State of Tennessee v. Brandon Shawn Jones ( 2004 )


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  •          IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT KNOXVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs April 20, 2004
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BRANDON SHAWN JONES
    Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
    No. 74736    Richard R. Baumgartner, Judge
    No. E2003-02050-CCA-R3-CD
    May 13, 2004
    The defendant, Brandon Shawn Jones, pled guilty to burglary of a motor vehicle and possession of
    burglary tools. The Knox County Criminal Court ordered the defendant to serve an effective two-
    year sentence with 120 days in confinement followed by probation. The defendant appeals the denial
    of total probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    JOE G. RILEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and THOMAS T.
    WOODALL, JJ., joined.
    Robert W. White, Maryville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brandon Shawn Jones.
    Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michelle R. Chapman, Assistant Attorney General;
    Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General; and Paula R. Ham, Assistant District Attorney
    General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. ABSENCE OF GUILTY PLEA TRANSCRIPT
    The facts and circumstances of the offense were important to the trial court’s sentencing
    determinations; however, the transcript of the guilty plea proceeding is absent from the record. Since
    we deem the guilty plea proceeding material to the determination of the issue presented, our proper
    course of action ordinarily is to sua sponte presume the trial court’s decision is correct. State v.
    Keen, 
    996 S.W.2d 842
    , 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); see also State v. Coolidge, 
    915 S.W.2d 820
    ,
    826-27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (specifically stating that the absence of a portion of the record
    relating to sentencing requires the court to presume the sentence is correct). By failing to produce
    an adequate record, a defendant generally waives any claim that the conclusions of the trial court are
    incorrect. See State v. Ivy, 
    868 S.W.2d 724
    , 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). However, because the
    available record amply supports the sentencing decision of the trial court, we will address the merits
    of the issue raised by the defendant.
    II. SENTENCING HEARING
    The defendant’s presentence report was admitted into evidence during the sentencing hearing.
    The presentence report reflects the defendant has two convictions for simple assault and one
    conviction each for casual exchange of a controlled substance, simple possession of marijuana, and
    possession of burglary tools. The defendant was convicted on all of these offense after he had been
    arrested for the present offenses but prior to sentencing. The assault offenses were committed prior
    to his arrest for the present offenses, while the remaining offenses were committed following his
    arrest for the present offenses.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    An appellate court’s review of a challenged sentence is de novo on the record with a
    presumption the trial court’s determinations are correct. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401
    (d). The
    Sentencing Commission Comments to this section of the statute indicate the defendant bears the
    burden of establishing the sentence is improper. When the trial court follows the statutory sentencing
    procedure and gives due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles relevant to
    sentencing, this court may not disturb the sentence. State v. Fletcher, 
    805 S.W.2d 785
    , 789 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. 1991).
    IV. TOTAL PROBATION
    The defendant contends the trial court erred in denying total probation. A defendant is
    eligible for probation if the sentence received by the defendant is eight years or less, subject to some
    statutory exclusions. 
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303
    (a). An especially mitigated or standard offender
    convicted of a Class C, D or E felony is presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative
    sentencing in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
    Id.
     § 40-35-102(6). However, although a
    defendant may be presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing, the defendant has
    the burden of establishing suitability for total probation. Id. § 40-35-303(b); State v. Boggs, 
    932 S.W.2d 467
    , 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In determining whether to grant or deny probation, a
    trial court should consider the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal record, the
    defendant’s social history and present condition, the need for deterrence, and the best interest of the
    defendant and the public. State v. Grear, 
    568 S.W.2d 285
    , 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Boyd, 
    925 S.W.2d 237
    , 244 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
    Upon examining the record, we conclude the defendant has not met his burden of establishing
    his entitlement to total probation. When the defendant was arrested for the present offenses, he had
    two pending assault charges for which he was convicted prior to sentencing in the present case.
    Following his arrest, the defendant continued to commit criminal offenses, including another offense
    for possession of burglary tools. The defendant’s continued criminal activity negatively reflects
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    upon his potential for rehabilitation. Furthermore, because the defendant was convicted of these
    other five offenses prior to the sentencing hearing for the instant offenses, they may be considered
    for purposes of sentencing. See State v. Jordan, 
    116 S.W.3d 8
    , 24 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (defining
    previous criminal convictions for enhancement purposes). The defendant’s prior criminal
    convictions alone are sufficient to justify the denial of total probation.
    We conclude the trial court did not err in requiring the defendant to serve 120 days of
    incarceration as part of his two-year sentence. This issue is patently without merit.
    Accordingly, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.
    ____________________________________
    JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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