Com. v. Edwards, D. ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • J-S50036-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DEMAR J. EDWARDS,
    Appellant                  No. 1917 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order entered June 2, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
    Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-48-CR-0004090-2010.
    BEFORE: PANELLA, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:                     FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2017
    Appellant, Demar J. Edwards, appeals pro se from the June 2, 2016
    order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    The pertinent facts and procedural history as gleaned from our review
    of the certified record are as follows: On November 29, 2007, Appellant and
    three accomplices entered an apartment located in Easton.        Three of the
    men ran upstairs to a third floor bedroom, after which Appellant and one of
    his accomplices shot and killed three victims execution-style.
    Investigation of these murders spanned several years. Appellant was
    arrested on September 1, 2010, and charged with three counts of criminal
    homicide and three counts of criminal conspiracy.         Prior to trial, the
    Commonwealth filed notice of aggravated circumstances and its intention to
    J-S50036-17
    seek the death penalty. On September 15, 2011, the trial court granted the
    Commonwealth’s motion to join Appellant’s trial with one of his co-
    defendants, and it denied Appellant’s motion for severance.
    Prior to the start of trial, the Commonwealth and Appellant reached an
    agreement whereby in exchange for the Commonwealth’s forgoing the death
    penalty, Appellant agreed to proceed with a bench trial rather than a jury
    trial. On November 3, 2011, the trial court found Appellant guilty of three
    counts of first-degree murder and three counts of conspiracy.      Thereafter,
    Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of three, consecutive life
    terms. Following the denial of his post-sentence motion, Appellant filed an
    appeal to this Court.    We affirmed his judgment of sentence on June 11,
    2013. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    82 A.3d 458
     (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 
    83 A.3d 167
     (Pa. 2013).
    Appellant timely and pro se filed a PCRA petition on November 21,
    2014.    The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition.
    Evidentiary hearings were held on three days in April 2015.         Both trial
    counsel and Appellant testified. By order entered June 2, 2015, the PCRA
    court denied the petition.
    On October 5, 2015, Appellant pro se filed a petition requesting
    permission to appeal nunc pro tunc.      The PCRA court granted Appellant’s
    request and appointed new counsel.          Counsel filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statement of concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on July 5,
    2016.
    -2-
    J-S50036-17
    On September 19, 2016, new counsel filed an application to stay the
    appeal, an application to remand, and an application to withdraw with this
    Court.   On October 11, 2016, this Court remanded and directed the PCRA
    court to conduct a Grazier1 hearing.             After conducting this hearing, the
    PCRA court granted counsel’s application to withdraw and permitted
    Appellant to proceed pro se.           Thereafter, Appellant pro se filed a Rule
    1925(b) statement, and the PCRA court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.2
    Appellant’s pro se brief does not contain a statement of questions
    involved pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2116.           Rather, he lists the following issues
    under his “Table of Contents:”
    1. Did the [PCRA] court [err] in dealing with the ineffectiveness
    of trial counsel and “appeal counsel.”
    2. Did the [PCRA] court [err] in dealing with prosecutorial
    misconduct from the information of Josh Oliver.
    3. Did the PCRA court [err] in finding that trial counsel was [not]
    ineffective for failing to complete the mitigation investigation,
    for a jury trial #4 and #3 of [Appellant’s Rule] 1925(b)
    response?
    4. Did the PCRA court [err] in finding that trial counsel was not
    ineffective for failing to call witness Eugenio Torres and Jacob
    Christine as [a] witness for [Appellant’s] trial?
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
     (Pa. 1998).
    2
    Although this Court initially dismissed the appeal due to Appellant’s failure
    to file a brief, we subsequently reinstated the appeal.
    -3-
    J-S50036-17
    5. Did the PCRA court [err] in finding that counsel was [not]
    ineffective for failing to investigate a letter from Rommell
    Thompson, a [C]ommonwealth witness?
    6. The PCRA court erred in finding that trial counsel was [not]
    ineffective for failing to properly investigate the case.
    7. Did the [C]ommonwealth violate [Appellant’s] rights under
    the 14th Amendment [o]f Due Process of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution and the United States Constitution, at the trial
    and Post Trial Proceeding?
    Appellant’s Brief at ii (unnumbered).
    When examining a post-conviction court's grant or denial of relief, we
    are limited to determining whether the court's findings were supported by
    the record and whether the court's order is otherwise free of legal error.
    Commonwealth v. Quaranibal, 
    763 A.2d 941
    , 942 (Pa. Super. 2000). We
    will not disturb findings that are supported in the record.   
    Id.
       The PCRA
    provides no absolute right to a hearing and the post-conviction court may
    elect to dismiss a petition after thoroughly reviewing the claims presented
    and determining that they are utterly without support in the record. 
    Id.
    Because a majority of Appellant’s claims challenge the stewardship of
    trial counsel, we apply the following principles. The law presumes counsel
    has rendered effective assistance.      Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    10 A.3d 1276
    , 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). The burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness
    rests on Appellant.   
    Id.
       To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead and
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) his underlying claim is
    of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel
    did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests;
    -4-
    J-S50036-17
    and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonably probability
    that the outcome of the challenged proceedings would have been different.”
    Commonwealth v. Fulton, 
    830 A.2d 567
    , 572 (Pa. 2003).                 Failure to
    satisfy any prong of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim.     Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    811 A.2d 994
    , 1002 (Pa. 2002).
    Within his brief, Appellant fails to develop any meaningful argument
    regarding his ineffectiveness claims and the tripartite test stated above. In
    fact, other than a “Summary of Argument,” which essentially restates his
    ineffectiveness claims, and asserts several more, see Appellant’s Brief at 1,
    Appellant provides no supporting argument. This Court has stated:
    While this [C]ourt is willing to liberally construe materials filed by
    a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any
    particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training. As our
    supreme court has explained, any layperson choosing to
    represent [himself] in a legal proceedings must, to some
    reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise
    and legal training will prove [his] undoing.
    Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    685 A.2d 1011
    , 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996)
    (internal punctuation modified; citation omitted).          The Rivera panel
    reiterated that “we decline to become the appellant’s counsel. When issues
    are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly
    inadequate to present specific issues for review[,] a Court will not consider
    the merits thereof.” 
    Id.
     Stated differently, Appellant has failed to provide
    -5-
    J-S50036-17
    this Court with a brief that would permit us to conduct meaningful appellate
    review. Thus, we hold that Appellant has waived all the above claims.
    Recognizing his failure to provide an argument section, Appellant has
    filed an application to amend his brief, in which he includes one.      The
    Commonwealth opposes Appellant’s application.     We deny the application.
    Nevertheless, even were we to grant it, we would still find waiver based
    upon the scant and irrelevant citations put forth by Appellant.         See
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 924 (Pa. 2009) (explaining
    when “an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with
    citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other
    meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”) (citation
    omitted).
    Application to Amend denied. Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/27/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1917 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 9/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2017