Carl William Cosio v. Commissioner , 2020 T.C. Memo. 90 ( 2020 )


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  •                                T.C. Memo. 2020-90
    UNITED STATES TAX COURT
    CARL WILLIAM COSIO, Petitioner v.
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
    Docket No. 23623-17L.                         Filed June 18, 2020.
    Carl William Cosio, pro se.
    A. Gary Begun and Randall B. Childs, for respondent.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    VASQUEZ, Judge: In this collection due process (CDP) case, petitioner
    seeks review, pursuant to section 6330(d)(1),1 of the determination by the Internal
    1
    Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
    Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax
    Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
    -2-
    [*2] Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) to proceed with collection of his unpaid
    Federal income tax liabilities for 2012 and 2015.2 The matter is before the Court
    on respondent’s motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Rule 121, to
    which petitioner objects. We will deny the motion.
    Background
    The following facts are based on the parties’ motion papers and
    attachments, including the administrative record from the IRS Appeals Office
    (Appeals). See Rule 121(b). These facts are stated solely for the purpose of
    disposing of the motion and not as findings of fact in this case. See Rule 1(b);
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Cook v. Commissioner, 
    115 T.C. 15
    , 16 (2000), aff’d, 
    269 F.3d 854
    (7th Cir. 2001). Petitioner resided in Florida when he timely filed his
    petition.
    2
    On May 11, 2018, respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
    jurisdiction with respect to tax year 2012, to which petitioner objected. Therein
    respondent argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to review the decision letter
    issued on October 12, 2017, on petitioner’s equivalent hearing. On May 15, 2018,
    the Court ordered petitioner to file any objection to respondent’s motion.
    Petitioner did not file an objection to respondent’s motion. On July 10, 2018, the
    Court granted respondent’s motion and dismissed petitioner’s case as to tax year
    2012 for lack of jurisdiction.
    -3-
    [*3] I.         Respondent’s Collection Efforts
    On November 15, 2016, petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for
    2015 that was not accompanied by a payment. On December 26, 2016,
    respondent, as to 2015, assessed tax of $34,179 and credited petitioner for tax
    withholding payments of $785. Respondent also assessed a section 6651(a)(1)
    addition to tax of $7,513, a section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax of $1,502, and
    interest of $1,156. On April 7, 2017, respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Levy
    and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (notice of levy), with respect to petitioner’s
    2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2015 tax years.3 Upon receipt of the
    notice of levy, petitioner submitted a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due
    Process or Equivalent Hearing, requesting a CDP hearing for tax years 2006
    through 2015.4 On the Form 12153 petitioner checked the “Installment
    3
    The notice of levy in the record does not reference petitioner’s tax liability
    with respect to 2012. We infer from the administrative record that petitioner
    received a separate notice of levy as to that year.
    4
    We lack jurisdiction to review respondent’s collection activities for tax
    years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014 because the petition
    commencing this case does not seek to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction to review
    any determination as to those years. See Orum v. Commissioner, 
    123 T.C. 1
    , 8
    (2004) (stating that the Court’s jurisdiction under sec. 6330 depends upon the
    issuance of a valid determination letter and the filing of a timely petition
    requesting review of the determination in the letter), aff’d, 
    412 F.3d 819
    (7th Cir.
    2005).
    -4-
    [*4] Agreement”, “Offer in Compromise”, and “I Cannot Pay Balance” boxes as
    collection alternatives. Under the “Other” section of the form, petitioner stated he
    had inherited cash from his brother and alleged that afterwards a broker had used
    the cash to buy and sell securities without his consent. For this reason, petitioner
    argued that he was not liable for the tax assessed.5 Petitioner did not check the
    box indicating he was interested in an equivalent hearing.
    After petitioner submitted his CDP request, Appeals sent him several letters.
    One informed him that he was not entitled to a CDP hearing or an equivalent
    hearing6 for tax years 2006 through 2009 because his request was untimely as to
    those years.7 Another informed him that his request for a CDP hearing was
    5
    Respondent concedes that petitioner’s statement in his CDP request is a
    challenge to his underlying tax liability for 2015.
    6
    An equivalent hearing resembles a CDP hearing in that it is held with the
    IRS Appeals Office, the settlement officer (SO) considers the same issues that
    would have been considered at a CDP hearing, and the SO generally follows the
    same procedures. See Craig v. Commissioner, 
    119 T.C. 252
    , 258-259 (2002). The
    chief differences are that the SO’s decision following an equivalent hearing is
    embodied in a “decision letter” as opposed to a “notice of determination” and that
    a decision set forth in the former document, unlike a determination set forth in the
    latter document, is not subject to judicial review.
    Id. 7 The
    record does not specify respondent’s basis for concluding that
    petitioner’s CDP request was untimely with respect to tax years 2006 through
    2009. In any event, we lack jurisdiction to review respondent’s collection activity
    for those years. See supra note 4.
    -5-
    [*5] untimely with respect to tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Appeals invited
    petitioner to request an equivalent hearing for 2012 by submitting a new Form
    12153 within 15 days. Petitioner failed to do so. Nonetheless, Appeals
    subsequently sent petitioner a letter granting him an equivalent hearing for 2012
    but not for 2010 or 2011.
    Appeals also issued petitioner a letter with respect to his tax liability for
    2015. For this tax year Appeals acknowledged timely receipt of the CDP request
    and stated that it was forwarding his case to its New York office.
    II.   CDP and Equivalent Hearings
    Appeals assigned SO Josephine Stockli to review petitioner’s case. On July
    11, 2017, SO Stockli mailed petitioner a letter scheduling a telephone conference
    for August 16, 2017. According to SO Stockli’s notes in respondent’s case
    activity record, the scheduled telephone conference related to petitioner’s tax
    liabilities for 2012 and 2015. However, the July 11, 2017, letter refers only to
    petitioner’s equivalent hearing for 2012. The letter does not reference petitioner’s
    CDP hearing, and the administrative record contains no letter scheduling a hearing
    with respect to tax year 2015. In the July 11, 2017, letter SO Stockli indicated that
    -6-
    [*6] she attached to the letter a copy of petitioner’s account transcript for 2012,8
    Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-
    Employed Individuals, and Form 656, Offer in Compromise.
    On July 24, 2017, petitioner called SO Stockli. According to respondent’s
    case activity report, petitioner told SO Stockli that “he ha[d] an in person
    conference with IRS in September and want[ed] to pursue that.” SO Stockli asked
    petitioner for further explanation and told him that she would call his authorized
    representative, Ron Porat.9 SO Stockli also asked petitioner to complete and
    submit Form 433-A and to file amended returns for 2012 and 2015 if he thought
    his returns were incorrect. After her telephone conversation with petitioner, SO
    Stockli called Mr. Porat and left him a voicemail asking him to return her call, to
    which Mr. Porat did not respond.
    8
    The notice of determination issued October 12, 2017, states that SO
    Stockli attached to the July 11, 2017, letter copies of petitioner’s account
    transcripts for 2012 and 2015. However, in the July 11, 2017, letter, SO Stockli
    stated that she was attaching a copy of petitioner’s account transcript for 2012
    only. It is unclear from the record whether SO Stockli attached to the July 11,
    2017, letter a copy of petitioner’s account transcript for 2015.
    9
    Mr. Porat was petitioner’s authorized representative during the CDP
    proceedings. He did not represent petitioner in any of the proceedings before this
    Court.
    -7-
    [*7] On August 16, 2017, SO Stockli called Mr. Porat to hold the scheduled
    telephone conference. According to respondent’s case activity record, Mr. Porat
    did not answer SO Stockli’s call, and she left him another voicemail. Mr. Porat
    returned SO Stockli’s phone call on August 18, 2017, and left her a voicemail. On
    August 22, 2017, SO Stockli issued a letter to petitioner informing him that the
    scheduled telephone conference was not held because Mr. Porat was unavailable.
    SO Stockli informed petitioner that she had not received Form 656 and Form
    433-A from him. She gave him 14 additional days to submit any information that
    he wanted her to consider before making a determination. Like the previous letter,
    SO Stockli’s August 22, 2017, letter, references petitioner’s equivalent hearing for
    2012 only. The record contains no similar letter with respect to petitioner’s CDP
    hearing for 2015.
    On September 13, 2017, SO Stockli mailed petitioner a letter stating the
    following:
    This letter is our acknowledgement [sic] that we received your case
    for consideration in our Appeals Office. However, we realize that
    your circumstances may have changed since you requested an
    Appeals hearing due to the storms that affected certain areas within
    the state of Florida.
    SO Stockli ended the September 13, 2017, letter by adding the following:
    -8-
    [*8] Please contact us within 14 days of this letter to advise on how to
    proceed with your case. * * * If we do not hear from you we will
    make every attempt to contact you as quickly as possible and begin
    the consideration of your case.
    Unlike the previous letters, the September 13, 2017, letter references
    petitioner’s tax liabilities for 2012 and 2015. The letter does not mention any
    previous communications that occurred among petitioner, Mr. Porat, and SO
    Stockli between July 2017 and September 2017.
    Neither petitioner nor Mr. Porat made any further contact with SO Stockli.
    Subsequently, SO Stockli closed petitioner’s case and, on October 12, 2017,
    issued to petitioner a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s)
    Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination), sustaining the
    proposed collection action with respect to 2015. That same day SO Stockli issued
    to petitioner a Decision Letter on Equivalent Hearing Under Internal Revenue
    Code Sections 6320 and/or 6330 with respect to 2012. Petitioner filed the petition
    in this case within 30 days of receiving both documents.
    In the petition, petitioner argued that he was not given proper notice with
    respect to his CDP hearing for 2015 and that his July 24, 2017, telephone
    conversation with SO Stockli “led [him] to believe that [he] would receive further
    communication regarding the [CDP] hearing.”
    -9-
    [*9] III.    Proceedings Before the Court
    Before this case was calendared for trial, respondent filed a motion for
    summary judgment. Respondent contends that petitioner is precluded from
    challenging his underlying tax liability in this Court because petitioner failed to
    present any evidence to support his arguments even though he was offered the
    opportunity to do so during the CDP proceedings. Petitioner filed a timely
    response to respondent’s motion. Petitioner alleges that neither he nor his
    representative “got notice * * * of pho[ne] meeting with Mrs. Stockli.” The Court
    held a hearing on respondent’s motion in Tampa, Florida.
    Discussion
    I.     Jurisdiction
    The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we must first ascertain
    whether a case before us is one that Congress has authorized us to consider. Sec.
    7442; Estate of Young v. Commissioner, 
    81 T.C. 879
    , 881 (1983). In a CDP case
    such as this, our jurisdiction depends on the issuance of a notice of determination
    following a timely request for a CDP hearing and the filing of a timely petition for
    review. Sec. 6330(d)(1); Orum v. Commissioner, 
    123 T.C. 1
    , 8, 11-12 (2004),
    aff’d, 
    412 F.3d 819
    (7th Cir. 2005). Respondent issued a notice of determination
    to petitioner with respect to tax year 2015, and petitioner filed a timely petition.
    - 10 -
    [*10] Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review the notice of determination
    sustaining the proposed collection action for 2015.
    II.    Summary Judgment
    The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and avoid costly,
    time-consuming, and unnecessary trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 
    90 T.C. 678
    , 681 (1988). The Court may grant summary judgment when there is no
    genuine dispute as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter
    of law. Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 
    98 T.C. 518
    , 520 (1992),
    aff’d, 
    17 F.3d 965
    (7th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether to grant summary
    judgment, we construe factual materials and inferences drawn from them in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,
    
    98 T.C. 520
    . Upon careful review of the parties’ filings to date, and viewing the
    facts and the inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to petitioner
    as the nonmoving party, we conclude that there are genuine disputes of material
    fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment.
    III.   Collection Principles
    Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy upon property and property
    rights of a taxpayer liable for tax if the taxpayer fails to pay the tax within 10 days
    after notice and demand for payment is made. Section 6330(a) provides that no
    - 11 -
    [*11] levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless
    the Secretary has notified such person in writing of the right to a hearing before
    the levy is made.
    If a taxpayer requests a hearing in response to a notice of levy pursuant to
    section 6330, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer or employee of
    Appeals. Sec. 6330(b)(1), (3). At the hearing the taxpayer may raise any relevant
    issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy, including appropriate spousal
    defenses, challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and collection
    alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). A taxpayer is precluded from contesting the
    existence or amount of the underlying liability unless the taxpayer did not receive
    a notice of deficiency for the liability in question or did not otherwise have an
    opportunity to dispute the liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v.
    Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 604
    , 609 (2000).
    Following a hearing Appeals must determine whether proceeding with the
    proposed levy action is appropriate. In making that determination Appeals is
    required to take into consideration: (1) verification presented by the Secretary
    during the hearing process that the requirements of applicable law and
    administrative procedure have been met, (2) relevant issues raised by the taxpayer,
    and (3) whether the proposed levy action appropriately balances the need for the
    - 12 -
    [*12] efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer’s concerns regarding the
    intrusiveness of the proposed collection action. Sec. 6330(c)(3).
    IV.   Standard of Review and Analysis
    Section 6330(d)(1) grants this Court jurisdiction to review Appeals’
    determination in connection with a collection hearing. Where the validity of the
    underlying tax liability is properly at issue, we review the taxpayer’s liability de
    novo. See Sego v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 610
    ; Goza v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 176
    , 181-182 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability is not properly at
    issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner,
    
    114 T.C. 610
    ; Goza v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 182
    . The parties disagree as
    to whether petitioner’s underlying tax liability is at issue and, consequently, the
    appropriate standard of review.
    A taxpayer may challenge the underlying liability in a CDP hearing if he did
    not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to contest the
    underlying liability. See sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); see also Sego v. Commissioner, 
    114 T.C. 609
    . This Court considers a taxpayer’s challenge to his underlying liability
    in a collection action case only if he properly raised that challenge at his CDP
    hearing. See Giamelli v. Commissioner, 
    129 T.C. 107
    , 115-116 (2007); sec.
    301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, Proced. & Admin. Regs. An issue is not properly
    - 13 -
    [*13] raised at the CDP hearing if the taxpayer fails to request consideration of
    that issue by Appeals or if he requests consideration but fails to present any
    evidence after being given a reasonable opportunity to do so. Giamelli v.
    Commissioner, 
    129 T.C. 115-116
    ; sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, Proced. &
    Admin. Regs. The taxpayer must also raise the issue in his petition to this Court.
    Rule 331(b)(4) (“Any issue not raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed
    to be conceded.”).
    Petitioner did not receive a notice of deficiency, and the parties agree that
    petitioner was entitled to challenge his underlying tax liability in his CDP hearing.
    They disagree, however, as to whether petitioner properly raised the issue during
    his CDP hearing.
    Respondent concedes (and we agree) that petitioner requested consideration
    of his underlying tax liability in his CDP hearing request. See supra note 5.
    However, requesting consideration of an issue during a CDP proceeding is not
    enough to preserve the issue for judicial review. The taxpayer must also present
    Appeals with “evidence with respect to that issue after being given a reasonable
    opportunity” to do so. Sec. 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, Proced. & Admin. Regs.
    According to respondent, petitioner failed to clear this threshold hurdle. The
    narrative in the notice of determination supports respondent’s contention.
    - 14 -
    [*14] The notice of determination tells the following story. In the July 11, 2017,
    letter, SO Stockli provided notice of the scheduled telephone conference
    pertaining to petitioner’s CDP hearing for 2015 and equivalent hearing for 2012.
    She requested financial and other information in the letter and followed up with
    petitioner and Mr. Porat by telephone. On August 16, 2017, SO Stockli called Mr.
    Porat for the scheduled hearing, but he was not available. Mr. Porat did not return
    SO Stockli’s call even though she left him a detailed message. Thereafter, SO
    Stockli informed petitioner by letter that no one appeared for his hearing and gave
    him 14 additional days to forward any documentation that he wanted her to
    consider. Finally, on September 13, 2017, taking into account a natural disaster
    that had affected the State of Florida, SO Stockli sent a letter to petitioner giving
    him 14 additional days and a last chance to contact her. Neither petitioner nor his
    representative made any further contact with SO Stockli. Consequently, SO
    Stockli sustained the notice of levy.
    If we were to take this narrative at face value, it could establish that: (1) SO
    Stockli informed petitioner about the telephone CDP hearing scheduled for August
    16, 2017, and gave him several weeks to present evidence supporting his
    challenge to his underlying tax liability for 2015 and (2) petitioner failed to do so.
    Petitioner, however, disagrees with the facts as presented in the notice of
    - 15 -
    [*15] determination and alleges that he did not receive proper notice of the
    scheduling of his CDP hearing, which in turn deprived him of his right to present
    evidence on his behalf as to the subject matter thereof. Having reviewed
    petitioner’s response and the administrative record, we find there is a material
    dispute of fact as to whether petitioner received a reasonable opportunity to
    present his evidence pertaining to his tax liability for 2015.
    The administrative record confirms that on July 11, 2017, SO Stockli issued
    a letter to petitioner scheduling a telephone conference for August 16, 2017.
    However, the scheduling letter that SO Stockli sent to petitioner refers to
    petitioner’s equivalent hearing for 2012 only. The letter makes no mention of
    petitioner’s tax liability for 2015, and the record contains no similar letter
    scheduling a CDP hearing with respect to that year.
    The same can be said of SO Stockli’s letter to petitioner dated August 22,
    2017, which informs petitioner that the telephone conference scheduled for August
    16, 2017, was not held because his representative had not been available. In the
    letter SO Stockli advised petitioner to provide information (within 14 days from
    the date of the letter) that he wanted her to consider before she made a
    determination on his case. Once again, however, SO Stockli referenced
    petitioner’s 2012 tax year only and did not mention his CDP hearing for 2015.
    - 16 -
    [*16] The fact that the July 11 and August 22, 2017, letters do not mention
    petitioner’s CDP hearing for 2015 indicates that SO Stockli might not have
    scheduled petitioner’s CDP hearing with respect to 2015, or that (at the very least)
    she might not have given petitioner proper notice of any such scheduled CDP
    hearing. In any of these situations, SO Stockli might have abused her discretion
    by not giving petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence with
    respect to tax year 2015.
    SO Stockli’s September 13, 2017, letter further supports the inference that
    SO Stockli might not have given petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present his
    evidence. The administrative record confirms that in her September 13, 2017,
    letter, SO Stockli gave petitioner 14 days to inform Appeals if he had been
    affected by the severe storms in the State of Florida. However, in the letter, SO
    Stockli also stated that if she did not hear from petitioner she “would make every
    attempt to contact” him and “begin the consideration of * * * [his] case.”
    (Emphasis added.) The case activity report shows that after issuing the September
    13, 2017, letter, SO Stockli did not make any further attempt to contact petitioner
    or give him another opportunity to submit his evidence. Instead, she closed his
    case and sustained the notice of levy.
    - 17 -
    [*17] Other documents in the record suggest that petitioner was genuinely
    confused about the date of his CDP hearing. A few days after SO Stockli issued
    the July 11, 2017, letter to petitioner, he contacted her to tell her that he had an in-
    person conference scheduled for September with an IRS employee whose name
    and title are not specified in the record. Petitioner stated that he wanted to
    “pursue” that opportunity. Although the notice of determination states that SO
    Stockli informed petitioner that she did not see “any open cases for petitioner” for
    September, respondent’s case activity record states that SO Stockli only “asked
    * * * [petitioner for] further explanation and told him that she would call his
    representative”. This conversation raises questions as to whether SO Stockli had
    reason to know that petitioner was confused about the scheduling of his CDP
    hearing.10
    The notice of determination is inconsistent with the administrative record in
    another material respect. Although the notice of determination states that Mr.
    Porat did not return SO Stockli’s August 16, 2017, call, respondent’s case activity
    record shows that Mr. Porat returned her call a couple of days later and left her a
    10
    In his petition, petitioner alleges that the July 24, 2017, conversation with
    SO Stockli led him to believe that he was going to receive further communication
    about the scheduling of his CDP hearing.
    - 18 -
    [*18] voicemail. This discrepancy raises questions as to the correctness of the
    notice of determination.
    On the record before us, we find that there exists a question of disputed
    material fact as to whether SO Stockli abused her discretion by failing to provide
    petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present evidence with respect to tax year
    2015. We will accordingly deny respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
    To implement the foregoing,
    An appropriate order will be issued.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23623-17L

Citation Numbers: 2020 T.C. Memo. 90

Filed Date: 6/18/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/19/2020