State v. Long Fox , 2013 S.D. 40 ( 2013 )

#26317-rev & rem-DG
2013 S.D. 40IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS LONG FOX, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
SULLY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE JOHN L. BROWN
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JOHN M. STROHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
AL ARENDT
Pierre, South Dakota Attorney for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON JANUARY 8, 2013
OPINION FILED 05/29/13
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] While intoxicated, Travis Long Fox stole a vehicle, drove the vehicle
into a ditch, and then fled the scene of the accident. The State brought various
charges against Long Fox, including grand theft. Long Fox entered into a “Deferred
Prosecution Agreement” (the Agreement) with the State, in which the State agreed
to defer prosecution of the grand theft charge if Long Fox pleaded guilty to other
charges and complied with additional conditions for a period of 24 months. One of
the conditions required Long Fox to plead guilty to grand theft if he violated any of
the other conditions of the Agreement. A few months into the 24-month period,
Long Fox violated some of the conditions of the Agreement. As a result, the State
re-filed the grand theft charge against Long Fox. Long Fox then filed a motion to
exercise his right to a jury trial, which the circuit court denied based upon the terms
of the Agreement. Ultimately, Long Fox pleaded guilty to grand theft and was
sentenced. Long Fox appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to exercise his
right to a jury trial on the grand theft charge.
FACTS
[¶2.] On August 15, 2010, 18-year-old Long Fox stole a car, drove the car off
of the road and into rural fence lines, and got the car stuck in a ditch. He then fled
the scene of the accident. Subsequently, a police officer was called to the scene.
Witnesses at the scene told the officer that Long Fox admitted he took the car and
got it stuck in the ditch. Upon learning that Long Fox was staying at a friend’s
residence, the officer contacted Long Fox’s friend and received permission to enter
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the residence in order to apprehend Long Fox. When the officer entered the home,
he located Long Fox, placed him in custody, and read him his Miranda rights.
[¶3.] Long Fox waived his rights and agreed to speak with the officer. Long
Fox admitted he had taken the car and wrecked it. He also admitted he had
consumed alcohol before driving the car. Additionally, Long Fox admitted he had
previously stolen a tractor battery from a neighbor’s tractor in an incident unrelated
to the theft of the vehicle.
[¶4.] On August 18, 2010, Long Fox was charged with grand theft, in
violation of SDCL 22-30A-17; reckless driving, in violation of SDCL 32-24-1; failure
to report an accident, in violation of SDCL 32-34-7; minor in consumption, in
violation of SDCL 35-9-2; and petty theft, in violation of SDCL 22-30A-17.3. An
amended complaint was filed on September 1, 2010, which added charges of
possession of marijuana, in violation of SDCL 22-42-6, and ingestion, in violation of
SDCL 22-42-15, to the list of charges being brought against Long Fox. Long Fox
was arraigned on these charges on September 22, 2010, and he entered a plea of
“not guilty” to all charges.
[¶5.] On October 6, 2010, Long Fox appeared before the magistrate court
and entered into the Agreement with the State. The Agreement was signed by the
magistrate judge. As part of the Agreement, the State agreed to defer prosecution
of the grand theft charge for 24 months if Long Fox complied with certain
conditions. One of these conditions was that Long Fox plead guilty to reckless
driving, ingestion, and failure to report an accident. In exchange for pleading guilty
to these charges, the State would dismiss the possession, minor in consumption, and
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petty theft charges with prejudice. The Agreement also contained other conditions,
including that Long Fox participate in the 24/7 program, not consume or possess
alcohol or controlled substances, pay restitution to the owner of the car and the
owner of the fence, and provide a factual basis for the grand theft charge within the
Agreement, which would be used against him if the grand theft charge was re-filed.
[¶6.] According to the terms of the Agreement, if Long Fox complied with
the conditions for 24 months, the State would file a dismissal of the grand theft
charge with prejudice. However, if Long Fox violated any of the conditions, the
grand theft charge would be re-filed and Long Fox would plead guilty to grand theft.
By signing the Agreement, Long Fox acknowledged that he understood his rights,
the nature of the charges against him, the maximum penalties that could be
imposed for his offenses, and the rights he waived by pleading guilty. Further,
Long Fox acknowledged that he entered into the Agreement freely and voluntarily.
After pleading guilty to reckless driving, ingestion, and failure to report an accident
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, Long Fox was placed on probation.
[¶7.] Months after entering into the Agreement, Long Fox violated the
conditions of his probation and of the Agreement. Specifically, Long Fox tested
positive for marijuana on January 13, 2011, and he missed his preliminary breath
test on April 21, 2011. Additionally, on July 15, 2011, Long Fox attempted to
provide a false urine sample to law enforcement and then tested positive for
marijuana. As a result of Long Fox’s violation of the conditions of his probation and
of the Agreement, the State re-filed the grand theft charge against Long Fox. The
State also moved to revoke Long Fox’s probation and its deferment of prosecution of
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the grand theft charge. On October 19, 2011, Long Fox moved to exercise his right
to a jury trial. The circuit court denied this motion, ruling that Long Fox was
contractually bound by the terms of the Agreement, which required him to plead
guilty to grand theft if he violated the conditions of the Agreement. 1
[¶8.] A hearing was scheduled for November 9, 2011, to address the State’s
motion to revoke Long Fox’s probation and its deferment of prosecution of the grand
theft charge. At the hearing, Long Fox admitted to violating the conditions of his
probation and of the Agreement. Long Fox was then re-arraigned on the grand
1. At the October 26, 2011 hearing on Long Fox’s motion to exercise his right to
a jury trial, counsel for Long Fox argued:
[The] Deferred Prosecution Agreement . . . seeks to force him –
and the thing is, you know, every one of us, particularly you [the
judge], sit in court every day and ask people, Did anybody force
you to plead to this charge? And that’s exactly what’s going to
happen in this case because the State is asking that this
Defendant be forced to plead to grand theft. And at a minimum,
I think it is a violation of his constitutional right to a jury trial.
And the fact that it was put in [the Agreement], it was agreed to
with counsel at [his] side, does not in any way somehow
diminish the constitutional violation. . . . I don’t see how you can
force somebody to stand up and plead guilty and find them
guilty when he says I’m not guilty and I’m being forced to plead
guilty because of this agreement.
However, the circuit court ruled:
I find from the agreement that Mr. Long Fox was adequately
advised of the circumstances that he was entering into in this
matter. He did plead to various misdemeanor charges, was
granted the opportunity to avoid entering a plea on the grand
theft charge based on the conditions that he comply with the
terms of that agreement. Now certainly he’s entitled to a
hearing on whether in fact he has violated the terms of that
agreement. But I think under the terms of the agreement, it’s
quite clearly set out that he’s agreed that he will plead guilty to
the grand theft charge.
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theft charge. Despite his desire to plead not guilty and exercise his right to a jury
trial on the grand theft charge, Long Fox reluctantly pleaded guilty to grand theft
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Long Fox was sentenced on
February 13, 2012. The circuit court imposed a jail term of 5 years, with all but 60
days suspended if Long Fox complied with certain conditions. Long Fox appeals the
circuit court’s denial of his motion to exercise his right to a jury trial on the grand
theft charge.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶9.] Whether the circuit court erred in denying Long Fox’s motion
to exercise his right to a jury trial on the grand theft charge.
[¶10.] Long Fox argues the portion of the Agreement requiring him to plead
guilty to grand theft was unconstitutional because it forced him to plead guilty to
grand theft at a later arraignment if he violated the conditions of the Agreement. 2
Thus, Long Fox asserts the circuit court erred in denying his motion to exercise his
right to a jury trial on the grand theft charge and instead enforcing the portion of
the Agreement requiring him to plead guilty to grand theft because that portion of
the Agreement was unconstitutional.
[¶11.] “Alleged violations of constitutional rights are reviewed de novo.”
State v. Zakaria, 2007 S.D. 27, ¶ 8, 730 N.W.2d 140, 143 (citing State v. Carothers,
2005 S.D. 16, ¶ 7, 692 N.W.2d 544, 546). “A plea of guilty is more than a confession
which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing
remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395
2. Long Fox does not challenge the validity of the Agreement as a whole.
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U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) (citing Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 583, 71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927)). Thus,
with regard to guilty pleas:
It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and
voluntary. The standard was and remains whether the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant. That is so
because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional
rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s
accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1969) (stating that a plea
must be a “voluntary expression of [the defendant’s] own choice”).
[¶12.] In this case, we conclude that the portion of the Agreement requiring
Long Fox to plead guilty to grand theft, which encompassed Long Fox’s waiver of
his right to a jury trial, 3 is unenforceable. After Long Fox admitted to violating the
conditions of his probation and of the Agreement, Long Fox was re-arraigned on the
grand theft charge. Although Long Fox agreed to plead guilty to grand theft if he
failed to satisfy the conditions of the Agreement, Long Fox should have been able to
withdraw from the portion of the Agreement related to the grand theft charge until
3. In the Agreement, Long Fox’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was explicitly
linked to the portion of the Agreement requiring Long Fox to plead guilty to
grand theft. First, the Agreement provided that “if [Long Fox] violates any
condition . . . , he shall enter a plea of guilty to the Grand Theft charge.” In a
later provision, the Agreement provided that “Defendant understands that if
his plea of guilty to any count or counts is accepted by the [circuit court], he
waives” his right to a jury trial. Long Fox did not separately waive his right
to a jury trial.
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he entered a guilty plea on that charge. See Wayne LeFave, et al. 5 Crim. Proc. §
21.2(f) (3d ed. 2007) (quoting People v. Heiler, 262 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977)) (stating that defendants “are always free to withdraw from plea agreements
prior to entry of their guilty plea regardless of any prejudice to the prosecution that
may result from a breach”). However, despite Long Fox’s desire to maintain his
plea of not guilty and exercise his right to a jury trial on the grand theft charge,
Long Fox was forced to plead guilty to grand theft under the terms of the
Agreement. 4
[¶13.] Therefore, in this case, Long Fox never voluntarily, of his own choice,
entered a plea of guilty to grand theft. As a result, we conclude that the portion of
the Agreement requiring Long Fox to plead guilty to grand theft is unenforceable
4. At the November 9, 2011 hearing, the circuit court ruled that Long Fox
violated the conditions of the Agreement. The court proceeded to arraign
Long Fox on the grand theft charge. After Long Fox was read his rights, the
following exchange took place:
The Court: I understand that this particular charge was
deferred as the result of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
entered into with the State. Part of the . . . Agreement . . .
would constitute your agreement that you would enter a guilty
plea to the charge. And you understand the effect of the . . .
Agreement you entered into and where that puts you today in
this case?
Long Fox: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court: Then at this time, are you ready to enter a plea?
Counsel for Long Fox: Judge, we are, but it was our intent to
plead not guilty today. But you know, . . . you ruled . . . that he
is bound by the agreement that he made . . . and it provides . . .
that he agrees that if this is revoked, he pleads guilty to grand
theft. I mean, is that to mean he has to plead guilty today?
The Court: Well, I guess this is the time for the arraignment.
I would assume that he would be bound by the terms of that
agreement.
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because it unconstitutionally deprived Long Fox of his right to voluntarily enter his
choice of plea on the grand theft charge. Further, because the portion of the
Agreement requiring Long Fox to plead guilty to grand theft is unenforceable, the
circuit court erred in determining Long Fox was bound by that portion of the
Agreement and in subsequently denying Long Fox’s motion to exercise his right to a
jury trial.
[¶14.] In reaching this conclusion we note that neither party cites to any
provision in the South Dakota Codified Laws or any caselaw that contemplates the
enforcement of an agreement in which a defendant gives up his right to voluntarily
enter a plea of his or her choice. Although SDCL 23A-7-8 discusses plea
agreements, SDCL 23A-27-12 discusses probation, SDCL 23A-27-13 discusses
suspended impositions of sentences, and SDCL 23A-27-18 discusses suspended
executions of sentences, none of these statutes 5 contemplate the portion of the
Agreement the State and Long Fox entered into in which Long Fox was required to
plead guilty to grand theft upon violating the conditions of the Agreement, thus
waiving his right to a jury trial.
[¶15.] We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶16.] ZINTER and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.
[¶17.] KONENKAMP, Justice, concurs in result.
[¶18.] WILBUR, Justice, deeming herself disqualified, did not participate.
5. Various conditions must be satisfied before these procedures can be utilized.
One specific condition required under each of these statutes is that the
defendant must have been convicted of, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere
to the charge before any of these procedures can be implemented.
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KONENKAMP, Justice (concurring in result).
[¶19.] Although the Court holds unenforceable only a portion of the felony
deferred prosecution agreement here, there is also a jurisdictional defect. As part of
this agreement, the factual basis for the felony of grand theft was offered and
accepted in magistrate court. It is doubtful whether a magistrate judge has
jurisdiction to accept or approve felony plea agreements of any sort. With felonies,
magistrate judges are limited to setting bail, assigning counsel, advising rights,
holding preliminary hearings, and, in certain instances, taking “not guilty pleas,”
but then only when directed to do so by the presiding judge. SDCL 23A-6-29.1;
SDCL 23A-4-3. If magistrates cannot accept a felony guilty plea, how can they
accept or approve a factual basis for a felony guilty plea as part of a deferred
prosecution agreement?
[¶20.] More than anything, however, today’s case illustrates the void in our
law governing deferred prosecutions. While we know they exist — this was but one
instance — deferred prosecution agreements in South Dakota have no standards, no
guidelines for eligibility, and no formalized procedures authorized by legislation.
They operate informally and purely at prosecutorial discretion. Nonetheless, when
these agreements are legally sanctioned and properly managed, other jurisdictions
have found them to be of considerable merit. 6
6. “[M]any jurisdictions have now adopted programs variously called pretrial
diversion, pretrial intervention, or deferred prosecution for the purposes of
conserving scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources and of dealing more
(continued . . .)
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[¶21.] Not to be confused with deferred prosecution, South Dakota presently
has several other complementary programs. One is the 24/7 Sobriety Program
overseen by the Attorney General. SDCL ch. 1-11. Participation may be a condition
of bond or pretrial release or a sentence. SDCL 1-11-20. Another is the Adult
Probationary Drug Court Program. SDCL 16-12B-14.1. These programs have a
distinctive difference from deferred prosecution: the locus of control over the case
process. Deferred prosecution programs tend to be prosecution based, whereas
Drug Courts and the 24/7 Sobriety Program are court-centered. 7 Our recently
enacted Public Safety Improvement Act, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 101, addresses
mostly post-conviction reforms.
[¶22.] Deferred prosecution programs help reduce criminal caseloads and
incarceration rates and “assist the courts, prosecutors, and victims in addressing
serious problems caused by growing criminal and juvenile justice populations
through reducing reliance on traditional case processing and working to stem the
‘revolving door’ syndrome.” National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies
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(. . . continued)
effectively with certain offenders.” Wayne LaFave, et al., 4 Crim. Proc. §
13.6(a) (3d ed. updated 2012).
7. This is not to suggest that courts should have no role. “While it is the
prosecutor’s prerogative to initiate pretrial diversion consideration for
potential participants, courts should have a role in monitoring the fair
application of diversion eligibility guidelines.” NAPSA Performance
Standards and Goals for Pretrial Release and Diversion 1995, Standard 2.6,
available at http://projectremand.org/pdf/diversion1995.pdf (last visited on
May 17, 2013).
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(NAPSA), Pretrial Diversion Abstract (January 1998). 8 For those charged with
public offenses, such programs provide “an opportunity to make significant changes
in their lives and prevent further penetration into the criminal justice system.” 9 Id.
[¶23.] According to the NAPSA, pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution is
defined as “any voluntary option that provides alternative criminal case processing
for a defendant charged with a crime and ideally results in a dismissal of the
charge(s).” 10 In the model established by NAPSA, these diversion programs
feature: “(1) uniform eligibility criteria; (2) structured delivery of services and
supervision; and (3) dismissal — or its equivalent — of pending criminal charges
upon successful completion of the required term and conditions of diversion.” 11
Unsuccessful participants are returned for prosecution.
8. See http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversionabstract.pdf (last visited on
May 17, 2013).
9. The NAPSA recognizes 298 pretrial diversion programs in 45 states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
10. See Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, 5.
http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/PromisingPracticeFinal.pdf (last
visited on May 17, 20130); see also supra note 7, NAPSA Performance
Standards and Goals for Pretrial Release and Diversion.
11. See supra note 10, Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion at 5. Pretrial
diversion programs may include the following elements: (1) offers persons
charged with criminal offenses alternatives to traditional criminal court
proceedings; (2) permits participation by the accused on a voluntary basis; (3)
occurs no sooner than the filing of formal charges and no later than a final
adjudication of guilt; and (4) results in dismissal of charges, or its equivalent,
if the participant successfully completes the diversion process. See
Performance Standards and Goals for Pretrial Diversion/Intervention
November 2008, available at
http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversion_intervention_standards_2008.pd
f (last visited on May 17, 2013).
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[¶24.] Our Legislature might well consider enacting authorization for a
formal pretrial diversion program. 12 Such legislation could address many questions
that will remain open after today. Should criminal charges on any crime be
permitted a diversion, or, as in many jurisdictions, should there be legislative limits
on the types of crimes subject to diversion? Is anyone eligible for diversion, or
should it be limited to first offenders, nonviolent offenders, youthful offenders, or
chemically-addicted offenders? Should there be guidelines to ensure statewide
uniformity in decisions allowing deferred prosecutions? 13 How can the process be
administered in a nondiscriminatory manner? See South Dakota Equal Justice
Commission Final Report, Findings on Pretrial Processes, 7.1.4; Recommendation
7.2.3. 14 Can prosecutors demand waiver of certain rights as a condition to
12. Polikov v. Neth, 699 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Neb. 2005) (“the power to design a
formal pretrial diversion program is a legislative function”).
13. See, e.g., ABA Standards on Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.8 (Discretion
as to Noncriminal Disposition: “(a) The prosecutor should consider in
appropriate cases the availability of noncriminal disposition, formal or
informal, in deciding whether to press criminal charges which would
otherwise be supported by probable cause; especially in the case of a first
offender, the nature of the offense may warrant noncriminal disposition. (b)
Prosecutors should be familiar with the resources of social agencies that can
assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion from the criminal process.”).
Standards available at:
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/cri
mjust_standards_pfunc_blk.html.
14. Report available at:
http://sdjudicial.com/uploads/downloads/SDEJCFinalReport2006jan.pdf. See
also supra note 7, NAPSA Performance Standards and Goals for Pretrial
Release and Diversion, Standard 3.2 (“No potential participant should be
denied access to the pretrial diversion/intervention option based upon race,
ethnic background, religion, gender, disability, marital status, sexual
orientation or economic status. No person who is protected by applicable
(continued . . .)
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obtaining a deferred prosecution? 15 How long can a term of a deferred prosecution
last? Do allegations of breach require a due process hearing? All these issues await
resolution through enabling legislation. Without legislation, these questions may
well be resolved only haphazardly through court rulings like the one today.
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(. . . continued)
federal or state laws against discrimination should be otherwise subjected to
discrimination for eligibility purposes.”).
15. See Abad v. Cozza, 911 P.2d 376, 377 (Wash. 1996) (permissible under
deferred prosecution statute to require “persons seeking a deferred
prosecution to waive, upon any subsequent revocation of the deferred
prosecution, the rights to a jury, to call and question witnesses, and to testify
in the postrevocation trial”).
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