Kristie M. Smith v. State of Tennessee ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                         08/23/2018
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs June 26, 2018
    KRISTIE M. SMITH v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 100561 G. Scott Green, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2017-02344-CCA-R3-PC
    ___________________________________
    The Petitioner, Kristie M. Smith, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief,
    alleging the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction
    relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
    WILLIAMS and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.
    J. Liddell Kirk, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kristie M. Smith.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant
    Attorney General; Charme Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha M. Fitzgerald,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    On April 29, 2008, the Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, for which
    she received a life sentence. See State v. Kristie M. Smith, No. E2010-00549-CCA-R3-
    CD, 
    2011 WL 5517646
    , at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2011), perm. app. denied
    (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2014). In her motion for new trial, the Petitioner alleged, among other
    things, ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied her motion for new trial
    and found that the Petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective. The Petitioner appealed
    and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Kristie M. Smith, 
    2011 WL 5517646
    , at *16. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on
    November 7, 2012, and an amended petition through appointed counsel on July 5, 2013,
    alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective for failure to file a Rule 11 application
    with the Tennessee Supreme Court and that the Petitioner’s trial was “tainted by
    structural error due to in-court and out-of-court misbehavior by the trial court judge[.]”
    The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner a delayed Rule 11 application which was
    subsequently denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Kristie M. Smith, 
    2011 WL 5517646
    .
    Post-Conviction Hearing. At the November 15, 2017 post-conviction hearing,
    the State presented its motion for summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction
    relief and argued that the Petitioner’s issues had been waived or previously litigated.
    Both parties agreed that the Petitioner’s original petition for post-conviction relief was
    timely filed and that “partial relief” was granted to the Petitioner through the delayed
    Rule 11 application. The Petitioner conceded that the ineffective assistance of counsel
    issue was previously litigated during “a pretty extensive hearing” on the Petitioner’s
    motion for new trial and again on direct appeal.
    The Petitioner also conceded that “[a] structural error is not going to be supported
    based on the out-of-court conduct of the trial court judge” when the record does not
    reflect that the out-of-court misconduct affected the trial. See State v. Letalvis Cobbins,
    No. E2013-00476-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2014 WL 4536564
    , at *13 (Tenn. Sept. 12, 2014).
    However, the Petitioner maintained that the trial judge’s “in-court misbehavior”
    constituted a due process violation and prejudiced her at trial. Specifically, the Petitioner
    asserted that the trial judge “was dozing off, took unnecessary recesses, [and] was
    inattentive” and that the Petitioner was prejudiced because:
    [I]f the [trial judge] was not during the course of the trial in a condition to
    be attentive to the evidence, that the [trial judge] wouldn’t be in a position
    to knowingly and competently exercise the thirteenth juror evaluation of the
    evidence in the case and, also, the rulings the [trial judge] made with regard
    to evidentiary issues.
    The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner was afforded a “full and fair”
    hearing, that she was permitted to file a delayed Rule 11 application, and that the rest of
    her claims had been waived or previously determined. The post-conviction court granted
    the State’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. It is
    from this order that the Petitioner now appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, the Petitioner argues that her original trial was prejudiced by the trial
    court’s “in-court misconduct.”1 She specifically contends that this issue was not waived
    1
    Although other issues were raised by the Petitioner in her petition for post-conviction relief,
    none of them are argued in her brief on appeal. Accordingly, those issues are waived.
    -2-
    or previously determined. The State responds that the post-conviction court properly
    dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because “any due process objection could
    have been [raised] during the motion for new trial proceedings” and the Petitioner waived
    her claim by failing to object or raise this issue in prior proceedings. Upon our review,
    we agree with the State.
    In reaching our conclusion, we are guided by the following well-established law
    pertaining to post-conviction relief. Post-conviction relief is only warranted when a
    petitioner establishes that his or her conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of
    an abridgment of a constitutional right. T.C.A. § 40-30-103. The Tennessee Supreme
    Court has held:
    A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless
    the evidence preponderates otherwise. When reviewing factual issues, the
    appellate court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence; moreover,
    factual questions involving the credibility of witnesses or the weight of
    their testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve. The appellate
    court’s review of a legal issue, or of a mixed question of law or fact such as
    a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, is de novo with no presumption
    of correctness.
    Vaughn v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 106
    , 115 (Tenn. 2006) (internal citations and quotation
    marks omitted); see Felts v. State, 
    354 S.W.3d 266
    , 276 (Tenn. 2011); Frazier v. State,
    
    303 S.W.3d 674
    , 679 (Tenn. 2010). A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of
    proving the factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f);
    Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 8(D)(1); Dellinger v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 282
    , 293-94 (Tenn.
    2009). Evidence is considered clear and convincing when there is no serious or
    substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from it. Lane v. State, 
    316 S.W.3d 555
    , 562 (Tenn. 2010); Grindstaff v. State, 
    297 S.W.3d 208
    , 216 (Tenn. 2009);
    Hicks v. State, 
    983 S.W.2d 240
    , 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
    The Post-Conviction Procedure Act states that a petition for post-conviction relief
    “must contain a clear and specific statement of all grounds upon which relief is sought,
    including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds.” T.C.A. § 40-30-106(d).
    Bare allegations that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law
    will not be sufficient to warrant further proceedings. See 
    id. Furthermore, the
    petitioner’s “[f]ailure to state a factual basis for the grounds alleged shall result in
    immediate dismissal of the petition.” 
    Id. Tennessee Code
    Annotated section 40-30-
    106(g) explains when a Petitioner’s claims have been waived:
    -3-
    (g) A ground for relief is waived if the petitioner personally or through an
    attorney failed to present it for determination in any proceeding before a
    court of competent jurisdiction in which the ground could have been
    presented unless:
    (1) The claim for relief is based upon a constitutional right
    not recognized as existing at the time of trial if either the
    federal or state constitution requires retroactive application of
    that right; or
    (2) The failure to present the ground was the result of state
    action in violation of the federal or state constitution.
    T.C.A. § 40-30-105(g). Furthermore, issues that have been “previously determined” may
    not be re-litigated in a post-conviction procedure. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(f). A ground
    for relief has been previously determined when “a court of competent jurisdiction has
    ruled on the merits after a full and fair hearing.” See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h). “A full and
    fair hearing has occurred where the petitioner is afforded the opportunity to call witnesses
    and otherwise present evidence, regardless of whether the petitioner actually introduced
    any evidence.” Id.; see Miller v. State, 
    54 S.W.3d 743
    , 747-48 (Tenn. 2001) (holding
    that the issue raised and resolved in the petitioner’s direct appeal “cannot be revisited in
    this post-conviction proceeding.”).
    Here, the Petitioner argues that she was prejudiced by the trial judge’s “in-court
    misconduct” and that the trial judge was unable to act in his capacity as the thirteenth
    juror due to his out-of-court drug use. The State responds that the trial judge’s in-court
    actions would have been visible to the Petitioner and her counsel during trial and any
    resulting due process violations could have been raised in the Petitioner’s motion for new
    trial or on direct appeal. By failing to object or raise these issues on previous appeal, the
    State asserts that the Petitioner has now waived this issue. In its order denying the
    petition for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court cited the Tennessee Supreme
    Court’s holding that “any structural error due to an alleged infirmity of the trial judge in
    [the Petitioner]’s case does encompass the judge’s conduct apart from the trial.” See
    State v. Davidson, 
    509 S.W.3d 156
    (Tenn. 2016). Furthermore, the post-conviction court
    concluded that any in-court misconduct by the trial court could have been previously
    litigated.
    Upon review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the
    Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. The record reflects that the Petitioner was
    permitted to file her Rule 11 application for review of this court’s decision and the
    Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application. See State v. Kristie M.
    -4-
    Smith, No. E2010-00549-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2011 WL 5517646
    , at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    Nov. 14, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2014). The Petitioner failed to argue
    this issue in her Rule 11 application and thus waived it on appeal. Accordingly, the
    Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing reasoning and analysis, the judgment of the post-
    conviction court is affirmed.
    ____________________________________
    CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE
    -5-