United States v. Micha Eatman ( 2019 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 18‐2525
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff‐Appellee,
    v.
    MICHA EATMAN,
    Defendant‐Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 17 CR 00119 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 16, 2019 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2019
    Before BAUER, BRENNAN, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
    BAUER, Circuit Judge. After a heated argument with his
    girlfriend, Micha Eatman found himself pounding on her
    apartment door and yelling to be let inside. Chicago police
    officers arrived in response to a 911 call and, within moments,
    they frisked Eatman, seized a loaded handgun, and placed him
    in handcuffs. Officers then asked Eatman to produce the gun’s
    2                                                  No. 18‐2525
    registration. The officers also spoke to his girlfriend, who
    refused to sign a police complaint. They then took Eatman to
    the police station, where a background check revealed two
    prior felony convictions. Eatman was turned over to federal
    authorities and indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Eatman moved to suppress
    the gun, arguing that he was searched without reasonable
    suspicion of criminal activity and arrested without probable
    cause since, at the time he was handcuffed, the officers did not
    know that he possessed the gun unlawfully. The district court
    denied the motion, finding that the officers had reasonable
    suspicion when they found Eatman attempting to gain access
    to the apartment and that the officers arrested Eatman only
    after inquiring whether he had registration for the gun. Eatman
    entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal
    the denial of his motion to suppress.
    On appeal, Eatman concedes the police officers had
    reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk but argues he was
    arrested without probable cause when he was handcuffed and
    thus his felon status should be suppressed. Because we find the
    use of handcuffs on Eatman to be reasonable, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On August 19, 2016, at 5:09 a.m., the Chicago Police
    Department received a call from a security guard reporting a
    domestic disturbance at an apartment building located at
    6425 South Lowe Avenue in the Englewood neighborhood of
    Chicago. Just moments before, a tenant of the building called
    security to report that her boyfriend had hit her and was trying
    No. 18‐2525                                                    3
    to gain access to her apartment. The 911 call led to the dispatch
    of two Chicago Police units, each receiving this message:
    “security officer brooks states m/b mikah beat‐
    ing f/b trinidad 2 children in the apartment no
    drinking/no drugs cs possibly may have gun cs
    she is req. more than 1 unit. cs he may try to
    leave building,. nfi”
    The 911 call reported more specific information, for
    instance that there was likely a gun involved but a question as
    to whether Eatman or his girlfriend had the gun. The security
    guard did not say Eatman beat his girlfriend, but responded
    “yes” when the dispatcher asked if Eatman “touched” her.
    Both units received the message in their patrol cars’ computer
    system in the minutes prior to arrival.
    Four police officers entered the building and briefly spoke
    with security guards before being escorted to the 19th floor.
    According to the two officers who testified at the suppression
    hearing, the guard escorting them upstairs reiterated that
    Eatman may have a gun. As they exited the elevator, the
    security guard directed the officers towards the apartment; the
    four officers observed Eatman pounding on the door and
    yelling to be let inside.
    Once the officers approached Eatman, they told him to back
    away from the door and put his hands on the wall. Officer
    Alvarez frisked Eatman and found a loaded handgun tucked
    into his waistband. Alvarez placed the gun into his pocket and
    handcuffed Eatman with Officer Rangel’s assistance.
    4                                                  No. 18‐2525
    The exact timing of what transpired after Eatman’s hand‐
    cuffing is unclear, but otherwise the factual record is undis‐
    puted. Eatman’s girlfriend emerged from the apartment and
    spoke with the officers. According to the officers, she was more
    concerned about $300 that she wanted from Eatman; she
    ultimately refused to sign a criminal complaint against
    Eatman. The officers asked Eatman if he had a Firearm Owners
    Identification card or a conceal‐and‐carry license. Although
    neither Rangel nor Alvarez testified as to how Eatman re‐
    sponded, their interviews with the United States Attorneyʹs
    Office and the district court record show that Eatman claimed
    the gun was his girlfriendʹs and that he took it to keep the gun
    away from the children.
    The officers then transported Eatman to the police station,
    where a background check revealed his prior felony convic‐
    tions. Eatman was read his Miranda rights at 8:17 a.m. and then
    admitted to having knowingly possessed the gun. Eatman was
    turned over to federal authorities and charged with one count
    for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1).
    Eatman filed a motion to suppress the gun, arguing that the
    officers lacked reasonable suspicion to perform a frisk and they
    had arrested Eatman without probable cause when they
    handcuffed him without knowing whether he could lawfully
    possess the gun. At the suppression hearing, Officers Rangel
    and Alvarez both testified that they had experience with
    domestic disturbances and considered the apartment building
    to be located in a high‐crime area.
    No. 18‐2525                                                     5
    The district court denied the motion to suppress and wrote
    an order the next day. Having found the officers’ testimony
    to be credible, the court held that the officers had reasonable
    suspicion to frisk Eatman and handcuff him for security
    reasons and that, after asking Eatman for registration, they had
    probable cause to arrest him for possessing a firearm in
    violation of Illinois law. The district court added that the
    officers arguably had probable cause to arrest Eatman for other
    crimes as well, including disturbing the peace, the alleged
    domestic incident, and the alleged theft. Accordingly, the court
    denied the motion.
    II. DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Eatman does not dispute the district court’s
    determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
    conduct a frisk, but renews the argument that he was arrested
    upon being handcuffed and, at that moment, the officers
    lacked probable cause. Eatman argues that since his prior
    convictions were only discovered as a result of this illegal
    arrest, his felon status should be suppressed. In reviewing the
    district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review
    factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
    United States v. Stewart, 
    902 F.3d 664
    , 672 (7th Cir. 2018).
    The instant case and our affirmation of the district court’s
    ruling is best understood as part of the progeny of Glenna,
    which holds that police officers may use reasonable means to
    effectuate an investigatory stop, including but not limited to
    the use of handcuffs. United States v. Glenna, 
    878 F.2d 967
    (7th
    Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 
    3 F.3d 1088
    (7th Cir. 1993);
    United States v. Bullock, 
    632 F.3d 1004
    (7th Cir. 2011). After the
    6                                                     No. 18‐2525
    Supreme Court’s ruling in Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968),
    which recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth
    Amendment seizures of persons must be based on probable
    cause, the circuit courts have consistently authorized the use of
    handcuffs so long as their use was a “reasonably graduated
    response to the demands of the situation[.]” 
    Glenna, 878 F.2d at 972
    ; see United States v. Kapperman, 
    764 F.2d 786
    (11th Cir. 1985);
    United States v. Taylor, 
    716 F.2d 701
    (9th Cir. 1983). Specifically,
    “in evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop, we
    examine first whether the officers’ action was justified at its
    inception, and second, whether it was reasonably related in
    scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
    the first place.” 
    Glenna, 878 F.2d at 971
    . To the extent that
    Eatman argues that his handcuffing was necessarily an arrest,
    his argument goes against established precedent. Rabin v.
    Flynn, 
    725 F.3d 628
    , 635 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that, “given the
    safety risks at stake, it was reasonable under clearly established
    law for the officers to temporarily detain Rabin pending the
    verification of his gun carry license”).
    First, Eatman does not dispute the district court’s finding
    that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the
    investigatory Terry stop. As the district court determined,
    Eatman was found engaging in the exact conduct that the
    complaint alleged: “[t]he security officers directed the police
    officers to the location of the caller and when they arrived on
    the scene outside the exact apartment, they observed the exact
    behavior described to them and conveyed to them by both
    the dispatcher and the security officers.” The police officers
    received credible information that Eatman had just harmed his
    girlfriend and may have a gun. The district court judge found
    No. 18‐2525                                                      7
    “[the officers’] testimony was not impeached on cross examina‐
    tion and was credible.”
    Eatman’s argument relies on finding that his handcuffing
    was an arrest or de facto arrest and without probable cause
    since the officers only asked him about the Firearm Owner
    Identification card and conceal‐and‐carry license after the
    handcuffing. The parties and the district court agreed that
    probable cause turned on a question that the officers asked
    Eatman while he was undoubtedly in police custody. 
    Smith, 3 F.3d at 1097
    –98 (citing New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U.S. 649
    , 655
    (1984)). However, as in Glenna where police officers asked for
    consent to search a car for registration papers, this question
    alone is not a custodial interrogation since it is not designed to
    nor likely to elicit testimonial evidence. 
    Glenna, 878 F.2d at 972
    .
    The district court specifically found that the officers
    “searched and handcuffed [Eatman] based on the need to
    secure the situation and for the safety of all involved including
    the responding officers.” Eatman does not argue that this
    finding was clearly erroneous but instead asks this court to
    find that the use of handcuffs was unreasonable because his
    gun had already been seized, he had not acted violently
    toward the police, and because the four officers outnumbered
    him in the hallway while his girlfriend was locked inside the
    apartment. This request asks this court to substitute our
    judgment for the police officers’ legitimate concerns, a request
    we will not entertain.
    The dispatch to the police officers reported that Eatman had
    committed battery against his girlfriend, that he may have a
    gun, and that he could try to escape. Moreover, this informa‐
    8                                                     No. 18‐2525
    tion came from a security guard who explicitly requested two
    units. When the officers frisked Eatman, they found a gun that
    further corroborated the information they had received.
    Whether or not the officers had probable cause to arrest him
    for the battery or disturbing the peace, they had reason to
    believe he may be combative or try to escape. The officers
    decided the best way to control the volatile situation was to
    handcuff Eatman and remove him from the door so they could
    speak to the girlfriend. The officers’ experiences in conjunction
    with the information presented to them made the use of
    handcuffs reasonable in relation to the gravity of the situation.
    Upon handcuffing Eatman, they spoke to both him and his
    girlfriend in order to determine whether he committed any
    crime. Although the record is unclear as to the exact time the
    officers inquired about Eatman’s gun registration, the district
    court determined this occurred shortly after he was
    handcuffed. In this case, the district court properly determined
    that the use of handcuffs was not an arrest but rather a method
    to de‐escalate the situation and allow the officers to investigate.
    Finally, we agree with the district court that the officers
    likely had probable cause to arrest Eatman for either the
    domestic battery or disturbing the peace. This court’s prece‐
    dent suggests the officers had probable cause for the domestic
    battery based on the information provided by the security
    guards and the fact they found Eatman trying to enter the
    apartment. Sheik‐Abdi v. McClellan, 
    37 F.3d 1240
    (7th Cir. 1994)
    (holding officers had probable cause to arrest for domestic
    battery based on the report of a paramedic); United States v.
    Tilmon, 
    19 F.3d 1221
    (7th Cir. 1994) (holding officers had
    probable cause when the suspect matched the description of
    No. 18‐2525                                                     9
    the robber of a nearby bank). With regard to disturbing the
    peace, Eatman was found yelling and pounding on his girl‐
    friend’s apartment door in the early morning, which led his
    girlfriend to contact the security guards; therefore, the officers
    likely had probable cause to arrest him for that crime as well.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the district court did not err in its denial
    of Eatman’s motion to suppress when it decided that the
    officer’s decision to handcuff Eatman was a reasonable means
    to effectuate the investigatory stop. The judgment of the
    district court is AFFIRMED.