Rhoeda Joy Tan Farolan v. Commissioner , 2018 T.C. Summary Opinion 28 ( 2018 )


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    T.C. Summary Opinion 2018-28
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    RHOEDA JOY TAN FAROLAN, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 26397-16S.                            Filed May 30, 2018.
    Rhoeda Joy Tan Farolan, pro se.
    Jason T. Scott and Michael Skeen, for respondent.
    SUMMARY OPINION
    LEYDEN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the
    provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the
    petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
    (continued...)
    -2-
    reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent
    for any other case.
    In a notice of deficiency dated September 19, 2016, the Internal Revenue
    Service (IRS)2 determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 2013 Federal income tax of
    $1,732. The issues for decision are whether petitioner is entitled to deductions for
    charitable contributions and unreimbursed employee expenses in excess of what
    respondent has allowed. The Court holds that petitioner is not entitled to
    additional charitable contributions deductions but is entitled to additional
    unreimbursed employee expense deductions.
    Background
    Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. Petitioner resided
    in California at the time she timely filed her petition.
    1
    (...continued)
    Revenue Code, as amended, in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references
    are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    2
    The Court uses the term “IRS” to refer to administrative actions taken
    outside of these proceedings. The Court uses the term “respondent” to refer to the
    Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who is the head of the IRS and is respondent
    in this case, and to refer to actions taken in connection with this case.
    -3-
    I.    Employment
    During 2013 petitioner was employed as a senior marketing
    communications specialist by a company in Milpitas, California, that
    manufactured semiconductor chips. In that position she was responsible for
    marketing, advertising, public relations, and internal and external company events,
    including trade shows. The company’s marketing efforts had grown over time and
    by 2000, the company produced or participated in 10 to 15 events per year.
    Petitioner’s responsibilities with respect to the events and trade shows
    required her to:
    1.     Own, plan, execute and manage large scale, high budget
    marketing programs including trade shows, employee,
    customer and partner events, industry events, sales training
    sessions, sports marketing and other corporate events.
    2.     Coordinate, produce and manage event branding, production of
    marketing materials, logistics, vendor negotiation, etc.
    3.     Partner with Product and Technical Marketing to develop
    strategic global marketing plans and impactful design and
    execution.
    4.     Develop, design and deliver comprehensive video
    communications campaign for events.
    5.     Lead pre-show planning meetings, internal show manuals and
    generate ideas for pre- and post-event marketing, coordinate
    logistics, calendars, budgets and post-show event reports.
    Petitioner’s job description stated that she might be required to work some
    evenings and weekends; that travel “may be up to 20%”; and that the purchase of
    -4-
    “formal and theme clothing” was anticipated for all trade shows, events, and
    evening functions. Petitioner’s other job-related expenses included travel; meals;
    and electric, phone, and internet services for working from home. The company
    did not have a reimbursement policy. Petitioner was not reimbursed for any
    expenses she paid as part of her employment.
    During 2013 the company participated in the following six trade shows:
    Trade show              Location             Date(s)
    Advanced Automotive        Pasadena, CA       Feb. 4-8, 2013
    Battery Conference
    (AABC)
    Applied Power              Long Beach, CA     Mar. 17-22, 2013
    Electronics
    Conference and
    Exposition (APEC)
    2013 Annual Creativity     San Jose, CA       Apr. 23, 2013
    in Electronics Awards
    (Electronics)
    Sensors Expo and           Rosemont, IL       June 3-6, 2013
    Conference
    (Sensors Expo)
    Battery Show North         Novi, MI           Sept. 15-19, 2013
    America (Battery
    Show)
    Energy Harvesting and      Santa Clara, CA    Nov. 18 and 21,
    Storage USA (EHS)                            2013
    -5-
    The company was an exhibitor at AABC, APEC, and EHS. Petitioner participated
    in at least three of these trade shows, which required overnight travel. She paid
    for hotels, taxis, baggage fees, and meals in connection with the trade shows she
    attended on the following dates: AABC from February 5 to 8, 2013; APEC from
    March 18 to 21, 2013; and the Battery Show from September 15 to 20, 2013.
    Petitioner also participated in several local holiday events for company employees
    in 2013 that were held within commuting distance and did not require overnight
    travel.
    Petitioner purchased clothing from Nordstrom, Bloomingdale’s, Banana
    Republic, Ann Taylor, J. Crew, and Old Navy to wear to the company events and
    trade shows. The clothing petitioner purchased, for which she provided proof of
    her expenses, consisted of blouses, shoes, sweaters, dresses, pants, activewear, and
    bracelets. None of the purchased clothing had a company logo.
    II.       Charitable Contributions
    During 2013 petitioner donated cash to various charitable organizations.
    She attended religious services at a Catholic church where she has been a
    parishioner since 1995 and made cash contributions to the collections at the
    religious services. As a parishioner petitioner used her personal automobile to
    drive to feed the homeless during Thanksgiving and to transport gifts from the
    -6-
    church for a Christmas giving-tree collection and other similar events throughout
    the year.
    III.   2013 Tax Return
    Petitioner timely filed her 2013 Federal income tax return. As relevant in
    this case petitioner claimed deductions on Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, for
    charitable contributions of $3,248 for gifts by cash or check and for miscellaneous
    itemized deductions totaling $21,878. Petitioner did not claim a deduction on the
    Schedule A for charitable contributions consisting of gifts other than by cash or
    check. The miscellaneous itemized deductions consisted of unreimbursed
    employee expenses of $21,628 and tax preparation fees of $250.
    Instead of attaching a Form 2106, Employee Business Expenses, to her 2013
    tax return, petitioner attached a statement reporting her unreimbursed employee
    expenses of $21,628 as follows: (1) $1,330 for cellular, electric, and internet
    services; (2) $2,924 for supplies and books; (3) $230 for postage; and (4) $17,144
    for “travel, entertainment, supplies, & etc.”.
    IV.    Notice of Deficiency
    The IRS examined petitioner’s 2013 tax return and subsequently issued the
    notice of deficiency. In the notice of deficiency, and as relevant, the IRS
    determined that petitioner had substantiated $2,562 of the claimed deduction for
    -7-
    charitable contributions but disallowed $686 of the claimed deduction because
    petitioner had not established that amount was a charitable contribution. The IRS
    also determined that petitioner had substantiated $11,010 of the claimed
    miscellaneous itemized deductions but had not substantiated $10,868 of the
    claimed deductions because petitioner had failed to establish that the expenses she
    paid were ordinary and necessary to her business as an employee.3
    Petitioner timely petitioned the Court for a redetermination of the
    deficiency. At trial the parties agreed that the disputed $686 of charitable
    contribution deductions consisted of cash contributions of $285 and out-of-pocket
    transportation expenses of $401 that petitioner asserted she had incurred during
    2013 in connection with her volunteer work as a parishioner of her church. The
    parties also agreed that the disputed $10,868 of unreimbursed employee expenses
    consisted of clothing costs of $8,524, dry cleaning expenses of $528, and meals
    and travel expenses of $1,816.
    3
    The notice of deficiency does not state, and at trial respondent did not
    argue, that petitioner failed to substantiate the tax preparation fees of $250.
    Nonetheless, petitioner submitted evidence to substantiate this expense. The
    Court therefore assumes that the allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions for
    2013 of $11,010 included the tax preparation fees of $250.
    -8-
    Discussion
    As we have observed in countless opinions, deductions are a matter of
    legislative grace, and a taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any
    claimed deduction. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
    503 U.S. 79
    ,
    84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 
    292 U.S. 435
    , 440 (1934). The
    taxpayer claiming a deduction on a Federal income tax return must demonstrate
    that the deduction is allowable pursuant to some statutory provision and must
    further substantiate that the expense to which the deduction relates has been paid
    or incurred. Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 
    65 T.C. 87
    , 89-90 (1975),
    aff’d per curiam, 
    540 F.2d 821
     (5th Cir. 1976); Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 
    43 T.C. 824
    , 831-832 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
    I.    Burden of Proof
    Generally, the Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency is presumed
    correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving it incorrect. See Rule
    142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 
    290 U.S. 111
    , 115 (1933). Under section 7491(a)(1),
    the burden of proof may shift to the Commissioner if the taxpayer produces
    credible evidence with respect to any relevant factual issue and meets other
    requirements.
    -9-
    At trial petitioner argued that the burden of proof had shifted to respondent
    under section 7491(a)(1). If the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with
    respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the proper tax liability, section
    7491(a)(1) places the burden of proof with respect to that issue on the
    Commissioner. See Rule 142(a)(2). “Credible evidence is the quality of evidence
    which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a
    decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted”. Higbee v.
    Commissioner, 
    116 T.C. 438
    , 442 (2001) (quoting H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 240
    (1998), 1998-
    3 C.B. 747
    , 994). Section 7491(a)(1) applies only if the taxpayer
    complies with substantiation requirements; maintains all required records; and
    cooperates with reasonable requests by the Commissioner for witnesses,
    information, documents, meetings, and interviews. Sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B).
    On the basis of the record, the Court concludes that petitioner has not established
    that she complied with the requirements of section 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B) and that
    therefore the burden has not shifted to respondent under section 7491(a)(1).
    II.   Charitable Contributions
    A taxpayer may deduct charitable contributions made during the taxable
    year. Sec. 170(a)(1). However, deductions for charitable contributions are
    allowed only if the taxpayer satisfies statutory and regulatory substantiation
    - 10 -
    requirements. See sec. 170(a)(1); sec. 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs. The required
    substantiation depends on the size of the contribution and on whether the
    contribution is a gift of cash or property.
    For separate contributions of less than $250 of cash or for the payment of
    unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the taxpayer’s rendering services to a
    charity, the taxpayer must substantiate each contribution with: (1) a bank record
    (i.e., canceled check); (2) written communication (i.e., receipt or letter) from the
    charitable organization showing the name of the organization, the date of the
    contribution, and the amount of the contribution; or (3) “other reliable written
    records” showing the name of the organization, the date of the contribution, and
    the amount of the contribution. Sec. 170(f)(17); Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 
    136 T.C. 515
    , 531 (2011); secs. 1.170A-1(g), 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.
    A.     Cash Contributions
    At trial petitioner argued that she was entitled to deduct $285 for the cash
    contributions she made to her church when she attended religious services in
    2013. Petitioner testified that “[e]very Sunday and other holy days of obligations I
    just contributed five dollars in cash”. Although petitioner appeared sincere in her
    testimony that she made these cash contributions to her church, the law requires
    more than sincere testimony to qualify for a charitable contribution deduction for
    - 11 -
    her cash contributions. See Oatman v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2017-17
    , at
    *15-*16. Petitioner did not seek verification of her cash contributions from her
    church and did not provide any bank record, written communication, or other
    reliable written record to corroborate her testimony. The Court holds she is not
    entitled to a charitable contribution deduction of $285 for her cash contributions.
    B.     Out-of-Pocket Transportation Expenses
    Petitioner also argued that the remaining disallowed deduction for
    charitable contributions, $401, was for out-of-pocket transportation expenses she
    incurred while driving as a volunteer for her church in 2013. A taxpayer may
    deduct unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the taxpayer’s rendering
    services to a charity, including out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily
    incurred in performing donated services. Sec. 1.170A-1(g), Income Tax. Regs.
    Petitioner testified that she estimated driving about 400 miles during 2013
    to feed the homeless during Thanksgiving and to transport gifts from her church.
    Petitioner did not provide a mileage log to substantiate any of the mileage
    expenses or any written communication or other reliable written record to show
    that she participated in these charitable activities for her church. Further, even if
    petitioner substantiated that she had driven 400 miles, her charitable contribution
    - 12 -
    deduction would be limited to $56 (400 miles at 14 cents per mile).4 Accordingly,
    the Court holds she is not entitled to a charitable contribution deduction of $401
    for out-of-pocket transportation expenses related to driving for her church.
    III.   Unreimbursed Employee Expenses
    A taxpayer may deduct ordinary and necessary expenses paid during the
    taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. Sec. 162(a). Generally, the
    performance of services as an employee constitutes a trade or business. Primuth v.
    Commissioner, 
    54 T.C. 374
    , 377 (1970). If as a condition of employment an
    employee is required to incur certain expenses, then the employee is entitled to
    deduct those expenses to the extent the expenses are not subject to reimbursement.
    See Fountain v. Commissioner, 
    59 T.C. 696
    , 708 (1973); Podems v.
    Commissioner, 
    24 T.C. 21
    , 22-23 (1955). On the other hand, section 262(a)
    generally disallows a deduction for personal, living, or family expenses.
    As a general rule, if the taxpayer provides sufficient evidence that she
    incurred a trade or business expense contemplated by section 162(a) but is unable
    to adequately substantiate the amount, the Court may estimate the amount and
    4
    Sec. 170(i) prescribes the standard rate of 14 cents per mile for purposes of
    computing the amount of a sec. 170(a) charitable contribution deduction for miles
    a taxpayer drives in connection with a charitable organization. See Rev. Proc.
    2010-51, sec. 5.01, 2010-
    51 I.R.B. 883
    , 885; Notice 2012-72, sec. 2, 2012-
    50 I.R.B. 673
    , 673.
    - 13 -
    allow a deduction to that extent. Cohan v. Commissioner, 
    39 F.2d 540
    , 543-544
    (2d Cir. 1930). But for certain kinds of business expenses section 274(d)
    overrides the Cohan rule, and these expenses, if otherwise allowable, are subject to
    strict substantiation rules. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C 823, 827 (1968),
    aff’d per curiam, 
    412 F.2d 201
     (2d Cir. 1969); sec. 1.274-5T(a), Temporary
    Income Tax Regs., 
    50 Fed. Reg. 46014
     (Nov. 6, 1985).
    With these fundamental principles of Federal income tax in mind, the Court
    considers petitioner’s claims to the various deductions in dispute.
    A.     Clothing Costs
    Petitioner deducted $8,524 for clothing she asserted her employer required
    her to wear to the trade shows and to company events. Generally, the cost of a
    business wardrobe, even if required as a condition of employment, is considered a
    nondeductible personal expense within the meaning of section 262. See, e.g.,
    Hynes v. Commissioner, 
    74 T.C. 1266
    , 1290 (1980). Those costs are not
    deductible even when it has been shown that the particular clothes would not have
    been purchased but for the employment. 
    Id.
     Clothing costs are deductible as
    ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162 only if a taxpayer
    proves that: “(1) the clothing is of a type specifically required as a condition of
    employment, (2) it is not adaptable to general usage as ordinary clothing, and (3) it
    - 14 -
    is not so worn.” Pevsner v. Commissioner, 
    628 F.2d 467
    , 469 (5th Cir. 1980),
    rev’g 
    T.C. Memo. 1979-311
    ; see Yeomans v. Commissioner, 
    30 T.C. 757
    , 767
    (1958); Deihl v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2005-287
    , 
    2005 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 285
    , at *74-*76.
    Petitioner was required to wear “formal and theme clothing” to the trade
    shows and company events, and the company did not reimburse her for it. For
    instance, petitioner testified that in 2013 her employer hosted an extravagant
    company event with an Oscars-inspired theme for which she purchased a gown.
    She asserted she could not wear the gown to other events because it was tailored to
    this event. Petitioner further testified that because she was the face of the
    company in a predominantly male-dominated industry her clothing and
    presentation mattered because others’ first impressions were shaped by her
    appearance. According to petitioner, the clothing she purchased could not be and
    was not worn outside of the trade shows and company events, not even to go to
    work on an ordinary day.
    Even assuming the Court accepts petitioner’s testimony that she did not in
    fact use the clothing for general or personal wear, the record does not support her
    assertion that the clothing was not adaptable to general usage. The parties
    stipulated receipts and statements from Nordstrom, Bloomingdale’s, Banana
    - 15 -
    Republic, Ann Taylor, J. Crew, and Old Navy. The receipts and descriptions
    indicate the clothing purchased consisted of blouses, shoes, sweaters, dresses,
    pants, activewear, and bracelets. This clothing and the accessories are in fact
    adaptable to general use as ordinary clothing by petitioner outside of her
    employment. See Hynes v. Commissioner, 
    74 T.C. at 1269
    , 1291 (finding that the
    cost of “regular business clothing * * * limited to colors and patterns which would
    televise well” was not deductible); Bernardo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-
    199, 
    2004 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 204
    , at *22-*23 (finding that a requirement that a
    taxpayer’s business wardrobe consist of suits or dresses of a particular color (black
    or white) did not indicate that the clothes were unsuitable for ordinary street
    wear). Accordingly, petitioner has not established she is entitled to deduct $8,524
    for clothing costs for 2013.
    B.     Dry Cleaning Expenses
    Petitioner deducted $528 for dry cleaning expenses. If the cost of acquiring
    clothing is deductible, then the cost of maintaining that clothing is likewise
    deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. Hynes v.
    Commissioner, 
    74 T.C. at 1290
    . Having found that the cost of the clothing is not a
    deductible business expense, the Court holds that the dry cleaning expenses are
    likewise not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses for 2013.
    - 16 -
    C.     Travel Expenses
    Petitioner deducted $1,816 for travel expenses she incurred traveling to and
    from the trade shows at which she represented her employer. Deductions for
    traveling expenses are allowed if the expenses are ordinary and necessary and paid
    or incurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business, including
    the business of being an employee. See sec. 162(a)(2); Mitchell v. Commissioner,
    
    74 T.C. 578
    , 581 (1980). Travel expenses include travel fares, lodging, meals, and
    expenses incident to travel. Sec. 1.162-2(a), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.274-
    5T(b)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 
    50 Fed. Reg. 46014
    -46015 (Nov. 6,
    1985).
    Deductions for travel expenses (including meals and lodging while away
    from home) are subject to the strict substantiation rules of section 274(d). Sec.
    274(d)(1); sec. 1.274-5T(a)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. Specifically,
    to be entitled to deduct travel expenses a taxpayer must substantiate by adequate
    - 17 -
    records5 or by other sufficient evidence6 corroborating the taxpayer’s own
    testimony: (1) the amount of the expense, (2) the dates of departure and return and
    the number of days spent away from home on business, (3) the destination or
    locality of travel, and (4) the business reason for the travel. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(2),
    Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.
    The record shows that petitioner’s tax home was the company’s office in
    Milpitas, California, and that petitioner traveled away from home for three trade
    shows: AABC, APEC, and the Battery Show.
    The record contains stipulated receipts for hotel, baggage fee, taxi, and meal
    expenses in the following amounts:
    5
    Substantiation by adequate records for travel expenses requires the
    taxpayer to maintain an account book, a diary, a log, a statement of expense, trip
    sheets, or a similar record prepared contemporaneously with the expenditure and
    documentary evidence (e.g., receipts or bills) of certain expenditures. Sec. 1.274-
    5(c)(2)(iii), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2), Temporary Income Tax Regs.,
    
    50 Fed. Reg. 46017
     (Nov. 6, 1985).
    6
    Substantiation by other sufficient evidence requires the production of
    corroborative evidence in support of the taxpayer’s statement specifically detailing
    the required elements. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 
    50 Fed. Reg. 46020
     (Nov. 6, 1985).
    - 18 -
    Trade show      Hotel       Taxi      Baggage fee      Food
    AABC           $662.51     $119.63         -0-         $24.89
    APEC            653.78       86.00         -0-          87.83
    Battery Show       -0-       -0-          $50           44.59
    Petitioner has met her burden of proving that she paid hotel, baggage, and
    taxi expenses totaling $782.14 for AABC, $739.78 for APEC, and $50 for the
    Battery Show. Petitioner has also proven that she paid for meals totaling $24.89
    for AABC, $87.83 for APEC, and $44.59 for the Battery Show. Therefore,
    petitioner is entitled to deduct these travel expenses subject to the 2% limitation
    under section 67(a) after the 50% limitation under section 274(n)(1) for meal
    expenses.
    Petitioner did not provide any evidence to substantiate her travel expenses
    with respect to the Sensors Expo or EHS. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to
    deduct travel expenses with respect to these two trade shows.
    D.      Other Expenses
    Petitioner also submitted receipts to substantiate other meal expenses
    relating to meals that she: (1) asserted were connected with entertaining the
    company’s clients either during the trade shows or at other times or (2) consumed
    - 19 -
    when she was not traveling away from home overnight or that were unrelated to
    entertaining clients.
    With respect to meals paid to entertain clients, a taxpayer must provide
    records sufficient to establish: (1) the amount paid for each meal, (2) the date of
    the meal, (3) the name and address of the dining establishment, (4) the business
    purpose of the meal, including the nature of any business discussion, and (5) the
    business relationship of the person entertained by the taxpayer. See sec. 274(d);
    Stroff v. Commissioner, 
    T.C. Memo. 2011-80
    , 
    2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 79
    , at
    *4-*5; sec. 1.274-5T(b)(3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 
    50 Fed. Reg. 46015
    (Nov. 6, 1985).
    Petitioner introduced into evidence meal receipts with handwritten notations
    referencing a trade show or other event and the last names of individuals. To the
    extent these receipts are from meals with clients, the receipts petitioner provided
    do not meet the fourth or fifth requirement (i.e., they do not explain the business
    purpose or the business relationship of the person entertained). Therefore, none of
    the meal expenses connected with entertaining clients are deductible.
    With respect to the other meal receipts petitioner provided that were not
    paid while traveling away from home or to entertain clients (i.e., for meals she
    - 20 -
    consumed during the course of her employment), the Court holds that these
    expenses are personal and are not deductible. See sec. 262(a).
    The record also contains stipulated receipts for tolls, parking fees, public
    transportation fees, and other hotel expenses paid in 2013. Petitioner has not
    proven that any of these expenses were related to travel away from home in
    connection with her employment or that they are otherwise deductible as ordinary
    and necessary business expenses. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a
    deduction for these expenses.
    The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments, and, to the extent not
    addressed herein, the Court concludes that they are moot, irrelevant, or without
    merit.
    To reflect the foregoing,
    Decision will be entered
    under Rule 155.