NLRB v. Amglo Kemlite Laboratories , 833 F.3d 824 ( 2016 )


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  •                                    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    Nos. 15-3695 & 15-1141
    AMGLO KEMLITE LABORATORIES, INC.,
    Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review and Cross-Application
    for Enforcement of a Decision and Order
    of the National Labor Relations Board.
    No. 13-CA-065271
    ____________________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 11, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 17, 2016
    ____________________
    Before BAUER and WILLIAMS, Circuit                        Judges,   and
    ADELMAN, District Judge. *
    WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Amglo Kemlite Laboratories
    makes specialty lights, such as those on airplane wings. Its
    *   Of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
    2                                         Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141
    employees in Illinois went on strike to protest low wages.
    The National Labor Relations Board found that Amglo un-
    lawfully retaliated by transferring some work from Illinois to
    a separate Amglo facility in Mexico. The Board issued a re-
    medial order. In this case, the Board asks us to enforce its
    order and Amglo asks us to set it aside. Because the order
    has a reasonable basis in law and is supported by substantial
    evidence, we enforce it.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Strike and Response
    On September 19, 2011, Amglo’s President, Izabella
    Christian, visited Amglo’s Illinois facility. Before her visit,
    several employees had complained to her—and to the Illi-
    nois plant manager, Anna Czajkowska—about low wages.
    During the visit, a supervisor reminded Christian about the
    employees’ complaints, but she responded that Amglo
    would not raise wages.
    The next morning, nearly all of the plant’s 94 employees
    went on strike. Christian and Czajkowska arrived shortly
    after the strike began, told employees that Amglo would not
    raise wages, and directed employees to return to work or go
    home. The employees asked to speak to Amglo’s owner, Jim
    Hyland, but Christian responded that Hyland was not as
    “pro-Polish” as he used to be. (Nearly all of the employees
    were of Polish descent.) Czajkowska said: “I’ll tell you what
    he’s going to say. He will tell us to get rid of half of you. And
    you’re not going to do anything. You’re not going to scare
    him. You’re not going to threaten him. You’re going to lose.”
    Czajkowska held resignation forms in her hand and told
    employees that if they did not like their wages, they could
    Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141                                        3
    quit. Christian discussed globalization and explained that
    companies can move production to China and Mexico (two
    places where Amglo had plants). The employees made a
    written demand for guaranteed annual raises and for back-
    pay since their last raise. They got no response.
    Employees arrived at the plant at 5:00 a.m. the next
    morning and continued striking. Two hours later, Christian
    and Czajkowska arrived and ordered employees to return to
    work or get off the company’s property. Choosing the second
    option, employees reassembled on public property and con-
    tinued their strike—but not for long. Over the next week,
    several employees returned to work, with no raise.
    On September 27, all of the employees who remained on
    strike—more than 50 people—signed an unconditional offer
    to return to work without a raise. Christian said that she
    could not give them a timeline for recalls, nor could she say
    how many of them would be recalled, because Amglo was
    transferring some work from Illinois to Mexico “because of
    the situation.” By September 30, Amglo had recalled all but
    22 employees. A month later, Amglo sent those 22 people a
    letter stating that, in part because of the transfer of work to
    Mexico, there were no jobs available. The letter informed the
    employees that, if a job opened up, they would be recalled
    before any new employee was hired. As of February 2012,
    none of the 22 had been recalled.
    B. Administrative Proceedings
    The National Labor Relations Board includes a General
    Counsel, who is responsible for investigating and prosecut-
    ing unfair labor practices. It also includes a “Board,” which
    is a quasi-judicial body that decides such cases. The General
    4                                               Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141
    Counsel is independent of the Board. See generally
    https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are. Here, after an investiga-
    tion, the General Counsel charged Amglo with unfair labor
    practices.
    An Administrative Law Judge held a hearing and issued
    findings and conclusions, which were appealed to the Board.
    The Board concluded that Amglo engaged in unfair labor
    practices by: (1) threatening to fire employees for striking,
    and (2) transferring work from Illinois to Mexico in retalia-
    tion for the strike. The Board ordered Amglo to avoid taking
    such actions in the future, to return the transferred work to
    Illinois, to offer full reinstatement to any employee who lost
    his or her job as a result of the transfer, and to make employ-
    ees whole for earnings and benefits lost as a result of the
    transfer.
    The Board asks us to enforce its order, and Amglo asks us
    to set it aside. 1
    II. ANALYSIS
    The National Labor Relations Act gives employees “the
    right to … engage in … concerted activities for the purpose
    of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
    29 U.S.C. § 157. It constitutes an “unfair labor practice” for
    an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
    1  Amglo’s challenge concerns only the transfer of work from Illinois
    to Mexico. Amglo did not challenge the finding that it threatened to fire
    workers for striking. So we summarily affirm the findings and remedial
    orders on that issue. See NLRB v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 
    1 F.3d 550
    , 567
    (7th Cir. 1993) (summarily affirming uncontested violations); NLRB v.
    P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 
    923 F.2d 506
    , 516 (7th Cir. 1991) (defenses waived
    if not raised in opening brief).
    Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141                                          5
    in the exercise of” that right. 
    Id. § 158(a)(1).
    The Board is
    empowered to find the existence of an unfair labor practice,
    and to issue remedial orders. 
    Id. §§ 160(a),
    (c); see also Con-
    temporary Cars, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    814 F.3d 859
    , 868 (7th Cir. 2016).
    We have jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or set aside the
    Board’s order. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f).
    Amglo does not challenge the Board’s finding that the
    strike was protected activity under the Act. So our review is
    only of the Board’s conclusion that Amglo violated the Act
    by transferring work from Illinois to Mexico for the unlawful
    purpose of retaliating against striking employees. See NLRB
    v. Washington Aluminum Co., 
    370 U.S. 9
    , 14–17 (1962) (em-
    ployer cannot “punish a man by discharging him for engag-
    ing in concerted activities which § 7 of the Act protects”); St.
    Regis Paper Co., 
    247 N.L.R.B. 745
    , 745 (1980) (transferring work
    can constitute retaliation); Westpoint Transp., Inc., 
    222 N.L.R.B. 345
    , 352 (1976) (same). “We apply a deferential standard of
    review to the Board’s findings, looking only to see whether
    they are supported by substantial evidence. This means such
    relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support the conclusions of the Board. Our task is
    not to reweigh the evidence; it is only to determine whether
    there is evidence in the record supporting the Board’s out-
    come that could satisfy a reasonable fact finder.” AutoNation
    v. NLRB, 
    801 F.3d 767
    , 771 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal citations
    and quotation marks omitted). “We review the Board’s ap-
    plications of the law to the facts and its interpretations of the
    Act deferentially as well, taking care to ensure that its legal
    conclusions have a reasonable basis in law.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    6                                        Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141
    Amglo acknowledges that it transferred some work from
    Illinois to Mexico. Its purpose was unlawful if animus to-
    ward the employees, because of the strike, was a “motivating
    factor” for its action. See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. NLRB,
    
    965 F.2d 523
    , 526 (7th Cir. 1992); Wright Line, Inc., 
    251 N.L.R.B. 1083
    , 1089 (1980). Finding that to be the case, the Board re-
    lied on the following:
    •   Christian’s discussion of globalization implicitly
    warned employees that if they continued striking,
    Amglo would transfer work to a foreign facility.
    •   Amglo showed hostility to the strike, including by
    threatening to fire half of the employees on the
    first day.
    •   Christian told striking employees that Amglo was
    moving work to Mexico “because of the situation.”
    •   During the General Counsel’s investigation, Czaj-
    kowska admitted that Amglo “accelerated” exist-
    ing plans to transfer work “because of the strike.”
    •   The timing of the transfer, so soon after the strike
    began, was suspicious.
    Also, in a separate section of its opinion, the Board noted
    that Amglo had increased its workforce, from 85 to 94 em-
    ployees, in the nine months prior to the strike—which un-
    dercuts Amglo’s argument that the post-strike reduction was
    for economic reasons. We are satisfied that substantial evi-
    dence supports the Board’s finding that the strike was a mo-
    tivating factor in Amglo’s transfer of some work to Mexico.
    Amglo argues that the Board’s order cannot be enforced
    because the General Counsel failed to prove the extent of the
    Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141                                           7
    unlawful transfer, meaning exactly how much work was
    transferred to Mexico and how many employees were affect-
    ed. But that is not required at this stage. As Amglo acknowl-
    edges in its reply brief, the Board employs a “judicially ap-
    proved bifurcation procedure” in which a first proceeding
    determines whether an employer engaged in an unfair labor
    practice, and a second proceeding determines the precise
    contours of an appropriate remedy. See NLRB v. Trident Sea-
    foods Co., 
    642 F.2d 1148
    , 1150 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Sure-Tan,
    Inc. v. NLRB, 
    467 U.S. 883
    , 902 (1984) (approving Board’s bi-
    furcated procedures); NLRB v. Katz’s Delicatessen of Houston
    Street, Inc., 
    80 F.3d 755
    , 771 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding employer’s
    challenge premature because compliance proceeding had
    not yet occurred).
    So the initial proceeding must show the existence of a vio-
    lation, while the extent may be proved at the second stage.
    But there is a nuance to that rule. It must be shown in the
    first proceeding that the violation is not de minimis. Chal-
    lenge-Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 
    295 N.L.R.B. 435
    , 438 (1989). In
    Challenge-Cook Brothers, the Board found that the employer’s
    transfer of work to another plant violated the Act, and the
    Board ordered backpay. Challenge-Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 
    282 N.L.R.B. 21
    , 22 (1986). The Sixth Circuit enforced that order.
    NLRB v. Challenge-Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 
    843 F.2d 230
    (6th
    Cir. 1988). In the subsequent compliance proceeding, “the
    quantity of work that was transferred and the number of
    employees affected thereby [remained to] be determined.”
    Challenge-Cook Bros. of Ohio, 
    Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. at 435
    . But the
    Board refused to let the employer argue that no employees
    were affected, because that would amount to relitigating the
    existence of a violation. 
    Id. at 438.
    8                                       Nos. 15-3695, 15-1141
    Amglo argued that the amount of work transferred was
    “miniscule.” To the extent this was an argument that no em-
    ployees were adversely affected, the argument needed to be
    addressed in the Board’s first proceeding. And it was. In re-
    jecting the view that minimal work was transferred, the
    Board relied on the following evidence:
    •   Amglo told a significant fraction of its employ-
    ees—22 out of 94—that they could not return to
    work in part because of the transfer of work to
    Mexico.
    •   When more than 50 employees offered to return to
    work without a raise, Christian could not give
    them a timeline or say how many would be re-
    hired, because of the transfer of work to Mexico.
    Amglo points to different evidence to argue that the
    transfer was minimal. But “[t]he presence of contrary evi-
    dence does not compel us to reverse the Board’s order as
    long as there is also substantial evidence supporting it.” Con-
    temporary 
    Cars, 814 F.3d at 868
    –69. Because the Board relied
    on “such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might ac-
    cept as adequate to support the conclusions of the Board,”
    
    AutoNation, 801 F.3d at 771
    , our review is complete.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We DENY Amglo’s petition for review and ENFORCE the
    Board’s order.