Strader v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
OCTOBER 1997 SESSION
January 8, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
RUSSELL STRADER, JR., * C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9611-CC-00433
APPELLANT, * RHEA COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Paul A. Swafford, Jr., Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, * (Post-Conviction)
APPELLEE. *
*
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Russell Strader, Jr. John Knox Walkup
Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter
No. 093164 450 James Robertson Parkway
M.C.R.C.F., P.O. Box 2000 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Wartburg, TN 37887-2000
Timothy F. Behan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
J. Michael Taylor
District Attorney General
Third Floor
First American Bank Building
Dayton, TN 37321
OPINION FILED: ____________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION
The petitioner, Russell Strader, Jr., appeals the trial court's dismissal
of his petition for post-conviction relief. He presents the following issues for our
review:
(I) whether the trial court erred by dismissing the petition
because all of the issues raised had been waived or
previously determined; and
(II) whether the trial court committed certain procedural
errors under the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act
which require a remand.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The petitioner was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and first
degree burglary. The trial court imposed consecutive, Range II sentences of sixteen
and ten years respectively. On June 2, 1993, our court affirmed the judgment.
State v. Russell Strader, Jr., No. 03C01-9206-CR-00217 (Tenn. Crim. App., at
Knoxville, June 2, 1993). An application for appeal to the supreme court was denied
on October 4, 1993. On May 2, 1996, the petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for
post-conviction relief alleging the following grounds for relief:
(a) impermissibly suggestive identification procedures;
(b) ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
(c) prosecutorial misconduct; and
(d) the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Several months later, the trial court granted a motion by the state to dismiss.
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Initially, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred by determining
that all grounds had been either waived or previously determined. We cannot
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agree.
"A ground for relief is previously determined if a court of competent
jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a full and fair hearing." Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-206(h). A "full and fair hearing" occurs if the "petitioner is given the
opportunity to present proof and argument on the petition for post-conviction relief."
House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 714 (Tenn. 1996) (footnote omitted). See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-206(h).
Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, waiver occurs if "the
petitioner personally or through an attorney failed to present [the ground] for
determination in any proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in which the
ground could have been presented." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g). "Waiver in
the post-conviction context is to be determined by an objective standard under
which a petitioner is bound by the action or inaction of his attorney." House, 911
S.W.2d at 714 (footnote omitted).
As to the suggestive identification claim, the petitioner contends that
he was the only individual in the photo lineup who wore a t-shirt decorated with
animal forms. On direct appeal, however, the petitioner argued his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge the pretrial identification. This court ruled as
follows:
Counsel viewed the photographic array presented
to the victim prior to the trial. This evidence was not
introduced during the trial. When the trial judge saw the
photographs introduced into evidence, he commented
that the features of the people depicted in the
photographs were quite similar. This Court reached the
same conclusion after viewing a copy of the
photographs. Thus, challenging the pretrial identification
procedure would have been an effort in futility. The
pretrial identification made at the preliminary hearing was
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also within proper bounds. It was not suggestive.
Counsel is not required to pursue frivolous issues.
Strader, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added). While the prior claim was made in the
context of ineffective assistance, this court has already determined that the
photographic lineup was not impermissibly suggestive. The substantive issue,
therefore, has been previously determined. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206. If we
consider this issue standing alone and not as part of the prior claim of ineffective
assistance, we must also hold that the issue has been waived. Id. It is not
permissible for a defendant in a criminal prosecution to object to the introduction of
evidence at trial on one ground and then later, in a post-conviction claim, assert the
same objection on a different basis. State v. Miller, 668 S.W.2d 281, 285 (Tenn.
1984).
The petitioner also alleged in this proceeding that his counsel was
ineffective at trial in other ways. In our view, this contention has been previously
determined. On direct appeal, the petitioner argued as follows:
[R]etained counsel (a) did not adequately confer with him
prior to trial, (b) did not adequately investigate a potential
alibi defense, (c) did not interview the victim or the
investigating officer, (d) did not properly challenge the
victim's identification ..., (e) did not properly use the
statements made by the victim during his cross-
examination of her, (f) did not object to prejudicial
hearsay testimony related by Deputy Cranfield, and (g)
did not advise the appellant of changes in the law under
which he was sentenced.
Strader, slip op. at 9. This court considered the claims in detail in its prior opinion
and then ruled that the level of service was in compliance with professional
guidelines. Id. at 13. Ineffective assistance of counsel is generally a single ground
for relief under the post-conviction statute. Cone v. State, 927 S.W.2d 579, 581-82
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). "'[T]he fact that such violation may be proved by multiple
acts or omissions does not change the fact that there remains only one ground for
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relief.'" Frank McCray v. State, No. 01C01-9108-CR-00255, slip op. at 10 (Tenn.
Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 11, 1992) (quoting William Edward Blake v. State,
No. 1326, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 19, 1991)). A petitioner
may not relitigate previously determined grounds for relief by presenting additional
factual allegations. Cone, 927 S.W.2d at 581-82. Thus, we must consider this
ground as having been previously determined on the direct appeal. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-30-206.
The petitioner has also alleged three counts of prosecutorial
misconduct. His initial claim is as follows:
The prosecutor failed to make available for inspection by
counsel for petitioner, color photo[s] used in the photo-
array presented to Ms. Scoggins, in violation of the Brady
rule .... Further, prosecutor continued to deny access to
the original color photo[s] on motion for new trial, and did
not produce the original photo[s] in court, after being
requested to do so, thereby causing the court to base
it[s] decision on poor quality, black and white
photocopies.
This contention has also been waived. The pleadings confirm that the petitioner
knew about this possible Brady violation during the motion for new trial and on direct
appeal. By failing to raise this issue at either of those times, the petitioner waived
the issue. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206. A second claim of misconduct is that the
prosecutor "elicited ... improper testimony from police officials." Because this issue
was clearly available on direct appeal but was not pursued, this issue has been
waived. Id.The petitioner also argues prosecutorial misconduct in that the
prosecutor "actually made the in-court identification of the petitioner as [the victim's]
assailant." Our court rejected this issue on direct appeal: "if the conduct of the
assistant district attorney general constituted error, it was harmless ...." Strader, slip
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op. at 7. Thus, this issue qualifies as having been previously determined. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-206.
Finally, the petitioner argues that the consecutive sentences (1) are
excessive and (2) constitute cruel and unusual punishment. On direct appeal, the
petitioner challenged and our court affirmed the imposition of consecutive
sentences:
Based upon a review of the record, the trial court
properly ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively. ... [T]he appellant's lengthy history of prior
convictions and criminal behavior illustrates that the
appellant refuses or is unwilling to conform his conduct to
that of a lawful and productive citizen. ... [H]e has
become more dangerous and brazen as time has
progressed. As a result, a lengthy sentence is needed to
protect the citizens of this state from the appellant.
This issue is without merit.
Strader, slip op. at 8. Thus, the claim that the sentences are excessive has been
previously determined. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206.
The failure to argue on direct appeal that the sentences were cruel and
unusual constitutes a waiver of that particular challenge to the imposition of
consecutive sentences. Id. A waiver occurs when the "petitioner personally or
through an attorney fail[s] to present [the ground] for determination in any
proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in which the ground could have
been presented." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g). Our research indicates that
challenges to sentencing based on cruel and unusual punishment trace back to at
least 1910, when the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment requires that "punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense." Weems v. United States, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549 (1910).
Thus, the claim of cruel and unusual punishment was available to the petitioner and
"could have been presented" on direct appeal. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g).
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The failure to do so constitutes a waiver. Id.In summary, all of the issues in the petition have either been waived or
previously determined. That determination leads us to the inevitable conclusion that
the trial court did not err by dismissing the petition. "If the facts alleged, taken as
true, fail to show that the petitioner is entitled to relief or fail to show that the claims
for relief have not been waived or previously determined, the petition shall be
dismissed." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(f). A colorable claim is "'one that alleges
facts showing that the conviction resulted from an abridgment of a constitutional
right and which demonstrates that the ground for relief was not previously
determined or waived.'" Waite v. State, 948 S.W.2d 283, 284-85 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997) (quoting Hugh Ronald Carmley v. State, No. 03C01-9305-CR-00167, slip op.
at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 13, 1994)). Because this petition failed to
state a colorable claim, there was no error in dismissing it.
Nor did the trial court err by failing to appoint counsel. The trial court
may dismiss without appointing counsel "when ... the petition does not include a
possible ground for relief." Waite, 948 S.W.2d at 284. If it "'appears beyond doubt
that the [petitioner] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief,'" the petition may be summarily dismissed. Id. at 285 (quoting
Swanson v. State, 749 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tenn. 1988)) (alteration in original). By
the terms of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206, "the trial court was obligated to review
the petition and dismiss it without hearing or appointment of counsel if the
allegations in the petition failed to show that any claims for relief have not been
previously waived or determined." Hobert Reece v. State, No. 03C01-9605-CC-
00190, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 14, 1997). In our view, the
trial court did not err by dismissing the petition.
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II
The petitioner next contends the trial court made certain procedural
errors under the new Post-Conviction Procedure Act. First, he complains that the
trial court erred by not reviewing his petition within thirty days and determining
whether it contained a colorable claim. The petitioner correctly notes that Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a) provides as follows:
The trial judge to whom the case is assigned shall, within
thirty (30) days of the filing of the original petition, ...
examine it together with all the files, records, transcripts,
and correspondence relating to the judgment under
attack, and enter an order in accordance with the
provisions of this section or § 40-30-207.
Despite this requirement, by October of 1996 no action had been taken on the
petition, which was filed in May of 1996. On October 7, 1996, the petitioner filed a
petition for writ of mandamus. Two days later, the state filed a motion to dismiss.
Within a week, the trial court entered an order dismissing the petition because each
issue had been previously determined or waived. The petitioner argues that
because the trial judge failed to comply with this provision, "sanctions" are
appropriate.
In State v. Jones, 729 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986), the
defendant complained because the trial court did not conduct a sentencing hearing
within the thirty days required by statute. Our court ruled that the accuracy of the
claim did not mean the defendant was entitled to substantive relief: "it is the general
rule in Tennessee that statutory provisions which relate to the mode or time of doing
an act to which the statute applies are not to be mandatory, but directory only." Id.This general rule is especially applicable where there is no "showing of prejudice."
Big Fork Mining Co., v. Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd., 620 S.W.2d 515, 521
(Tenn. App. 1981). The same rationale would apply here. There has been no
showing that the petitioner was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to act within the
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time frame required by the statute. This issue is without merit.
Next, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred by allowing the
state to file its motion to dismiss before entering a preliminary order. If the trial court
had entered a preliminary order, the state would have thirty days to respond to the
petition. Section 40-30-208(a), Tenn. Code Ann., provides that "the district attorney
general shall represent the state and file an answer ... within thirty (30) days." Also,
our Supreme Court Rules provide the "state shall file an answer or motion to dismiss
within thirty (30) days of the preliminary order." Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 28, § 6(C)(6).
In that regard, the state's motion to dismiss may have been premature; the new Act
contemplates that the state is not required to file an answer until after the
preliminary order is entered.
Nevertheless, the petitioner was not harmed by the state's filing the
motion to dismiss before the trial court entered a preliminary order or dismissed the
case. The pleading was merely superfluous. The trial court was required by statute
to dismiss the petition at the preliminary stage whether a response had or had not
been filed by the state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
__________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge
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CONCUR:
________________________________
David H. Welles, Judge
________________________________
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
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