State v. Hopkins , 2017 S.D. 13 ( 2017 )

#27886-a-GAS
2017 S.D. 13IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW LAMAR HOPKINS, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
HUTCHINSON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE PATRICK SMITH
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
CULLEN P. MCNEECE
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
KENNETH E. LEHR
Scotland, South Dakota Attorney for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
MARCH 22, 2017
OPINION FILED 04/12/17
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SEVERSON, Justice
[¶1.] Following a court trial, the circuit court found Matthew Hopkins guilty
of driving with .08 percent blood alcohol content. Hopkins also pleaded guilty to a
part II information alleging that this was his second driving under the influence
offense. On appeal, Hopkins asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied a
motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
Background
[¶2.] On the evening of September 25, 2015, Officer Wagner was completing
paperwork at the Parkston Police Department when she heard a loud vehicle pass
by. She looked up from her work and observed a white vehicle traveling at a high
rate of speed. She immediately went to her patrol car and tried to use radar to
determine the speed of the vehicle but was unsuccessful. The vehicle turned into a
gas station and Officer Wagner followed. When she arrived, the vehicle was
unoccupied. She entered the gas station and asked the clerk who was driving the
white vehicle. The clerk responded that it was the clerk’s son and that he was in
the bathroom.
[¶3.] When the driver of the vehicle, Matthew Hopkins, exited the bathroom,
he had his hands in his pants pockets. Officer Wagner asked that Hopkins remove
his hands from his pockets and step outside with her because she had a couple
questions for him. Officer Wagner testified that he initially removed his hands from
his pockets but then placed them back inside the pockets. She asked him twice to
take his hands out of his pockets but he refused. Officer Wagner testified that when
she got outside with Hopkins, she told him, “I’m going to put you in cuffs for my
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safety because you continue to put your hands in your pocket. . . . At this point
you’re just being detained, you’re not under arrest.” She then frisked him and
asked him why he was driving so fast. He responded that he had to get his car to
his mother before she finished work. During this encounter, she could smell
alcohol. While he was still in handcuffs, she asked him if he had been drinking. He
responded that he drank a couple of beers. She then placed him in the back of her
car and took his driver’s license to run a check. “[E]verything came back okay” so
she got him out of the car, took the handcuffs off of him, and asked him to do field
sobriety tests. He did not perform well on several tests. Officer Wagner gave him a
preliminary breath test that showed a .138 percent blood alcohol content. She
placed Hopkins under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). She also asked if he
would consent to a blood draw, which he refused. After obtaining a warrant, a blood
draw was performed. Hopkins’ blood alcohol content was .162 percent.
[¶4.] Hopkins was charged with alternative counts of driving under the
influence and driving with .08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. He
moved to suppress the statements that he made to law enforcement (that he had
been driving and drinking), asserting that he was subject to a custodial
interrogation and entitled to being advised of his Miranda rights. See id. He also
sought to suppress all physical evidence obtained by law enforcement alleging it to
be “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.
Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). After a hearing, the circuit court denied Hopkins’
motion to suppress and the case proceeded to a court trial. The court found Hopkins
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guilty of driving with .08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. Hopkins
pleaded guilty to a part II information alleging a second offense driving while under
the influence. On appeal to this Court, Hopkins alleges that the circuit court erred
when it failed to suppress his statements and the physical evidence obtained by law
enforcement.
Standard of Review
[¶5.] “A motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of a
constitutionally protected right is a question of law reviewed de novo.” State v.
Rademaker, 2012 S.D. 28, ¶ 7, 813 N.W.2d 174, 176 (quoting State v. Wright, 2010
S.D. 91, ¶ 8, 791 N.W.2d 791, 794). “The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard. Once the facts have been determined,
however, the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law
reviewed de novo. This Court will not be restricted by the trial court’s legal
rationale.” Id.Analysis
[¶6.] There is no dispute that Hopkins was not advised of his Miranda
rights prior to the officer asking him why he had been driving so fast and whether
he had been drinking. However, only “[i]ndividuals subject to a custodial
interrogation are entitled to Miranda warnings.” State v. McCahren, 2016 S.D. 34,
¶ 30, 878 N.W.2d 586, 599. In this case, Hopkins was subjected to an investigatory
detention, i.e. a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968). In the interest of her safety, Officer Wagner secured Hopkins and
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performed a search for weapons.∗ The United States Supreme Court has indicated
that normally Terry stops will not constitute Miranda custody. It has explained:
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a policeman who
lacks probable cause but whose “observations lead him
reasonably to suspect” that a particular person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that
person briefly in order to “investigate the circumstances that
provoke suspicion.” “[T]he stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably
related in scope to the justification for their initiation.’”
Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to
try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s
suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And,
unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable
cause to arrest him, he must then be released. The
comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317(1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). The Court has
reiterated that “the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in
a traffic or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.” Howes v. Fields, 565
U.S. 499, 510, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012) (quoting Maryland v.
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010)).
[¶7.] Nevertheless, in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct.
3138, 3450, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984), when the Court addressed whether roadside
questioning during routine traffic stops constituted custodial interrogation, it
compared traffic stops to Terry stops, explaining:
[T]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as
soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree
∗ Hopkins does not challenge any aspect of the Terry stop.
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associated with formal arrest.” If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes,
he will be entitled to the full panoply of protection prescribed by
Miranda.
(Citations omitted.). Thus, the Court has indicated that we must still analyze Terry
stops to determine if a detainee was in custody such that Miranda rights were
necessary. See also United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting government’s claim that “so long as [an] encounter remained a Terry stop,
no Miranda warnings were required.”).
[¶8.] To determine whether an individual was in custody we utilize a two
part test:
First, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a
reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and
the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must
apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.
McCahren, 2016 S.D. 34, ¶ 30, 878 N.W.2d at 599 (quoting State v. Wright, 2009
S.D. 51, ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d 512, 520). The United States Supreme Court has
explained that “[r]elevant factors include the location of the questioning, its
duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of
physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the
end of the questioning.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S. Ct. at 1189 (citations
omitted). “Determining whether an individual’s freedom of movement was
curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all
restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.” Id.-5-
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“[T]he freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for Miranda custody.” Id. (quoting Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 112, 130 S. Ct. at
1124).
[¶9.] Hopkins insists that the sole fact that he was handcuffed during
the initial questioning means that he was in custody at the time of Officer
Wagner’s questions. Courts across the country have handled this issue
differently. Hopkins cites to two cases where handcuffs have been a deciding
factor in determining that a suspect was in custody. See United States v.
Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Handcuffs are generally
recognized as a hallmark of a formal arrest. . . . Thus, a reasonable person
. . . would ordinarily conclude that his detention would not necessarily be
temporary or brief and that his movements were now totally under the
control of the police[.]”); Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (“[T]he use of handcuffs would cause the reasonable person to feel that
one was not free to leave, and that one’s freedom of movement was restrained
to the degree associated with a formal arrest.”). Hopkins also refers us to
cases where courts determined that the combination of handcuffs and other
circumstances amounted to a suspect being in custody. See United States v.
Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1098 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding suspect was in custody
where he “had not been told whether he was under arrest, he was removed
from the taxicab in which he was riding, separated from his property and his
associates and handcuffed. By the time of his arrest, there were a large
number of officers at the scene. . . . Under these circumstances, there was
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sufficient curtailment of [suspect’s] freedom of action to establish custody for
Miranda purposes.”); State v. Wilson, 169 P.3d 1184, 1194-95 (N.M. Ct. App.
2007)(“The officer used force in order to fully handcuff Defendant, which
caused Defendant to drop to his knees, and then the officer placed Defendant
in the back seat of the officer’s vehicle. . . . [W]e conclude as a matter of law
that a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would believe that he was
restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. . . . Defendant was
in Miranda custody.”).
[¶10.] Those latter cases, which took the handcuffs into account along
with the other circumstances, are consistent with the approach taken by
several other courts that have addressed the question. Those courts have
explicitly determined that the use of restraints is not determinative. In
Dixon v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 398, 399 (Va. 2005), law enforcement
responded to a motor vehicle accident and detained a suspect at the scene of
the accident. After the suspect was handcuffed, an officer placed the suspect
in the front passenger seat of the officer’s patrol car and locked the door. Id.The officer told the suspect he was not under arrest but was being detained
for investigative purposes. Id. After verification of the suspects name and
birth date, the officer began questioning the suspect about the accident. Id.The Virginia Supreme Court determined that under those circumstances, “a
reasonable person in [the suspect’s] position would have understood that his
freedom was being restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.
at 401. The court explained:
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Our conclusion in this regard is influenced most strongly by the
combined factors of [the suspect] being restrained in handcuffs
and being locked in a police patrol car. While the presence of
either of these factors, in the absence of the other, may not
result in a curtailment of freedom ordinarily associated with a
formal arrest, the presence of both factors compels the
conclusion that a reasonable person subjected to both restraints
would conclude that he was in police custody.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized “that
the use of handcuffs does not in all cases render a suspect in custody for Miranda
purposes.” State v. Martin, 816 N.W.2d 270, 280 (Wis. 2012). The Ninth Circuit
has determined the same. See United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir.
1981) (citing United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1976))
(“Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody.”).
[¶11.] Handcuffs certainly restricted Hopkins’ ability to move during Officer
Wagner’s simultaneous pat-down and questioning, but the United States Supreme
Court has also explained that “[d]etermining whether an individual’s freedom of
movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the
last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of
Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S. Ct. at 1189. And the Supreme Court’s
expression of relevant factors to consider includes “the presence or absence of
physical restraints during the questioning[,]” which indicates that handcuffs are not
dispositive. See id. Accordingly, we continue to use our previously expressed test
and simply take the handcuffs into consideration when examining the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the questioning.
[¶12.] Hopkins was not subject to a custodial interrogation. The
encounter took place immediately outside of a gas station, in a public area.
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Officer Wagner was the only law enforcement officer present during the
encounter. When she placed Hopkins in handcuffs, she informed him that he
was not under arrest and that she was securing him for her safety. He
indicated that he understood. She testified that Hopkins was in handcuffs
for probably three minutes during which she frisked him and placed him in
the back of her patrol car while she ran a check on his driver’s license. There
is no indication how long it took her to frisk him, but it would have been less
than those three minutes. It was during that brief frisk that she asked him
general questions about his driving and drinking because she had smelled
alcohol. At that point in time and under these circumstances, we conclude
that a reasonable person would have understood that the detention would be
temporary and brief as the officer checked for weapons to ensure her safety.
[¶13.] Officer Wagner did eventually place Hopkins in her locked
patrol car while he was still handcuffed. However, we need not determine
whether the additional factor of being in the patrol car would amount to
custody in this case. It does not appear that Officer Wagner asked Hopkins
any questions or that he made any statements while she verified his identity
and ran a check on his driver’s license. After the check was complete, she
released him from the handcuffs and asked that he perform field sobriety
tests. Hopkins does not appear to dispute that at that point in time she had
the authority to perform those tests.
[¶14.] Because Hopkins’ constitutional rights were not violated in this
case, we need not address his remaining suppression of evidence argument.
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Conclusion
[¶15.] The totality of circumstances surrounding the encounter between
Hopkins and Officer Wagner did not amount to a custodial interrogation.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by denying his motion to suppress any
incriminating statements made during the encounter. We affirm.
[¶16.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and ZINTER, WILBUR and KERN,
Justices, concur.
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