Frank Adams v. State ( 2010 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMB ER SESSION, 1997 December 30,1997
Cecil W. Crowson
FRANK E. ADAMS, ) Appellate Court Clerk
C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9609-CR-00401
)
Appe llant, )
)
) DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) (Post-Conviction)
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
WILLIAM C. ROBERTS, JR. JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Suite 1502 , Parkway T owers Attorney General and Reporter
Nashville, TN 37219
JANIS L. TURNER
Assistant Attorney General
425 5th Avenu e North
Nashville, TN 37243
VICTOR S. JOHNSON
District Attorney General
KATRIN MILLER
Assistant District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 2n d Aven ue No rth
Nashville, TN 37201-1649
OPINION FILED ________________________
AFFIRMED
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
OPINION
The Petition er app eals th e trial court’s denial of h is petition for p ost-
conviction relief. He was convicted by a jury on February 14, 1991, of felony
murder and two counts of agg ravated ro bbery. H e was s entenc ed to life
imprisonment for the count of felony m urder and ten (10) years for each count of
aggravated robbery, all to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of
life plus twenty (20) years. His motion for new trial was denied on March 15,
1991. This C ourt affir med his con victions on O ctobe r 29, 19 92, an d his
application for appeal to our supreme court was denied on Jun e 28, 19 93. State
v. Adams, 859 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), perm. to appeal denied
(Tenn. 1993). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on
Octob er 21, 19 93.
With the assistance of counsel, the Petitioner filed an amended petition on
May 31, 1995. In that petition, the Petitioner alleged that counsel at trial and on
appeal rendered ineffective assistance for the following reasons: (1) That trial
counsel failed to inves tigate the whereabouts of the murder weapon; (2) that trial
counsel failed to offer testimony regarding when the Petitioner was arrested; (3)
that trial couns el failed to meet regularly with the Petitioner and inform him about
pretrial investigations; (4) that trial counsel failed to impeach the co-defendant at
trial regarding his drug use. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
the petition on July 5, 199 5. The trial court den ied post-conviction relief in an
order containin g extens ive findings of fact filed on July 17, 1995. After a brief
hearing for addition al testimony from counsel, the trial court issued a
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supplemental order affirm ing its den ial of post-conviction relief which was entered
on July 27, 199 5. The P etitioner filed a notice of a ppeal o n May 1 3, 1996 . In this
appe al, the Petitioner argu es that (1) Trial cou nsel rendere d ineffective
assistance; and (2) that the trial court violated the Petitioner’s constitution al rights
by use o f an invalid jury instruction . We affirm the ju dgme nt of the trial co urt.
As a threshold matter, the State argues that this appeal should be
dismissed because the Pe titioner did not timely file his notice of appeal. The
State cites Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
requires that the notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3 “shall be filed with and
received by the clerk of the court within 30 days after the date of entry of
judgm ent.” The trial co urt issued its final order o n July 27, 1 995 and the
Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on May 13, 1996. However, Rule 4(a) also
provides that the filing of a notice of appeal “may be waived in the interes t of
justice.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). While the failure to file the requisite notice of
appeal rests upon the appellant, we be lieve it is in the interest of justice that the
requirement be wa ived in th is case. See State v. Scales, 767 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.
1989).
In the Petitioner’s first issue, he argues that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistan ce, thus vio lating his righ t to competent representation as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amen dme nt to the United States Cons titution. In this
appe al, he specifically argues that counsel failed to investigate various a spects
of his case adequately and that counsel failed to attack the credibility of the co-
defend ant in his ca se ade quately.
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The Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that coun sel failed to
investigate a witness w ho saw how the Petitioner w as arres ted as it relate d to a
suppression issue p rior to tria l. He stated that counsel only info rmed him th at his
statem ents would not be suppressed, but did not elaborate on his case. He
testified that counsel did not interview two of three witnesses who saw him being
arrested. The Petitioner stated that co unsel told him th e witnesses w ere
irrelevant. The P etitioner said he met with counsel, Karl Dean, less than ten
times and m et with the investigator once. The Petitioner testified that counsel
provided him with the indictm ent, but did not provide information about the
suppression hearing or the motion for new trial. The Petitioner admitted that he
discu ssed the dire ction o f his cas e with c ouns el.
The Petitioner stated that his first attorney was Ross Alderman, who le ft his
position. Mike Engle was then assigned to the Petitioner, who requested a
different attorney. Karl Dea n and Lau ra Dykes the n represented the Petitioner
through trial. The Petitioner testified that they did not inform him regarding the
evidence in his case. The Petitioner also stated that defense counsel allowed an
in-court identific ation o f him and that counsel did not explain why a pretrial lineup
had not bee n done . He con tended that coun sel did no t adequ ately cross-
exam ine the witn ess reg arding th e identificatio n.
The Petitioner stated that counsel did not effectively challenge inconsistent
testimony regard ing the details of the ro bberie s. He a lso tes tified tha t coun sel did
not investigate or impea ch the co -defend ant, Mr. Crowell’s, credibility by cross-
examining him about prior drug use. The Petition er state d that tria l coun sel did
not introduce diagrams of the scene of the crime. He stated that counsel
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intended to investigate the scene but that he did not know if they did. He stated
that it would have been helpful if counsel prepared their own diagrams of the
scene. He stated tha t counsel neve r attempted to locate the gun used in the
offenses. He testified that the co-defendant was telling others while in jail that he
was going to put the blame on the Petitioner. The Petitioner stated that one
inmate testified. The Petitioner also testified that there was a problem with the
jury instructions regarding the reasonable doubt standard and that he did not
discu ss with coun sel the conte nts of th e mo tion for n ew trial.
On cross-examination, the Petitioner stated that he did not remember
testifyin g at the sup press ion he aring a lthoug h doc ume nts pre sente d to him
indicated that he testified. He stated that he met with Ross Alderman twice, and
Mike Engle four times. He admitted that he met w ith all counsel who represented
him a total of seventeen to eighteen times, in addition to court appearances. He
agreed that counsel filed a number of motions on his be half. Th e Petitio ner did
not reques t that Mr. D ean be remov ed from his case . Couns el discus sed with the
Petitioner whether he sh ould te stify at trial. The Petitioner thought that counsel
shou ld have highlighted that fact that he was found with a substantial amount of
coins on his person, but that the money taken in the robbery was only bills and
no coins. He testified that counsel should have h ighligh ted the co-de fenda nt’s
drug use, a lthoug h it was the Sta te’s theory that the robberies were perpetrated
to obtain money for drugs. He stated that he told counsel to whom the gun used
in the robberies was sold, but that he did not attempt to contact that person
himse lf.
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On redirect, the Petitioner testified that Jeffrey DeVasher, who represented
him on appeal, did not meet with him, nor did he raise sufficiency of the evidence
as an issue. Also, he felt that trial counsel did not follow up on finding the person
with the gun, nor did counsel adequ ately try to loca te a witness who heard the co-
defendant bragging about the crime.
Karl Dean testified at the post-conviction hearing. He stated that he began
working in the Davidson County Public Defender’s office in 1983 and was elected
Public Defender in 1990. He estimated that he had been involved in about one
hundred criminal jury trials and that approximately half were homicide trials. Ms.
Dykes had been in the o ffice ap proxim ately three years when they represented
the Petitioner. He spen t approximate ly twenty-eight (28) hou rs preparing for the
Petition er’s trial. The investigator was thorough and attempted to interview all of
the State’s witnesses, succeeded with a few, and followed up with inmates in the
jail regarding the co-defendant’s statements.
He attem pted to investig ate the locatio n of the murd er wea pon, b ut cou ld
not verify the Petitioner’s claim because he could not talk with the co -defend ant.
Also, the Petitioner’s knowledge of the murder weapon’s location was not
relevant to the issue of his state of mind which was the theory presented at trial
that he was not the shooter and unaware that a robbery was going to take place.
He filed numerous motions on behalf of the Petitioner and treated it as a major
trial. Mr. Dea n and M s. Dykes both went to the crime scene. He testified that the
Petitione r was pre sent an d that he te stified at the s uppres sion hea ring.
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On cross-exam ination, Mr. Dean stated that they investigated and
interviewed Mr. Zimmerman, a convenience store employee who was present
during the robbery and cross-examined him regarding the facts of the case.
Defense couns el also interv iewed L isa Can trell, who wa s prese nt when th e
Petitioner was arre sted, but c ould no t recall wha t efforts they u ndertoo k to
interview her parents. Mr. Dean did not recall anything regard ing the Petition er’s
mother as a possible impeachment witness against a witness for the State. He
clarified that his office spent twenty-eight hours pretrial and over fourteen during
the trial on the Petitioner’s case. He noted that the Petitioner never complained
that defense counsel was not meeting with him enough. Mr. Dean was aw are
that the Petitioner and the co-defendant Crowell used drugs and that this issue
came out at trial. He had no correspondence from the Petitioner regarding any
complaints about his representation.
The trial court conduc ted a brief supple mentary he aring to clarify Mr.
Dea n’s testimony regarding the number of trials with which he had been involved.
He testified that he had worked on twenty-seven homicide trials, but that the one-
hundred total overestimated the actual number of all trials. He could no t,
however, say with certainty how many on which he had worked.
In a post-co nviction pro ceedin g unde r the Act a pplicable to this case, the
petitioner must prove the allegations in the p etition by a preponderance of the
evidence. Davis v. S tate, 912 S.W .2d 689, (T enn. 19 95); Adkins v. State, 911
S.W.2d 334, 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). In appellate review of post-
conviction proceedings, the trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive unless the
evidence in the record preponderates against the finding s. Coop er v. State , 849
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S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tenn . 1993); Butler v. Sta te, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn.
1990).
The trial court denied the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief in an
order containing extensive findings of fact. The trial court concluded that Mr.
Dean adeq uately in vestigated the location of the murder weapon when
considering the de fense ’s theo ry abo ut the P etitione r’s involv eme nt in the crime.
The trial court considered that the murder weapon was “not a critical element for
the petitioner’s defense.” The trial court also addressed the Petitio ner’s
contention that defense c ounsel failed to inves tigate the case a dequately. Mr.
Dean testified that their investigator conducted a thorough investigation, and that
they explored the state ments m ade by the co -defendant and investigated the
crime scene. The office spent twenty-eight hours or more on the case.
Regarding Mr. Dean’s lack of interest in the case, the trial court cited fifteen
motions made to the court on the Petitioner’s behalf. The trial court concluded
that the iss ue was without m erit.
The trial court also noted that defense counsel met with the Petitioner
between ten and seventeen times, and on the day before the suppression
hearing and the motion for new trial. T he cou rt also noted that the Petitioner
never complained regarding the frequency of the meetings.
The trial court also found that co unse l’s failure to interv iew Lis a Can trell’s
parents did not overcome the presumption that Mr. Dean’s decision was trial
strategy. The trial judge also noted that evidence refuted the claim that the
Petitioner was not present at the suppression hearing. Also, the court found that
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counsel legitimately did not introduce evidence of the c o-defe ndan t Crow ell’s
drug use beca use he felt there h ad been s ufficient testimony p resented by the
State. The co urt found the challe nge to the represe ntation on appea l to be
meritless. In its conclusion, the trial court found that Mr. Dean and Ms. Dykes
had significant trial experience and that they were well-prepared for the trial. As
a result, their representation was well within the necessary range of competence
for criminal defense attorneys.
The Petitioner argues that the trial court erre d by den ying his pe tition. In
determining whether counsel provided effective assistance at trial, the court must
decide whether counsel’s performance was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936
(Tenn . 1975). T o succe ed on a claim tha t his coun sel was in effective at trial, a
petitioner bears the burden of showing that his counsel made errors so serious
that he was not functioning as counsel as gu arantee d unde r the Sixth
Amendment and that the deficient representation prejudiced the petitioner
resulting in a failure to produ ce a re liable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 68 7, reh’g denied, 467 U.S. 12 67 (1984); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d
744, 747 (Tenn. 1993); Butler v. Sta te, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990). To
satisfy the seco nd pron g the pe titioner mu st show a reaso nable p robability tha t,
but for counsel’s unreasonable error, the fact finder would have h ad rea sona ble
doubt regardin g petitione r’s guilt. Strickland, 466 U .S. at 69 5. This reaso nable
probab ility must be “su fficient to undermine confidence in the outcome .” Harris
v. State, 875 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 199 4).
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When reviewing trial counsel’s actions, this court should n ot use the be nefit
of hindsight to second-guess trial strategy and criticize coun sel’s tactics. Hellard
v. State, 629 S .W .2d 4, 9 (Ten n. 198 2). Co unse l’s allege d error s sho uld be
judged at the time they were made in light of all facts and circumstances.
Strickland, 466 U.S . at 690; see Cooper, 849 S.W.2d at 746.
After a care ful consideration of the record, we cannot conclude that the
evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the Petitioner
received compe tent representa tion from the attorne ys involved in the preparation
and trying of his case . Indeed , the trial judge was in a fa r better po sition to assess
the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, as the trial court concluded, there
is not sufficient evidence that the decisions or lack of action complained of by the
Petitioner constitute d error. T herefore , we agre e that the tria l court properly
denied the petition.
As his final issue in this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the instruction
submitted to the jury regarding reasonable doubt was constitutionally insufficient
and a violation of due proce ss. At th e outs et, we n ote tha t the Pe titioner d id not
address this issu e until th is appeal. Although he briefly alluded to the issue
during his testim ony at the post-conviction he aring, n either th e origin al pro se
petition nor the ame nded petition conta ined th is issue. Furthermore, the trial
court did no t addre ss the issue in its orde r nor ha s the P etitioner alleged any
reason why a wa iver would not app ly. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g).
Howeve r, even if we were to address the issue, we would conclude that it had no
merit.
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The Petitioner contends that the jury instruction that was issued misstates
the necessary stand ard of be yond a re asona ble dou bt. W e note tha t the
Petitioner has not included the record containing the jury instructions, howe ver,
he allege s that the in struction s tated that:
Rea sona ble doub t is that d oubt e ngen dered by an in vestiga tion of a ll
the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Re ason able doubt does not
mean a captious, possible, or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of
guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but
moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every
eleme nt of proo f necess ary to con stitute the o ffense.
The Tennessee Supreme Court has recently affirmed and incorp orated in
its opinion excerpts of this Court’s opinion regarding the identical language for the
reaso nable doubt instruction and concluding that no due process violation
occurre d. State v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489 , 520-21 (Tenn . 1997); see also State
v. Sexton, 917 S.W .2d 263 (Tenn . Crim. A pp. 199 5); Pettyjohn v. State, 885
S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. Crim . App. 1994 ); Terry S hanno n Kime ry v. State, C.C.A. No.
03C01-9512-CC-00412, Greene C ounty (Tenn. Crim. App, Knoxville, Jan. 28,
1997), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1997). There fore, w e con clude that this
issue is w ithout me rit.
Accord ingly, we affirm the judgm ent of the tria l court.
____________________________________
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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CONCUR:
___________________________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
___________________________________
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
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