State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Stewart ( 2016 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    March 22, 2016 Session
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROGER DALE STEWART
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hawkins County
    No. 13CR81     John F. Dugger, Jr., Judge
    No. E2015-00820-CCA-R3-CD – Filed October 18, 2016
    _____________________________
    The defendant, Roger Dale Stewart, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent
    homicide, a Class E felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies.
    On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the
    trial court erred when it refused to provide a requested jury instruction; that his
    convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy and the Due Process Clause; and
    that the trial court erred by imposing a two-year sentence to be served in confinement.
    Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which TIMOTHY L.
    EASTER, J., joined. NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part
    and dissenting in part.
    William E. Phillips and William E. Phillips, II, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the Appellant,
    Roger Dale Stewart.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel;
    Dan Armstrong, District Attorney General; and Lindsey Lane, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    This case arose after a fatal car wreck. At trial, the State‟s theory was that the
    defendant was driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic in the slow lane of the
    highway in an attempt to reach the automobile dealership where he worked.
    Mr. Jerry Hughes testified that on the date of the wreck, his family had a birthday
    lunch for his mother, Ms. Thelma Hughes. After they left the restaurant, Mr. Hughes was
    driving his mother‟s car, a 1990 Plymouth. Mr. Hughes‟s mother and nephew were also
    in the car. Mr. Hughes was driving on Highway 11W, and he was traveling at fifty to
    fifty-five miles per hour in the right hand lane. As he was driving, he saw a car driven by
    the defendant “coming right at” him going south1 in a northbound lane “kind of down the
    wrong side of the four-lane.” He did not see the defendant until the defendant “was
    turning down the four-lane in the wrong lane.” Mr. Hughes attempted to turn the steering
    wheel to avoid a collision, but the defendant hit the driver‟s front end and driver‟s side of
    Mr. Hughes‟s car, sending it into a grassy area beside the road. Mr. Hughes testified that
    the collision occurred at an angle. After the wreck, Mr. Hughes saw his mother “slumped
    over” in the front passenger‟s seat. He asked if she was alright, and Ms. Hughes replied,
    “[N]o.” Ms. Hughes was having difficulty breathing, and Mr. Hughes held her head up
    in an effort to alleviate her struggles until the rescue crew arrived. Mr. Hughes testified
    that his hand was swollen and that he temporarily lost some usage of it but that it was
    “okay now that way.” Mr. Hughes testified that his nephew suffered a slight burn on his
    neck from the seat belt.
    After the accident, Ms. Hughes was transported to the hospital, where according to
    Mr. Hughes, “[s]he was in a lot of pain.” She passed away almost six weeks after the
    wreck. Mr. Hughes described Ms. Hughes‟s condition as “horrifying,” as she seemed
    like she was in constant pain. Mr. Hughes stated that Ms. Hughes had a broken left wrist
    and a broken right thumb, which rendered her unable to use either hand. She had to wear
    a neck brace “and a full body brace to the waist” as a result of her broken bones.
    Dr. Dan Anderson testified that he worked at Holston Valley Medical Center as a
    trauma and surgical critical care physician. He treated Ms. Hughes, and he said that she
    had a high neck fracture, bilateral rib fractures, a sternal fracture, a fracture in her L3
    lumbar vertebral body, a left wrist fracture, and right hand fractures. He testified that her
    condition was worsened by a previous history of atrial fibrillation. Ms. Hughes took
    blood thinning medication to treat the condition, and Dr. Anderson explained that she
    was mildly coagulopathic, which worsened her outcome. Dr. Anderson testified that the
    eighty-four-year-old Ms. Hughes likely had at least eight fractured ribs, and he stated that
    the mortality risk for a person over the age of seventy with those injuries was between
    1
    While Mr. Hughes identified the direction of Highway 11W as “North” and “South,” it appears
    that the highway runs eastbound and westbound.
    2
    sixty and eighty percent. He testified that a primary concern for elderly patients who had
    to wear cervical collars and back braces was their ability to eat. He explained that the
    most common problem was aspiration, which would cause a buildup in the lungs and lead
    to pneumonia. He estimated that Ms. Hughes “would at best have a 50 percent chance of
    leaving the hospital at any point.”
    Dr. Dawn LaJoie performed an autopsy of Ms. Hughes. She testified that “Ms.
    Hughes died of complications of multiple blunt force injuries.” She explained that Ms.
    Hughes had bilateral pneumonia. Dr. LaJoie agreed that Ms. Hughes had more than
    twice the amount of the average level of morphine in her system. Dr. LaJoie explained
    that these “supratherapeutic” levels of morphine in her system were not uncommon for
    cases of chronic pain management and comfort care measures.
    Sergeant Scott Alley of the Hawkins County Sheriff‟s Department responded to
    the crash scene. He testified that he observed a Ford Fusion, driven by the defendant, and
    a gray Plymouth, driven by Mr. Hughes, both with “heavy front-end damage.” The
    majority of damage to the defendant‟s vehicle was on the corner of the front passenger‟s
    side, and the Hughes‟s vehicle was primarily damaged on the corner of the front driver‟s
    side. Both vehicles were facing an eastbound direction. Sergeant Alley first spoke with
    the defendant, and he said that the defendant did not appear disoriented, but he agreed
    that during a deposition he said that the defendant “seemed a little addled.” Sergeant
    Alley also spoke with Ms. Hughes, who told him that she was “„hurting all over.‟”
    Sergeant Alley initially believed that there were only two people in the Hughes‟s vehicle,
    but he learned several days after the accident that there was a third person in the vehicle.
    Based on statements from the defendant and “skid marks and gouge marks” from
    the Hughes‟s vehicle, Sergeant Alley created a diagram of the crash, which occurred in
    the eastbound lane of Highway 11W. The defendant told Sergeant Alley that he was test-
    driving the vehicle and attempting to return it to R&R Auto Sales, which was located just
    off of Highway 11W. The defendant told Sergeant Alley “that he was trying to cross
    over to go down the shoulder of the roadway to get to R&R Auto Sales, which put him
    traveling west in the eastbound lanes of 11W.” The highway had two westbound lanes
    and two eastbound lanes separated by medians. Between some of the medians were
    “crossovers,” which were streets that permitted someone driving west to turn left and
    cross the eastbound lanes. Based on his investigation of the scene, Sergeant Alley
    determined that just before the crash, the defendant was traveling west on Highway 11W.
    When he reached the Corbin Heights Road crossover, he turned left and then bore right
    onto Highway 11W, intentionally traveling west into oncoming eastbound traffic. The
    Hughes‟s vehicle was traveling eastbound on Highway 11W in the right hand lane when
    the collision occurred, and Sergeant Alley testified that it was a “head on” collision.
    3
    Sergeant Alley agreed that his diagram showed an approximation of the defendant‟s route
    but “not the exact route” that the defendant traveled.
    Based on a skid mark from the Hughes‟s vehicle, Sergeant Alley was able to
    determine the point of impact of the crash. Sergeant Alley testified that “[t]he
    approximate point of impact was in the eastbound right-hand or slow lane, probably a
    couple of feet into the lane from the white line shoulder.” Sergeant Alley testified that
    the impact occurred at an angle of “thirtyish” degrees between the front passenger‟s side
    of the defendant‟s car and the front driver‟s side of the Hughes‟s vehicle. He explained
    that while the vehicles were at an angle and did not collide directly head-on, “it was a
    head-on collision, front end of the vehicle to the front end of the vehicle.” Sergeant Alley
    estimated that the point of impact occurred thirty to forty feet away from the intersection
    of Corbin Heights Road and Highway 11W, and he testified that it was not possible that
    the collision occurred in the intersection of Corbin Heights and Highway 11W.
    Sergeant Alley testified that there were alternate ways to reach R&R Auto Sales.
    He explained that the defendant could have continued westbound and reached a crossover
    road several hundred yards further down Highway 11W. The defendant could have used
    this crossover road to then travel eastbound to R&R Auto Sales. At the hospital, the
    defendant told Sergeant Alley that he was attempting to cross over the highway to enter
    the parking lot of R&R Auto Sales via the shoulder of the eastbound lane of Highway
    11W. He told Sergeant Alley that “it was something that he had done a thousand times
    before[,] and nothing like this had ever happened.”
    Sergeant Alley agreed that there were a number of vehicles for sale parked by
    R&R Auto Sales in a grassy area close to the collision site. An aerial surveillance
    photograph of the area revealed patches of dead grass close to the crash site and the
    intersection of Highway 11W and Corbin Heights Road, indicating that cars for sale had
    previously been parked there. Photographs taken the day of the crash showed that a
    minivan was parked in the grass close to the intersection between Highway 11W and
    Corbin Heights Drive, which is where the Hughes‟s car came to rest. Sergeant Alley
    agreed that it was “not impossible” that the defendant meant that he had been attempting
    to access the portion of the lot closest to the intersection when he said that he was
    crossing over to the lot. However, he testified that based on the point of impact, which
    was further west than the minivan, he did not believe that it was possible that the
    defendant was attempting to access this area of the lot when the crash occurred. He
    testified that it was possible that the defendant was attempting to access the lot west of
    the point of impact. Sergeant Alley testified that if the defendant was attempting to make
    a continuous left turn to access the parking spot next to the van, instead of turning right
    down Highway 11W, that he would have continued onto Corbin Heights Drive. He also
    testified that the impact would have occurred more on the passenger‟s side, rather than
    4
    the front, of the defendant‟s vehicle had he been driving the proposed route. He agreed
    that other than the defendant‟s statement, he did not have any evidence to support his
    conclusion that the defendant intentionally drove the wrong way down Highway 11W.
    He testified that he did not believe that the defendant was turning left the entire time after
    he entered the intersection, and he said that he would be surprised if data from the air bag
    module in the defendant‟s car indicated that he was turning left the whole time.
    Sergeant Alley agreed that his depiction of the crash had the driver‟s side of the
    defendant‟s vehicle impacting the front driver‟s side of the Hughes‟s vehicle, and he
    agreed that the damage to the vehicles did not reflect a collision in this manner. He
    testified that the collision was a “head on” collision.
    Trooper James Fillers of the Tennessee Highway Patrol testified that he was a
    member of the Critical Incident Response Team (“CIRT”) and that he performed an
    accident reconstruction of the wreck. In creating the reconstruction, Trooper Fillers
    relied on data from the air bag control module on the defendant‟s car, Sergeant Alley‟s
    diagram, witness statements, and his own personal observations of the scene. Using a
    tool called “Total Station,” he was able to take measurements of the roadway and tire
    marks. He visited the scene eight days after the crash and took photographs of the
    intersection from the westbound turn lane of Highway 11W. A “Do Not Enter” sign is
    visible in these photographs. Trooper Fillers testified that a tire mark made by the right
    passenger‟s side tire of the Hughes‟s vehicle reflected the point of impact. He identified
    photographs of scratches on the pavement just in front of the tire marks, which he
    testified were indicative of the Hughes‟s vehicle striking “a frame or a rim that would
    contact the pavement and cause that mark.” Trooper Fillers testified that the accident
    occurred over fifty feet from the intersection of Highway 11W and Corbin Heights Road.
    He created damage profiles of both vehicles, and he testified that the damage was
    consistent with a head-on collision. Trooper Fillers reviewed Sergeant Alley‟s diagram
    of the accident when reconstructing the scene, and he testified that the only change that
    he would make to the diagram would be to align the rear end of the defendant‟s car closer
    to the shoulder line.
    Trooper Fillers completed a CIRT report that included data from the air bag
    control module on the defendant‟s vehicle. The module contained “five seconds of pre-
    crash data,” and Trooper Fillers analyzed the data for his report. Within the report,
    Trooper Fillers drafted a memorandum that included measurements of the defendant‟s
    vehicle‟s speed, engine revolutions per minute, and service brakes in the five seconds
    leading up to the crash. Trooper Fillers agreed that there was additional data in his report
    that he did not include in his memorandum, and he explained that he omitted the
    information because it would have been redundant. However, he testified that he
    considered the additional data, including the “Delta V data” that showed the change in
    5
    velocity of the defendant‟s vehicle, when making his analysis about the cause of the
    accident. The module showed that five seconds before impact, the defendant‟s speed was
    28 miles per hour; half of a second before impact his speed was 18 miles per hour; and at
    impact the defendant was driving 14.9 miles per hour. The module also recorded the
    position of the steering wheel. Trooper Fillers explained that positive numbers meant
    that the wheel was being turned to the left, and negative numbers indicated a turn to the
    right. Five seconds before the crash, the wheel was at 4.9 degrees, which Trooper Fillers
    testified meant that the wheel was turned to the left. One and a half seconds before the
    crash, the wheel was at negative 1.7 degrees, indicating a “[r]ight-hand turn.” Trooper
    Fillers testified that he did not attempt to estimate the speed of the Hughes‟s vehicle, but
    he testified that if the car were traveling fifty-five miles per hour at the point of impact,
    the force of the collision would have moved the defendant‟s car in the same direction that
    the Hughes‟s vehicle was traveling. He testified that the collision would have sent the
    defendant‟s car into “a counterclockwise rotation, rearward.” After his investigation,
    Trooper Fillers concluded that “driving on the wrong side of the roadway is the primary
    contributing factor to the cause of this crash.”
    On cross-examination, Trooper Fillers agreed that the diagram created with Total
    Station did not represent any analysis or accident reconstruction but simply represented
    the measurements he took. He explained that his entire report constituted the accident
    reconstruction, and it was based upon the total evidence, witness statements,
    photographs, vehicle examinations, damage profile, and scale diagram[s]. He agreed that
    he did not include a diagram of the pre-impact or post-impact direction of the vehicles.
    He testified that he did not attempt to calculate the speed of the Hughes‟s car prior to the
    wreck. He also agreed that he did not attempt to calculate the directional force of impact,
    and he testified that such an analysis would not have answered any questions for him. He
    stated that he did not need to calculate the direction of force because he was able to
    conclude that the collision was a head-on collision based upon “a combination of
    roadway evidence, damage profiles, vehicle examinations, [and] witness statements.” He
    stated that he was certain that his depiction of the crash was accurate. He explained that
    he could determine the alignment of the vehicles at the point of impact based upon the
    tire mark indicating the point of impact. He said that the damage profiles explained how
    the cars crashed into one another and that he was able to “match the damage up.” He
    testified that it would surprise him if an analysis of the data in his report indicated a
    direction of collision force that was different from what he suggested. He testified that it
    was not possible that the defendant never turned right on Highway 11W because without
    the right turn, the defendant would have driven through a yard.
    Mr. Ricky Stewart, Dr. Dan Carroll, and Mr. Scott Reiling testified for the
    defense. Mr. Stewart testified that he owned R&R Auto Sales and that the defendant was
    his brother. The defendant was an agent for R&R Auto Sales and had the authority to
    6
    purchase vehicles at auction on behalf of R&R Auto Sales. On the date of the accident,
    Mr. Stewart instructed the defendant to attempt to sell the Ford Fusion at an auction and
    to return the car to the R&R Auto Sales lot if he could not sell it. Mr. Stewart was shown
    a picture of the R&R Auto Sales lot, and he testified that he parked used automobiles for
    sale in the grassy area all the way to the edge of the intersection between Corbin Heights
    Road and Highway 11W. He testified that the defendant had parked vehicles in that
    location at Mr. Stewart‟s direction many times before.
    Dr. Carroll testified that he had treated the defendant since 1995 and that the
    defendant suffered from diabetes. Nearly a month after the accident, the defendant came
    to see Dr. Carroll, and he said that just prior to the accident, while driving the vehicle, he
    experienced a “syncopal episode,” which was accompanied by “a sense of impending
    faint, light-headedness and visual disturbance.” Dr. Carroll explained that a syncopal
    event was “temporary loss of consciousness” followed by “spontaneous recovery.” He
    stated that the event lasted only “a matter of minutes” and that it caused a loss of muscle
    tone, which could cause a person to slump over or to fall down. The defendant told Dr.
    Carroll that he had consumed several high sugar drinks prior to the accident, and Dr.
    Carroll testified that consuming a large quantity of sugar could lead to a syncopal
    episode. He testified that based on the information that the defendant provided, the
    defendant suffered from a syncopal episode. Dr. Carroll testified that another emergency
    room doctor, Dr. Ken Goh, arrived at the scene of the accident moments after it occurred
    and wrote that the defendant “seemed momentarily stunned and confused but cleared up
    fairly quickly.” Dr. Goh also wrote that the defendant appeared “dazed.”
    On cross-examination, Dr. Carroll testified that the only evidence that the
    defendant suffered from a syncopal episode was the statements of the defendant and Dr.
    Goh. Dr. Carroll was not aware that the defendant was facing criminal charges when he
    examined him.
    Mr. Reiling testified as an expert in accident reconstruction. He conducted an
    accident reconstruction, and he stated that his analysis in many respects matched the
    survey of Trooper Fillers. Based on photographs, Mr. Reiling identified what he said was
    a post-impact skid mark from the defendant‟s vehicle. He conducted a vehicle alignment
    test and determined where the vehicles were located at the point of impact. He testified
    that the vehicles collided at a sixty degree angle. He testified that the collision caused the
    defendant‟s car to rotate in a counterclockwise direction and that if the State‟s estimation
    of direction force was correct, the defendant‟s vehicle would have rotated in a clockwise
    motion. He testified that Trooper Fillers‟s estimation of the angle of the vehicles was
    incorrect because if they had collided in the manner proposed by Trooper Fillers, there
    would have been “contact damage across the entire front-end of the Ford and most of the
    front-end of the Plymouth.” He testified that the photographs of the vehicles indicated
    7
    that the damage was “limited to corner-to-corner impact” and that the cars could not have
    physically collided in the manner proposed by Trooper Fillers.
    Mr. Reiling testified that he did not see any analysis conducted on any data in the
    report other than the data that was included in Trooper Fillers‟s memorandum. He stated
    that he utilized the “Delta V” data to calculate the direction of the impact force as forty-
    one degrees. He testified that this data could be particularly valuable in accident
    reconstruction, particularly when there was “no roadway evidence.” Mr. Reiling
    explained that he used other data in the CIRT report and that it was helpful in
    ascertaining the pre-impact path of the defendant‟s vehicle. Mr. Reiling testified that the
    defendant never turned to the right after leaving the intersection but that his vehicle
    continued “along a curved path.” He stated that his analysis contradicted Sergeant
    Alley‟s diagram of the crash, which showed the defendant‟s vehicle turning right. He
    also stated that the steering wheel angles were not indicative of the movement of the
    entire vehicle. He testified that the slight change in direction of the steering wheel half of
    a second before the crash would not have been significant enough to change the direction
    of the vehicle. He stated that the left front corner of the defendant‟s vehicle had entered
    the shoulder of the road at the time of the collision. Mr. Reiling identified the “Do Not
    Enter” sign, and he said that there was no indication that the defendant‟s vehicle was in
    front of the sign at the time of impact.
    At the conclusion of the proof, the jury convicted the defendant of criminally
    negligent homicide of Ms. Hughes as a lesser included offense of reckless vehicular
    homicide in Count 1 and of reckless endangerment of Mr. Hughes and his minor nephew
    with a deadly weapon as charged in Counts 2 and 3. The trial court ordered the
    preparation of a presentence report for the sentencing hearing.
    At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that several enhancement factors
    applied. The State asked the trial court to consider the defendant‟s prior criminal history;
    that the offense involved more than one victim; that a victim of the offense was
    particularly vulnerable, citing to the fact that Ms. Hughes was eighty-four years old; that
    the injuries to the victims and damage to their property was particularly great; that the
    defendant used a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense; that the defendant
    had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high; and
    that during the commission of a felony the defendant‟s actions resulted in the death of
    another. The State contended that no mitigating factors were present.
    The defendant called several witnesses to testify on his behalf. Kendall Lawson
    testified that he was a practicing attorney who had known the defendant for twenty to
    twenty-five years. He testified that, in his opinion, the defendant was a person of good
    character, and he testified that the defendant had been very helpful to the community. He
    8
    testified that the defendant had provided assistance to many in the community, including
    Mr. Lawson himself. He testified that he was aware that the defendant had filed for
    bankruptcy.
    Jim Point testified that he was a practicing attorney and that he had known the
    defendant for about thirty-two years, although he stated that the nature of their
    relationship was primarily professional. Mr. Point testified that the defendant was a
    person of good character whose involvement in the community had been “excellent.”
    He testified that the defendant had been very generous with donating his money and
    equipment to those in need. He stated that the defendant had a good relationship with his
    children and was making sure that his children were raised well.
    Brad Price testified that he knew the defendant through his church. He testified
    that the defendant ensured that his children regularly attended church and that the
    defendant also attended church regularly. He testified that the defendant had good
    character and provided assistance to those in need in the community.
    Lynn Mahan testified that he attended church with the defendant and had “the
    utmost respect for” him. He testified that he had observed the defendant provide a great
    deal of financial and spiritual assistance to members of the community.
    The defendant testified and said that he was sorry for the wreck. He stated that he
    did not cry when he lost both of his parents in a car accident but that he had “shed a
    million tears over Ms. Hughes.” The defendant testified that he completed the seventh or
    eighth grade but that he could not read very well. He explained that he had started a
    successful business that allowed him to make charitable contributions to the community.
    He stated that he and his wife purchased Christmas gifts for the children of fifteen
    strangers.
    The defendant testified that he currently operated a business with four employees.
    He explained that he had to be present on a daily basis to oversee the operation of the
    business. He testified that his employees would lose their jobs if he was incarcerated. He
    testified that he had declared bankruptcy and owed a bank two million dollars. He
    testified that he needed to operate his business so that he could pay off his debts.
    The defendant testified that he had two children and that he paid $150 a week in
    child support. He shared custody of the children. The defendant testified that he was in
    poor health, suffering from diabetes and tremendous pain in his legs and knees.
    On cross-examination, the defendant agreed that he had received speeding tickets
    in the past, and he believed that he received a speeding ticket after the accident. He
    9
    testified that he had been in two other minor car wrecks since the accident. He stated that
    forty-seven years ago, he purchased stolen tools and received probation. He also
    admitted that twenty-five years ago, a police officer told him that he was arrested for a hit
    and run. He began arguing with the officer and eventually “swung at him.” He stated
    that the trial cost him over $700,000.
    The trial court found that several enhancement factors applied. The court found
    that the defendant had a previous history of criminal convictions, citing to the defendant‟s
    felony grand larceny conviction, numerous traffic offenses, and the assault conviction.
    See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1). The court found that Ms. Hughes was particularly vulnerable
    due to her age, noting that a younger person with her injuries may have survived the
    crash. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(4). The court found that the defendant possessed a deadly
    weapon during the offense, noting that the defendant used a vehicle in the commission of
    the offense and that there were “other ways for someone to die in criminally negligent
    homicide other than a vehicle.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(9). The court found that no
    mitigating factors applied.
    The trial court observed that “other people need to be deterred from this kind of
    behavior.” The court stated that this was “a serious” and “tragic case,” noting that Ms.
    Hughes was in the wreck on her birthday and passed away after suffering from extreme
    physical pain for weeks as a result “of the defendant‟s desire to take a shortcut across the
    road.” The court noted that the defendant was not in good physical health and observed
    that the defendant had several witnesses who testified to the defendant‟s good character
    and the positive impact that he made in the community. However, the court gave “great
    weight to the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense and the nature of the
    circumstances of the defendant‟s criminal conduct.”
    The court found that to give the defendant probation on “this kind of case” would
    send “a terrible message” because “[a]n 84-year-old woman was killed, suffered greatly
    and to just send somebody home on probation and it‟s not right.” The trial court stated
    that it observed the defendant during trial and that he never displayed remorse during the
    trial. The trial court said that the defendant “looked like somebody just trying to get out
    of the case. Trying to get out of trouble.” The court stated that the defendant displayed
    remorse at the sentencing hearing when he was facing jail time. “But from what I saw,
    he just kept pouring glasses of water and drinking water during the trial and just acting
    like he was bored throughout the trial.” The court found that the defendant had shown no
    remorse at trial for his actions. The court found that the defendant “probably would abide
    by probation” but that there was a chance that he would get into another car wreck or be
    charged with a traffic violation, observing that the defendant received a speeding ticket
    and was involved in two traffic accidents while this case was pending. In terms of
    protecting society from the defendant‟s future conduct, the court found that the defendant
    10
    was unlikely to commit “any major offenses.” The court found that full probation would
    unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense.
    The trial court imposed a two-year sentence for the conviction for criminally
    negligent homicide. The court also merged the reckless endangerment conviction in
    Count 3 with the reckless endangerment conviction in Count 2, and it imposed a two-year
    sentence in Count 2.2 The court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender and
    ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of two years.
    ANALYSIS
    The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions;
    that the trial court erred when it denied the defendant‟s request for special jury
    instructions for the offenses of reckless vehicular homicide and criminally negligent
    homicide; that his conviction for felony reckless endangerment violates the Double
    Jeopardy and Due Process clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; and
    that the trial court abused its discretion in denying an alternative sentence and imposing
    the maximum sentence.
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.
    He contends that his actions were not a “gross deviation” from the standard of reasonable
    care. He also claims that the evidence does not support a finding that he knew or should
    have known that his actions might endanger human life. Finally, he contends that the
    State‟s evidence was not believable. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient.
    2
    At the sentencing hearing, the State advised the trial court that the “[S]tate would stipulate that
    [the two separate counts of felony reckless endangerment] need to merge into one count.” We do not
    agree that the counts needed to merge. In State v. Cross, 
    362 S.W.3d 512
    (Tenn. 2012), a case reviewing
    a reckless endangerment conviction, the supreme court noted that when permitted by the facts, the State
    may pursue multiple offenses for each of the different individuals who were put in jeopardy by a
    defendant‟s conduct. 
    Id. at 519
    n.5. When the State elects to prosecute a defendant for criminal acts
    committed against individual victims, as alleged in Counts 2 and 3 of the defendant‟s indictment, as
    opposed to a class of persons, the State can have multiple indictments for reckless endangerment. State v.
    Payne, 
    7 S.W.3d 25
    , 29 n.3 (Tenn. 1999). If we were to apply a double jeopardy analysis under State v.
    Watkins, 
    362 S.W.3d 530
    (Tenn. 2012) (released contemporaneously with Cross), the defendant could
    have been convicted separately of both counts of reckless endangerment because each count involved a
    different named victim. Thus, separate convictions for Counts 2 and 3 fail the threshold scrutiny for a
    double jeopardy claim. 
    Id. at 556-57.
    Any error by the trial court in accepting the State‟s stipulation,
    however, does not reach the level of plain error because our consideration of such is not necessary to do
    substantial justice. See State v. Adkisson, 
    899 S.W.2d 626
    , 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
    11
    When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question
    for this court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979). On appeal,
    “„the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and to all
    reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.‟” State v. Elkins, 
    102 S.W.3d 578
    , 581 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State v. Smith, 
    24 S.W.3d 274
    , 279 (Tenn.
    2000)). Therefore, this court will not re-weigh or reevaluate the evidence. State v.
    Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Instead, it is the trier of fact,
    not this court, who resolves any questions concerning “the credibility of witnesses, the
    weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the
    evidence.” State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    , 659 (Tenn. 1997). “[A]lthough
    inconsistencies or inaccuracies may make the witness a less credible witness, the jury‟s
    verdict will not be disturbed unless the inaccuracies or inconsistencies are so improbable
    or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the appellant‟s guilt.” State v. Radley,
    
    29 S.W.3d 532
    , 537 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
    A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a
    presumption of guilt. State v. Evans, 
    838 S.W.2d 185
    , 191 (Tenn. 1992). The burden is
    then shifted to the defendant on appeal to demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient to
    support the conviction. State v. Tuggle, 
    639 S.W.2d 913
    , 914 (Tenn. 1982). This court
    applies the same standard of review regardless of whether the conviction was predicated
    on direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Dorantes, 
    331 S.W.3d 370
    , 381 (Tenn.
    2011). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction, and the
    circumstantial evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
    guilt.” State v. Wagner, 
    382 S.W.3d 289
    , 297 (Tenn. 2012).
    In order “[t]o establish criminally negligent homicide, the State must prove three
    elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) criminally negligent conduct on the part of the
    accused; (2) that proximately causes; (3) a person‟s death.” State v. Jones, 
    151 S.W.3d 494
    , 499 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Farner, 
    66 S.W.3d 188
    , 199 (Tenn. 2001) (citing
    T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a))). “Criminally negligent conduct that results in death constitutes
    criminally negligent homicide.” T.C.A. § 39-13-212(a) (2010). A person is criminally
    negligent who:
    acts with criminal negligence with respect to the circumstances surrounding
    that person‟s conduct or the result of that conduct when the person ought to
    be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
    or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
    the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
    12
    care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
    viewed from the accused person‟s standpoint.
    T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(4); see also T.C.A. § 39-11-302(d).
    In order “[t]o be criminally negligent, a defendant must fail to perceive a
    substantial and unjustifiable risk.” State v. Briggs, 
    343 S.W.3d 106
    , 110 (Tenn. Crim.
    App. 2010). “Whether a defendant failed to perceive the risk must be determined under
    the circumstances as viewed from the defendant‟s standpoint.” 
    Id. To establish
    criminally negligent homicide in the context of a motor vehicle accident, “the proof must
    show more than a „mere[] want of due care, inadvertence, or inattention,‟ and the
    defendant must have known „or reasonably should have known that . . . the death charged
    was the natural and probable consequence of such negligence.‟” 
    Id. (quoting Roe
    v.
    State, 
    358 S.W.2d 308
    , 314 (Tenn. 1962)).
    A person commits the offense of felony reckless endangerment “who recklessly
    engages in conduct that places or may place another person in imminent danger of death
    or serious bodily injury” and uses a deadly weapon. T.C.A. § 39-13-103(a), (b)(2). A
    person:
    acts recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding the conduct or the
    result of the conduct when the person is aware of, but consciously
    disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
    the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
    disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
    ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
    the accused person‟s standpoint
    T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(31).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the defendant turned
    into a cross through road in the median between the eastbound and westbound lanes of
    Highway 11W. Despite a “Do Not Enter” sign, the defendant was driving west in an
    eastbound lane when he struck the Hughes‟s car. The defendant told Sergeant Alley that
    he had performed this maneuver “a thousand times before,” indicating that he was
    familiar with the area and the signs. Sergeant Alley and Trooper Fillers testified that this
    accident occurred at least thirty to forty feet from the intersection between Highway 11W
    and Corbin Heights Road, and Mr. Reiling testified that the accident occurred beyond the
    sign. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant
    should have been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk of ignoring a “Do Not
    Enter” sign and driving the wrong way into oncoming traffic, that his actions constituted
    13
    a “gross deviation” of the standard of due care, and that he reasonably should have
    known that his conduct might endanger human life. The evidence was further sufficient
    for the jury to find that Ms. Hughes‟s death was a natural and probable result of the
    defendant‟s negligence. See State v. Gillon, 
    15 S.W.3d 492
    , 500 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1997) (upholding conviction for criminally negligent homicide when the defendant
    disregarded a stop sign and entered a four-lane, divided highway and crossed through a
    median connector without slowing down).
    The evidence was also sufficient to show that the defendant acted recklessly. As
    stated above, Sergeant Alley testified that the defendant told him that he had utilized the
    shortcut to R&R Auto Sales “a thousand times before,” indicating that he was aware of
    the “Do Not Enter” sign. A rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant
    consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk of ignoring the sign to drive
    into oncoming traffic and that this act was a gross deviation from the standard of care an
    ordinary person would exercise in the defendant‟s position. The evidence was sufficient
    for the jury to find that by ignoring the sign and driving in the improper lane, the
    defendant placed Mr. Hughes and Mr. Hughes‟s eleven-year-old nephew in imminent
    danger of death or bodily injury and that he did so while using his automobile, which is
    considered a deadly weapon. State v. Wilson, 
    211 S.W.3d 714
    , 719 (Tenn. 2007) (stating
    that an automobile is considered a deadly weapon under the reckless endangerment
    statute).
    The jury considered the testimony of Sergeant Alley and Trooper Fillers, along
    with the testimony of Mr. Reiling. The jury‟s verdicts indicate that they credited the
    testimony of the State‟s witnesses, and this court will not disturb that finding on appeal.
    We conclude that the defendant is not entitled to any relief.
    II. Jury Instructions
    The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a
    special jury instruction regarding the offenses of reckless vehicular homicide and
    criminally negligent homicide. He contends that his instruction would have helped
    clarify the definition of criminally negligent homicide for the jury. The State responds
    that the trial court properly instructed the jury.
    Regarding the charges of reckless vehicular homicide and criminally negligent
    homicide, the defendant requested that the trial court provide the following instruction,
    which was derived from State v. Briggs, 
    343 S.W.3d 106
    , 110 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010),
    and Roe v. State, 
    358 S.W.2d 308
    , 314 (Tenn. 1962):
    14
    To establish homicide via the reckless or negligent operation of an
    automobile, the proof must show more than a mere want of due care,
    inadvertence, or inattention, and the defendant must have known or
    reasonably should have known that the death charged was the natural and
    probable consequence of such conduct.
    The trial court declined to provide the requested instruction and instructed the jury as
    follows:
    Recklessly means that a person acts recklessly with respect to
    circumstances surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when
    the person is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
    unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The
    risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a
    gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
    exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person‟s
    standpoint.
    ...
    Criminal negligence means that a person acts with criminal
    negligence when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and
    unjustifiable risk that the alleged victim will be killed. The risk must be of
    such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
    deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
    under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person‟s
    standpoint.
    The court also instructed the jury that:
    Before you can convict the defendant, the State must show beyond a
    reasonable doubt that a person or class of person was in the zone of danger.
    The zone of danger is that area in which a reasonable probability exists that
    the defendant‟s conduct would place others in imminent danger of death or
    serious bodily injury.
    A defendant is entitled to “a correct and complete charge of the law, so that each
    issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions.”
    State v. Garrison, 
    40 S.W.3d 426
    , 432 (Tenn. 2000). “A charge „is erroneous if it fails to
    fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law.‟” State v.
    James, 
    315 S.W.3d 440
    , 446 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Hodges, 
    944 S.W.2d 346
    ,
    15
    352 (Tenn. 1997)). When a trial court‟s instructions correctly, fully, and fairly set forth
    the applicable law, the trial court‟s refusal to give a requested special instruction does not
    amount to error. State v. Phipps, 
    883 S.W.2d 138
    , 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
    “Whether jury instructions are sufficient is a question of law appellate courts review de
    novo with no presumption of correctness.” State v. Clark, 
    452 S.W.3d 268
    , 295 (Tenn.
    2014).
    In Roe, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “[t]o convict a motorist of
    homicide by negligence, it is, of course, not enough to prove that he was guilty merely of
    a want of due care, inadvertence, or inattention, but it must be shown that his negligence
    in driving was such that he k[ne]w or reasonably should have known that it might
    endanger human life, and that the death charged was the natural and probable result of
    such negligence.” 
    Roe, 358 S.W.2d at 314
    . We reiterated this standard more recently in
    
    Briggs, 343 S.W.3d at 110
    (concluding that defendant‟s failure to perceive risk of driving
    slowly on the shoulder after a malfunction was legally insufficient to constitute negligent
    homicide). We have alternatively described this as “the requirement that death or injury
    be likely and foreseeable in [criminal] cases involving automobile accidents.” State v.
    Jones, 
    151 S.W.3d 494
    , 502 (Tenn. 2004) (concluding that defendant was not criminally
    negligent for traveling by car with a toddler on her lap); see State v. Gillon, 
    15 S.W.3d 492
    , 498 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (“In the numerous cases in which automobile
    accidents have led to convictions for either criminally negligent or reckless homicide, the
    unifying strand is that the risk is of such a nature and degree that injury or death is likely
    and foreseeable.”).
    The Defendant does not cite any cases that stand for the proposition that it is error
    not to include the language he requested, and we can find none. In State v. McKinney,
    the trial court instructed the jury that it was unnecessary that the death be the natural and
    probable result of the defendant‟s drunk driving. 
    605 S.W.2d 842
    , 847 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1980). We nevertheless upheld the conviction because the instructions also included
    language requiring the jury to find that the unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of
    the death. 
    Id. While the
    Tennessee Supreme Court has required an instruction that the
    harm be the natural and probable consequence of the criminal act in cases involving
    criminal responsibility, State v. Howard, 
    30 S.W.3d 271
    (Tenn. 2000), we can find no
    analogous requirement for negligent homicide, which does not depend on the conduct of
    another. See, e.g., State v. Mickens, 
    123 S.W.3d 355
    , 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003)
    (analyzing under criminal responsibility, noting that “the rule did not apply when the
    crime of which the defendant was convicted was the target crime itself and not some
    unintended collateral crime,” and concluding that it did not apply to felony murder or
    when the “target” crime was the murder).
    16
    Here, the jury instructions required the jury to find that the Defendant should have
    been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim would be killed, such
    that his failure to perceive it was a gross deviation from the standard of care, and the
    instructions also required a finding that the victims were in an area in which a reasonable
    probability existed that the Defendant‟s conduct would place the victims in imminent
    danger of death or serious bodily injury. Although the Defendant‟s proposed instruction
    was certainly a correct statement of the law, the jury instructions given by the trial court
    conveyed that the death must be likely and foreseeable, which is the function of the
    “natural and probable cause” language in the context of negligent homicide. See State v.
    Jones, 
    151 S.W.3d 494
    , 502 (Tenn. 2004). Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to
    relief.
    III. Double Jeopardy
    The defendant argues that his conviction for felony reckless endangerment violates
    the principles of double jeopardy and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and
    Tennessee constitutions. He contends that the verdicts for criminally negligent homicide
    and reckless endangerment are mutually exclusive verdicts that violate double jeopardy.
    He argues that because the jury found him not guilty of operating his vehicle recklessly in
    Count 1, they could not find him guilty of felony reckless endangerment based on the
    same conduct.
    “Mutually exclusive verdicts” are “the type of inconsistent verdicts that occur
    „where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other.‟”
    State v. Davis, 
    466 S.W.3d 49
    , 73 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting United States v. Powell, 
    469 U.S. 57
    , 69 n.8 (1984)). In Davis, our supreme court recently concluded that inconsistent
    verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts were not a basis for setting aside a conviction.
    The court addressed the issue of inconsistent verdicts when the inconsistency was
    “between two convictions on alternative counts arising from a single criminal action.”
    
    Davis, 466 S.W.3d at 76
    . The defendant was charged with alternative counts of first
    degree felony murder and first degree premeditated murder against the same victim. 
    Id. at 53.
    The jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder as a lesser included
    offense of felony murder and of reckless homicide as a lesser included offense of
    premeditated murder. 
    Id. The supreme
    court concluded that the defendant was not
    entitled to relief, emphasizing “that „[t]he validity accorded to [inconsistent] verdicts
    recognizes the sanctity of the jury‟s deliberations and the strong policy against probing
    into its logic or reasoning, which would open the door to interminable speculation.‟” 
    Id. at 77
    (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Zane, 
    495 F.2d 683
    , 690 (2d Cir.
    1974)). The court opined that it was “disinclined to open the door to the increased
    confusion and increased litigation that arises from trying to parse a jury‟s inconsistent
    verdicts.” 
    Id. 17 In
    this case, as in Davis, there was an inconsistency between two convictions
    arising from the same criminal action. By convicting the defendant of criminally
    negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of reckless vehicular homicide, the jury
    established that the defendant was not reckless in his operation of his motor vehicle.
    However, in convicting the defendant of reckless endangerment, the jury necessarily
    found that the defendant acted recklessly in operating the motor vehicle. While we agree
    with the defendant that these verdicts are inconsistent, we do not agree that the verdicts
    need be set aside.
    The defendant argues that no speculation into the jury‟s reasoning is required
    because the reasoning must have been conditioned only on the element of recklessness.
    While the element of recklessness may be the distinguishing mens rea element between
    criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment, it is unclear whether the jury‟s
    decision hinged on whether the defendant acted recklessly. When a jury returns
    inconsistent verdicts, “„[t]he most that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows
    that either in the acquittal or conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but
    that does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant‟s guilt.‟” Wiggins v.
    State, 
    498 S.W.2d 92
    , 93 (Tenn. 1973) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 390
    , 393
    (1932)). A variety of reasons, such as a compromise or a mistake on the part of the jury,
    may be the cause of inconsistent verdicts. 
    Id. As a
    result, this court “will not upset a
    seemingly inconsistent verdict by speculating as to the jury‟s reasoning if we are satisfied
    that the evidence establishes guilt of the offense upon which the conviction was
    returned.” 
    Id. at 94.
    As we concluded above, the evidence was sufficient to support the
    defendant‟s convictions for both criminally negligent homicide and reckless
    endangerment. We conclude that he is not entitled to any relief.
    IV. Sentencing
    The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative
    sentence. He argues that he was a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing and that
    he established his suitability for probation. He also contends that the trial court erred in
    imposing the maximum sentence of incarceration based on the need to avoid depreciating
    the seriousness of the offense and to effectively deter others from committing similar
    offenses. Finally, he contends that the trial court erroneously applied several
    enhancement factors and did not provide meaningful consideration to all of the
    sentencing factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-103.
    The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously applied several enhancement
    factors. He contends that the State presented no evidence of his conviction for “grand
    larceny” and that the trial court erred in finding that he had a history of criminal
    18
    convictions and criminal behavior. He argues that the trial court erroneously found that
    Ms. Hughes was particularly vulnerable due to her age. He also contends that the trial
    court erred in finding that the defendant possessed or employed a deadly weapon during
    the commission of the offense because the operation of a motor vehicle is a necessary
    element of reckless vehicular homicide.
    This court reviews challenges to the length of a sentence under an abuse of
    discretion standard, “granting a presumption of reasonableness to within-range
    sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our
    Sentencing Act.” State v. Bise, 
    380 S.W.3d 682
    , 707 (Tenn. 2012). The court will
    uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record
    demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and
    principles listed by statute.” 
    Id. at 709-10.
    The weighing of various enhancement and
    mitigating factors is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Carter, 
    254 S.W.3d 335
    , 345 (Tenn. 2008). The misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating
    factor by the trial court “does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court
    wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706
    . A
    sentence imposed by the trial court that is within the appropriate range should be upheld
    “[s]o long as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of
    sentencing, as provided by statute.” 
    Id. As a
    n initial matter, we must address the defendant‟s claim that this court cannot
    consider the presentence report on appellate review. He argues that because the report
    was not entered into evidence or marked as an exhibit, this court cannot consider it. Our
    supreme court “has held that any matter that the trial court has appropriately considered is
    properly includable in the appellate record pursuant to Rule 24(g) of the Tennessee Rules
    of Appellate Procedure when the matter is „necessary to convey a fair, accurate and
    complete account of what transpired in the trial court with respect to those issues that are
    the bases of appeal.‟” State v. Smotherman, 
    201 S.W.3d 657
    , 661 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting
    State v. Housler, 
    167 S.W.3d 294
    , 298 (Tenn. 2005)). At the conclusion of the trial, the
    court ordered the preparation of a presentence report. Trial counsel agreed that he was
    provided with a copy of this report and that the trial court received a copy. During the
    sentencing hearing, the trial court referenced the defendant‟s convictions and appeared to
    be reading from the presentence report, and the court stated that it considered the
    presentence report when imposing a sentence. The presentence report was not initially
    included in the technical record, but the defendant supplemented the record with the
    report that was file stamped by the criminal court clerk. The trial court clearly referenced
    the presentence report when imposing the defendant‟s sentence, and we conclude that it
    was properly included in the appellate record and may be considered on appellate review.
    See 
    Smotherman, 201 S.W.3d at 661-62
    .
    19
    The defendant‟s presentence report indicates that he had numerous convictions for
    traffic offenses, along with convictions for grand larceny and assault. At the hearing, the
    defendant testified that forty-seven years prior to the hearing, he was convicted of an
    offense after he purchased stolen tools, and he admitted that he had received multiple
    speeding tickets in the past. The record supports the finding of this enhancement factor.
    The trial court also found that Ms. Hughes was particularly vulnerable, citing to the fact
    that she may have survived her injuries had she been younger. At trial, Dr. Anderson
    testified that due to Ms. Hughes‟s age and the nature of her injuries, she had a mortality
    risk of sixty to seventy percent. One of the elements of criminally negligent homicide is
    death, and the record supports the finding that Ms. Hughes‟s chances of survival were
    significantly decreased due to her age. See State v. Kissinger, 
    922 S.W.2d 482
    , 487
    (Tenn. 1996) (stating that this “factor may be used to enhance sentences when a victim‟s
    natural physical and mental limitations renders the victim particularly vulnerable for his
    or her age because of an inability to resist, a difficulty in calling for help, or a difficulty in
    testifying against the perpetrator”). Additionally, the trial court found that the defendant
    used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. While the use of a deadly
    weapon is not an element of criminally negligent homicide, see T.C.A., the use of a
    deadly weapon is an element of reckless endangerment. See T.C.A. § 39-13-103(b)(2).
    To the extent that the trial court utilized this factor to enhance the defendant‟s sentence
    for reckless endangerment, we conclude that the trial court erred.                However, the
    misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor by the trial court “does not
    invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act,
    as amended in 2005.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706
    . As we stated above, the trial court
    properly applied several other enhancement factors, and we conclude that the trial court
    properly imposed two-year sentences for each of the defendant‟s convictions.
    The defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it denied him an
    alternative sentence. When imposing a sentence, the trial court should consider: (1) the
    evidence, if any, received at trial and at the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence
    report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4)
    the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and
    information offered by the parties on the applicable enhancement and mitigating factors;
    (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts as to
    sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; and (7) any statement the
    defendant wishes to make in his own behalf about sentencing. T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b)(1)-
    (7) (2010). This court reviews the denial of an alternative sentence that falls within the
    appropriate range and reflects that the decision was based on the purposes and principles
    of sentencing under an “abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of
    reasonableness.” State v. Caudle, 
    388 S.W.3d 273
    , 278-79 (Tenn. 2012). This court
    should uphold a sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range and the record
    20
    demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and
    principles listed by statute.” 
    Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10
    .
    A defendant “who is an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a
    Class C, D, or E felony[] should be considered as a favorable candidate for alternative
    sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” T.C.A. § 40-35-
    102(6)(A). Here, the defendant was convicted of two Class E felonies and was sentenced
    as a standard offender. As a result, he was a favorable candidate for an alternative
    sentence.
    A defendant who receives a sentence of ten years or less may be eligible for
    probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a). However, the defendant bears the burden of
    establishing that he or she is a suitable candidate for probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b).
    “This burden includes demonstrating that probation will „subserve the ends of justice and
    the best interest of both the public and the defendant.‟” State v. Carter, 
    254 S.W.3d 335
    ,
    347 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting State v. Housewright, 
    982 S.W.2d 354
    , 357 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1997)). In determining whether full probation is appropriate, the trial court “may
    consider the circumstances of the offense, the defendant‟s potential or lack of potential
    for rehabilitation, whether full probation will unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
    offense, and whether a sentence other than full probation would provide an effective
    deterrent to others likely to commit similar crimes.” State v. Boggs, 
    932 S.W.2d 467
    , 477
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
    In determining whether incarceration is an appropriate sentence, the trial court
    should consider whether:
    (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a
    defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct;
    (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness
    of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
    deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or
    (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or
    recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). Additionally, the trial court should consider the
    defendant‟s potential or lack thereof for rehabilitation or treatment in determining
    whether an alternative sentence is warranted. T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5).
    21
    Here, the trial court imposed a sentence of incarceration based on the need to deter
    others from committing similar crimes and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the
    offenses. The trial court “may sentence a defendant to a term of incarceration based
    solely on the need for deterrence when the record contains evidence which would enable
    a reasonable person to conclude that (1) deterrence is needed in the community,
    jurisdiction, or state; and (2) the defendant‟s incarceration may rationally serve as a
    deterrent to others similarly situated and likely to commit similar crimes.” State v.
    Hooper, 
    29 S.W.3d 1
    , 13 (Tenn. 2000). In Hooper, the Tennessee Supreme Court
    created a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether deterrence was
    a proper basis to deny alternative sentencing: (1) whether other incidents of the charged
    offense are increasingly present in the community, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole;
    (2) whether the defendant‟s crime was the result of intentional, knowing, or reckless
    conduct or was otherwise motivated by a desire to profit or gain from the criminal
    behavior; (3) whether the defendant‟s crime and conviction have received substantial
    publicity beyond that normally expected in the typical case; (4) whether the defendant
    was a member of a criminal enterprise, or substantially encouraged or assisted others in
    achieving the criminal objective; and (5) whether the defendant has previously engaged
    in criminal conduct of the same type as the offense in question, irrespective of whether
    such conduct resulted in previous arrests or convictions. 
    Id. at 10-12.
    If the trial court
    imposes a sentence of incarceration based on the seriousness of the offense, “the
    circumstances of the offense as committed must be especially violent, horrifying,
    shocking, reprehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree,
    and the nature of the offense must outweigh all factors favoring a sentence other than
    confinement.” State v. Trotter, 
    201 S.W.3d 651
    , 654 (Tenn. 2006). However, “the
    heightened standard of review that applies to cases in which the trial court denies
    probation based on only one of these factors is inapplicable” when the trial court relies on
    both the deterrent effect and the seriousness of the offense. State v. Kyto Sihapanya, No.
    W2012-00716-SC-R11-CD, 
    2014 WL 2466054
    , at *3 (Tenn. April 30, 2014). Because
    the trial court relied on both factors, “we review the denial to determine if the trial court
    abused its discretion.” State v. Robert Allen Lester, Jr., No. M2014-00225-CCA-R3-CD,
    
    2014 WL 5501236
    , at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2014), no perm. app. filed; see also
    Patrick James O’Brien, Jr., No. E2014-02248-CCA-R3-CD, 
    2015 WL 5179190
    , at *4
    (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2015) (citing to Robert Allen Lester, Jr., and concluding that
    “if the trial court bases the denial of alternative sentencing on more than one factor, no
    additional findings are necessary, and we apply an abuse of discretion standard of
    review.”) no perm. app. filed; State v. William Avery Crisp, No. M2013-01339-CCA-R3-
    CD, 
    2014 WL 3540646
    , at *10-11 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 17, 2014), no perm. app. filed.
    The trial court found that it would send “a terrible message” to grant the defendant
    complete probation. The court noted that the cause of the wreck was the defendant‟s
    desire to take a shortcut that brought him into oncoming traffic and that others needed to
    22
    be deterred from such behavior. The testimony at trial and the sentencing hearing
    showed that Ms. Hughes suffered immense physical pain before she passed away and that
    her age made her injuries far more likely to be fatal. The court also noted that taking a
    shortcut into the wrong lane was a maneuver that the defendant had completed “a
    thousand times before.” Additionally, the court found that the defendant might continue
    to commit traffic offenses, as the defendant admitted that after the wreck, he was
    involved in two separate automobile accidents and received a speeding ticket. We
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant an
    alternative sentence.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. We
    remand for the entry of a judgment sheet showing that the defendant was convicted in
    Count 3 and that this conviction merged with the conviction in Count 2.
    _________________________________
    JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE
    23