State of Tennessee v. Helen Ruth Kirby ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                         09/17/2019
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs August 27, 2019
    STATE OF TENNESSEE V. HELEN RUTH KIRBY
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Roane County
    No. 11828 Jeffery Hill Wicks, Judge
    ___________________________________
    No. E2019-00122-CCA-R3-HC
    ___________________________________
    Petitioner, Helen Ruth Kirby, appeals from the summary denial of her petition for writ of
    habeas corpus challenging her guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder.
    Because Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
    MCMULLEN and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.
    Tracey Vought Williams, Petros, Tennessee, for the appellant, Helen Ruth Kirby.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant
    Attorney General; Russell Johnson, District Attorney General; and Robert Edwards,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    Nearly twenty-two years ago, Petitioner was indicted for one count of first degree
    murder for the December 1997 death of her husband, Larry Kirby. According to the
    State’s recitation of the facts, Petitioner shot her husband in the head while he was
    reclined on the couch recuperating from an injury and then staged the scene to look as
    though her husband died in an attempted robbery. On March 20, 2000, Petitioner pled
    guilty to the reduced charge of second degree murder with an agreed Range III sentence
    of 45 years to be served at 100% as a violent offender, less any sentence credits up to
    15%. From the record before this Court, it appears that nothing further happened with
    this case until Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal on November 9, 2006, and an
    original petition for post-conviction relief in this Court, both of which were dismissed for
    lack of jurisdiction on May 7, 2007. On September 6, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of
    appeal with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which was treated as a Tennessee Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 11 application for permission to appeal and was dismissed as
    untimely on September 27, 2007.
    On June 12, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro se “Motion to Modify Judgment,” arguing
    that she should not have been sentenced as a Range III offender because she had no prior
    convictions. On August 24, 2017, the State filed a “Response to the Motion to Modify
    Judgment,” asserting that the motion was untimely as either a Tennessee Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 35 motion for reduction of sentence or as a petition for post-
    conviction relief. On October 23, 2017, the trial court issued an order reviewing the
    complicated procedural history of the case. The trial court noted that Petitioner had filed
    a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 9, 2006,1 that she was appointed
    an attorney in December of that year, and that her post-conviction attorney was
    subsequently disbarred in 2015 without any further action having been taken on her
    petition. The trial court appointed Petitioner’s current appellant counsel to represent
    Petitioner on both her pending motion and petition for post-conviction relief.
    On October 26, 2018, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an “Amended Petition for
    Post-Conviction Relief and Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” As her stated
    grounds for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner asserted that her guilty plea was invalid and
    her conviction void because the trial court failed to substantially comply with Tennessee
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 when accepting her guilty plea and because she did not
    affirmatively admit her guilt during the plea colloquy. Petitioner asserted that these
    failures rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.2 On November 26, 2018,
    the State, through the Attorney General’s Office representing the Tennessee Department
    of Correction,3 filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” asserting
    that Petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The trial court
    summarily dismissed the portion of the petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus on
    December 19, 2018.
    Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on January 17, 2019. On January 18,
    2019, Petitioner filed a motion to stay these appellate proceedings until the resolution of
    1
    This petition is not in the record on appeal.
    2
    Petitioner also challenged the voluntary nature of her guilty plea, as well as raised a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, as grounds for post-conviction relief.
    3
    The State noted in its response that any answer to the post-conviction claims must come from
    the district attorney general’s office.
    -2-
    the post-conviction proceedings in the trial court. This Court denied the motion to stay
    on January 23, 2019.4
    Analysis
    In Tennessee, “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any
    pretense whatsoever . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause
    of such imprisonment and restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101. While there is no statute of
    limitations for filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the grounds upon which relief
    may be granted are narrow. Hickman v. State, 
    153 S.W.3d 16
    , 20 (Tenn. 2004). Habeas
    corpus relief is only available when it appears on the face of the judgment or record of
    the proceedings that the convicting court was without jurisdiction or that the defendant is
    still imprisoned despite the expiration of his sentence. Id.; Archer v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 157
    , 164 (Tenn. 1993). In other words, habeas corpus relief may be granted only when
    the judgment of conviction is void, rather than merely voidable. Summers v. State, 
    212 S.W.3d 251
    , 255 (Tenn. 2007). A void judgment is “one that is facially invalid because
    the court did not have the statutory authority to render such judgment.” 
    Id. at 256
    (citing
    Dykes v. Compton, 
    978 S.W.2d 528
    , 529 (Tenn. 1998)). A voidable judgment is “one
    that is facially valid and requires proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to
    establish its invalidity.” 
    Id. The petitioner
    bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
    that the judgment is void. Wyatt v. State, 
    24 S.W.3d 319
    , 322 (Tenn. 2000). However, if
    the habeas corpus court determines that there is nothing on the face of the judgment to
    indicate that the conviction contained therein is illegal, it may summarily dismiss the
    petition without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing.
    
    Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261
    ; T.C.A. § 29-21-109. Because the issue of whether habeas
    corpus relief should be granted is a question of law, we conduct a de novo review without
    any presumption of correctness given to the decision of the lower court. 
    Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255
    .
    Petitioner argues that the trial court’s failure to substantially comply with
    requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 rendered her guilty plea
    invalid and her subsequent conviction void. However, this Court has repeatedly “held
    4
    In the technical record, which was filed after this Court denied Petitioner’s motion to stay, there
    is an out-of-place page titled “Conclusion” and numbered 5 but with no other header, case number, or
    signature. This page summarizes Petitioner’s mental health history and states, “The statute of limitations
    for filing her petition for post-conviction relief will not be tolled because the petitioner has failed to prove
    that she was or is mentally incompetent.” Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings
    may have been concluded sometime before the technical record was transmitted to this Court on April 22,
    2019. However, this Court has no record of a pending appeal from Petitioner’s post-conviction
    proceedings. This opinion will only address Petitioner’s habeas corpus claims.
    -3-
    that a ‘claim that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of
    Criminal Procedure is an allegation that would render a conviction voidable, not void.’”
    Peter D. Billington v. Shawn Phillips, Warden, No. W2018-01915-CCA-R3-HC, 
    2019 WL 1450394
    , at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2019) (quoting Cedric Jeffries v. Steven
    Dotson, Warden, No. W2009-00816-CCA-R3-HC, 
    2009 WL 4789975
    , at *2 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2009), no perm. app. filed), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 19, 2019).
    Rule 11 is designed “to ensure that guilty pleas are voluntarily, knowingly, and
    intelligently entered.” Lane v. State, 
    316 S.W.3d 555
    , 563 (Tenn. 2010). The Tennessee
    Supreme Court has held that the “[v]oluntariness of the plea . . . has no relevance in a
    habeas corpus proceeding.” 
    Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 259
    (citing 
    Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 164
    ). Moreover, any omission from the required litany of advice is reviewed for
    harmless error. 
    Lane, 316 S.W.3d at 565
    . Thus, a trial court’s failure to fully advise a
    defendant of her constitutional rights prior to accepting a guilty plea “merely renders the
    related judgment voidable rather than void.” State v. Neal, 
    810 S.W.2d 131
    , 134 (Tenn.
    1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Blankenship v. State, 
    858 S.W.2d 897
    , 902
    (Tenn. 1993). Because Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim, the trial court did
    not err in summarily denying habeas corpus relief.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    ____________________________________
    TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE
    -4-