State v. Garrison ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
AUGUST 1997 SESSION
February 27, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * C.C.A. No. 03C01-9702-CC-00047
*
Appellee, * BLEDSOE COUNTY
*
VS. * Hon. Thomas W . Graham, Judge
*
JOHN C. GARRISON, * (Solicitation to Commit First Degree
* Murder)
Appellant. *
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Gregory P. Isaacs John Knox Walkup
280 One Centre Square Attorney General and Reporter
P.O. Box 2448
Knoxville, TN 37901-2448 Michael J. Fahey, II
(on appeal) Assistant Attorney General
425 Fifth Avenue North
Thomas N. DePersio 2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building
136 S. Illinois Avenue Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Suite 104
Oak Ridge, TN 37830 James W. Pope
(at trial) Assistant District Attorney General
First American Bank Building
Dayton, TN 37321
OPINION FILED:__________________
REVERSED AND REMANDED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The defendant, John C. Garrison, was convicted of solicitation to
commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a Range II
sentence of sixteen years to be served consecutively to a sentence in Knox County
for two counts of theft over ten thousand dollars. The defendant was fined twenty-
five thousand dollars.
In this appeal of right, the defendant presents the following issues for
our review:
(I) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
conviction for solicitation to commit first degree murder;
(II) whether the defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel under the state and federal
constitutions;
(III) whether the defendant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel because of the failure to
communicate a plea offer;
(IV) whether the solicitation statute, on its face and as
applied by the trial court, is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad; and
(V) whether the trial court improperly charged the jury
that the defendant was eligible to receive a sentence of
12 to 20 years as a multiple, Range II offender.
Because we have determined there to be prejudicial error, we must
reverse the judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
The state charged that the defendant, while in prison on prior theft
convictions, had attempted to arrange the death of Charles Coward, a victim of his
prior crimes. On the morning of trial, May 15, 1995, original defense counsel,
Thomas N. DePersio, asked for a continuance because he had just four days earlier
2
obtained evidence of taped conversations between the defendant and two state
witnesses. According to DePersio, the transcripts were critical in determining
whether the defendant should testify. DePersio argued that he could not
competently represent the defendant because the evidence was so belatedly
provided. In response, the state insisted that DePersio had been notified of the
existence of the evidence as early as December of 1994. The trial court denied the
continuance request.
At trial, Jeff Blevins, an Assistant District Attorney for Knox County,
testified that prior to this trial, in August of 1992, he had prosecuted the defendant
on two charges of theft. In one of the theft cases, the victims were Charles Coward
and Loy Smith, partners of Holston View Farms. The defendant had pled guilty to
the charge. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant was to pay fifteen
thousand dollars in restitution on the day of the plea. At a subsequent hearing, the
defendant was supposed to submit a plan for restitution and receive probation.
Blevins recalled that no plan was ever provided; therefore, the defendant received
an eight-year prison sentence and was ordered to pay forty-one thousand dollars in
restitution. According to Blevins, Coward would have been the state's most
essential witness had the case gone to trial.
On cross-examination, Blevins conceded the defendant had provided
a proposed plan to pay the balance of the restitution, but the state had nonetheless
opposed a sentence of probation. The state rejected offers of two-hundred fifty
dollars and five hundred dollars per month and then sought the maximum sentence
without probation on the premise that the defendant had failed to provide a plan of
3
restitution.1 The trial court denied probation and the defendant was sentenced to
prison.
Coward, the sixty-four-year-old victim of the solicitation, testified that
he and Loy Smith were partners in a several businesses. They co-own and operate
Vend-A-Wash, a coin laundry business in Knoxville; their general business office is
located in a two-story building on Holston Drive and the main laundry site is next
door. In the early 1990's, the office safe was protected by a local rather than a
monitored alarm system. Coward recalled that his custom was to go to nearby
Ruby's Coffee Shop every morning just after 5:00 a.m.; he then traveled by car to
his office, arriving there between 5:44 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Coward testified that he
carried the business proceeds in the trunk of his car and armed himself with a
loaded .38 Chief Special. Generally, no one else arrived at the office until well after
7:00 a.m.
In the summer of 1990, Coward and Smith formed Holston View
Farms, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring land options. The defendant was hired to
acquire those options. The relationship ended about nine months later when
Coward learned that the defendant had stolen a large sum of money. Coward and
Smith hired attorney Herb Moncier to prosecute the defendant for theft, attended
each of the hearings, planned to testify had the case gone to trial, and were
adamantly opposed to the defendant receiving probation. Coward recalled that
defense attorney DePersio had offered a restitution in the sum of fifteen thousand
dollars, paid upon entry of the defendant's guilty plea plus five hundred dollars per
month. Coward and Smith received twelve thousand dollars from the initial
1
The Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently held that the state had reneged on the plea
agreement and remanded for sentencing. On remand, the defendant received two consecutive nine-
year sentences as a Ra nge II multiple offender.
4
payment. Three thousand dollars was divided by two victims of a different theft
committed by the defendant. Coward remembered that both of those victims were
also prepared to testify against the defendant had there not been a guilty plea to the
theft charges.
John Rollyson, a prison inmate serving a seventeen-year sentence for
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, testified that in 1993 he informed Charlie
Scott of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation that the defendant had asked him to
have an unnamed person killed. Another TBI agent contacted Rollyson with a plan
to audiotape a discussion with the defendant.
In their taped discussion, the defendant provided Rollyson with details
about the victim but did not reveal his motive for the killing; without naming the
victim, he described him as a heavy man who went to work at a coin laundry
business in Knoxville at a certain time every morning and stopped along the way to
eat breakfast at the same restaurant. The defendant said that the victim drove a
large older model car, carried a lot of money in his trunk, and kept a gun under the
front seat. He suggested that the victim would be alone in the office during the early
morning hours. The victim was to be robbed and killed, with the robbery proceeds
to be kept by the killer; if the proceeds fell short of ten thousand dollars, the
defendant agreed to pay the difference. The defendant told Rollyson that there was
a safe in the office and little security.
After delivering the tape to prison officials, Rollyson agreed to set up a
meeting between the defendant and his uncle's girlfriend Joanne Kurth, who was to
communicate the plan to Rollyson's uncle. The uncle would perform the killing.
5
At trial, Rollyson testified that he suspected that the defendant was
trying to set a trap because the plan included a killing very similar to the one for
which Rollyson had been convicted. See State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1992); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1994). Rollyson
acknowledged that he had pled guilty and testified for the state against his co-
defendant in the trial of his earlier crime. He also admitted that he had directed the
defendant to fill out a visitation form for the Joanne Kurth meeting scheduled in
September of 1993.
Joanne Schuller, a special undercover TBI agent, testified that she
visited the defendant in September of 1993 posing as Joanne Kurth. The purpose
of the visit was to arrange a murder contract. The agent, who recorded the
conversation, told the defendant that Rollyson had telephoned her. She
acknowledged that she was aware of the defendant's problem and his need for a
solution. In response, the defendant recited a hypothetical situation about a
prisoner who faced an important trial which could result in an acquittal if there were
no witnesses to testify against him. The defendant then described the victim, initially
without naming him, as one who owned coin laundry businesses in Knoxville, with
daily business proceeds of up to ten thousand dollars. He pointed out that the
victim would be alone during certain hours of the day and would have the cash in
the trunk of his car. The defendant told Agent Schuller that he would guarantee any
difference between the amount robbed from the victim and ten thousand dollars.
When the agent asked if they were moving from hypothetical to fact, the defendant
nodded in the affirmative but made no verbal response. Agent Schuller agreed to a
ten thousand dollar fee for the crime with a five hundred dollar advance payment.
The defendant committed to pay any shortage from the robbery through Rollyson
6
and then identified the intended victim as Charlie Coward of Vend-A-Wash in
Knoxville.
Agent Schuller testified that she was aware that Agent Tom
Carmouche, posing as a hit man named Tom Ross, had already spoken with the
defendant at the prison. She did not know that the defendant had contacted Agent
Jenkins about Ross' visit. Agent Schuller described the five hundred dollar advance
as "good faith money" to be paid before the killing. She acknowledged that the
defendant never made the initial payment.
When defense counsel moved for an acquittal at the conclusion of the
state's proof, the trial court initially granted the motion as to the solicitation charge
because there was nothing to show that the contract was complete. Initially, the trial
judge ruled that the evidence was adequate to show that the defendant had
attempted to solicit the murder of Coward, but pointed out that the indictment
alleged a solicitation. After lengthy discussions, the court changed its ruling, holding
that the state's proof would sustain the offense of solicitation to commit first degree
murder.
The defendant's father, David M. Garrison, testified that his son had
experienced financial difficulties for years. He acknowledged that he had paid the
fifteen thousand dollars in restitution for his son's Knox County thefts. He testified
that his son had not requested five hundred additional dollars which might have
been utilized as the advanced payment.
In his trial testimony, the defendant confirmed his history of money
troubles and confessed to his prior convictions for passing bad checks, which
7
included one felony and several misdemeanors. He admitted that he had pled guilty
to two counts of theft for which he initially received consecutive sentences of eight
and six years, later modified to concurrent terms. The defendant, who was serving
that sentence at the time of this charge, appealed on the ground that assistant
district attorney Blevins had breached the plea agreement by opposing probation. A
panel of this court sustained his argument and awarded a new sentencing hearing. 2
The defendant acknowledged his displeasure about the district attorney's office and
revealed that he often talked about his anger to other inmates.
The defendant testified that he spoke about his situation with Jerry
Johns, an inmate who worked in the prison library. Johns, he said, suggested that
his best alternative was a new trial and the absence of critical state witnesses.
While Johns' suggestion surprised and scared the defendant, he did not discontinue
the conversation with Johns until he learned that Johns had a relative who could be
hired to kill. While conceding that he went along, the defendant claimed he never
encouraged Johns to set up a meeting. He insisted that other inmates, including
Rollyson, made similar suggestions. The defendant asserted that he "played along"
by continually expressing dissatisfaction with Coward and those involved in his
prosecution.
The defendant recalled a visit from undercover TBI Agent Tom
Carmouche, who introduced himself as Tom Ross and who described himself as a
hitman. The defendant claimed that he rejected the offer made by "Ross" who, he
claimed, threatened him with harm if he repeated the content of their conversation.
The defendant testified that he informed a guard that his visitor had offered to kill
2
An app eal of that s entenc e is now u nder rev iew by a se parate p anel of this c ourt. State v.
Garrison, C.C.A. No. 03C01-960 1-CR-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App ., at Knoxville, app. pending).
8
someone for money. He recalled that the guard thought he was joking. The
defendant testified that he returned to his cell block and telephoned an attorney,
Steve Irving of Knoxville, to inform him of the incident. The defendant claimed that
he also reported the incident to Lt. Terry Bedwell, a shift officer at the prison.
Bedwell arranged a meeting with Internal Affairs Officer Greg DeLong, who told the
defendant that TBI Agent Jack Jenkins wanted to interview him.
The defendant testified that he gave a statement to Agent Jenkins,
who asked that he try to get Ross to return to the prison. A few days later, the
defendant informed Lawrence Towe, a Knoxville businessman, about the
conversations.
The defendant recalled that Rollyson had informed him of his prior
involvement in a contract killing, a fact he already knew. He stated that he knew
that Rollyson had testified for the state and that Rollyson's co-defendants had
received either death sentences or life terms as a result. The defendant expressed
his belief that Rollyson was attempting to extract money; he testified that he did not
think Rollyson's offer was serious. While Rollyson provided him with instructions on
where to send the five hundred dollars, the defendant confirmed that he did not
send the money.
The defendant acknowledged his meeting with Joanne Kurth in
September of 1993. Following their conversation, he informed Officer Baker and
Officer Michael Holder about her visit and the discussion of contract killing. He
testified that he believed Kurth was trying to scam him for five hundred dollars and
claimed that he never asked his father to provide the advance necessary. The
defendant recalled a separate meeting with Agent Jenkins and Officer DeLong. He
9
told Agent Jenkins that he had had another possible contact but he did not
specifically mention Joanne Kurth's name. The defendant insisted that he did not
intend any harm to Coward, Smith, Blevins, Moncier or either of his other two theft
victims.
On cross-examination, the defendant did not deny making the
statements to Rollyson about Coward and his work habits. He admitted that he was
not working for the TBI on August 26, 1993, when this taped conversation with
Rollyson took place and that he did not specifically inform Agent Jenkins about
Rollyson. While acknowledging that he spoke with Johns about killing Coward,
Smith, and others, he insisted that Johns had approached him with the proposal
and, as a result of their conversation, "Tom Ross" had made his visit. The
defendant claimed that he told Agent Jenkins that there were several individuals
offering to perform the killings and explained that he did not specifically name
Rollyson or Kurth.
Officer Michael Holder, testifying as a defense witness, recalled a
conversation with the defendant on or about September 22 or 23, 1993. They
discussed an event that occurred the previous Sunday in which the defendant
purportedly had a visitor who had offered to "make people disappear." Officer
Holder did not see the visitor.
Lawrence Towe, a friend of the defendant, testified that the defendant
told him that he thought he was being set up because someone had approached
him about a killing. Towe recalled that he did not believe at the time that there was
any substance to the defendant's concern.
10
Thomas Marshall, who was serving a seventeen-year sentence for
aggravated rape at the time of these events, testified that he knew that several
inmates, including Rollyson and Johns, were trying to set up the defendant in an
effort to scam his money. He remembered that while there was talk of contract
killing, the defendant was not taking it seriously.
John Baker, the unit officer for the cell block, recalled that the
defendant asked to see internal affairs about a visit he had from a stranger. A week
or two later, when Officer Baker inquired whether the visitor had returned, the
defendant first replied in the affirmative, and then said, "No, it was a woman this
time." He recalled the defendant saying the woman offered to make a hit. Officer
Baker testified that he did not believe the defendant and did not report the
conversation to anyone.
On redirect by the state, Agent Jenkins testified that the defendant was
not working as a TBI informant, although he seemed to believe that he was. Agent
Jenkins testified that before the arrest, the defendant made no mention of Joanne
Kurth or anyone else other than Johns and that Johns and Rollyson were both
working for TBI at the time. He stated that he had visited twice with the defendant to
keep up the "ruse" and to give the defendant an opportunity to renounce the
solicitation. Agent Jenkins acknowledged that Johns volunteered to work for the TBI
and wanted something in return. He conceded that Rollyson also volunteered to
act on behalf of the TBI. He testified that when the defendant offered to help the
TBI, he had at first tried to dissuade him. When he was unable to do so, Jenkins
testified that he acted as if he accepted the defendant's help.
11
I
The defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. On
appeal, of course, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are
matters entrusted to the jury as triers of fact. Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the
relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn.
1983); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).
At the time of the offense, the crime of solicitation was defined as
follows:
(a) Whoever, by means of oral, written or electronic
communication, directly or through another, intentionally
commands, requests or hires another to commit a
criminal offense ... with the intent that the criminal
offense be committed, is guilty of the offense of
solicitation.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102. In State v. Lee, 618 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1981), this court determined that the elements of solicitation consist of (1) the
intent that a criminal offense be committed; and (2) a "willful communication of ...
that intent to another in the form of a solicitation, request, command or hiring." The
Sentencing Commission Comments provide that the "defendant must intentionally
try to enlist another in criminal activity and must intend that the offense be
committed." The legislative intent is to punish those who instigate group criminal
activity.
12
Here, of course, the defendant was charged with solicitation of first
degree murder. At the time of this offense, first degree murder was defined as "[a]n
intentional, premeditated and deliberate killing of another...." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
13-202(a) (Supp. 1993). "Intentional" is the culpable mental state which "refers to a
person who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a result
of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a). Premeditation is a
previously formed design or intent to kill. State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 147
(Tenn. 1992). Deliberation was defined at the time as cool purpose, when a killing is
other than one made in a momentary state of passion. Id.In our view, the state's evidence, accredited by the jury, is sufficient to
support solicitation to commit intentional, premeditated and deliberate killing. Taken
in a light most favorable to the state, the taped conversation between Agent Schuller
and the defendant established an intentional communication in the form of a request
to commit the murder of the victim Coward. The state's proof indicated the
defendant’s previously formed design to kill, an intent to cause the death of the
victim, and the defendant's cool purpose. By accrediting that evidence, a rational
jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
II
At his motion for new trial, the defendant contended that his trial
counsel was ineffective because he conducted "virtually no investigation," failed to
pursue discovery from the state, failed to file notice of an affirmative defense, failed
to maintain communication with the defendant, failed to review the state's evidence
with the defendant prior to trial, failed to interview witnesses, failed to keep
scheduled appointments, and was generally unprepared to proceed on the day of
13
trial. The defendant argues that these shortcomings, partly attributable to trial
counsel's struggle with alcohol3 and depression, deprived the defendant of his right
to effective counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant
argues trial counsel's representation fell below the standards set forth in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and the ABA Standards of Criminal Justice.
The state asserts that the performance of trial counsel was not deficient and even if
it was, that the defendant has failed to show prejudice.
Represented by new counsel at the hearing on the motion for new trial,
the defendant offered proof of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness through letters, the
transcript of the motion to continue the trial, and the testimony of his trial counsel.
While the defendant did not testify at the hearing, he submitted an affidavit in
support of his motion for new trial. The affidavit was not included in this record.
A lawyer in trial counsel's firm wrote a letter to the defendant one
month before trial which began:
Dear Mr. Garrison:
I am sorry to have to be writing this letter to you; I
really thought Mr. DePersio would be able to handle your
case in Bledsoe County.
He was out of the office for about a month
suffering from depression and returned several weeks
ago and seemed to be doing well. Last week he suffered
another bout of depression and is out of the office again.
For this reason, I would recommend that you obtain other
counsel for the Bledsoe case. If you will notify us of your
new counsel, we will send the pertinent portions of Tom's
file....
The defendant responded as follows:
3
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that trial counsel was intoxicated during the
trial.
14
...You and [] have been my only sources of information
and unfortunately you have been hindered by Tom’s lack
of action. I appreciate your help. While I wish Tom only
the best, I am certainly disappointed that he has become
so ineffective. ... Nor am I happy to find that the lawyer
upon whom I have relied for representation is suddenly
mentally incapacitated some thirty (30) days prior to
trial....
DePersio remained as trial counsel and argued for a continuance on
the morning of trial:
Mr. DePersio: Now then, I very promptly and very early
on in the case filed a motion ... a request for discovery ...
and I signed it on November 9, of 1993 .... In response to
that, I was provided a copy of a transcript of a
conversation between [the defendant] and an undercover
TBI agent by the name of Schuller, who was going under
the name of Kurth, or something to that effect, and that
was all that I was provided.
... I had assumed, and it turns out correctly,
that there had been a number of recorded conversations,
not only involving [the defendant], but involving other
inmates with the TBI agent.
Now, those conversations, the two other
inmates are ... Jerry Johns and ... John Rollyson ....
... [t]he 5th of May, [1995,] I had a
conversation with [District Attorney General] Pope, ... he
advised me that Mr. Jenkins had finally provided the
information and that ... I could come down ... to review
the information. ... It turns out Thursday I had a jury trial.
So May 10 was when was available. ... [I] met with Mr.
Pope ... and reviewed the information.
Now, there were a number of cassette
tapes, six to eight tapes, and admittedly, I listened to one
and said, you know, I'm not going to listen to the others,
to see if they would be consistent with the transcriptions,
and I don't know if that's the same manila envelope I
looked at, but on the outside of the envelope that had the
tapes, had highlighted in red which tapes were
transcribed. None of the highlights, as I recall, included
any conversations other than the Schuller conversation,
which I already had, that involved [the defendant]....
So I scanned the stuff coming back in the
car from Dayton, but really did not have a great deal of
time, because I had the jury trial Thursday ... on Friday
the 12th [of May, 1995,] ... was when I first realized that
there were two significant recorded and transcribed
conversations involving [the defendant] and the inmates
... Johns ... and ... Rollyson.
15
... [T]he conversations of [the defendant]
were vitally important, and I should have had those a real
long time ago.
Now, what it comes down to then is Friday,
our strategy basically has changed somewhat in that now
we're confronted with this information, and we have to
deal with it somehow or another. Now, I had made
arrangements to visit with [the defendant] on Saturday,
but I was unable to do that as a result of my office
schedule. And then I did go down later yesterday
afternoon, but it was Mother's Day and it was also my
son's birthday. By the time I was able to get there, I only
had enough time to leave the statements with the prison
authorities to deliver to [the defendant] for him to have
the opportunity to review just last night. So he and I
haven't even discussed them....
... You know, I don't see that he could ... be
competently represented, this information just coming to
me in such a short time prior to trial, or that he could be
effectively represented, not having the ability to prepare
regarding those statements.
***
General Pope: ... I believe back in December of '94, I
gave him discovery and told him that he could come and
look at my files at any time.... I said, you know, I've still
got this stuff here, you’re welcome to come see it, and he
said, ["]Fine, I'll come see it in January,["] and Mr.
DePersio didn’t come in January. And then I contacted
him before this trial again [to ask] if he was going to
come see it and he said yes, and that's when he came....
Trial counsel admitted being asked by the defendant whether he was
prepared to try the case. While revealing that he had replied in the affirmative, trial
counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he had not fulfilled his
personal standards for representation. The following exchange occurred at the
hearing:
The Court: ... [Y]ou know how much time you spent on
this case .... I want to know ... do you believe, looking
back on your mental condition leading up to this trial and
way that the trial ultimately got to the point of being
handled ... looking at the preparation, do you think ... you
provided within a reasonable degree of professional care,
that you held up to your duty ... to prepare an adequate
defense?
Trial Counsel: ... I believe [my] efforts ... met that
requirement, but ... it was not something that I was
particularly pleased with as far as, you know, myself....
16
The Court: So you'll admit ... you don't think you met your
own [personal] standards in this case?
Trial Counsel: No, I don't.
Trial counsel also testified that he had practiced law for eighteen years
and had conducted more than one hundred fifty jury trials on charges ranging from
misdemeanors to murder. He had previously represented the defendant for the
Knox County thefts. He recalled that for this solicitation charge, he had first
contacted the defendant after he was indicted by the grand jury in mid-October of
1993 and, during the twenty months until trial, had met with the defendant on only
four occasions for no more than six hours. He acknowledged scheduling but failing
to attend sixteen or more other appointments with the defendant, explaining that he
did not feel like traveling or he did not feel like a meeting. Trial counsel conceded
that he was suffering from depression and alcohol problems and, in the months prior
to trial, had been arrested for DUI and had lost his driving privileges. Trial counsel
kept no time records and had no idea how much time he had spent on this case.
Trial counsel testified that the defendant was genuinely concerned
about whether there had been an adequate investigation. He acknowledged that in
April of 1995 he saw a psychiatrist, received a prescription, and was using an anti-
depressant during the defendant's trial.
Trial counsel remembered that most of his preparation occurred
between May 10 and May 15, 1995. He described his strategy at trial as an attempt
to convince the jury that the defendant was simply "playing along" with the killing for
hire scheme. He testified that he did not intend to put on evidence of entrapment or
renunciation of the solicitation because he did not think there was evidence of
either; he did, however, concede that he requested an instruction on renunciation to
17
"cover bases." Trial counsel explained, "I didn't see entrapment as working,
because [the defendant] is the one offering the money.... Renunciation seemed
senseless, because there was no proof of that."
Trial counsel stated that he was satisfied with the number and content
of his meetings with the defendant. He could not recall any favorable witnesses that
he failed to utilize and did not think it essential to discuss the content of the tapes of
conversations with the defendant prior to trial even though the defendant would
likely have to explain the contents if he chose to testify at trial. Trial counsel
acknowledged that he had an opportunity to review these statements with the
defendant between the first and second days of the trial but did not.
Trial counsel remembered that he asked for a continuance on the
morning of trial but he could not recall why:
You know, I discuss in there that my strategy has
changed and I don't know if that was, I can't honestly say
whether or not that's kind of huffing sort of like a used car
salesman.... [The defendant] asked me if I was ready to
go to trial and ... I sensed some discomfort...."
He revealed that he was provided with transcripts on May 10, 1995, five days before
the trial, and that he left them at the prison for the defendant on the night before
trial. During argument for a continuance, trial counsel had said, "I haven't even
discussed [the transcripts] with him. ... [H]e and I haven't discussed it at all."
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel described his statement in
support of the continuance as "huffing, something that is neither honest nor
dishonest.... [I]t seemed like a reasonable explanation to approach the Court ...
saying, look we just got this information.... [I]f there was a strategy change it would
have been a slight strategy change, but a strategy change nonetheless...." Of the
18
tapes and transcripts, trial counsel stated, "they were not significant. They were
significant in the context of the requests for a continuance, so yes, they were
significant, but as it related to the trial of the matter itself on the merits, they were
not significant in the way I looked at the case. I might have looked at the case
wrong." Trial counsel admitted that he never reviewed the original tape recordings
in their entirety to verify the authenticity of the transcripts.
Trial counsel testified that he was unaware that the defendant had
unsuccessfully attempted to make contact by telephoning his office on fifty-nine
occasions in October of 1993. He acknowledged that he did not spend a significant
amount of time counseling the defendant during the trial. While asserting that the
defendant never sought his withdrawal as counsel, trial counsel concluded that the
defendant did inquire as to his readiness for trial. Trial counsel testified that he
never had any reason to question or investigate the defendant's mental stability or
competency. He acknowledged that he still took an anti-depressant drug and
continued to practice law.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial holding in
part as follows:
This Court finds the representation of Thomas DePersio,
while not meeting the highest standards with regard to
pre-trial communication and preparation, did not deny the
Defendant a fair trial and that there was full airing of the
relevant facts and a full confrontation with State
witnesses, upon which the jury in this case could and did
make a fair and impartial decision.... [I]t is not shown that
any shortcomings of counsel, while regrettable, actually
resulted in a failure to present any particular witness or
defense which deprived this Defendant of a fair trial.
In order to establish that his counsel was ineffective, the defendant
must show that the advice given or services rendered were not within the range of
19
competence of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn.
1975). He must also establish that but for his counsel's deficient performance, the
results of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
The burden is on the defendant to show that the evidence
preponderates against the findings of the trial judge who, in this instance, found in
favor of the state. State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991); Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The findings in
the trial court on questions of fact may not be reversed on appeal unless the
evidence preponderates otherwise. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d at 224; Graves v.
State, 512 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
In Strickland, the court described the burden of proof as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or ... sentence resulted from a breakdown in
the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
To establish prejudice, the evidence stemming from failure to prepare
a sound defense or present witnesses must be significant, but it does not
necessarily follow that the trial should have otherwise resulted in an acquittal. Id. at
2071; see Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1985); Code v. Montgomery,
20
799 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1986). In Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4 (Tenn. 1982), our
supreme court made the following pronouncements:
Although ... we adopted a higher standard of
competence for the legal representation required in
criminal cases, we did not require perfect representation.
Moreover, the defense attorney's representation, when
questioned, is not to be measured by "20-20 hindsight."
***
It cannot be said that incompetent representation has
occurred merely because other lawyers, judging from
hindsight, could have made a better choice of tactics....
[W]e know that a criminal trial is a very dramatic, vibrant
and tense contest involving many variables and that
counsel must make quick and difficult decisions
respecting strategy and tactics which appear proper at
the time but which, later, may appear to others, or even
to the trial lawyer himself, to have been ill-considered.
Id. at 9-10. In Hellard, our supreme court adopted the rationale of United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.Cir. 1973):
This court does not sit to second guess strategic and
tactical choices made by trial counsel. However, when
counsel's choices are uninformed because of inadequate
preparation, a defendant is denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
The Standards for Criminal Justice describe the duty to investigate as follows:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits
of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.
The investigation should include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities....
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 4-4.1(a) (3d ed. 1993). Comments to this
section provide as follows:
Facts form the basis of effective representation.
Effective representation consists of much more than the
advocate's courtroom function per se. Indeed, adequate
investigation may avert the need for courtroom
confrontation. Considerable ingenuity may be required to
locate [witnesses] .... The resources of scientific
laboratories may be required .... Neglect of any of these
steps may preclude the presentation of an effective
defense.
21
The prosecutor and law enforcement agencies are
important sources of information often needed by the
defense lawyer.... Defense counsel should urge the
prosecutor to disclose facts even though defense
counsel must then proceed to verify them.
***
Effective investigation by the lawyer has an
important bearing on competent representation at trial,
for without adequate investigation the lawyer is not in a
position to make the best use of such mechanisms as
cross-examination or impeachment of adverse witnesses
at trial .... The effectiveness of advocacy is not to be
measured solely by what the lawyer does at the trial;
without careful preparation, the lawyer cannot fulfill the
advocate's role....
Commentary, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (emphasis added).
In our view, the performance of trial counsel was deficient by his failure
to adequately investigate portions of the proof and maintain communication with his
client. The kind and quality of representation afforded the defendant prior to trial do
no honor to the bench, the bar, or the criminal justice system. Thus, the question
becomes whether the defendant was prejudiced by these deficiencies:
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine
whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. In making that
determination, the court should keep in mind that
counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing
professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing
process work in the particular case.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
There must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
unprofessional error, "the result of the proceeding would have been different," not
that it necessarily would have been different. Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. The
probable result need not be an acquittal. A reasonable probability of being found
22
guilty of a lesser charge, or a shorter sentence, satisfies the second prong in
Strickland. See Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d at 225 (citing Chambers v. Armontrout,
907 F.2d 825, 832 (8th Cir. 1990)).
While trial counsel was ineffective because he performed "virtually no
investigation," the defendant in our view has been unable to demonstrate how more
extensive investigation of the facts would have benefitted the defense theory at trial.
Certainly, the defendant has been unable to present new witnesses that would have
been helpful to his defense theory. In that regard, the evidence does not
preponderate against the findings of the trial judge. Moreover, the defendant has
not established that knowledge of the tapes, if discovered earlier, or a more
intensive review of the content would have changed the result of his trial. The
defendant has not established that his trial would have been different had trial
counsel promptly traveled to Dayton in December of 1994 to retrieve the evidence of
taped conversations between the defendant and inmates Rollyson and Johns.
Rollyson testified at trial and was subjected to a probing cross examination. Johns
was not called as a witness. The tape recorded conversations at issue were never
entered into evidence. Thus, the defendant was not actually prejudiced by trial
counsel's lack of diligence in timely reviewing the content of the tapes or by his
failure to timely and adequately prepare the defendant to testify about their content.
Trial counsel failed to file notice of affirmative defenses of entrapment
or renunciation of his solicitation. Instead, his strategy was to contest the culpability
of his client; he asserted that the defendant lacked the requisite mens rea for
solicitation in that he did not intend for anyone to be killed and did not consummate
his bargain by payment of the "advance money." At the new trial hearing, trial
23
counsel was questioned about the impact late discovery had on his defense
strategy:
Appellate counsel: Isn't it true that the Rollyson's
transcript was important, because Rollyson was the first
person that talked to [the defendant] and after Rollyson
you had the TBI undercover agents? So evaluating an
entrapment defense or assessing other avenues to
proceed, Rollyson was pretty important, correct?
Trial counsel: I didn't see an entrapment defense there.
Appellate counsel: Well, and you testified during direct
that your strategy was, we did it. Isn't it true in court that
you asked the judge for a renunciation instruction?
Trial counsel: I don't recall and I don't deny that. That
sounds accurate.
Appellate counsel: And isn't it true that you never filed a
notice, that you were using affirmative defense of
renunciation that's required?
Trial counsel: I don't recall. That sounds accurate.
Appellate counsel: Do you think if you had looked at this
information a little sooner that you might have talked to
[the defendant] and listened to the tapes and you may
have filed a notice of renunciation instead of bringing it
up during the middle of trial?
Trial counsel: No. I don't know. I don't think so, because
the renunciation, in effect, was contrary to our strategy,
because how could you renounce something that you
had never voluntarily entered into?
In hindsight, the entrapment defense or one of renunciation might appear to be a
plausible defense theory. Yet the proof at the motion for new trial did not establish
to the satisfaction of the trial judge a reasonable probability that an entrapment or
renunciation defense would have changed the result of trial. There has been no
offer of proof as to what facts would support an entrapment defense and the
defendant's own testimony belies a claim of renunciation. Thus, despite our
conclusion that trial counsel was deficient by his performance, the evidence offered
at the hearing on the motion for new trial simply does not preponderate against the
findings made by the trial court that no prejudice resulted.
The letter from trial counsel's law partner advising the defendant to
retain other counsel is troubling. The state points out that trial counsel returned to
24
the office days after that letter was written and, therefore, had adequate time to
prepare for trial. Trial counsel's explanation that he was merely “huffing” at the time
of the continuance request because he thought the defendant was uncomfortable
and wanted a delay is also of concern. The prolonged absence of trial counsel from
his work due to depression or excessive alcohol use would warrant circumspection.
Again, however, the defendant has been unable to establish how trial counsel's
absence from his office adversely affected the results of his trial.
III
Next, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to communicate a plea offer to the defendant prior to trial. The
state contends that the defendant would not have accepted the offer anyway; thus,
there was no prejudice to the defendant.
An attorney is required to promptly communicate a plea offer to a
client. See State v. Rubio, 746 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice advise attorneys to communicate plea offers
promptly and fully:
(a) Defense counsel should keep the accused
advised of developments arising out of plea discussions
conducted with the prosecutor.
(b) Defense counsel should promptly
communicate and explain to the accused all significant
plea proposals made by the prosecutor.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-6.2. The Commentary makes the following
emphasis:
[T]he lawyer has the duty to communicate fully to the
client the substance of [plea] discussions.... [T]he client
should be given sufficient information to participate
intelligently in the decision whether to accept or reject a
plea proposal. It is important that the accused be
informed both of the existence and the content of
proposals made by the prosecutor; the accused, not the
25
lawyer, has the right to decide whether to accept or reject
a prosecution proposal, even when the proposal is one
that the lawyer would not approve. If the accused's
choice on the question of a guilty plea is to be an
informed one, the accused must act with full awareness
of the alternatives, including any that arise from
proposals made by the prosecutor.
Prior to trial, trial counsel had approached the District Attorney to ask if
there was any possibility of a settlement. The state responded with an offer of
Range I, ten years, consecutive to the Knox County sentences for theft. At the new
trial hearing trial counsel testified, "We weren't inclined to accept it ... our feelings
were we needed to come out clean on this for Knox County."4 He recalled that the
defendant had told him he could not enter a plea agreement and, in consequence,
he never communicated the offer to the defendant prior to trial. During jury
deliberations or sometime after conclusion of the trial, trial counsel informed the
defendant of the plea offer; his recollection of the conversation was that the
defendant said he would not have accepted the proposal but did recognize the
failure in communication as a possible basis for a new trial. Trial counsel signed an
affidavit containing the following assertion:
Shortly before trial of this cause, I spoke with
Assistant District Attorney Pope[] concerning a potential
plea agreement in this case. Assistant District Attorney
Pope communicated to me a plea offer of 10 years
Range I, standard, if Mr. Garrison pled to all counts of
the indictment.
Although I met with Mr. Garrison prior to the trial of
this cause, I never related to him the offer given to me by
Assistant District Attorney Pope.
Mr. Garrison never learned of the State's offer
until after the trial of the matter had been concluded.
4
In theory, an acquittal in this case and an enforcement of the original plea agreement in the
Knox C ounty theft c ases c ould hav e resulted in probation for the de fendan t. See State v. Garrison,
No. 03C01-9305-CR-00169 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 10, 1995) (reversing and remanding
for rese ntencing ), app. pending, State v. Garrison, No. 03C01-9601-CR-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App., at
Knoxv ille, no date).
26
Trial counsel testified that he did not believe he had a professional
duty to inform the defendant of the plea offer. He conceded, however, that clients
often changed their minds on guilty pleas and acknowledged having reached an
agreement through negotiation even when the first offer was unacceptable. He
recalled that, in this instance, the District Attorney made it clear that this was a take
it or leave it offer subject to no further negotiations. Ultimately, the defendant
received a sixteen-year sentence, six years more than the state's pretrial offer.
In its denial of the motion for a new trial, the trial court made the
following observations:
With regard to the failure to communicate the
State's plea offer, this Court finds that the Defendant had
communicated to his attorney early on and throughout
his discussions that he would not negotiate a plea. The
Court would further note that this particular Defendant
was quite familiar with the plea bargaining process,
having entered into many pleas over the preceding
decade, including four felony pleas.... It should be noted
that there is no reason to believe nor proof presented
that this Defendant would have accepted the ten (10)
year sentence offered by the State a few days before
trial. The very fact that Defendant did not even inquire
about a possible plea offer until after the trial was in the
hands of the jury, given this Defendant's familiarity with
the system, is a telling point for this Court.
The question for this court is whether counsel's failure to communicate
a plea offer prior to trial qualified as ineffective assistance even though the
defendant had earlier instructed that he would not enter a plea agreement.
In Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994), the supreme
court ruled that trial counsel's failure to communicate a plea bargain offer to the
defendant prior to trial qualified as ineffective assistance of counsel. In that case,
defense counsel representing a client charged with assault with intent to commit
27
murder received an offer from the state for a Range I sentence of five years with no
probation or community corrections alternatives. Id. at 663. The defendant
proceeded to trial with no knowledge of the plea offer. Id. He was tried, found
guilty, and sentenced to thirty-five years as a Range II offender. Id. The supreme
court remanded the case with instructions that the state reinstate its original plea
offer for good faith negotiations. Id. at 667. If the parties failed to reach an
agreement, or if the trial judge would not approve it, the defendant would receive a
new trial. Id.The state seeks to distinguish Harris because the defendant here
instructed his counsel that he would not agree to enter a plea of guilt. The state
also points out that in Harris, the offer was thirty years less than the actual sentence;
here, the offer and the sentence differ by only six years.
In Harris, our supreme court found ineffective assistance of counsel
where there was a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and
client:
This standard of proving prejudice requires only a
showing of 'a reasonable probability ... sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.' There is no
doubt that the prejudice suffered by defendant was the
direct result of failure on the part of defense counsel to
discuss the plea bargain offer with his client and his
failure to respond timely to the State's offer.
Id. at 665. According to the court, the record in Harris demonstrated both
incompetence and prejudice. Id. The trial judge observed, "There is no question
that the defendant was denied the opportunity of accepting or rejecting the plea and
that there is a great chasm or gap in the sentence of five (5) years in the plea offer
and the thirty-five (35) years imposed by the Court." Id. at 664. Harris had argued
that failure to communicate the plea offer was deficient representation and that the
28
disparity in the two sentences was manifestly prejudicial. Our supreme court did
not, however, expressly address how Harris had satisfied the prejudice prong
required under the Strickland rule. See State v. Lester D. Herron, C.C.A. No.
03C01-9109-CR-00284, slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 10,
1992) (holding failure of counsel to preserve defendant's right to appellate review
did not require showing of prejudice before a delayed appeal could be granted). Nor
did the court base its conclusion on any assertion by the petitioner that he would
have accepted the plea offer had he known about it. Harris, 875 S.W.2d at 665; cf.
Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201,1206 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding the defendant
must prove that but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability he would
have accepted the guilty plea offer). In fact, the record established that Harris had
already rejected an offer of a Range I, nine-year sentence. Harris, 875 S.W.2d at
664.
Moreover, a plea agreement is not enforceable until approved by the
trial court. Id. at 666. In Harris, the post-conviction trial judge clearly stated on the
record that he would not have approved a five-year sentence due to the "aggravated
facts" of the case. Id. at 664. Nonetheless, our supreme court reversed the
conviction and remanded the cause with instructions that the state reinstate its
original guilty plea offer and otherwise negotiate in good faith. If an agreement
could not be reached by the parties and then approved by the trial judge, the case
would proceed to trial. Id. at 665, 667.
In our view, Harris controls. Trial counsel's failure to communicate the
plea offer to the defendant requires a grant of relief despite the trial court's
conclusion, based upon trial counsel's testimony, that the defendant would not likely
have accepted the offer anyway. The state must reinstate its original guilty plea
29
offer and negotiate in good faith. Should the parties fail to reach a plea agreement
or should the trial court refuse to approve it, there shall be a new trial.
IV
The defendant makes a general challenge to the constitutionality of
the solicitation statute and also argues that it was unconstitutionally applied by the
trial court in the instructions to the jury. The defendant also complains that the
statute in question is vague and overbroad. The state disagrees.
Initially, trial courts are charged with upholding the constitutionality of
statutes where possible. Dykes v. Hamilton County, 191 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tenn.
1945); State v. Joyner, 759 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). The
constitutional test for vagueness is whether a statute's prohibitions are not clearly
defined and thus are susceptible to different interpretations as to what conduct the
statute actually proscribes. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 447-48 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294,
2298 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1320 (1964). In
contrast, the constitutional test for overbreadth is whether the statute's language
overreaches unlawful conduct and encompasses activity that is constitutionally
protected. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d at 448; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114-15, 92 S. Ct. at
2302-03. Under our principles of due process, an overbroad or vague statute is
vulnerable to a constitutional challenge because it (1) fails to provide fair notice that
certain activities are unlawful; and (2) fails to establish reasonably clear guidelines
for law enforcement officials and courts, which in turn invites arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 448; see Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48, 49-50, 96 S. Ct. 243, 243-44 (1975); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94
S. Ct. 1242, 1246-47 (1974).
30
The statute challenged by the defendant provides as follows:
(a) Whoever, by means of oral, written or
electronic communication, directly or through another,
intentionally commands, requests or hires another to
commit a criminal offense, or attempts to command,
request or hire another to commit a criminal offense, with
the intent that the criminal offense be committed, is guilty
of the offense of solicitation.
(b) It is no defense that the solicitation was
unsuccessful and the offense solicited was not
committed....
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102.
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague where the "meaning of the
statutory provision is clear and unambiguous [and a]ny person of ordinary
intelligence would have no difficulty in discerning the proscribed activity." State v.
Ash, 729 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986); see United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812 (1954); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S.
399, 402-403, 86 S. Ct. 518, 520-521 (1966). To establish that a statute is
overbroad, one must demonstrate from the "text of the law and actual fact that there
are a substantial number of instances where the law cannot be applied
constitutionally." State v. Lyons, 802 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tenn. 1990); New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988)
(citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973)).
In our view, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad. Initially, the
terms are clear and unambiguous, provide reasonable notice of what conduct is
prohibited, and satisfy the requirements of due process. Secondly, we reject the
defendant's claim that "[t]he mental gymnastics are endless if on[e] tries to define an
'attempted solicitation' which is apparently two steps removed from the underlying
substantive offense which never happened." Because the defendant is not charged
with attempted solicitation, he has no standing to challenge that portion of the
31
statute. "[A] person has no standing to contest the constitutionality of a statutory
provision unless the provision[] he claims to be deficient has been used to deprive
him of his rights." State v. Purkey, 689 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984);
State v. Vanzant, 659 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Pritchett, 621
S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1981). Moreover, the defendant has failed to provide examples
of law and fact that demonstrate how the statute infringes on lawful, constitutionally
protected activity.
Finally, the defendant alleges that the statute is unconstitutional as
applied because the trial court revised its language in providing the jury instructions
in an effort to resolve what it perceived to be an ambiguity. The state points out that
the statute merely provides various alternative methods of accomplishing solicitation
and that the court simply tailored its instruction to more closely coincide with the
indictment. The indictment provides as follows:
[The defendant] on the ___ day of September, 1993, in
Bledsoe County ... did unlawfully, intentionally, and by
means of oral communication request and solicit one
Joanne Schuller to commit the criminal offense of First
Degree Murder on the person of Charles Coward with the
intent on the part of the said [defendant] that the said
offense of First Degree Murder so requested and
solicited be committed ....
The trial judge charged the jury, in pertinent part, as to the essential elements of
solicitation:
That the Defendant by means of oral, written, or
electronic communications directly or through another,
requested another to commit the offense of first degree
murder of Charles Coward with the intent that the offense
of first degree murder be committed.
A person is guilty of solicitation "who[], by means of oral written or electronic
communication, directly or through another, intentionally commands, requests or
hires another to commit a criminal offense, or attempts to command, request or hire
another to commit a criminal offense, with the intent that the criminal offense be
32
committed ...." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102(a) (emphasis added). The offense of
solicitation requires "(1) the intent that a criminal offense be committed; and (2) the
willful communication of ... that intent to another in the form of a solicitation, request,
command, or hiring." Lee, 618 S.W.2d at 324 (emphasis added).5 By comparing
the language of the statute to the jury instruction, we conclude that the trial court
omitted the mens rea of intent which necessarily modifies request.
The trial judge is under a constitutional obligation to "declare the law"
in the jury instructions. Tenn. Const., art VI, § 9. The trial judge has a duty to give a
complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Harbison,
704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986). It is presumed that the jury follows the
instructions of the trial court. State v. Blackmon, 701 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1985); Klaver v. State, 503 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). Our
supreme court requires a review of the jury charge in its entirety in order to
determine if instructions are erroneous. State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352
(Tenn. 1997). A charge is prejudicial error "if it fails to fairly submit the legal issues
or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law." Id. Our law requires that all of the
elements of each offense be described and defined in connection with that offense.
State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tenn. 1989).
The trial court omitted the word "intentionally," the mens rea
requirement of the request. This request, an essential element of the charge, must
be purposeful with the aim to accomplish the desired result. In the words of the
5
This articulation of the elements of solicitation interpreted the 1973 version of our statute, see
Tenn. Pub. Acts., ch. 62 (April 4, 1973), which provided: "Whoever, by means of oral, written, or
electronic communication, directly or through another, willfully solicits, commands, requests, or hires
anothe r to com mit a crim inal offens e, or attem pts to solicit, co mm and, req uest, or hire another to
commit a criminal offense, with the intent that the criminal offense solicited be committed is guilty of
the offense of solicitation." However, the statutes are substantially the same with the primary
diffe renc e bein g the repla cem ent o f "willfu lly" with "in tentio nally ."
33
Sentencing Commission the defendant must "intentionally try to enlist another in
criminal activity," as opposed to the making of an inquiry without any serious intent.
The defendant's strategy in defense centered on his lack actual intent. While
conceding that he communicated with Joanne Kurth about hiring someone to kill
Coward, the defendant contended that he was simply playing along and that he
never seriously intended to request the murder of Coward or that Coward be
harmed. In our view, under these facts, the mens rea of the offense was sufficiently
fundamental to the elements of the crime and the defense theory that a failure to
charge the jury that the request must be intentional requires a new trial. The error
here requires that remedy.
V
In his final issue, the defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in
charging the jury as to the appropriate sentencing classification and range of
punishment he could be required to serve if convicted. The trial court charged that
the defendant was a multiple offender and the instruction was based on a Range II
sentence of twelve to twenty years for a Class B felony:
(a) A "multiple offender" is a defendant who has
received:
(1) A minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4)
prior felony convictions within the conviction class, a
higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony
classes....
***
(4) Convictions for multiple felonies committed as part
of a single course of conduct within twenty-four (24)
hours, constitute one (1) conviction for the purpose of
determining prior convictions....
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-106.
At the time of trial, the defendant had two prior Class C felony
convictions resulting from guilty pleas entered in Knox County; these convictions
34
place the defendant within the multiple offender definition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
35-106(a). Although he appealed the sentences, his convictions were the result of
pleas of guilt and would be unaffected by his appeal. The defendant argues that
these convictions were the result of a single course of conduct within twenty-four
hours and should be counted as only one conviction. We disagree. According to
the stipulation of proof entered at the submission hearing, one theft occurred in May
of 1991; the other theft occurred over several months from August of 1990 to May of
1991 and involved numerous unlawful transactions. Thus, the defendant was
properly categorized a multiple offender.
The sentencing range for Range II, multiple offender convicted of
solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony, is not less than twelve
and not more than twenty years. The trial judge properly instructed the jury.
The judgment of the trial court must be reversed. This cause is
remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of the guilty plea offer of Range I, ten
years to be served consecutively to the sentences in Knox County. The state is
directed to negotiate in good faith. If the trial court refuses to approve a plea
agreement, or if no agreement can be reached, the defendant shall receive a new
trial.
__________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
35
CONCUR:
_________________________________
Paul G. Summers, Judge
__________________________________
William M. Barker, Judge
36