were on trial for
was admissible to show plan or scheme). 5 Thus, subsequent acts can be admitted
under the plan exception to SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)).
5. In addition to the Arizona and Kansas cases specifically recognized in White,
other jurisdictions have also allowed evidence of acts occurring subsequent to
the charged conduct to be admitted as proof of a common scheme or plan. See
People v. Catlin, 26 P.3d 357 (Cal. 2001) (evidence regarding defendant’s
murder of his fifth wife was admissible, in prosecution for first-degree
murders of his mother and fourth wife, to show identity and to establish
common scheme or plan); People v. Balcom, 867 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1994) (holding
that evidence that defendant committed uncharged rape and robbery weeks
after charged offenses was admissible to prove that charged offenses were
manifestations of common design or plan); State v. Ramsey, 692 N.W.2d 498
(N.D. 2005) (evidence of subsequent sexual contact was admissible under the
plan or absence of mistake or accident exceptions to Rule 404(b)); State v.
Cowley, 672 S.E.2d 319 (W. Va. 2008) (evidence of burglary and sexual
(continued . . .)
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[¶22.] Second, Medicine Eagle argues evidence of the incident involving S.M.
was not admissible under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b))’s plan exception because the
State did not present evidence to establish that a common plan or scheme actually
existed at the time of M.E.H.’s alleged rape in 2000. However, as discussed above,
direct proof of the existence of a plan is not necessary. Instead, the existence of a
common plan or scheme can be proven circumstantially by establishing that the
acts are sufficiently similar. In this case, Medicine Eagle does not argue the
incidents involving M.E.H. and S.M. were not similar. 6 Therefore, we need not
further address this argument. 7
[¶23.] Overall, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the incident involving S.M. under SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule
404(b)). The record reflects that the trial court made the proper inquiries before
admitting the evidence. Additionally, the trial court gave a limiting instruction to
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(. . . continued)
assault that occurred six months after burglary and sexual assault defendant
was on trial for was admissible to show common plan).
6. Additionally, Medicine Eagle has not directly challenged the length of time
between the kidnapping and rape of M.E.H. in 2000 and the incident
involving S.M. in 2003. Regardless, this Court has previously stated that “we
have chosen not to set a rigid time limitation when determining whether bad
acts are too remote.” Ondricek, 535 N.W.2d at 877 (concluding that sexual
abuse occurring ten years prior to the prosecution was not too remote).
7. At oral argument, counsel for Medicine Eagle requested that this Court
impose a requirement that the jury/judge make a specific finding in cases
involving SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule (404(b)), when subsequent acts are used to
prove the existence of a common plan or scheme, that the common plan or
scheme actually existed at the time of the charged conduct and did not arise
later. However, counsel for Medicine Eagle cites no authority for imposing
such a requirement.
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prevent the jury from misusing the evidence. Specifically, the trial court advised
the jury that evidence of the incident involving S.M. could be used “only to show:
motive, intent, plan or common scheme. You may not consider it as tending to show
in any other respect the defendant’s guilt of the offense with which the defendant is
charged.” Further, the jury was instructed that it was “not required to consider this
evidence and whether you do is a matter within your exclusive province.” 8 As a
result, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in admitting
evidence of the incident involving S.M.
[¶24.] 2. Whether Medicine Eagle’s rights under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause were violated when
the trial court allowed Barbara Leal to testify about the
2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing even though some steps of
the testing were performed by nontestifying analysts.
[¶25.] At trial, the State called Leal to testify regarding the 2008 and 2011 Y-
STR testing. Leal testified about the different steps she performed during the 2008
and 2011 Y-STR testing. Leal explained that she did not perform every step of the
Y-STR testing conducted in 2008 and 2011, as Cellmark utilized a team approach to
DNA testing. However, Leal testified that she was familiar with the other steps of
the testing and had performed them on other occasions. Additionally, Leal
explained that the analysts at Cellmark were trained to follow standard operating
8. In addition, prior to admitting S.M.’s testimony regarding the alleged rape,
the trial court instructed the jury:
You may only consider [evidence of the incident involving S.M.]
to determine, motive, plan and common scheme. Before
determining whether to consider this evidence, you must first
determine if a preponderance of the evidence established that
[Medicine Eagle] committed the other acts. You are not required
to consider this evidence and whether you do so or not is a
matter within your exclusive province.
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protocols in conducting DNA testing, and that they were trained to note any
discrepancies. Leal testified that because no discrepancies were noted by the
analysts that performed the other steps of the Y-STR testing, the standard
operating protocols were followed.
[¶26.] Leal also testified about the results of the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR
testing, which implicated Medicine Eagle. Leal explained that although she did not
create the original 2008 report containing the results of the 2008 testing, she
independently reviewed the report, analyzed the results, and reached her own
conclusions regarding whether Medicine Eagle or Red Bird could be excluded as
contributors to the samples. Leal’s conclusions were generally consistent with the
conclusions contained in the 2008 report. 9 Additionally, Leal testified about the
conclusions she reached regarding the 2011 Y-STR testing, which were consistent
with her 2011 report. At trial, neither the 2008 report nor the 2011 report were
introduced into evidence through Leal. Instead, the State introduced Exhibit 19,
which was a chart containing a summary of Leal’s conclusions and statistical
calculations for each of the samples tested in 2008 and 2011. 10 On appeal, Medicine
Eagle argues his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was
violated when the trial court allowed Leal to testify about the results of the 2008
9. However, Leal made one slight modification. The 2008 report indicated that
the profile obtained from the non-sperm cell fraction of the underwear cutting
was a mixture of at least two males. Leal reviewed the profile and
determined that the mixture appeared to be more consistent with originating
from two males.
10. Thus, Medicine Eagle’s assertions that the 2008 and 2011 reports were
introduced at trial through Leal are not supported by the record.
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and 2011 Y-STR testing (and admitted Exhibit 19 containing Leal’s conclusions and
statistical calculations) because some steps of the testing were performed by
nontestifying analysts.
[¶27.] Alleged violations of constitutional rights are reviewed by this Court
under the de novo standard of review. State v. Johnson, 2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 771
N.W.2d 360, 365 (citing State v. Selalla, 2008 S.D. 3, ¶ 18, 744 N.W.2d 802, 807).
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.’” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531,
174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009) (internal citation omitted). In Crawford v. Washington,
the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause, “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [are
admissible] only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
1369, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). As we recognized in State v. Johnson:
Crawford did not precisely articulate what is considered
‘testimonial,’ but it provided some guidance. At a minimum, the
Court announced, ‘testimonial’ includes statements made during
police interrogations and prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial. In describing
testimonial statements, the Court also noted that testimony is
typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ Further, the
Court offered a non-exclusive list of ‘formulations’ of the term
‘testimonial’: (1) ‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine . . . ;’ (2) ‘extrajudicial statements contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
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prior testimony, or confessions;’ and (3) statements made under
circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.
2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 19, 771 N.W.2d at 368 (internal citations omitted).
[¶28.] Following Crawford, the United States Supreme Court issued two
decisions that are relevant to Medicine Eagle’s appeal: Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011) and Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009). 11 Melendez-
Diaz was decided by the Court in 2009. 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527. In Melendez-
Diaz, the defendant was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine. Id. at
308, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. At trial, the prosecution submitted three notarized
“certificates of analysis” containing the results of the forensic analysis performed on
the substances seized from the defendant, which established the substances were
cocaine. Id. at 308, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. The defendant objected to the admission of
the certificates, arguing that admission of the certificates without testimony from
the analysts who tested the seized substances violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 309, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. The trial court overruled the
11. Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2012)
(plurality opinion), is the United States Supreme Court’s most recent decision
relevant to Medicine Eagle’s Sixth Amendment claim. In Williams, the
United States Supreme Court specifically considered an alleged violation of a
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights based on the introduction of
testimony regarding DNA testing. ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221. However,
given the fractured nature of the Williams opinion and that no rationale was
agreed upon by a majority, Williams does not provide this Court with a sound
basis for its decision in this case. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.
481 U.S. 69, 81, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 95 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1987) (indicating that
plurality opinions, which do not represent the views of a majority of the
Court, are not binding precedent).
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defendant’s objection, and admitted the certificates. Id. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held the certificates were testimonial statements, and the
analysts were “witnesses” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 312, 129 S.
Ct. at 2532. As a result, the Court concluded that the trial court’s admission of the
certificates without requiring the analysts to be called as witnesses violated the
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 329, 129 S. Ct. at 2542.
[¶29.] Bullcoming was decided by the Court in 2011. ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct.
2705. In Bullcoming, the defendant was arrested and charged with driving while
intoxicated (DWI). Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. 2709. At trial, the prosecution introduced a
forensic laboratory report which certified that the defendant’s blood alcohol
concentration was above the limit for aggravated DWI. Id. However, the analyst
that signed the report did not testify. Id. Instead, the prosecution called an analyst
who was familiar with the lab’s testing procedures, but had neither participated in
nor observed the testing of the defendant’s blood sample. Id. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that the report was testimonial and that admission of
the report through an analyst who did not sign the report or perform or observe the
testing violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at __,
131 S. Ct. 2710. The Court concluded that the “surrogate testimony” did not satisfy
constitutional requirements and that the defendant had the right to confront the
analyst who certified the report. Id.
[¶30.] In support of his claims that the admission of Leal’s testimony
regarding the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing violated his Confrontation Clause
rights, Medicine Eagle argues this case is equivalent to Bullcoming. Medicine
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Eagle asserts Leal essentially offered “surrogate testimony” because she did not
perform each step of the Y-STR testing conducted in 2008 and 2011, yet she still
testified about the results of the testing. However, the facts of this case are
distinguishable from the facts of Bullcoming in three key respects. First, unlike in
Bullcoming, where the nontestifying analyst’s report was admitted into evidence, in
this case neither the 2008 report nor the 2011 report were even admitted into
evidence. Instead, the only exhibits admitted through Leal were her curriculum
vitae and the chart she created containing a summary of her independent
conclusions and statistical calculations for each sample tested in 2008 and 2011. 12
Second, unlike the analyst in Bullcoming, who did not participate in or observe the
testing, in this case Leal participated in various steps of both the 2008 and 2011 Y-
STR testing. Third, unlike the analyst in Bullcoming, who testified about the
testing results reached by a nontestifying analyst, in this case Leal did not testify
about another analyst’s conclusions or the specific contents of the original 2008
report. Instead, Leal only testified about her own conclusions from the 2008 and
2011 Y-STR testing and the statistical calculations she performed. Therefore, this
case is factually distinguishable from Bullcoming. For these same reasons, this
case is also distinguishable from Melendez-Diaz.
[¶31.] Although Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz are factually distinguishable
from this case, both Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz provide guidance on issues
pertinent to Medicine Eagle’s claim that his Confrontation Clause rights were
12. Furthermore, Leal created and signed the report regarding the 2011 Y-STR
testing. Therefore, even if the 2011 report had been admitted through Leal,
its admission would likely have been appropriate under Bullcoming.
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violated when Leal was permitted to testify about the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing
even though she did not perform each step of the testing. Therefore, both
Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz remain relevant to this Court’s resolution of
Medicine Eagle’s Sixth Amendment claim.
[¶32.] Specifically, Melendez-Diaz provides some guidance as to who must be
called as a witness in order to satisfy a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause in cases where testing is performed by multiple individuals. In Melendez-
Diaz, after holding that the certificates were “testimonial” and that the defendant
was entitled to be confronted at trial with the analysts who created the certificates,
the Court clarified its holding, stating: “we do not hold, and it is not the case, that
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody,
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person
as part of the prosecution’s case.” 557 U.S. at 311 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1.
Further, the Court indicated that its holding “does not mean that everyone who laid
hands on the evidence must be called.” 13 Id.
[¶33.] Additionally, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Bullcoming provides
guidance on the issue of whether a testifying analyst’s level of involvement in the
forensic testing impacts a court’s evaluation of a defendant’s claim that his or her
right to confrontation was violated. In Bullcoming, Justice Sotomayor suggested
the Court’s decision was affected by whether the testifying analyst participated in
13. The Court provided this clarification in response to concerns the dissent
raised regarding which analyst would be required to testify in situations
where multiple individuals participated in the forensic testing process.
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527.
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the forensic testing. ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Justice Sotomayor recognized that Bullcoming “is not a case in which the person
testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited,
connection to the scientific test at issue.” Id. Justice Sotomayor went on to point
out that instead, the testifying analyst in Bullcoming had no involvement in
conducting the forensic testing or producing the report introduced at trial. Id.
[¶34.] With this guidance in mind, we conclude that Medicine Eagle’s
Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by the State’s introduction of
testimony from Leal regarding the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing. Leal participated
in various steps of both the 2008 and 2011 testing and even wrote the original
report regarding the results of the 2011 Y-STR testing. Also, Leal independently
reviewed, analyzed, and compared the data obtained during the 2008 Y-STR
testing. She then came to her own independent conclusions about whether
Medicine Eagle could be excluded as a contributor to the samples. In addition, the
2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing reports were not introduced at trial through Leal.
Instead, only the chart Leal created, which contained a summary of her conclusions
and statistical calculations for each sample, was admitted into evidence. Further,
Leal only testified about her own conclusions and statistical calculations. Finally,
Medicine Eagle had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Leal at trial
regarding her conclusions and statistical calculations. 14 Therefore, under the
14. Notably, in similar situations, other jurisdictions have concluded that a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated even though some of
the analysts who participated in the forensic testing process did not testify at
trial. See United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d,
(continued . . .)
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circumstances of this case, we conclude that Medicine Eagle’s Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation was not violated by the trial court’s admission of Leal’s
testimony regarding the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing, even though analysts who
performed some steps of the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing did not testify at trial.
[¶35.] 3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Medicine
Eagle’s motion to vacate the part II proceedings.
[¶36.] On appeal, Medicine Eagle argues that the State’s filing of the
Amended Part II Information dismissed the original Part II Information. As a
result, Medicine Eagle asserts that when the State dismissed the Amended Part II
Information without refiling the original Part II Information or filing a second
Amended Part II Information, no part II information even existed upon which the
trial court could proceed. Thus, because no part II information existed, Medicine
________________________
(. . . continued)
401 F. App’x 565 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation was not violated when DNA expert was permitted to
testify about the results of preliminary steps of the testing performed by
other analysts, which formed part of the basis for the DNA expert’s analysis
and conclusion); Disharoon v. State, 727 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 767, 184 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2012) (concluding that Confrontation
Clause was not violated when expert was allowed to testify about the results
of DNA testing, even though expert did not perform every step of the testing);
Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009) (concluding that defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights were not violated when lab supervisor testified to
DNA testing results, but analyst who performed the tests did not testify at
trial); State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2012) (concluding that defendant’s
confrontation rights were not violated by lab supervisor’s testimony
regarding DNA testing results, even though lab supervisor did not perform
the preliminary stages of the DNA testing and the analysts that performed
those steps were not called to testify at trial); State v. Manion, 295 P.3d 270
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that testimony of DNA expert regarding
results of DNA testing performed by nontestifying analyst did not violate the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights because the DNA expert conducted
an independent review of the results and formed her own opinion about the
DNA evidence).
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Eagle claims the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his
habitual offender jury trial.
[¶37.] In contrast, the State argues that subject-matter jurisdiction is not an
issue because the trial court already obtained personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction with regard to the principal offense. Additionally, although the State
recognizes that the filing of an amended complaint supersedes an original
complaint in civil matters, the State argues that the same rule is not applicable to
habitual offender proceedings because a part II information is not the same as a
criminal or civil complaint. Further, the State claims that its filing of the dismissal
of the Amended Part II Information should actually be treated as an amendment or
modification of the Amended Part II Information to revert back to the original Part
II Information. Finally, the State argues Medicine Eagle waived his challenge to
the part II proceedings because he did not object to the use of the original Part II
Information until after the jury found him to be a habitual offender.
[¶38.] We first address the State’s argument that Medicine Eagle waived his
challenge to the part II proceedings. “Whether this Court has jurisdiction is a legal
issue which is reviewed de novo.” State v. Anders, 2009 S.D. 15, ¶ 5, 763 N.W.2d
547, 549 (citing State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21, ¶ 10, 729 N.W.2d 356, 362).
“Jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time and determination of jurisdiction is
appropriate.” Id. ¶ 5, 763 N.W.2d at 549-50 (citing Sazama v. State ex rel.
Muilenberg, 2007 S.D. 17, ¶ 9, 729 N.W.2d 335, 340). Further, subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be acquired by agreement, consent, waiver, or estoppel.
Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797, 799 (S.D. 1983).
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[¶39.] Consideration of whether jurisdiction exists generally entails a
determination of whether the court possesses personal jurisdiction over the
defendant and subject-matter jurisdiction over the subject matter before it. See
Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S.D. 266, 133 N.W. 266, 269 (1911). The State is correct that
the trial court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal charges the
State brought against the defendant. However, as one court observed,
“‘[j]urisdiction’ is a word of many, too many, meanings.” United States v. Vanness,
85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In reviewing similar cases involving statutory
schemes requiring the filing of an information in order for a defendant to be subject
to an enhanced sentence, courts are split over whether the failure to file an
information, or defects in its filing, are issues of jurisdiction, or whether instead,
such flaws simply prevent, preclude, bar, or deprive the trial court of the authority
to impose an enhanced sentence. 15 See Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 44 (1st
Cir. 1999).
[¶40.] In South Dakota, beyond the concepts of personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction, we have defined the term “jurisdiction” more broadly to include “the
legal power, right, or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered
either in general or with reference to the particular matter, . . . [the] power to
15. We note that none of the cases cited by Justice Zinter or Judge Salter involve
a situation in which the part II information had been dismissed. We also
note that Justice Zinter heavily relies on State v. Mee (Mee I), 67 S.D. 335,
292 N.W. 875 (1940), rev’d on rehearing, 67 S.D. 589, 297 N.W. 40 (1941)
(Mee II) and Justice Wollman’s writing in Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d
797, 800 (S.D. 1983) (Wollman, J., dissenting). See infra Justice Zinter’s
dissent ¶¶ 71, 75 n.25, 76. We emphasize that neither is controlling, as
Justice Wollman did not write for the majority in Honomichl, and Mee I was
reversed by Mee II.
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inquire into the facts and apply the law, and . . . the right to adjudicate concerning
the subject-matter in the given case[.]” State ex rel. Byrne v. Ewert, 36 S.D. 622,
156 N.W. 90, 95 (1916) (citation omitted). We have also declared it to mean
“whether there was power to enter upon the inquiry and not whether the
determination by the court of a question of law or fact involved is correct.” Jannsen
v. Tusha, 68 S.D. 639, 643, 5 N.W.2d 684, 685 (1942). Applying those definitions,
we conclude that the question of whether there was statutory authority for the trial
court to impose the enhanced sentence (given the disputed legal status of the
original/Amended Part II Information) is a jurisdictional question. As a result, this
Court can review Medicine Eagle’s challenge to the part II proceedings regardless of
when he made this challenge.
[¶41.] Next, SDCL 22-7-11 requires that:
Any allegation that a defendant is an habitual criminal shall be
filed as a separate information at the time of, or before,
arraignment. However, the court may, upon motion, permit the
separate information to be filed after the arraignment, but no
less than thirty days before the commencement of trial or entry
of a plea of guilty or nolo contendre. The information shall state
the times, places, and specific crimes alleged to be prior
convictions and shall be signed by the prosecutor. An official
court record under seal or a criminal history together with
fingerprints certified by the public official having custody
thereof is sufficient to be admitted in evidence, without further
foundation, to prove the allegation that the defendant is an
habitual criminal.
(Emphasis added.) This Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether
the filing of an Amended Part II Information in a habitual offender proceeding
serves to dismiss the original Part II Information. When considering how the filing
of an amended information affects the original information, several courts have held
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that the filing of an amended information essentially acts as a dismissal of the
original information. See Armstrong v. United States, 16 F.2d 62, 64 (9th Cir. 1926)
(indicating that the amendment of an information causes the original information to
be abandoned, and that the filing of a new information “destroyed all functions of
the old information as fully as though it had been dismissed by formal motion”);
Wilcox v. State, 248 So. 2d 692, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that the filing
of an amended information “has the effect of vitiating the original information as
fully as though it had been formally dismissed by order of court”); State v. Devine,
164 P.3d 1009 (N.M. 2007) (reiterating that an amended criminal information has
the effect of dismissing a prior criminal information); State v. Navone, 39 P.2d 384,
385 (Wash. 1934) (indicating that the original information was superseded by the
filing of the amended information).
[¶42.] Additionally, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has applied this same
rule in the context of informations filed for purposes of habitual offender
proceedings. See State v. Chacon, 706 P.2d 152 (N.M. 1985). Specifically, in State v.
Chacon, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that “[a]n ‘amended’
information vitiates the original information as fully as though it had been formally
dismissed by order of the court. It constitutes the filing of a new instrument which
supersedes its predecessor.” 706 P.2d at 153 (quoting State v. Benally, 658 P.2d
1142, 1144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)).
[¶43.] For purposes of this case, the State has not offered a valid reason for
creating a special rule for a part II information for habitual offender with regard to
the effect an amendment has on the original filing. We conclude that when the
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State filed the Amended Part II Information, the original Part II Information was
effectively dismissed. Thus, following the State’s dismissal of the Amended Part II
Information, no part II information even existed upon which the trial court could
proceed with Medicine’s Eagle habitual offender jury trial. 16 The fact that the State
included language in its dismissal of the Amended Part II Information indicating
that it was not dismissing the original Part II Information and that it intended to
proceed upon the original Part II Information makes no difference, because by that
point the original Part II Information had already been effectively dismissed. See
Wilcox, 248 So. 2d at 694 (holding that the State’s filing of the amended information
dismissed the original information, the State’s subsequent withdrawal of the
amended information left the State without a charge against the defendant, and the
original information could not be “revived”). Furthermore, we reject the State’s
argument that its filing of the dismissal of the Amended Part II Information should
be treated as an amendment to the Amended Part II Information. 17
[¶44.] SDCL 22-7-11 requires the filing of a part II information. Because the
State’s filing of the Amended Part II Information and subsequent dismissal of the
16. In his discussion of waiver and plain error, Justice Zinter treats the lack of a
part II information as a “defective” part II information. We disagree with
this treatment. In this case, no part II information even existed at the time
of the part II proceedings due to the State’s dismissal of the Amended Part II
Information. As no part II information existed, it cannot be considered
“defective” or otherwise.
17. The filing of the dismissal of the Amended Part II Information served to
terminate the part II proceedings under the Amended Part II Information.
See SDCL 23A-44-2 (providing that “[a] prosecuting attorney may file a
dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint and the prosecution
shall thereupon terminate”).
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Amended Part II Information left the State without a part II information on file, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to continue with the part II proceedings and
impose an enhanced sentence. 18 Therefore, the trial court erred in denying
Medicine Eagle’s motion to vacate the part II proceedings. As a result, on this issue
we reverse and remand for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
[¶45.] In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of the incident involving S.M. as other acts evidence pursuant to SDCL 19-
12-5 (Rule 404(b)). Subsequent acts are admissible to prove common plan or
scheme, and the existence of a common plan or scheme can be proven
circumstantially by establishing that the acts are sufficiently similar. Therefore,
we affirm on this issue. Next, Medicine Eagle’s Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was not violated by the trial court’s admission of Leal’s testimony
regarding the 2008 and 2011 Y-STR testing despite the fact that analysts that
performed some steps of the testing did not testify at trial. Leal performed various
steps of the 2008 and 2011 testing, independently reviewed, analyzed, and
compared the data obtained from the testing, reached her own conclusions
regarding the results of the testing, and conducted statistical calculations based on
her results. Further, neither the 2008 report nor the 2011 report were introduced
18. In Honomichl v. State, this Court held that the State’s failure to file an
information left the court without subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and
sentence defendant. 333 N.W.2d at 798-99. Although Honomichl was not
decided in the context of a part II information for habitual offender, the same
principle applies in this case. Further, despite Justice Zinter’s analysis, we
note that neither party advocated for overruling Honomichl.
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through Leal at trial, as Leal only testified about her own conclusions. Thus,
Medicine Eagle’s opportunity to cross-examine Leal was sufficient for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, we affirm on this issue. Finally, because the
State’s filing of the Amended Part II Information effectively dismissed the original
Part II Information, no part II information existed upon which the trial court could
proceed following the State’s dismissal of the Amended Part II Information. As a
result, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the habitual offender
proceedings. Therefore, on this issue we reverse and remand for resentencing.
[¶46.] SEVERSON, Justice, concurs.
[¶47.] KONENKAMP, Justice, and SALTER, Circuit Court Judge, concur in
part and concur in result in part.
[¶48.] ZINTER, Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part.
[¶49.] SALTER, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for WILBUR, Justice,
disqualified.
KONENKAMP, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in result in part).
[¶50.] I concur on Issues 1 and 2. I join Judge Salter’s concurrence in result
on Issue 3.
SALTER, Circuit Court Judge (concurring in part and concurring in result in part).
[¶51.] I join the Chief Justice’s opinion on Issues 1 and 2, and I agree that the
error presented in Issue 3 requires this Court to vacate Medicine Eagle’s sentences
and remand for resentencing. However, I do not agree that the trial court’s
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imposition of the sentences here implicates its jurisdiction, and I write separately to
respectfully add my views.
[¶52.] Since the indictment in this case alleged offenses cognizable under
South Dakota law, the trial court obtained the limit of its subject matter jurisdiction
when the case commenced. See State v. Escalante, 458 N.W.2d 787, 789 (S.D. 1990)
(“A trial court in a criminal case does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction unless
state files a formal and sufficient indictment or information.”) (citing In re
Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d 135 (S.D. 1985); Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797
(S.D. 1983)). There simply is no additional layer or tier of jurisdiction that exists in
a criminal case. I would hold that the trial court exceeded the statutory limits of its
sentencing authority but did so without yielding its jurisdiction.
[¶53.] Nearly all of the federal courts of appeals confronting a similar issue
have held that errors in the recidivist enhancement sentencing procedure for
federal drug offenders impact only a trial court’s sentencing authority—not its
jurisdiction. Federal prosecutors may seek enhanced mandatory minimum
sentences for violations of the Controlled Substances Act for repeat drug offenders
after filing an “information . . . stating in writing the previous convictions to be
relied upon.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(viii) (authorizing
enhanced sentences). However, in instances where compliance with section 851’s
information-filing requirements has been suboptimal, the overwhelming majority of
federal courts of appeals have refused to treat noncompliance as a jurisdictional
infirmity. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
Whether or not the prosecution files a timely section 851(a)(1)
information, a federal district court plainly possesses subject-
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matter jurisdiction over drug cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231
(conferring original jurisdiction “of all offenses against the laws
of the United States”). This jurisdiction necessarily includes the
imposition of criminal penalties. Once subject-matter
jurisdiction has properly attached, courts may exceed their
authority or otherwise err without loss of jurisdiction. . . . Thus,
the only question that legitimately arises from the prosecution’s
[failure to comply with section 851(a)(1)] concerns the court’s
authority to impose an enhanced sentence. This is simply not a
question of subject-matter jurisdiction. . . .
Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); see also
United States v. Pritchett, 496 F.3d 537, 543-46 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing cases and
noting only the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held noncompliance with
section 851 implicates a jurisdictional error); United States v. Mooring, 287 F.3d
725, 727-28 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting claim that irregularity in the section 851
information procedure resulted in a jurisdictional error).
[¶54.] Here, the same analysis applies. The trial court had jurisdiction over
this criminal case and, following the guilty verdicts, was obligated to proceed to
sentencing. See SDCL 23A-27-1 (sentences “shall” be imposed without
unreasonable delay). As explained below, the fact it undertook a habitual criminal
proceeding without an effective Part II habitual criminal information constituted
error which ultimately led to a sentence in excess of its authority. The error did
not, however, deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.
[¶55.] The issue—sentencing authority versus jurisdiction—involves more
than mere semantics. Jurisdictional errors, as the Chief Justice’s opinion states,
are not subject to waiver. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781,
1782, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860 (2002). They are also not subject to appellate review for
harmlessness, and they may not be the subject of procedural default in post-
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conviction proceedings. McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1248-49 (11th Cir.
2001). Non-jurisdictional errors are treated differently. They can be waived or
forfeited, State v. Ganrude, 499 N.W.2d 608, 612 (S.D. 1993), and they can be
reviewed for harmlessness. State v. Garritsen, 421 N.W.2d 499, 501 (S.D. 1988).
[¶56.] Though the question is one of first impression in South Dakota, this
Court’s previous decisions point decidedly, if implicitly, toward treating
irregularities in the habitual offender procedures as non-jurisdictional errors. For
instance, in State v. Pasek, this Court held that despite the trial court’s erroneous
determination of the number of previous convictions, the defendant was not
prejudiced because there was, in any event, a sufficient number of prior convictions
to support his enhanced sentence. 2004 S.D. 132, ¶ 31, 691 N.W.2d 301, 310-11
n.12. Further, in State v. Anderson, this Court rejected a prisoner’s repeated post-
conviction efforts to challenge his enhanced sentence, noting his “failure to raise the
issue on [direct] appeal barred any further appeal on the issue, and left only habeas
corpus” and other post-conviction remedies as “possible avenues for . . . relief.” 2005
S.D. 22, ¶ 24, 693 N.W.2d 675, 682. This Court has also affirmed a trial court’s
decision to sentence a defendant as a habitual criminal despite the State’s failure to
refile a “new” Part II habitual criminal information when the defendant was
arraigned on an additional principal felony charge. State v. Graycek, 368 N.W.2d
815, 818 (S.D. 1985). In Graycek, the defendant pleaded guilty to the additional
felony charge as well as reduced misdemeanor drug charges pursuant to a plea
agreement. The defendant objected to the state’s failure to file another habitual
criminal information before sentencing, but declined the trial court’s offer to allow
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him to withdraw his guilty pleas and “be reinstated to the position he was in prior
to entering his pleas. . . .” Id. at 817-18. These cases strongly suggest that failure
to comply with the habitual criminal statutes may be reviewed for harmlessness
and also that it may be waived 19 or the subject of procedural default—none of which
is consistent with a jurisdictional error. 20 See State v. Knoche, 515 N.W.2d 834, 840
(S.D. 1994); State v. Moves Camp, 376 N.W.2d 567, 569 (S.D. 1985).
[¶57.] The divergent views on this subject may well be attributable to the
imprecision with which the term “jurisdiction” has historically been used. However,
in its contemporary concept of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
held that jurisdiction means simply “‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case.’” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630, 122 S. Ct. at 1784, (quoting Steel Co.
v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210
(1998)). The facts in Cotton quickly illustrate the distinction between sentencing
authority and the power to sentence.
[¶58.] In Cotton, a federal indictment alleging drug conspiracy offenses did
not include threshold quantities necessary to trigger enhanced sentences. The trial
court’s decision to impose an enhanced sentence was, therefore, erroneous, but it did
19. For example, in Graycek, this Court noted the defendant “in effect
acquiesced” to the additional principal felony charge. 368 N.W.2d at 818.
20. Though this Court has from time to time made reference to “jurisdiction” in
the context of a habitual offender enhancement, it is clear the question has
not been squarely presented and addressed on the merits. See, e.g., Graycek,
368 N.W.2d at 818; In re Abelt, 82 S.D. 308, 145 N.W.2d 435 (1966). Nor does
the Chief Justice’s opinion rely upon these cases as controlling authority for
its conclusion that the error here is jurisdictional.
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not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and could be reviewed for harmlessness
under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 631, 122 S. Ct. at 1785.
[¶59.] Applying these principles, the trial court’s procedural error here should
also be reviewed for harmlessness. In my view, Medicine Eagle has preserved his
objection to his sentence by objecting to it before it was imposed, and I would review
the error for harmless error, rather than the more demanding strictures of the plain
error doctrine. See United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 659 (8th Cir. 2009) (errors
which are preserved are reviewed for harmless error); State v. Gard, 2007 S.D. 117,
¶ 15, 742 N.W.2d 257, 261 (in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, “[t]he
trial court must be given an opportunity to correct any claimed error before we will
review it on appeal”) (citation omitted); see also State v. Holter, 340 N.W.2d 691, 692
(S.D. 1983) (holding defendant’s sentencing argument was not properly before the
Court because he “did not at any time prior to this appeal raise a claim that his
sentence was improper or illegal”). 21
[¶60.] Under harmless error review, error is harmless and may be
disregarded where it does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights. SDCL 23A-44-
14. The State must prove the error was not prejudicial. State v. Nelson, 1998 S.D.
124, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d 439, 443. Here, the State cannot sustain this burden.
21. Here, the record establishes the trial court had the opportunity to address
Medicine Eagle’s objection to the habitual offender sentencing enhancement.
After Medicine Eagle filed an objection in advance of his sentencing hearing,
the trial court considered the argument and rejected it, ultimately entering
written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Under the circumstances, the
trial record is sufficiently developed to enable appellate review.
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[¶61.] The inquiry in this regard begins not with a judicial assessment of the
purpose behind the habitual offender statutes or whether Medicine Eagle had notice
that the State was seeking an enhanced sentence based upon the original Part II
information. Rather, the analysis begins with the text of the principal statute at
issue here which allows for an enhanced sentence only after a separate information
has been filed. See SDCL 22-7-11. In addition, faithful application of this Court’s
decisions requires that the habitual offender statutes be strictly construed because
of their “highly penal nature.” See State v. Loop, 422 N.W.2d 420 (S.D. 1988)
(habitual offender statutes should be strictly construed given their “highly penal
nature”); Graycek, 368 N.W.2d at 818; State v. Grooms, 339 N.W.2d 318 (S.D. 1983);
State v. Layton, 337 N.W.2d 809 (S.D. 1983).
[¶62.] The text of SDCL 22-7-11 provides in relevant part:
Any allegation that a defendant is an habitual criminal shall be
filed as a separate information at the time of, or before,
arraignment. However, the court may, upon motion, permit the
separate information to be filed after the arraignment, but no
less than thirty days before the commencement of trial or entry
of a plea of guilty or nolo contendre. The information shall state
the times, places, and specific crimes alleged to be prior
convictions and shall be signed by the prosecutor.
[¶63.] The statute includes four principal requirements: (1) the filing of an
information (2) signed by the prosecutor (3) at least thirty days before the trial or
change of plea and (4) stating the times, places and specific crimes alleged. These
requirements must be satisfied as a predicate to a sentencing judge’s authority to
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impose an enhanced sentence. 22 If these requirements are not satisfied, the
imposition of an enhanced sentence could well lead to sentencing error which is not
harmless.
[¶64.] That aptly describes what happened in this case. The original Part II
Information was replaced by a superseding, amended Part II Information which
was then, itself, dismissed, leaving no effective habitual offender information.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of an enhanced mandatory life sentence
presents a clear case of prejudice. Though a sentence of up to life was authorized at
the time Medicine Eagle committed the offense of kidnapping, the habitual offender
enhancement required a mandatory life sentence by elevating the authorized
punishment from that of a Class 1 felony to a Class B felony. 23 Indeed, the trial
court stated during the sentencing hearing that “[t]his is a mandatory life sentence”
22. Though these requirements are necessary to a trial court’s authority to
impose an enhanced sentence, they should not be regarded as de facto
“jurisdictional” requirements. Unlike true components of subject matter
jurisdiction, the statutory requirements of SDCL 22-7-11 could be waived or
reviewed for harmlessness. Indeed, this distinction appears to figure
prominently in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Mooring, that
the defendant had waived 21 U.S.C. § 851’s information requirement at the
time of his change of plea hearing by stipulating that he had received
sufficient notice under section 851. 287 F.3d at 727-728. In this case, by
contrast, there is no indication Medicine Eagle actually undertook a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver of his rights under SDCL 22-7-11.
23. In 2005, the Legislature amended the statute prescribing felony classes and
penalties by adding a category of Class C felony, punishable by up to life in
prison. SDCL 22-6-1(3). The maximum prison sentence for a Class 1 felony
was reduced to fifty years. SDCL 22-6-1(4). The kidnapping statute, SDCL
22-19-1, was also amended in 2005, but at the time of Medicine Eagle’s
offense, kidnapping was a Class 1 felony in the absence of the victim’s
“permanent physical injury[.]” State v. Frazier, 2002 S.D. 66, ¶ 12, 646
N.W.2d 744, 749.
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and that it “was not exercising any discretion in terms of that sentence.”
Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 31. Therefore, the trial court’s error was not
harmless, and the case must be remanded for resentencing on the kidnapping
charge.
[¶65.] The question of whether resentencing is required for the sexual contact
and rape convictions presents a closer question, in my view. Both sentences were
within the unenhanced sentencing ranges, and a credible argument could be made
that the sentences were unaffected by the missing Part II Information. See
Sentencing Hearing Transcript at 29 (trial court stating “those are the maximum
penalties under the unenhanced charges pursuant to the Part II Information.”).
However, the trial court also ordered that the sentences be served concurrent to the
life sentence after observing, “I don’t see any purpose being served by consecutive
sentences in that regard.” Id. Given the fact that the trial court will resentence on
the kidnapping charge and the fact the individual sentences could be potentially
interrelated, the trial court may well feel differently on remand and should have the
ability to undertake sentencing on all the counts of conviction.
ZINTER, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶66.] I join the Court’s opinion on Issues 1 and 2, but I dissent on Issue 3
(vacating Medicine Eagle’s sentences). On Issue 3, I agree with Judge Salter and
Justice Konenkamp that the error alleged in the part II information proceedings
involved the question of statutory authority rather than the circuit court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Judge Salter’s federal authorities highlight that distinction. I
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write to explain why South Dakota’s constitution, statutes, and precedent also
require recognition of the distinction. My only disagreement with Judge Salter’s
analysis is his additional conclusion that Medicine Eagle made the objection
necessary to preserve this issue for harmless error review. Medicine Eagle is
limited to plain error review because he did not raise his current part II information
objection before the part II information trial. And under plain error review, his
sentences must be affirmed under Supreme Court precedent.
[¶67.] There is no dispute that the circuit court had jurisdiction over this
subject matter. This Court has long-defined “jurisdiction” as: “the power to hear and
determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, [and] to
adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them[.]” Calhoun v. Bryant, 28 S.D.
266, 271, 133 N.W. 266, 269 (1911) (quoting Herman on Estoppel & Res Judicata,
vol. 1, par. 66). We have adhered to similar definitions to this day. See, e.g., supra
Chief Justice’s opinion ¶ 40; Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc., 2013 S.D.
49, ¶ 21, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 11 (1982)) (defining “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction” as “the ‘authority
[of courts] to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action’”).
[¶68.] The circuit court’s power to hear and determine all aspects of criminal
cases is derived from the South Dakota Constitution and Legislature. Article V, § 5
of the South Dakota Constitution provides in pertinent part: “The circuit courts
have original jurisdiction in all cases except as to any limited original jurisdiction
granted to other courts by the Legislature.” And the Legislature has not limited
any aspect of the circuit court’s criminal jurisdiction. SDCL 16-6-12 provides:
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The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
determine all cases of felony, and original jurisdiction
concurrent with courts of limited jurisdiction as provided by law
to try and determine all cases of misdemeanor and actions or
proceedings for violation of any ordinance, bylaw, or other police
regulation of political subdivisions.
Based upon these provisions, the circuit court had “the power to hear and
determine” all aspects of Medicine Eagle’s criminal case and to “exercise any
judicial power” over the parties. See Calhoun, 28 S.D. at 271, 133 N.W. at 269. Its
jurisdiction over the subject matter is clear.
[¶69.] The disagreement on appeal arises from the reliance the Chief
Justice’s opinion places on Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797 (S.D. 1983). In
Honomichl, no part II informations had been filed with respect to the convictions at
issue. Three members of this Court did state that “[w]ithout a formal and sufficient
indictment or information, a court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction and
thus an accused may not be punished for a crime.” Id. at 798. But under the
modern understanding of subject matter jurisdiction, this view is no longer
followed. 24
[¶70.] Honomichl was decided by a divided Court. Two justices would have
held that a defendant can waive the failure to file an information by pleading guilty
because the failure to file an information is not jurisdictional. Three justices held
that the lack of an information was a jurisdictional defect, which was not subject to
24. The Chief Justice’s opinion agrees with the definition of subject matter
jurisdiction. See supra Chief Justice’s opinion ¶ 40. The flaw in the opinion’s
reasoning is that it equates “statutory authority” with “subject matter
jurisdiction.” See id. If this reasoning were correct (it is not), all trial errors
involving statutory authorization would constitute jurisdictional errors not
subject to waiver.
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waiver. The majority relied on two authorities. It first relied on State v. Mee (Mee
I), 67 S.D. 335, 292 N.W. 875 (1940), rev’d on rehearing, 67 S.D. 589, 297 N.W. 40
(1941). The Mee cases, however, were unusual because this Court initially held that
entry of a plea without the filing of an information waived the information. Mee I,
67 S.D. at 340-41, 292 N.W. at 877. Only on reconsideration did the Court rule that
the result of not filing an information was that “from [that] point on the county
court was without jurisdiction to proceed further in the case until the state’s
attorney had filed an information.” State v. Mee (Mee II), 67 S.D 589, 591, 297 N.W.
40, 41 (1941). But the Mee II Court failed to cite any authority or even one sentence
of reasoning for its change in position. As then Justice Wollman later observed, had
the Mee II Court recognized the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction in
terms of a court’s ability to adjudicate certain classes of cases and a court’s
jurisdiction over a particular offense and the particular defendant, “it may well
have adhered to its original opinion, which held that defendant had waived the
filing of an information by his plea of guilty.” Honomichl, 333 N.W.2d at 800
(Wollman, J., dissenting).
[¶71.] The Honomichl majority’s only other authority was Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505 (1927). 333 N.W.2d at 798. Albrecht,
in turn, relied upon Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1887). In
Bain, the Supreme Court utilized language analytically identical to that in Mee II.
The Supreme Court held that after an insufficient superseding indictment—which
is the same as an information for purposes of today’s discussion—“the jurisdiction of
the offense [was] gone, and the court [had] no right to proceed any further in the
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progress of the case for want of an indictment.” Bain, 121 U.S. at 13, 7 S. Ct. at
788. After Honomichl, however, Bain was overruled by a unanimous Supreme
Court in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860
(2002).
[¶72.] Cotton rejected the 1887 Bain-Mee II concept of jurisdiction as
outdated. Id. at 629-30, 122 S. Ct. at 1784-85. The Court observed that it was a
“somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction, which was more a fiction than anything
else[.]” Id. at 630, 122 S. Ct. at 1784-85 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). The Court ruled that the Bain-Mee II concept of jurisdiction was not in
keeping with its modern meaning: “i.e., ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate the case.’” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)).
[¶73.] The Supreme Court went on to rule that, even though jurisdiction can
never be forfeited or waived, the right to indictment can be waived. Id. at 630, 122
S. Ct. at 1785. Waiver can occur because, as the Court had noted in a number of its
post-Bain cases, “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to
adjudicate a case.” Id. at 630-31, 122 S. Ct. at 1785 (discussing Lamar v. United
States, 240 U.S. 60, 36 S. Ct. 255, 60 L. Ed. 526 (1916) and United States v.
Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 66, 71 S. Ct. 595, 95 L. Ed. 747 (1951)). Ultimately, the
Court expressly overruled Bain, holding that “indictment defects” and “indictment
omissions” do not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction. See id. at 631, 122 S. Ct. at
1785 (stating that “Bain is overruled”).
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[¶74.] This Court issued similar post-Honomichl decisions in the habitual
offender context indicating that the failure to properly file a part II information
does not compromise a circuit court’s jurisdiction. In State v. Grooms, 339 N.W.2d
318, 320-21 (S.D. 1983), this Court held that failure to re-serve a copy of the part II
information on the defendant before his retrial did not alone justify reversal of his
habitual offender conviction. In State v. Graycek, 368 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D. 1985),
this Court held that the failure to refile a part II information after the original
charges against the defendant were dismissed and new charges were filed did not
deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to sentence the defendant as a habitual
offender. And in State v. Alexander, 313 N.W.2d 33 (S.D. 1981), following a
mistrial, the defendant was charged under a new amended indictment with
different language. Notwithstanding this new proceeding and the State’s failure to
“file a new supplemental information for habitual offender,” this Court found no
error. Id. at 34. We did so because—somewhat like our case today—an habitual
criminal information had been filed in the original (but dismissed) proceeding and
the State had advised that it intended to proceed on the allegations that were
contained in the information from that dismissed proceeding. 25
25. The Chief Justice’s opinion overlooks these cases when it states that none of
the cases in this writing deal with “a situation in which the part II
information had been dismissed.” See supra Chief Justice’s opinion ¶ 39 n.15.
In each of the foregoing cases there was no part II information that had been
filed or served in the criminal proceeding in which the defendant was being
prosecuted. And there is no distinction between proceeding in a criminal
action in which there is no information and proceeding in a criminal action in
which the information is dismissed. For this reason, the Chief Justice’s
opinion also overlooks several additional cases. For example, former Justice
Wollman’s writing came in a case in which this Court was reviewing
(continued . . .)
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[¶75.] These decisions and the Cotton ruling support Justice Wollman’s
opinion in Honomichl, concluding that the failure to file an information is not a
subject matter jurisdiction defect and the lack of an information may be waived.
See Honomichl, 333 N.W.2d at 800 (Wollman, J., dissenting). As Justice Wollman
stated rhetorically, “If the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a grand jury
presentment or indictment . . . in the federal courts is a personal privilege that may
be waived . . . , why may it not be held that the alternative charging document [i.e.,
an information] provided by Art. VI, § 10 of the South Dakota Constitution is a
personal privilege that may also be waived?” Id. (citing Barkman v. Sanford, 162
F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947)). Justice Wollman was joined in his dissent by then Justice
Dunn. Because their view of subject matter jurisdiction was adopted by the
Supreme Court in Cotton, as well as the numerous courts cited in Judge Salter’s
writing, we should not cling to an 1887 view of jurisdiction that is no longer
followed. The Chief Justice’s opinion does not cite one post-Cotton case supporting
________________________
(. . . continued)
jurisdiction following guilty pleas where “informations were not filed by the
State on either offense.” Honomichl, 333 N.W.2d at 798. In Mee I, “no
information had been filed . . . , but this [Court concluded that it] did not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the act charged in [that] case.” 67 S.D.
at 339, 292 N.W. at 877. And like the case we consider today, the opinion
reversed in Bain came in a case where amendments to an indictment were
determined to render the indictment “no indictment of a grand jury” at all.
Bain, 121 U.S. at 13, 7 S. Ct. at 787, overruled by Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.
Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court
has concluded that a defendant may waive the right to any indictment, not
just “dismissed” indictments. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630, 122 S. Ct. at 1785. As
an aside, it should finally be noted that the original part II information in
today’s case was never dismissed by the circuit court or the State. As is more
fully explained hereafter, infra ¶¶ 77 and 82, both the circuit court and the
State acceded to Medicine Eagle’s request to dismiss the amended part II
information and proceed on the original part II information.
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its subject matter jurisdiction theory. We should overrule Honomichl and now hold
that the lack of a part II information is waivable because it does not divest circuit
courts of their subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases. Under article V, § 5
of the South Dakota Constitution and SDCL 16-6-12, the circuit court’s subject
matter jurisdiction—its power to adjudicate such proceedings—cannot be called into
question. 26
[¶76.] We should also not lose track of what occurred in this case. In the
course of a single criminal proceeding, the State timely filed a part II information,
and it timely filed an amended part II information that added to but did not
eliminate the originally alleged prior conviction. The State subsequently dismissed
the amended part II information, expressly stating in the dismissal that it was
proceeding on the originally filed part II information. Even if the Chief Justice’s
opinion were correct that no part II information remained following this procedural
course of events, the issue on appeal concerns the habitual criminal penalty, not the
State’s power to initiate the case in a circuit court. Therefore, these procedural
26. Moreover, even if we were to continue to follow the now discredited view of
subject matter jurisdiction as expressed in Honomichl and Mee II, jurisdiction
over the habitual criminal proceedings clearly attached in this case because
the State filed the original part II habitual criminal information and gave
notice of its intent to proceed on the allegations in that information. As this
Court ruled in Alexander, even though the original case has been dismissed,
the State may properly proceed with habitual criminal proceedings in a
second case without filing a new habitual criminal information as long as the
State gives notice that it intends to proceed on the allegations contained in
the part II information from the dismissed case. Alexander, 313 N.W.2d at
34, 37. Analytically, this is no different than what occurred in the case we
consider today.
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events did not divest the circuit court of its subject matter jurisdiction under the
constitution and SDCL 16-6-12.
[¶77.] Although the purported absence of a part II information was not a
jurisdictional defect, it was a defect in the institution of the part II prosecution or a
defect in the part II information itself. Such defects must be raised by motion prior
to trial or are deemed waived. SDCL 23A-8-3 (Rule 12(b)); SDCL 23A-8-9 (Rule
12(f)).
[¶78.] Required motions under Rule 12(b) range from “[d]efenses and
objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution;” SDCL 23A-8-3(1),
to “[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information[;]”
SDCL 23A-8-3(3). Within that range lies a defense or objection based upon the
dismissal of an amended part II information and the continuation of the habitual
offender proceedings under a previously filed part II information. Concluding
otherwise controverts the intent of Rule 12(b) to restrict “the defense tactic of
‘sandbagging’” where defense counsel, recognizing a defense “would forego raising
the defect before trial, when a successful objection would merely result in an
amendment of the pleading (or a new pleading).” 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 19.1(d) (3d ed. 2007). 27 Here, the dismissal of the amended
27. Judge Salter’s concurrence in result correctly notes that defenses and
objections may be preserved for appellate review if the trial court has been
given an opportunity to correct claimed errors. See supra Judge Salter’s
opinion ¶ 60. Although Medicine Eagle raised an objection before sentencing,
SDCL 23A-8-3 (Rule 12(b)) further required that the objection be raised
before trial to provide the opportunity for corrective measures such as the
“amendment of a pleading (or a new pleading).” See 5 Wayne R. LaFave
et al., Criminal Procedure § 19.1(d) (3d. ed. 2007). Medicine Eagle’s
(continued . . .)
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part II information and continuation of proceedings under the original part II was
not only clear to Medicine Eagle, he requested proceeding on the original part II
information in his motion to dismiss the amended part II. Yet the majority today
would reward Medicine Eagle for his sandbagging in the assertion of this claimed
defense or objection. This should not occur under rules specifically designed to
prevent such practices.
[¶79.] Medicine Eagle did not make the required motion before trial. Because
the claimed error was not raised before trial as required by SDCL 23A-8-3(1) (Rule
12(b)), the objection was waived under SDCL 23A-8-9 (Rule 12(f)). Therefore, at
best, the claimed defect in the habitual criminal proceedings is subject to review for
plain error. “Where an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial, our review
is limited to whether the trial court committed plain error.” State v. Bowker, 2008
S.D. 61, ¶ 45, 754 N.W.2d 56, 69. See also United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d
1251, 1258 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that a “late-blooming claim [challenging] an
indictment for failure to charge an offense” is reviewable for plain error); United
States v. Blade, 336 F.3d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627,
122 S. Ct. at 1783; United States v. McBride, 862 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1988))
(applying plain error review to the denial of a motion for new trial based upon a
defect in an indictment).
________________________
(. . . continued)
sandbagging here deprived the State of that opportunity to file a new or
amended pleading. Therefore, under the rules, the objection was waived,
relegating the objection to plain error review.
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[¶80.] To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that there was:
(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and
only then may we exercise our discretion to notice the error if (4)
it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
the judicial proceedings.
State v. Olvera, 2012 S.D. 84, ¶ 9, 824 N.W.2d 112, 115 (quoting State v. Jones, 2012
S.D. 7, ¶ 14, 810 N.W.2d 202, 206). This is the same plain error standard utilized
by the Supreme Court. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32, 122 S. Ct. at 1785. In
analyzing an analogous defective indictment proceeding, the Cotton Court skipped
immediately to the last element of the test. The Supreme Court concluded that the
indictment error in that case did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings[,]” because the evidence was
“‘overwhelming’” and “‘essentially uncontroverted.’” Id. at 632-33, 122 S. Ct. at
1786) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1550,
137 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997)).
[¶81.] Like the case in Cotton, Medicine Eagle can claim no lack of fairness,
integrity, or public reputation in the part II habitual criminal proceedings because
his criminal history is not disputed on appeal. Additionally, the original part II
information was timely filed and he was duly arraigned on it before trial on the
principal and habitual criminal charges. Thus, he had notice of the specific
habitual offender allegation that was ultimately tried. Further, the amended part
II information was dismissed on Medicine Eagle’s motion before trial, and Medicine
Eagle specifically requested as part of his motion that “the case proceed on the
original [p]art II information that was filed at the initiation of [the] case.” The
State and the circuit court proceeded exactly as Medicine Eagle requested. The
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State dismissed the amended part II information and explicitly stated in its written
dismissal that “[t]he State does not dismiss the original part II and intends to
proceed with that original part II at the trial on such matter.” The State then
proceeded to trial on the original part II information with no objection whatsoever
from Medicine Eagle.
[¶82.] “‘A criminal trial is not a game where defendant’s counsel may lie in
the weeds and hold back motions or objections that go to the very heart of the
prosecution. There exist ample means of attacking the sufficiency of the charge
prior to trial. SDCL 23A-8-2.’” State v. Lachowitzer, 314 N.W.2d 307, 309 (S.D.
1982) (quoting State v. Williams, 297 N.W.2d 491, 493 (S.D. 1980)). Even on appeal,
Medicine Eagle does not challenge the existence or validity of the prior conviction he
was found guilty of. Thus, to paraphrase Cotton, “[t]he real threat . . . to the
‘fairness integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings’ would be if
[Medicine Eagle], despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence . . . [of his
prior conviction was] to receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less
substantial . . . offenses because of an error that was never objected to at trial.” See
535 U.S. at 634, 122 S. Ct. at 1787.
[¶83.] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent as to Issue 3. I would affirm
Medicine Eagle’s convictions and sentences as a habitual offender.
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