William J. McCorkle v. Commissioner , 124 T.C. No. 5 ( 2005 )

124 T.C. No. 5UNITED STATES TAX COURT
WILLIAM J. MCCORKLE, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 1433-03L. Filed February 24, 2005.
R’s Appeals Office determined that R was warranted
in filing a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL) against P
with respect to his 1996 Federal income tax liability.
P assigns error on the grounds that R erroneously
refunded his $2 million remittance for 1996 to the U.S.
Marshals Service pursuant to a forfeiture order issued
under 18 U.S.C. sec. 982 (2000) by the District Court
in an unrelated, non-tax criminal case. R and P have
both moved for summary judgment.
1. Held: R was dutybound to comply with the
forfeiture order, which is not subject to collateral
attack in this court.
2. Held, further, R had no duty to defend against
the forfeiture order.
3. Held, further, the Appeals Office did not err
in determining that R was warranted in filing the NFTL;
therefore, R’s motion for summary judgment will be
granted and P’s will be denied.
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William J. McCorkle, pro se.
Pamela L. Mable, for respondent.
OPINION
HALPERN, Judge: This case is before the Court to review a
determination made by respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals) that
respondent was warranted in filing a notice of Federal tax lien
(the notice of Federal tax lien or NFTL) against petitioner with
respect to his Federal income tax liability for 1996 (1996 tax
liability). We review that determination pursuant to sections
6320(c) and 6330(d)(1).1 Petitioner assigns error to Appeals’
determination on the grounds that Appeals erred in determining
that a $2 million remittance made by petitioner to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) on or about May 16, 1997 (the $2 million
remittance), did not satisfy the 1996 tax liability. Appeals
determined that the $2 million remittance did not satisfy the
1996 tax liability because that amount had been refunded to the
U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service) pursuant to an order of
the court in a non-tax criminal case involving petitioner. The
order specified that the $2 million was subject to criminal
forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 982 (2000). There being
little dispute as to the underlying facts, the parties have each
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and all Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
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moved for summary judgment (together, the motions).
Rule 121 provides for summary judgment. Summary judgment
may be granted with respect to all or any part of the legal
issues in controversy "if the pleadings, answers to
interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and any other
acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a
decision may be rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(a) and
(b).
We are satisfied that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of
law. For the reasons that follow, we shall grant respondent’s
motion for summary judgment and deny petitioner’s.
Background
Introduction
We draw the following facts from the pleadings, requests for
admissions (together with any objections or responses thereto),
the motions, memoranda in support of the motions, responses to
the motions, other documents filed with the Court, and reports of
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerning criminal
proceedings involving petitioner and others; viz United States v.
McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003), and United States v.
Venske, 296 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). Principally, we rely on
the Statement of the Facts contained in respondent’s Memorandum
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of Authorities in Support of Respondent’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. Respondent describes the facts so stated as being
undisputed, and it appears that petitioner agrees.2 For purposes
of disposing of the motions, we find the following facts to be
true.3
Residence
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner was an inmate
at the Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia.
The $2 Million Remittance
Petitioner failed to file an income tax return for 1996,
although he requested (the request) and received an extension of
time, until August 15, 1997, to do so. No payment of tax
accompanied the request, and the request recites that no income
tax is owed for 1996. When, subsequently, petitioner made the $2
million remittance (on or about May 16, 1997), he indicated that
it was for his 1996 tax year, and respondent applied it to
petitioner’s account for 1996. The $2 million remittance was not
accompanied by a tax return. Petitioner made the $2 million
2
In Petitioner’s Response in Opposition to Respondent’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Petitioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, petitioner describes respondent’s
statement of facts as being merely incomplete: “Not all of the
undisputed facts are set forth in Respondent’s Memorandum of
authorities”.
3
All dollar amounts have been rounded to the nearest
dollar.
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remittance on or about May 9, 1997, shortly after Federal agents
had seized petitioner’s property and documents.
The Criminal Case
Petitioner was one of several defendants in the multicount
criminal case styled United States v. McCorkle, Criminal Docket
No. 98-CR-52-All (M.D. Fla.) (sometimes, the criminal case). On
March 19, 1998, a superseding indictment was brought against
petitioner (among others), which included numerous counts
involving fraud and money laundering. The money-laundering
counts were brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. secs. 1956 and 1957,
and the superseding indictment charged that petitioner had
laundered and conspired to launder telemarketing fraud proceeds
from July 26, 1996, through July 2, 1997.
The superseding indictment also contained a forfeiture count
alleging that any proceeds that petitioner obtained from fraud
and money laundering were forfeitable to the United States
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 982(a)(1). Petitioner and his wife
had deposited $7 million in laundered proceeds into the Royal
Bank of Canada Trust Company, in the Cayman Islands. Of that $7
million, $2 million was used to make the $2 million remittance,
and $2 million was transferred to a legal trust fund established
to pay the legal fees of petitioner’s (and his wife’s) criminal
defense attorneys, including F. Lee Bailey, which $2 million was
later transferred by Mr. Bailey to himself and others.
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On November 4, 1998, a jury convicted petitioner (among
others) of executing a telemarketing scheme in violation of 18
U.S.C. secs. 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud), of
conspiring to launder the proceeds of the scheme in violation of
18 U.S.C. sec. 1956(h), and of laundering those proceeds in
violation of 18 U.S.C. secs. 1956(a)(2)(B) and 1957(a). On
November 5, 1998, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida (the District Court) submitted the criminal
forfeiture count to the jury, which returned a special verdict
finding that certain real and personal property, including
numerous bank accounts, was subject to forfeiture. As part of
its determination, the jury concluded that, because it was
traceable to petitioner’s criminal acts, the $2 million
remittance was subject to forfeiture. The jury also concluded
that the $2 million petitioner had transferred to the legal trust
fund established to pay his criminal attorneys, including Mr.
Bailey, was forfeitable, since it was also traceable to
petitioner’s criminal acts. On December 16, 1998, pursuant to
the jury’s determination on the forfeiture count, the District
Court entered a forfeiture order (the forfeiture order),
requiring forfeiture of, among other things, the $2 million
remittance.
Petitioner was sentenced on January 25, 1999. Petitioner
appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals for
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the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the conviction but vacated
petitioner’s sentence and remanded the case to the District Court
for resentencing. See United States v. Venske, 296 F.3d 1284(11th Cir. 2002).4 The Court of Appeals left intact the
forfeiture aspects of the case. United States v. McCorkle, 321
F.3d at 1294 n.1.
Pursuant to the forfeiture order, on or about February 1,
1999, the Marshals Service sought to recover from respondent the
$2 million remittance. On or about February 18, 1999, respondent
complied with the forfeiture order and returned $2 million to the
Marshals Service by making a manual refund and issuing a check
made payable to the Marshals Service (the refund).
Respondent’s Examination
In 1999, after petitioner’s conviction for the offenses
described above, respondent commenced an examination of
petitioner’s Federal income tax liability for 1996. That
examination resulted in the issuance of a notice of deficiency
for 1996, determining a deficiency in tax of $905,315 and various
additions to tax and penalties. Petitioner did not petition the
Tax Court with respect to the notice of deficiency. On October
4
After remand, the District Court conducted another
sentencing hearing on Sept. 11, 2003, and made certain findings.
The District Court then adopted and imposed its original sentence
against petitioner. Petitioner has appealed his resentencing to
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which appeal is
pending.
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9, 2000, respondent assessed an income tax deficiency of
$905,315, an estimated tax penalty of $48,186, a miscellaneous
penalty of $656,353, a failure to pay penalty of $9,053, and
interest of $234,073.
Notice of Federal Tax Lien
On or about April 18, 2002, respondent filed the notice of
Federal tax lien with the County Comptroller of Orange County,
Florida, showing “Unpaid Balance of Assessment” for 1996 in the
amount of $1,852,980. On April 24, 2002, respondent issued to
petitioner Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and
Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. 6320.
Collection Due Process Hearing
On May 3, 2002, petitioner timely requested a hearing under
section 6320 (collection due process hearing). In that request,
petitioner opposed the filing of the NFTL and noted the $2
million remittance, which, he argued, had satisfied his 1996 tax
liability. Because petitioner was incarcerated, the Appeals
Office accorded petitioner the collection due process hearing by
way of an exchange of correspondence. During the course of the
hearing, a settlement officer conducting the hearing for the
Appeals Office learned of the forfeiture order and respondent’s
disposition of the $2 million remittance.
On January 10, 2003, the Appeals Office sent to petitioner a
Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under
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Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination) denying
petitioner any relief. The notice of determination contained a
summary of the Appeals Office’s determination, which was further
detailed in an attachment authored by the settlement officer. In
support of sustaining the filing of the NFTL, the settlement
officer determined that the $2 million remittance had been
subject to a criminal forfeiture proceeding and that petitioner
was not entitled to rely on those funds to satisfy the 1996 tax
liability. The settlement officer also determined that the
filing of the NFTL was appropriate and no circumstances existed
to either release or withdraw it. He further determined that
petitioner had admitted to his inability to pay the liability,
but petitioner had failed to request any collection alternatives
or to provide any information from which collection alternatives
could be considered. The settlement officer sustained the filing
of the NFTL.
The Amended Petition
Petitioner filed a petition and an amended petition. In the
amended petition, petitioner states that, for 1996: “[He] paid
$2,000,000.00 estimated tax payment to the IRS, but never did
actually file a return.” He adds: “The Department of the
Treasury in a manual refund check refunded this $2,000,000.00 to
the U.S. Marshall’s service pursuant to a court order for
forfeiture.” He claims: “This refund based upon the court order
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of forfeiture is in error.” He explains: “At the time of
payment of the $2,000,000.00[,] no forfeiture order was in place
by the U.S. Courts.” Therefore, he concludes, no tax lien is
appropriate, since, once he paid his tax for 1996, the IRS was
without authority to “unpay” it and demand that he pay it again.
Discussion
I. Law
A. Collection Procedure
Section 6321 imposes a lien for unpaid Federal taxes.
Section 6323 provides that the lien imposed by section 6321 is
not valid against certain persons until notice of the lien (the
NFTL) is filed in accordance with rules provided. Section
6320(a) provides that, after the Commissioner has filed the NFTL,
the Commissioner must notify the taxpayer of the fact of the
filing and, among other things, the taxpayer’s right to request a
hearing. If the taxpayer requests a hearing, the hearing is to
be conducted by Appeals, and the Appeals officer conducting the
hearing must verify that the requirements of any applicable law
or administrative procedure have been met. Secs. 6320(c),
6330(c)(1). The taxpayer requesting the hearing may raise “any
relevant issue” relating to the unpaid tax or the Commissioner’s
collection action. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer “may also
raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the
underlying tax liability” if the taxpayer did not receive any
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statutory notice of deficiency for, or did not otherwise have an
opportunity to dispute, such tax liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).
Following the hearing, the Appeals officer must determine
whether the collection action is to proceed, taking into account
the verification the Appeals officer has made, the issues raised
by the taxpayer at the hearing, and whether the collection action
“balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the
legitimate concern of the * * * [taxpayer] that any collection
action be no more intrusive than necessary.” Sec. 6330(c)(3)(C).
We have jurisdiction to review such determinations where we have
jurisdiction over the type of tax involved in the case. Sec.
6330(d)(1)(A); see Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287, 290
(2004). Where the underlying tax liability is properly at issue,
the taxpayer is entitled to a de novo hearing in this court.
E.g., Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). Where
the underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, we review
the determination for abuse of discretion. Id. at 182. When
faced with questions of law, as we are here (determining whether
petitioner may challenge the forfeiture order and whether
respondent was obligated to defend against it), the standard of
review makes no difference. Whether characterized as a review
for abuse of discretion or as a consideration "de novo" (of a
question of law), we must reject erroneous views of the law. See
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Abrams v.
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Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that it is
not inconsistent with the discretion standard for an appellate
court to decline to honor a purported exercise of discretion
which was infected by an error of law); Swanson v. Commissioner,
121 T.C. 111, 119 (2003).
B. Criminal Forfeiture
Title 18 U.S.C. sec. 982, is entitled “Criminal forfeiture”,
and it governs forfeiture in cases involving convictions for
money laundering. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. sec. 982(a)(1)
provides:
Sec. 982 Criminal Forfeiture.
(a)(1) The court, in imposing sentence on a person
convicted of an offense in violation of * * * [18
U.S.C. secs. 1956 or 1957] shall order that the person
forfeit to the United States any property, real or
personal, involved in such offense, or any property
traceable to such property.
The seizure of property forfeited under 18 U.S.C. sec.
982(a)(1) and any judicial proceeding relating to the forfeiture
are governed by 21 U.S.C. sec. 853 (2000) (except subsection (d)
thereof). 18 U.S.C. sec. 982(b)(1). Title 21, U.S.C. sec.
853(c), addresses third party transfers and provides as follows:
Sec. 853(c). Third party transfers.
All right, title, and interest in property
described in * * * [18 U.S.C. sec. 982] vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture under * * * [18 U.S.C. sec. 982].
Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a
person other than the defendant may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be
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ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the
transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to
subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of
purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that
the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section.
Title 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(n)(1), provides that, following the
entry of an order of forfeiture, the United States shall give
notice of the order, and section 853(n)(2) thereof provides that
any person, “other than the defendant”, asserting a legal
interest in the property ordered to be forfeited, has 30 days to
petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of
his alleged interest. Following the District Court’s disposition
of any petitions filed under 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(n)(2), or, if
none are filed, after the close of the period for filing such
petitions, 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(n)(7) provides “the United States
shall have clear title to property that is the subject of the
order of forfeiture and may warrant good title to any subsequent
purchaser or transferee.”
II. Arguments of the Parties
The essence of petitioner’s argument is that he satisfied
the 1996 tax liability with the $2 million remittance before he
forfeited to the United States his ownership rights in the
laundered funds (the source of the $2 million remittance).
Petitioner believes that the rights of the United States under
the forfeiture statute did not ripen until (1) he was convicted,
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(2) the jury rendered a special verdict of forfeiture, and (3)
the District Court entered the forfeiture order. Moreover,
petitioner argues that, since respondent was a bona fide
purchaser for value reasonably without cause to believe the $2
million remittance was subject to forfeiture, he could have
defended against the forfeiture order and, because he failed to
do so, should be barred from trying to collect the 1996 tax
liability.
Respondent counters that, on account of his criminal
conviction, petitioner cannot challenge the validity of the
forfeiture order or respondent’s compliance with it. Respondent
also argues that, since, at the time he received notice of the
forfeiture order, he had not assessed petitioner’s 1996 income
tax liability, he had no standing to make a claim as a bona fide
purchaser for value.
III. Analysis
A. Introduction
The jury in the criminal case returned a special verdict of
forfeiture with respect to the $2 million remittance. In
returning the special verdict, the jury necessarily found that
petitioner had transferred $2 million of laundered proceeds to
the IRS. Cf. United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d at 1294 n.2.
Thereafter, the District Court entered the forfeiture order, the
United States presumably notified respondent of the order, and,
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since respondent failed to petition the court for a hearing to
adjudicate his rights in the laundered proceeds, the United
States gained clear title to the $2 million remittance, which the
Marshals Service collected. See 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(1),
(2), (7). The forfeiture order has neither been vacated by the
District Court, nor has the court’s decision to issue it been
reversed. Therefore, respondent, like this court, must respect
it. Moreover, respondent had no duty to challenge it.
B. Petitioner Cannot Challenge the Forfeiture Order
Petitioner errs in his understanding of that portion of 21
U.S.C. sec. 853(c) that embodies what is known as the “relation-
back doctrine”, according to which title of the United States to
forfeited property “relates back” to the time of commission of
the illegal act underlying the forfeiture. In pertinent part, 21
U.S.C. sec. 853(c) provides: “All right, title, and interest in
[the forfeited] property * * * vests in the United States upon
the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture”. Contrary
to petitioner’s belief, therefore, the date on which the District
Court orders the forfeiture is not the date on which the rights
of the United States arise. It is true that, until the order of
forfeiture is entered, the United States has no right to seize
the forfeited property, see 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(g), but, upon
entry of the order, the forfeiture relates back to the date of
the criminal act giving rise to the forfeiture. See, e.g.,
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Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989).
Neither petitioner’s nor our understanding of 21 U.S.C. sec.
853(c) is of moment, however, since we, as well as respondent,
must respect the forfeiture order and have no warrant to reject
it. The rule is clear: “[I]t is for the court of first instance
to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until
its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by
itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are
to be respected.” Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313
(1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
When, on or about February 18, 1999, respondent complied
with the forfeiture order, the order had neither been vacated nor
had the decision to issue it been reversed. Barring his
challenging the order under 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c), respondent was
dutybound to comply. Since he did not challenge it, and was
under no obligation to do so (see infra), he committed no error
in complying with the order. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit vacated petitioner’s sentence and
remanded the case for resentencing but left the forfeiture order
intact, and the forfeiture order is not subject to collateral
attack in this court. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, supra. We
fail to see how Appeals abused its discretion in determining not
to give petitioner credit for funds received from petitioner (the
$2 million remittance) that respondent was forced to disgorge to
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the Marshals Service pursuant to an order that he was bound to
obey.
C. Respondent’s Failure To Defend Against the Forfeiture
Order
Petitioner concedes that respondent failed to defend against
the forfeiture order pursuant to a hearing authorized by 21
U.S.C. sec. 853(n)(2). Nevertheless, petitioner argues that,
when respondent received the $2 million remittance, respondent
was reasonably without cause to believe that the remittance was
subject to forfeiture. Therefore, petitioner continues, since
the remittance was received in payment of petitioner’s tax debt,
respondent could have successfully defended against the
forfeiture order as a bona fide purchaser for value. See 21
U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(6)(B).5 Because respondent remained
silent when he could have spoken up, petitioner argues that
respondent should be barred from collecting the 1996 tax
liability (in petitioner’s words, “a second time”). Respondent
answers that he could not have defended against the forfeiture
order since, when he received notice of it, he was without
standing to make a claim as a third party with a legal interest
5
We note that this argument implicitly acknowledges the
relation-back doctrine, since it assumes a transfer of property
to a third party after ownership of the property vests in the
United States. See 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c).
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in the $2 million remittance.6
We need not decide whether respondent had standing to make a
claim pursuant to 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(6)(B). Neither need
we decide whether a person receiving a payment in discharge of a
liability qualifies as a “purchaser” within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. sec. 853(c), (n)(6)(B).7 We need not decide those
questions because, even if we were to answer both questions in
the affirmative, petitioner cannot show that respondent was
6
Respondent claims that, in order for a tax debt to arise
to permit him to have any rights against the taxpayer and the
taxpayer’s property, he must first make an assessment of the tax
and then make a demand for payment. In support of that claim,
respondent points to secs. 6201 through 6203, 6321, 6322; secs.
301.6201-1 and 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.; and Capuano v.
United States, 955 F.2d 1427, 1432 (11th Cir. 1992). Here,
respondent states, assessment and demand followed by more than a
year his compliance with the forfeiture order. Petitioner’s
position is that, pursuant to sec. 6151, his tax debt for 1996
arose on Apr. 15, 1997, when payment thereof was due.
7
It is not settled whether, in using the term “bona fide
purchaser for value” in 21 U.S.C. secs. 853(c) and (n)(6)(B)
(emphasis added), Congress intended the term “purchaser” to
operate as a limitation on the class of persons that, having
engaged in arm’s-length transactions with the defendant, is
entitled to protection of its interests. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit has determined that Congress did not
intend such a limitation. United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d
200, 208 (4th Cir. 1987) (“If the term ‘purchaser’ were so
construed, a car dealer who sold a car to a later convicted
defendant without knowledge of the potential forfeitability of
the defendant's assets could have the payment he received for the
car forfeited while a person who purchased otherwise forfeitable
stock from the defendant would be protected.”). Other Courts of
Appeals have not interpreted 21 U.S.C. sec. 853(c)(6)(B) so
liberally. See, e.g., United States v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg), S.A., 46 F.3d 1185, 1191-1192 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We
shall await an appropriate opportunity to address the issue.
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obligated to defend against the forfeiture order, and he has
failed to show the elements necessary to raise successfully
equitable estoppel as a defense to respondent’s efforts to
collect the 1996 tax liability.
Title 21, U.S.C. sec. 853(n)(2), provides that any person,
“other than the defendant,” asserting a legal interest in
property that has been ordered forfeited “may” petition the
District Court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his
alleged interest in the property. A third party, therefore, has
a right, not a duty, to petition the District Court,8 and it is
his interest, not the defendant’s, that is to be determined.
Indeed, the defendant has no interest in the forfeited property
and is prohibited even from petitioning the court. Petitioner
has failed to suggest any other statutory provision that would
obligate respondent to defend against the forfeiture order and
makes no claim that respondent was under a contractual obligation
to do so. Therefore, we find that respondent had no duty to
defend against the forfeiture order.
Equitable estoppel is a judicial doctrine that precludes a
party from denying that party’s own acts or representations that
induce another to act to his or her detriment. E.g., Graff v.
8
Nor has the Internal Revenue Service a duty to collect a
tax assessment from specific property in which it has a lien
rather than permitting the property to be forfeited. Raulerson
v. United States, 786 F.2d 1090, 1092-1093 (11th Cir. 1986).
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Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 761 (1980), affd. 673 F.2d 784 (5th
Cir. 1982). It is to be applied against the Commissioner only
with utmost caution and restraint. E.g., Hofstetter v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 695, 700 (1992). The essential elements of
estoppel are: (1) There must be a false representation or
wrongful misleading silence; (2) the error must be in a statement
of fact and not in an opinion or a statement of law; (3) the
person claiming the benefits of estoppel must be ignorant of the
true facts; and (4) he must be adversely affected by the acts or
statements of the person against whom estoppel is claimed. E.g.,
Estate of Emerson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 612, 617-618 (1977);
see also Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999).
“Where an allegation of estoppel raises factual questions on
which reasonable minds might disagree, the questions must be
resolved at trial by the trier of fact. * * * However, where
the facts are not in dispute or are beyond dispute, the existence
of estoppel is a question of law.” J.C. Wyckoff & Associates v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1493 (6th Cir. 1991). See
generally 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, sec. 188 (2000).
Since there is no dispute here as to the relevant facts, we treat
petitioner’s claim of estoppel as raising only a question of law,
which we may dispose of with only brief discussion.
Respondent made no false statement to petitioner, nor did
respondent’s silence (if we can call his failure to petition
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silence) mislead petitioner. Moreover, petitioner was not
ignorant of the forfeiture order, and petitioner has failed to
show that respondent had any duty to assist petitioner in
mitigating his losses with respect to his criminal offenses.
These are critical defects in petitioner’s estoppel defense.
Respondent’s failure to petition the District Court does not
bar him from collecting the 1996 tax liability.
IV. Conclusion
We have concluded that, to the extent petitioner’s claim
constitutes a collateral attack on the forfeiture order, it must
be denied, and, further, respondent is not barred from collecting
the 1996 tax liability on account of his failure to petition the
District Court. Appeals did not err in determining that
respondent was warranted in filing the notice of Federal tax
lien. Therefore, as stated, respondent, not petitioner, is
entitled to summary judgment in his favor.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order and
decision granting respondent’s
motion for summary judgment,
denying petitioner’s, and
deciding for respondent will
be entered.