State of Tennessee v. Dequan Hasani Bertrand ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                        05/04/2017
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    Assigned on Briefs February 15, 2017
    STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEQUAN HASANI BERTRAND
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
    No. 2013-D-3070      J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge
    No. M2016-00920-CCA-R3-CD
    _____________________________
    A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dequan Hasani Bertrand, of
    aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the
    commission of a dangerous felony. The jury acquitted the Defendant of one count of
    aggravated rape and was unable to reach a verdict as to two other counts of aggravated
    rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-four
    years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted
    the victim’s identification of him; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
    convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum
    sentences within his range and ordered his sentences to run consecutively. After review,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS T.
    WOODALL, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.
    Frank T. McLeod (at trial), and Joshua L. Brand (on appeal), Nashville, Tennessee, for
    the appellant, Dequan Hasani Bertrand.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Alexander C. Vey, Assistant
    Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Amy M. Hunter,
    Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    I. Facts
    This case arises from a robbery that occurred on October 15, 2013, at the home of
    1
    the victim, K.T.1 With regard to the events surrounding this incident, a Davidson County
    grand jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of aggravated rape, one count of
    aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm
    during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of attempted aggravated
    robbery.
    A. Suppression Hearing
    The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him. The
    Defendant alleged that the day after the offense, October 16, 2013, a law enforcement
    officer showed the victim a photographic lineup containing pictures of six men, including
    the Defendant, whom all looked similar. The victim was unable to identify any of the
    pictures as being of the man who had robbed her. The Defendant further stated that, two
    days later, on October 18, 2013, law enforcement officers showed the victim a second
    photographic lineup. This second line up, he posited, contained pictures of six men that
    did not look similar to each other. From this lineup, the victim immediately and
    definitively identified the Defendant’s picture as being of the man who had attacked her.
    The Defendant alleged that the second lineup was clearly suggestive and that the victim’s
    identification was inadmissible.
    The trial court held a hearing on the motion, during which the parties presented the
    following evidence: Michael Bennett, a detective with the Nashville Metropolitan Police
    Department, testified that he investigated the events in this case. As part of his
    investigation, he developed a photo lineup to show the victim. The detective said that the
    Defendant did not have a booking photograph available to use to develop the photo
    lineup, so the detective accessed the Defendant’s driver’s license photograph. He then
    took the physical description of the Defendant and searched booking photographs for five
    other men who looked similar to the Defendant. Detective Bennett said that, therefore,
    the lineup that he showed to the victim had one driver’s license picture and five booking
    photograph pictures.
    Detective Bennett testified that he showed the lineup to the victim the day after the
    incident. He explained the standard instructions to her before showing the victim the
    lineup. He stated that the victim looked at the lineup for approximately forty minutes,
    but she was unable to identify any of the pictures as being of her assailant. The detective
    noted that the Defendant’s picture was in position number three.
    During cross-examination, Detective Bennett testified that he did not use hair style
    or complexion to develop his photo array. He said that he simply looked for photographs
    1 To protect her privacy, we will refer to the victim by her initials only.
    2
    of men that looked similar to the Defendant.
    Detective Andrew Vallee testified that he also compiled a photo lineup to show to
    the victim. He was unsure whether he knew, at that time, that Detective Bennett had
    previously shown her a photographic lineup, but he believed that the two had not
    discussed this matter before Detective Vallee created his lineup. He explained that,
    within the department, some cases were investigated by two separate divisions. For
    example, in cases involving a rape and a robbery allegation, the Sex Crimes Unit handled
    the rape investigation, and the Precinct Investigation Unit handled the robbery portion of
    the investigation. There were, therefore, actually two separate investigations being
    conducted simultaneously.
    Detective Vallee testified about creating the photo lineup. He said that the
    Defendant did not have an available booking photograph, so the detective retrieved the
    Defendant’s driver’s license photograph from the Tennessee Criminal Justice portal. The
    detective noted that the Defendant had available several photographs, and he did not
    remember if he chose the most recent photograph. He found it unsurprising that he and
    Detective Bennett had chosen different photographs. The detective testified that, because
    he wanted to show the victim a color lineup and because he wanted to have the pictures
    appear with similar backgrounds, he then manually chose five other driver’s license
    photographs. Detective Vallee said that he attempted to choose men of similar age and
    weight. He said he attempted to choose some men with similar hair and that “[he] did the
    best [he] could with that.”
    Detective Vallee testified that he showed the photo lineup to the victim, and she
    immediately identified the Defendant’s photograph as being of the man who assaulted
    her.
    During cross-examination, Detective Vallee testified that he did not recall whether
    he interviewed the victim before he compiled the lineup. The detective agreed that, of
    the men in the photo lineup, one was bald and two had short hair. The detective agreed
    that it was “possibl[e]” that he spoke with Detective Bennett before he compiled his
    photo lineup but that he did not remember.
    The victim testified that she worked in the fitness industry and that, as she was
    preparing to leave her home to go to work on October 15, 2013, she was sexually
    assaulted and robbed. She said that it was around 4:15 p.m., and she had gone to her car
    parked in the driveway only to see that she had left her garage door open. She returned to
    the house quickly to shut the garage door, leaving the front door of her house open. On
    her way back to her front door she saw a man whom she had never seen before on her
    front porch. She said that the area was well-illuminated and that she told the man
    3
    something to the affect of “stay right there.” The man came into the house and walked
    behind her.
    The victim described her living room as fifteen feet wide, and she said that she
    was looking at the man’s face as he walked towards her across that distance. She
    estimated that she viewed him for a total of five to six seconds before he was behind her.
    After he was behind her, he told her not to look at him, and she complied. The victim
    said that, after the assault, her fiancé called the police who responded to the scene.
    The victim testified that Detective Bennett showed her a photographic lineup on
    October 16, the day after the assault. She said she was unable to identify any of the
    pictures as belonging to her assailant. She explained that there were two pictures that she
    could not decide between, photographs number three and four. The victim said that she
    was 95% certain that her assailant was the person in photograph number three, the
    Defendant, but that she did not identify him because she was not 100% certain. The
    victim explained that, in this photo lineup, the Defendant was smiling in his photograph
    which “thr[ew] her off” because in the image she had in her mind the Defendant was not
    smiling.
    The victim recalled that Detective Vallee showed her another photo lineup on
    October 18, 2013. In this lineup, the Defendant was not smiling in the photograph. She
    immediately identified the Defendant’s picture as being of the man who had assaulted
    her.
    During cross-examination, the victim testified that she was shown a total of three
    photographic lineups. The first, she said, did not contain the Defendant’s picture, and she
    did not identify anyone. The second contained the Defendant’s photograph, and she was
    95% certain that he was the perpetrator. In the third, she identified a photograph of the
    Defendant.
    Based upon this evidence, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion
    to suppress. It found:
    In this case, the Court finds that the victim was asked on multiple
    occasions if she could identify any individual in the photographic lineups as
    the man who attacked her. The Court finds that there was no evidence that
    either of the detectives prompted or indicated to the victim who she should
    choose out of the lineups. To the contrary, the Court finds that both
    detectives followed the proper lineup procedure to the letter. The Court
    finds that the detectives never led the victim to choose a particular person
    in the lineup, or even suggested that a suspect was included. The Court
    4
    acknowledges that the victim vacillated somewhat between some of the
    photos on October 16. However, the Court finds that this was due to the
    Defendant appearing different in the photo than he did on the day of the
    offense. The Court finds that when the victim was presented with a lineup
    that included a photo of the Defendant where he looked more similar to the
    way he looked on the day of the offense, the victim immediately identified
    him. The Court finds that the detectives allowed the victim to reach a
    decision on her own. The Court does note that the second lineup on
    October 16 apparently included a photo of the Defendant wherein the
    background appeared different than the backgrounds in the other photos
    because the detective used a driver’s license photo for the Defendant and
    “mug shots” for the other men. However, the victim did not identify the
    Defendant in this particular lineup, and the Court finds that it had no effect
    on the victim’s identification of the Defendant on October 18. In light of
    all of the circumstances of the identification, the Court finds no evidence of
    coaching or prompting of the victim to make an identification in this case,
    and the Court finds that the identification procedure was not unduly
    suggestive.
    While the Court finds that the identification was not unduly
    suggestive, the Court also finds that the identification passes the ‘totality of
    the circumstances’ test established in Biggers [
    409 U.S. 188
    , 199-200
    (1972)]. The factors to be considered under Biggers are “the opportunity of
    the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’
    degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
    criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
    confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
    confrontation.” Biggers, 
    409 U.S. at 199-200
    , 
    93 S. Ct. at 382
    .
    The Court finds that the victim in this case had a short time to view
    the Defendant’s face at the time of the crime. However, the Court finds in
    the seconds she was able to view his face, her full attention was focused on
    him. The Court also notes that the lighting in the room where the crime
    occurred, as well as the fact that the Defendant had to walk straight toward
    the victim for a distance of about 15 feet, allowed the victim to get a very
    good look at the Defendant’s face. The victim was unable to give a detailed
    physical description of the Defendant, but there is no evidence that the
    description she was able to give was inaccurate in any way. The Court also
    finds that when she was able to identify the Defendant, the victim was
    absolutely certain that he was the man who attacked her. The Court credits
    her testimony and finds that when she was uncertain, she declined to
    5
    identify the Defendant or anyone else. Finally, the Court notes that the
    crime is alleged to have occurred on October 15, 2013. The victim first
    viewed a lineup the next day, and positively identified the Defendant three
    days later on October 18. Under all of these circumstances, the Court finds
    that the victim’s identification of the Defendant was reliable.
    B. Trial
    At trial, the parties presented the following evidence: The victim testified that, at
    the time of these events, she lived in Davidson County and worked as a personal trainer.
    This assault occurred as she was leaving her house on October 15, 2013, to go to a gym
    in Hendersonville for a personal training appointment. The victim said that she left her
    house and got into her car. She remembered that she had left the door between the garage
    and her house open, so she went back into her house to close that door. When she went
    in the front door, she did not close it because she was going into the house briefly. The
    victim said that, after she closed the garage door, she noticed out of the “corner of [her]
    eye” that there was a man, whom she identified as the Defendant, on her front porch. She
    said he was wearing a loose knit hat and dark clothing
    The victim testified that she said to the Defendant, “Can I help you?” and then told
    him to “wait right there.” She said that she began crossing the living room toward the
    front door, and the Defendant opened the screen door at which point the victim noticed
    that he had a gun. The Defendant walked towards her, came around behind her, and took
    her phone out of her hands. She saw that the Defendant had “longer” hair that he wore in
    braids pulled back from his face. He then put his hands over her mouth and began asking
    her questions. He asked her if there was anyone else in the house, and the victim
    responded that there was not. The Defendant was “[v]ery serious” and told her that if
    there was anyone else in the house he would kill them and then kill her, threats that she
    believed.
    The victim said that the Defendant then told her to get down on the floor of the
    living room, and she got down onto her knees and elbows. The Defendant told her to get
    all the way down, and she lay down on her belly on the floor with her face towards the
    floor. The Defendant told her not to move or he would kill her, and he suggested that
    there was someone outside. The Defendant told her, “You stay here, if you go outside
    he’ll kill you, if I don’t get to you first.” The Defendant went to the front door and called
    out to someone, saying “Rue.” The victim said that she never heard another man’s voice,
    and she never saw a second person.
    The victim said that the Defendant went upstairs and was gone for three or four
    minutes. She heard him walking back and forth, but she was still scared to move, fearing
    6
    that there was someone outside who might kill her. The Defendant came back downstairs
    and asked if she had a boyfriend, so she told him that she had a fiancé. The Defendant
    then pulled down her shorts, and the victim informed him that she was menstruating. The
    Defendant said, “That is okay. I will find other things to do.”
    The victim testified that, at that point, the Defendant brought her to her knees, and
    he put his penis in her mouth. He told her to put it all the way in her mouth and not to
    bite. She said that he kept pushing her head down farther and farther onto his erect penis.
    The victim said that she did not think the Defendant ejaculated. She said that,
    immediately after the incident, she told medical providers and police more details but
    that, after so much time, it was hard for her to remember some of those details.
    The victim said that the Defendant went to the kitchen sink and then returned to
    her. He again forced his penis into her mouth, and he had one of his hands on the back of
    her head. She noticed at that point that he had a black glove on his other hand and that
    there was a skeleton design on the glove. She identified a photograph of this glove for
    the jury. The victim said that the Defendant forced her to crawl into a nearby half bath
    and told her to stay there for twenty minutes or until her fiancé returned. She said that
    she stayed in the bathroom until her fiancé returned to her home, which was about five
    minutes after the Defendant left.
    The victim testified that, when her fiancé arrived, he called 911. She got a glass
    and started spitting into it in hopes of preserving evidence. Later, she noted that there
    were several items missing: a guitar; two laptops; her purse; an orange Columbia
    backpack; and a pair of earrings. Her car was also missing from her driveway.
    The victim said that the police responded quickly to the 911 call, and they
    transported her to the hospital for a medical exam. She gave the medical personnel
    truthful answers and endured the physical examination. The victim said that she returned
    home only briefly and then went to a friend’s house to stay for a while.
    The victim recalled that, the following day, her throat and her anus were both sore.
    Also that day, Detective Wiser showed her a photographic lineup. The Defendant’s
    photograph was not among the pictures, and she did not identify anyone. Detective
    Bennett then showed her a second photographic lineup. In this lineup, there were
    photographs of two men who seemed familiar to her, one of which was of the Defendant.
    She said that the Defendant was smiling in his photograph so that, while he looked “very
    familiar,” the smile made her unable to positively identify him as her assailant, even after
    viewing the lineup for more than twenty minutes.
    The victim said that, on October 18, 2013, Detective Vallee showed her a third
    7
    photographic lineup. She immediately identified the Defendant’s photograph as being of
    her assailant. She stated that she was 100% certain that it was him, and she noted that he
    was not smiling in this photograph.
    During cross-examination, the victim testified that when she described her attacker
    to the police, she said he was dark-skinned. She said that his hair was shoulder length
    and pulled back. She also said that he had an “awful smell” and a “foreign accent,”
    possibly an African accent. She said that the attacker’s voice was “normal” at first and
    then changed into a voice with an accent. The victim said she told police that her attacker
    was younger than she was, maybe in his later twenties, taller than she was, and “skinny.”
    The victim agreed that she told police that she was terrible at physically describing
    someone. She also agreed that she only saw her attacker for four or five seconds and that
    she could not identify him in the photographic lineup shown to her by Detective Bennett.
    The victim agreed that she told the police that her assailant was circumcised. The
    victim said that she attended counseling to help her process this assault. The victim said
    that she had initially told the police that she had been penetrated anally but that she no
    longer was sure that this had occurred.
    During redirect examination, the victim testified that she believed that the person
    who appeared in her doorway was the same man who forced her to perform oral sex upon
    him. She said, however, she did not look at his face again. She further said that there
    were times that her assailant held the gun to her rib cage, but she did not recall when
    during the “ordeal” this occurred.
    Pamela Crues, a family nurse practitioner, testified that she worked in the
    emergency room of General Hospital conducting sexual assault examinations. She
    examined the victim on October 15, 2013, at around 8:18 p.m., and the examination took
    until 10:30 p.m. Ms. Crues testified that the victim gave her an account of what had
    occurred, and it comported largely with the victim’s trial testimony. Ms. Crues said that
    the victim detailed how her assailant put his penis in her mouth and “toyed with the idea
    of putting it in her bottom.” She said that he may have put the tip in her “bottom” but
    then he again placed his penis in her mouth. When Ms. Crues asked the victim
    specifically about penetration, the victim said that her assailant had penetrated her mouth
    and anus. The victim told Ms. Crues that the man had not ejaculated. During cross-
    examination, Ms. Crues testified that the victim did not have any signs of physical
    trauma. She agreed that the victim refused the HIV medication and declined counseling
    services offered to her. During redirect examination, Ms. Crues said that the lack of
    trauma to the victim’s anus was not unexpected given the victim’s account of the assault.
    Paul Nies, an officer with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, testified
    8
    that he responded to the call in this case between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on October 15,
    2013. He said that, before responding, he had also received a call about a suspicious
    person. He recalled that an anonymous citizen called 911 to report that there were some
    individuals parked in front of their apartment. The citizen reported seeing the individuals
    going in and out of the side yard, which the citizen found unusual. Officer Nies said that,
    when he arrived, Officer Kelly was already interviewing an individual that was standing
    outside of a tan Buick Century. The individual and others with him did not want to
    provide their names. One of the individuals eventually gave Officer Kelly his driver’s
    license, telling him that he had run out of gas, which was why he was parked in that area.
    The other man did not provide his correct identity. The two men said that they were
    going to go to a bus stop and catch a bus.
    Officer Nies said that he was disturbed by the interaction with these two men. He
    said that when individuals were not forthcoming with their identities, officers suspected
    that there was something more amiss. Officer Nies recalled that, within thirty minutes of
    this interaction, he responded to a call about a home invasion. He spoke to the victim,
    who relayed to him what had happened, including that she had been raped and
    sodomized. The officer said that, after speaking with the victim, he looked around
    outside her home. Outside the house near a crawl space he found a silver handgun. He
    informed other officers investigating the case about the location of the weapon.
    During cross-examination, Officer Neis testified that the Defendant was not one of
    the two men present when he responded to the Buick.
    Officer James Kelly, with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, testified
    that before he responded to the victim’s rape call, he had responded to a call that there
    was a gold sedan with “numerous male black subjects inside or just outside of it walking
    around.” The caller said that it appeared that the men were “casing” the neighborhood.
    When Officer Kelly arrived at the sedan’s location, he saw a gold four-door Buick
    Century sedan. There was one black man in the back seat, who appeared “very nervous,”
    because he was looking around and appeared to be looking for someone. The man exited
    the vehicle immediately upon the officer’s arrival, appeared very nervous and very
    defensive. The man told the officer that the officer could not stop him. The officer told
    the man that he was simply checking on his welfare. He recalled that there was a gas
    station approximately 100 feet from where the sedan was parked.
    Officer Kelly said that he spoke with the man for a few minutes, and the man
    identified himself as “Brian Willis” but refused to provide any other information about
    himself. The officer said that, at that point, another man named Ivy Dobson came around
    from behind the apartment complex in front of which the sedan was parked. Mr. Dobson
    said that he was with the man who identified himself as Mr. Willis. Mr. Dobson
    9
    provided the officer with his identification, which the officer verified.
    Officer Kelly said that the two men began talking and appeared “extremely
    nervous.” The men kept repeating, “[W]here’s Quan?” When Officer Kelly asked who
    Quan was, they replied that he was their friend who had picked them up earlier in the
    sedan. Officer Kelly recalled that the sedan had Ohio license tags and that the
    registration was current but that the registration did not match the car. The men informed
    him that the car was out of gas, so they left the vehicle and went toward a bus stop.
    Officer Kelly testified that he went to an area to fill out a report about the
    interaction and that, within fifteen minutes, he received the call about the victim’s home
    invasion.
    During cross-examination, Officer Kelly said that he told both men that they were
    free to leave.
    Ivy Larue Dobson II testified that he was twenty-one years old at the time of trial
    and that he had attended Middle College High School. He said that he had known the
    Defendant since their freshman year of high school, even though they went to different
    high schools, because they both played on the same team for summer league basketball.
    Mr. Dobson said he got to know the Defendant “a good amount,” and the two frequently
    spent time together.
    Mr. Dobson testified that he and the Defendant had both been charged with
    aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary with regard to the home invasion of the
    victim’s home. Mr. Dobson said that he was not, however, charged with the rape
    offenses. He agreed that, because he was a co-defendant, his testimony may be
    questioned, but he stated that he desired only to tell the truth, not having been offered
    anything in exchange for his testimony.
    Mr. Dobson recalled the events that occurred on October 15, 2013. He stated that,
    at the time, he worked concessions at Bridgestone Arena and lived at home with his
    parents. He said that he had taken a break from school at Tennessee State University
    (“TSU”) but that he returned to school the following semester. Early in the day on
    October 15, Mr. Dobson spent time with his girlfriend, Ashton Williams, at TSU. In the
    afternoon, the Defendant and Brian Frelix, whom Mr. Dobson knew from college, picked
    him up from TSU in a gold Buick. Mr. Dobson recalled that Mr. Frelix was driving and
    that the Defendant was sitting in the front passenger seat. When Mr. Dobson got into the
    car, he sat in the backseat.
    Mr. Dobson said that he thought the plan was for them to go to a music studio
    10
    where he had been previously with Mr. Frelix to record music. Mr. Frelix was pursuing a
    career in the music industry while at TSU. Mr. Dobson said that, after the two men
    picked him up, they traveled to Mt. Juliet. He said that this was not the location of the
    music studio, so Mr. Dobson asked what they were doing and if the men could take him
    back to TSU. He described Mr. Frelix and the Defendant as “being real quiet and real
    sketchy.” Mr. Dobson said that the men then went to Opry Mills and, after that, they
    drove to Spence Lane.
    Mr. Dobson said that the car ran out of gas on Spence Lane, and the men were
    frustrated with Mr. Dobson for “not cooperating.” Attempting to determine what to do
    next, the men discussed obtaining money through criminal means, which Mr. Dobson
    found absurd because the men had jobs with “great” income and great families. He found
    this discussion “really . . . random.” Mr. Dobson noted that, during this car ride, both Mr.
    Frelix and the Defendant were consuming a purple liquid drug out of baby bottles that
    they were calling “Pluto.” They offered the drug to Mr. Dobson, but he declined. Mr.
    Dobson found the men’s behavior out of character and “very very weird.” He noted that
    the Defendant was the prom king at his high school and attended Hampton University.
    He said that Mr. Frelix was a “church going guy who did very well in music.”
    Mr. Dobson said that, after the men parked the car when it ran out of gas, he saw
    that Mr. Frelix and the Defendant each had a gun. The Defendant handed Mr. Dobson a
    silver gun and encouraged him to commit various crimes. Mr. Dobson said that he
    declined for several reasons, one of which was that he had a date at 6:00 p.m. Mr.
    Dobson recalled that, after handing him the gun, the Defendant got a “small revolver”
    from Mr. Frelix. Mr. Frelix and the Defendant became frustrated with Mr. Dobson for
    not being willing to participate in criminal activity. The Defendant then got out of the car
    “really fast” and said he was going to get the gas money. Mr. Dobson said that he then
    exited the vehicle, looked for the Defendant, and saw him on the steps of “some
    apartment.” Mr. Dobson said that, at that point, he saw the policeman by the car. Mr.
    Dobson said he “got real scared and nervous,” so he put his gun under the hole on the
    side of the apartment and headed toward the officers to speak with them. Mr. Dobson
    identified photographs of the gun that the Defendant handed to him. He said that, at the
    time, the gun had no bullets or a clip inside the weapon.
    Mr. Dobson said that, when he spoke with the officers, he told them the direction
    that the Defendant had headed and that he did not see the Defendant again at that point.
    The Defendant did not return during the time that Mr. Dobson spoke with police. Mr.
    Dobson noted that he only briefly saw the Defendant on the steps of the apartment
    because, as soon as he saw the Defendant on the steps, he saw police speaking with Mr.
    Frelix. Mr. Dobson said that he knew that Mr. Frelix was going to give the police
    officers “a little bit of trouble” because of Mr. Frelix’s history and past, so he returned to
    11
    the vehicle as fast as possible. Mr. Dobson said that Mr. Frelix was not forthcoming with
    the police officers about his true identity. The officers asked Mr. Dobson to get Mr.
    Frelix to cooperate.
    Mr. Dobson said that the officers asked them how many people were with them,
    and Mr. Dobson told them three, the third being their friend “Quan.” The officers then
    asked where the third man was, and Mr. Dobson told them that the Defendant had gone to
    look for gas and would return shortly. Mr. Dobson said that he fully cooperated with the
    police officers, even though he did not tell them at which apartment he had last seen the
    Defendant standing on the steps. He explained that he did not know the Defendant’s
    plan, so they just told the officers the direction in which the Defendant had gone.
    Mr. Dobson described the manner in which the Defendant was dressed on the day
    of the incident, saying that he had on khaki pants and a black hoodie. He wore a “Rasta”
    style hat from which fake dreadlocks were protruding. At the time, the Defendant’s hair
    was actually short, but it appeared as if he had braids when he wore the hat.
    Mr. Dobson said that, after speaking with police, he and Mr. Frelix walked to a
    bus stop and the officers appeared to be preparing to leave the Buick. Mr. Dobson said
    they took a bus to downtown Nashville. He explained that he and Mr. Frelix had no
    money, so the bus driver said she would take them only as far as downtown. The two
    then walked from downtown back to TSU, which took an extended period of time. He
    estimated that they returned to TSU around 6:00 p.m. Mr. Dobson said that he went on
    his date with his girlfriend to the movies, accompanied by his mother.
    Mr. Dobson testified that he did not hear from the Defendant that evening or the
    following day. On October 17, 2013, his family saw a news story about the incident, and
    the story identified him as a suspect. He contacted the police and surrendered himself for
    questioning. Mr. Dobson testified that he spoke with multiple law enforcement officers
    and that he told them the same version of events to which he had testified. He said that
    he worked with officers in an attempt to speak with the Defendant over the phone to find
    out what had happened. They could never contact the Defendant.
    Mr. Dobson said that, at some point after his first interview with law enforcement
    officers, the Defendant called Mr. Dobson’s girlfriend. Mr. Dobson spoke briefly with
    the Defendant during this call and asked him why this incident had become such a big
    deal. The Defendant informed him that he had received oral sex from the woman and
    that he had to use some type of car to get away.
    Mr. Dobson testified that law enforcement officers interviewed him again on
    November 15, 2013. At that interview, Mr. Dobson willingly provided them with a DNA
    12
    sample. Mr. Dobson said he was formally charged as a co-defendant to the aggravated
    robbery and burglary. He gave another statement to police, providing them the
    information from his phone call with the Defendant and also giving them an address
    where they may find the stolen property. He described this place as an apartment near
    TSU that was leased by “Charlie Brown” and where he and his friends would “hang out”
    during that summer before the incident. Also living with Mr. Brown where two
    roommates, and Mr. Dobson believed their names were Devon and Jordan Williams. Mr.
    Dobson described the Defendant and Mr. Frelix as friends with Mr. Brown. Mr. Dobson
    said that he had seen the Defendant at this location before October 15, but not after that
    date because Mr. Dobson had not returned to the apartment since the incident.
    Mr. Dobson said that he had never seen the victim or been into her home. He said
    he never took her property or her car. He then said that the Defendant referred to him by
    the nickname, “Rue.” During cross-examination, Mr. Dobson testified that, at the time of
    this offense, he wore his hair in long “dreads.” During redirect examination, Mr. Dobson
    testified that, at the time that police officers were talking with Mr. Frelix, he could have
    gone the opposite direction and not approached them. The officers had not seen him at
    this point, but he still chose to return to speak with them.
    Charles Brown testified that, around the time of these events, he lived, went to
    school, and worked in Nashville. He lived near TSU with two roommates, “Anthony”
    and Jordan Williams in the Village on the Green apartments. At the time of trial, he
    maintained the same employment and was still attending school in hopes of obtaining his
    degree in business administration with a minor in architectural engineering. Mr. Brown
    said that he knew the Defendant, “Quan,” as an acquaintance, in part because people
    frequently spent time at his apartment. The Defendant, he said, was better friends with
    Mr. Williams. Mr. Brown said that he also knew Mr. Dobson, whom he called “Rue,”
    and Mr. Frelix from TSU.
    Mr. Brown recalled the Defendant coming to his home in October 2013. He said
    that the Defendant, who was alone, brought in some laptops and a guitar. Mr. Brown said
    that he told the Defendant that he knew that the Defendant had not paid for the laptops
    and that they were not his. He told the Defendant that the laptops could be tracked and to
    take them away from his apartment. The Defendant left the guitar in the hall closet and
    then left with the laptops. Mr. Brown said that he never saw the Defendant or the laptops
    again.
    Mr. Brown said that, a month later, the police came to his apartment and asked to
    search it. He consented, and they found the guitar. Mr. Brown said that he explained to
    police what had happened and that the Defendant had brought the guitar to his apartment.
    13
    During cross-examination, Mr. Brown agreed that he may have written down on a
    statement that the Defendant brought the guitar in “September” but it was actually
    October. He said that, when the Defendant came to his home, it was around 11:30 p.m.,
    and Mr. Brown had just arrived home from work. Mr. Brown said that there was no one
    else at home.
    Detective Jeff Wiser, with the Sex Crimes Unit of the Metropolitan Nashville
    Police Department, testified that he assisted Detective Mike Bennett in this investigation.
    He said that he showed the victim two photographic lineups the day after the incident,
    October 16, 2013. The first lineup contained six photographs, one of a man they
    suspected as being involved. The victim did not identify anyone’s picture as being of the
    man who had assaulted her. Detective Wiser interviewed the victim and reviewed the
    police report about the welfare check on the men in the Buick that had run out of gas. He
    then showed the victim a second lineup that contained a photograph of Mr. Dobson and
    five men that looked similar to him. The victim did not identify any of the pictures as
    being of her assailant. On the same day that Detective Wiser got word that the victim’s
    car had been located in an apartment complex, Village on the Green, on Ed Temple
    Boulevard. Officers retrieved the victim’s vehicle for processing.
    Detective Wiser said that he interviewed Mr. Dobson on November 15, 2013. Mr.
    Dobson was “very cooperative” and told the detective a recount of the events similar to
    his trial testimony, including the telephone call from the Defendant detailing part of the
    assault. Mr. Dobson took them to Mr. Brown’s address, which the detective noted was in
    the same apartment complex where the victim’s vehicle had been located. The detective
    confirmed Mr. Brown’s testimony, saying that Mr. Brown told him about the Defendant
    bringing computers to his home and leaving a guitar in his hall closet.
    Detective Wiser testified that there was no sperm detected as a result of the
    victim’s medical exam. There was also no DNA detected in the glass collected from the
    victim’s home or on her shorts.
    Detective Andrew Vallee, a Special Agent with the TBI, testified that, at the time
    of this incident, he worked as a detective for the Metropolitan Nashville Police
    Department. As a detective, he investigated the victim’s report of a robbery and assault.
    He said that Detectives Wiser and Bennett focused on the sexual assault investigation and
    he focused on the robbery aspect of the incident. On the day of the offense, he responded
    to the scene and spoke with the victim briefly.
    The detective also spoke with Mr. Dobson, who gave him a statement similar to
    Mr. Dobson’s trial testimony. On this basis, he compiled a photographic lineup that
    included the Defendant’s photograph. At the time, he was unaware that Detective
    14
    Bennett had compiled and shown the victim a separate photographic lineup that included
    the Defendant’s photograph. Detective Vallee said that he showed the victim the lineup,
    which was in color, on October 18, 2013. She immediately pointed to the photograph of
    the Defendant as being a photograph of her assailant.
    Detective Vallee testified that he also inputted the serial number of the gun found
    in the crawl space into his computer database. The gun, a Lorcin .380, was registered to
    the Defendant’s father, Felix Bertrand. The gun records showed that it was purchased
    from a pawn shop.
    The detective said he also investigated the license tag displayed on the Buick. He
    said that the license tag number did not belong to that vehicle. It was an expired tag that
    was registered to Felix Bertrand, the Defendant’s father. The Ohio license tag that
    officers found in the backseat of the Buick, belonged to a “Justin Howell.” This tag also
    did not belong to the Buick.
    Detective Vallee confirmed that Mr. Dobson informed him in a later interview that
    stolen property may be at Mr. Brown’s apartment. The detective followed up, and found
    the guitar at the apartment.
    During cross-examination, the detective testified that he was unsure whether he
    consulted with Detective Bennett before he created his own photographic lineup. He said
    he did not believe that he viewed the lineup Detective Bennett created before he created
    his own. He agreed that he included some men who had short hair despite the victim’s
    description, explaining that people’s appearances change. He noted that there were other
    photographs with men who had longer hair also in the lineup. Detective Vallee agreed
    that Detective Bennett’s lineup contained photographs of men who all had longer hair. It
    was also black and white rather than in color.
    Several crime scene investigators with the Metropolitan Nashville Police
    Department testified. Lisa Whitaker testified that she processed the victim’s vehicle on
    October 16, 2013. In the vehicle she found a black glove upon which there was white
    plastic. She also collected from the vehicle: a phone charger; a Comcast receipt; an
    Emerson brand of headphones; and DNA swabs of multiple areas. Felicia Evans testified
    that she processed the interior of the residence by photographing it and collecting
    evidence. She photographed the gun in the crawlspace of the apartment, collected it, and
    confirmed that it contained no ammunition. Ms. Evans testified that she photographed
    and collected a glass that the victim had spit into after the incident. She photographed the
    Buick, including its license plate, which was still parked near the crime scene. Due to an
    impending storm, Ms. Evans processed the exterior for latent fingerprints and
    successfully obtained some. Ms. Sharon Tilley and Ms. Rhonda Evans processed the
    15
    Buick on October 18, 2013, pursuant to a search warrant that officers had obtained for the
    vehicle. Of note inside the vehicle she found: a white latex glove; an Ohio license plate
    lying on the backseat; a backpack containing more latex gloves; other backpacks; and
    electronic devices. Ms. Tilley and Ms. Evans said that, inside backpacks that were in the
    vehicle, they found a paycheck from Fed-ex bearing the Defendant’s name and a yellow
    and black shirt that had a tag with the Defendant’s name on it. Ms. Tilley also
    photographed two baby bottles that were in the vehicle. The two investigators processed
    the interior of the vehicle for latent fingerprints.
    Linda Wilson, an employee at the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department
    Crime Laboratory, testified that she analyzed the latent fingerprint evidence in this case.
    Ms. Wilson found that Mr. Frelix, Mr. Dobson, and the Defendant all left latent prints on
    the Buick. On cross-examination, Ms. Wilson agreed that she could not determine when
    the prints were left.
    For the Defendant, Angela Bertrand, his mother, testified that the Defendant was
    uncircumcised. She further testified that her husband had reported stolen the gun that law
    enforcement officers found in the crawl space, which was registered to her husband.
    The Defendant testified that on October 15, 2013, sometime before noon, he, Mr.
    Dobson, and Mr. Frelix met some friends outside of Mr. Brown’s apartment. The men
    were talking about who would take what car that day. The Defendant said that he owned
    a two-seater car and his friend, Justin Howell, owned a four-door Buick. They decided to
    switch cars since Mr. Howell was going to school by himself. The Defendant said that
    he, Mr. Dobson, and Mr. Frelix got into Mr. Howell’s car and decided to go to the
    Defendant’s house. The Defendant explained that he had not been home the night before,
    so he needed to shower and change for the new day.
    The Defendant recalled that, after showering and changing, the men went to a strip
    mall in Hermitage, looking for items for the Defendant’s room. They then went to Opry
    Mills Mall. The Defendant said that they left the mall and headed to Southern Thrift
    Store in Hermitage to look for room decorations. The Defendant said that Mr. Frelix and
    Mr. Dobson dropped him off near the store, and he walked the rest of the distance to the
    store. The Defendant said that there had been a “mix up” among the men. He explained
    that they had borrowed Mr. Howell’s car with the agreement that they would fill up his
    gas tank when done using the car. The Defendant said that, while he had money with
    him, he said he was not going to fill up the tank, explaining that he was unhappy that this
    responsibility frequently fell to him. The Defendant said he went into Southern Thrift
    and purchased a framed picture of the Eiffel Tower.
    The Defendant said that he and the other men usually smoked marijuana. He
    16
    explained the drug “Pluto,” saying that a rapper had given that name to children’s cough
    syrup. He explained that adults could ingest an entire bottle of the syrup and “slowly but
    surely reach a high.” The Defendant said he learned about this drug from Mr. Dobson,
    who had taken the drug and encouraged the Defendant to do so also.
    The Defendant testified that, at around 3:00 p.m. that day, he left Southern Thrift
    and walked home. The Defendant agreed that he left his backpack in the Buick,
    explaining that he did not need anything from it. The Defendant denied giving Mr.
    Dobson a gun. The Defendant denied ever entering the victim’s apartment. He said he
    did not rape her, sodomize her, force her to perform oral sex upon him, or threaten her
    with a weapon. The Defendant said he was uncircumcised. He said that Mr. Dobson lied
    while testifying and that he had never taken a guitar to Mr. Brown’s house. The
    Defendant said that he had short hair on the day the offenses occurred.
    During cross-examination, the Defendant agreed that, at the time of these events,
    he was friends with Mr. Dobson, and he knew Mr. Frelix and Mr. Brown. He agreed,
    that day, he was driving around with Mr. Dobson and Mr. Frelix. He said that he sat in
    the backseat and that Mr. Dobson and Mr. Frelix were in the front seats. The Defendant
    said that Mr. Frelix did not have a gun with him on the day of this incident and that no
    one had consumed any “Pluto” on that day. The Defendant said that he carried the Eiffel
    Tower framed picture over four miles to his house. He agreed that he did not contact
    Southern Thrift to obtain a video of him there that day and that he had not located his
    receipt.
    The Defendant said that he did not make the report that his father’s gun, which he
    had with him that day, was stolen. He explained that, after this incident and after he was
    arrested, his father noticed that the gun was missing. The Defendant told his father that
    Mr. Dobson had been in the house and had access to the gun. The Defendant’s father
    filed a report indicating that the gun had been stolen by Mr. Dobson.
    In rebuttal, the victim testified that she had never before seen Mr. Dobson and that
    he was not the person who raped her. Detective Jeff Wiser testified that before trial that
    day he showed the victim a photographic lineup that included a picture of Mr. Frelix.
    The victim did not identify Mr. Frelix’s picture as being of her assailant.
    Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery,
    aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous
    felony. The jury acquitted the Defendant of one count of aggravated rape and was unable
    to reach a verdict as to two other counts of aggravated rape.
    C. Sentencing Hearing
    17
    At the Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the victim testified that this event had
    made her scared because she thought that the Defendant was going to kill her. She also
    worried about her husband coming home and finding her in the condition she was in and
    how hard that was going to be for him too. The victim said that, even two years later, she
    found it hard to be home alone. She said that this incident would affect her and her
    relationships with others for the rest of her life. She asked for the maximum sentence.
    Melba Marcrum testified that she lived in Mt. Juliet and worked as the executive
    director of a non-profit organization. Ms. Marcrum testified that on October 15, 2013,
    she went to a board meeting for her organization and then went to Opry Mills Mall to
    shop at Sun and Ski. As she was leaving the mall, she stopped and opened her car door
    to pour out some water. The Defendant walked toward her and then pulled her car door
    open. Ms. Marcrum said, “no, no, no,” because she realized that he had a gun in his hand
    with his sleeve pulled over it. Ms. Marcrum said that she was scared and did not want the
    Defendant to take her purse because she had documentation in it that she needed for a trip
    with her daughter. The Defendant reached over her, and she took her thumb and pushed
    it into his eye in an effort to get him to go away. The Defendant then stuck a gun into the
    side of her neck. Ms. Marcrum said that she assumed that she was going to die.
    Ms. Marcrum said that, as it was the middle of the afternoon there were other cars
    present. The Defendant looked over his shoulder at one of the cars, and Ms. Marcrum
    turned and kicked the Defendant multiple times. She also screamed until he backed away
    from her and started walking away. Ms. Marcrum said that the Defendant looked over
    his shoulder to see if anyone was coming toward them, and Ms. Marcrum closed the door
    and locked it. She said she saw him walk away in her rearview mirror. She then saw him
    start to come back toward her, so she put the car into gear and started to drive. When she
    saw an Opry Mills security car, she started honking the horn until they came. At that
    point she realized that the Defendant’s watch had broken during their struggle and was in
    her car. She also noticed that her shoe had come off during the struggle and was on the
    ground near where the struggle had occurred.
    Ms. Marcrum testified that the security officer called the police. Police officers
    showed her a photographic lineup, and, from it, she identified the Defendant’s picture as
    being of the man who assaulted her.
    Ms. Marcrum testified that this incident scared her and also caused her to worry
    about how it would affect her daughters. She had sought counseling for her fear of
    people approaching her from behind. She said that her fear had affected her daily life.
    Based upon this evidence, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years
    18
    for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years for the aggravated burglary conviction,
    and six years for the employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction. It
    ordered that all the sentences run consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty-
    four years as a Range I offender. He noted that the service of the firearm sentence was
    mandatory as described by statute.
    I remember this trial very well and I think it lasted three or four days
    here and I remember the testimony of all of the witnesses beginning with
    [the victim] and all of these witnesses. I got 10 or 15 pages of notes that I
    took and I am not going to go over all of those different notes of the whole
    matter that we had that time, but basically this [D]efendant I think along
    with two other defendants had already been kind of reported to the police as
    a suspicious vehicle in the area where this incident ended up happening
    with [the victim] and they were there with a car and they had some excuse
    about it running out of gas or whatever else it was and some way he eased
    through that initial inquiry or investigation or whatever it was.
    I remember the testimony of [the victim] who testified here about
    what happened. She was getting ready to go to work and apparently, if I
    remember right, had to go back in the house to get something in connection
    with leaving before she wanted to take with her and then she was
    confronted by this defendant and she testified about the whole day and what
    all happened and this defendant ended up being convicted of aggravated
    robbery, aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during a dangerous
    felony.
    He had two other cases I think that there was a mistrial on having to
    do with aggravated rape, so I am just going to consider today for the
    purpose of this hearing the aggravated robbery, the aggravated burglary and
    the firearm and then consider the appropriate sentence in that.
    The Court finds in this case without belaboring this any longer than
    necessary that there are three enhancement factors that relate to the
    sentence that is appropriate in this case. Number 1, the Court is going to
    find that the [D]efendant was a leader in the commission of these offenses
    involving two or more people. There were two more people with him I
    think outside in a car, one of them was coming around some crawl space or
    something another. I remember so many details of it, but I do think this
    man who had a nickname that was called out that had a bearing on the
    whole case and its investigation, so I think he was more or less the leader
    between these three other guys, two other guys.
    19
    The case not only involved an aggravated robbery and aggravated
    burglary and a weapon, but I think if I am remembering this right that the
    car of [the victim] was taken in connection with this incident and found at
    like Village by the Green or someplace near, forget the exact street. In other
    words, her car was recovered in connection to the defendant. There was a
    guitar that was taken from [the victim’s] residence that I think was
    recovered, some property was taken to a man’s place and I forget his name
    right now but I have got it all down here, who took it and somehow kept it
    there and when the police came and did a search warrant found the guitar
    that was identified as her guitar and so there is all kinds of evidence against
    this man right here. There is no question about it, but the Court finds that
    as to all of the counts that the enhancement factors as I started to say here
    was that this was the leader, this offense, under number 7, 40-35-114
    involved a victim, . . . clearly a victim, a person who was in their own
    home, had no connection with this man, nothing at all that led her to be
    knowing him other than him come barging in her house when she is trying
    to leave to go to work, so I think she was the victim and this offense, all of
    it, had to do with gratifying this [D]efendant’s desire for pleasure or
    excitement; and number 10 the Court finds that the defendant had no
    hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human life was high.
    He is putting a gun right in this woman’s face, fortunately she wasn’t shot
    or killed, but that is part of it as well.
    As far as the 40-35-115 based on all of the circumstances of this
    case, I know this man is a young man, and I appreciate what you had to say,
    [defense counsel], I think you handled this in a way just to bring some
    points out about your experiences or whatever, but I do think that this
    young man here is a dangerous offender by all the activity that took place
    on that day and whatever else, but I am not getting into whatever else, but
    the defendant I find is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little
    or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in
    which the risk to human life is high, that fits this case, so the Court without
    belaboring this any further and going into all of the details of all of these
    notes that I have got here, when I have got plenty of them that will be made
    part of the record is going to put the sentence into effect now. . . .
    [Defendant] the jury finds you guilty in aggravated robbery charge in count
    four, it is a class B felony and the maximum sentence for that is 12 years
    and that is the sentence that you are going to get in this case.
    Count five aggravated burglary, that carries a sentence of between 3
    20
    and 6 years and the sentence in your case under the aggravating
    circumstances of this whole day, this whole afternoon, this nightmare in
    this woman’s life [the victim] is going to be six years. The firearm case
    with a dangerous felony, a class C felony has a mandatory six year sentence
    and that is the sentence in this case and the Court under section 40-35-115
    believes that every one of these convictions that happened on that day, [the
    victim] being the victim are cases that should be run consecutively, so the
    sentence is going to be a sentence all together of 18, 24 years, a range 1
    offender, but one of them is a mandatory sentence to serve, but I think this
    is a case that deserves the maximum sentence for what this woman was put
    through . . . .
    The Defendant appeals the judgments of the trial court.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted
    the victim’s identification of him; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
    convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum
    sentences within his range and ordered his sentences to run consecutively.
    A. Motion to Suppress Photo Lineup
    The Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
    suppress the victim’s identification during the second photographic lineup. The
    Defendant contends that the victim’s identification of him from the photographic lineup
    was tainted because law enforcement officers used unduly suggestive procedures during
    the lineup. The Defendant notes that the victim viewed multiple lineups and that he was
    the only individual whose photograph was shown to her repeatedly. He further asserts
    that the totality of the circumstances weighs against the reliability of the identification in
    this case. The State counters that the trial court properly admitted the victim’s
    identification of the Defendant because the lineup was not unnecessarily suggestive and
    that, even if suggestive, the identification was still reliable considering the totality of the
    circumstances.
    Our standard of review for a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
    on a motion to suppress evidence is set forth in State v. Odom, 
    928 S.W.2d 18
     (Tenn.
    1996). Under this standard, “a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will
    be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” 
    Id. at 23
    . As is customary, “the
    prevailing party in the trial court is afforded ‘the strongest legitimate view of the
    evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that
    21
    evidence.’” State v. Carter, 
    16 S.W.3d 762
    , 765 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Keith,
    
    978 S.W.2d 861
    , 864 (Tenn. 1998)). Nevertheless, this Court reviews de novo the trial
    court’s application of the law to the facts, without according any presumption of
    correctness to those conclusions. See State v. Walton, 
    41 S.W.3d 75
    , 81 (Tenn. 2001);
    State v. Crutcher, 
    989 S.W.2d 295
    , 299 (Tenn. 1999). The trial court, as the trier of fact,
    is able to assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight and value to be
    afforded the evidence, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Odom, 
    928 S.W.2d at 23
    . In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court may
    consider the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at the subsequent
    trial. State v. Henning, 
    975 S.W.2d 290
    , 299 (Tenn. 1998).
    The Supreme Court has recognized that although perils exist in identifying
    suspects through use of photograph lineups, identification from photographs can be an
    effective method “from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing
    innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them
    through scrutiny of photographs.” Simmons v. United States, 
    390 U.S. 377
    , 384 (1968).
    As the Simmons Court recognized, potential for misidentification increases when a
    photograph is “in some way emphasized” or “if the police indicate to the witness that
    they have other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime.” 
    Id. at 383
    . The Simmons Court held that “convictions based on eyewitness identification at
    trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only
    if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give
    rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 
    Id. at 384
    ; see
    Sloan v. State, 
    584 S.W.2d 461
    , 466 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). “[A] photographic
    identification is admissible unless, based upon the totality of the circumstances, ‘the
    confrontation conducted . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
    irreparable mistaken identification that [the accused] was denied due process of law.’”
    State v. Hall, 
    976 S.W.2d 121
    , 153 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 
    388 U.S. 293
    ,
    301-02 (1967)).
    The relevant guidelines for assessing whether evidence of an identification from a
    photograph lineup is admissible were announced in Neil v. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. 188
     (1972).
    The Biggers two-part analysis requires, first, that the trial court determine whether the
    identification procedure was unduly suggestive. 
    Id. at 198
    . “To be admissible as
    evidence, an identification must not have been conducted in such an impermissibly
    suggestive manner as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
    State v. Cribbs, 
    967 S.W.2d 773
    , 794 (Tenn. 1998); see Simmons, 
    390 U.S. at 383
    . If the
    identification procedure was unduly suggestive, the second question is whether the
    identification was reliable despite the undue suggestion. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. at 198-99
    .
    The Biggers majority identified five factors to be considered in making that
    determination:
    22
    the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
    the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior
    description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the
    witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and
    the confrontation.
    
    Id. at 199-200
    . If, upon consideration of the Biggers factors, the court determines that the
    identification procedure was so unduly suggestive that it violated the defendant’s due
    process rights, evidence of the identification must be excluded. State v. Shanklin, 
    608 S.W.2d 596
    , 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
    The Defendant argues that the lineup was unduly suggestive because the victim
    viewed multiple lineups, and he was the only person depicted in both lineups. The
    Defendant notes that the victim could not successfully identify his photograph in the first
    lineup that officers showed to her that contained his photograph. Then, when shown a
    second lineup containing his photograph, she immediately identified him. He attributes
    her immediate identification of him to the fact that he was the only person to appear in
    both lineups. He goes on to state that the totality of the circumstances weighs against her
    identification because she only viewed him for a few seconds, she was focused on his
    weapon, and her description was too general to support her identification.
    As stated above, the Biggers two-part analysis requires, first, that the trial court
    determine whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive, meaning that it
    was conducted in such an impermissibly suggestive manner as to create a substantial
    likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See Biggers, 
    409 U.S. at 198
    ; Cribbs, 
    967 S.W.2d at 794
    . We conclude that the photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive.
    This case was assigned to two different detectives: Detective Vallee investigated the
    property portion of the case and Detective Bennett investigated the sex offense
    allegations. The day after the offense, Detective Bennett showed the victim a
    photographic lineup that included the Defendant’s photograph. To ensure that the
    photographs in the lineup appeared similar, he included photographs of men who looked
    similar to the Defendant and he showed it to her in black and white only. The Defendant
    appeared smiling in this photograph and, while the victim was 95% certain it was him,
    she did not identify anyone as her assailant. Detective Vallee, unaware that the victim
    had already seen a photographic lineup, created his own photographic lineup. He chose a
    picture of the Defendant in which the Defendant appeared unsmiling. To ensure that the
    photographs in the lineup appeared similar, he included photographs of men who looked
    similar to the Defendant and used other driver’s license photographs so that the
    backgrounds matched. The victim immediately identified the Defendant’s picture. We
    conclude that these lineups were not conducted in such an impermissibly suggestive
    23
    manner as to create a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
    Moreover, the totality of the circumstances reflects that the victim’s identification
    was reliable. See Biggers, 
    409 U.S. at 199
    . First, it was light outside when she saw the
    Defendant, and she looked at him while he walked toward her across her living room,
    which she estimated took five seconds. While her description of this was general, it was
    accurate. She was 100% certain of her identification of the Defendant when she saw his
    unsmiling picture three days after the robbery. We conclude that the trial court did not
    err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the Defendant is not entitled
    to relief on this issue.
    B. Sufficiency of Evidence
    The Defendant next contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
    conviction for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm
    during the commission of a dangerous felony. He states that the identification of him was
    “uncertain and skeptical” and that there was no proof that he intended to commit a theft
    or assault when he entered the victim’s home. He further denies that he took any items
    using his weapon as a threat. The State counters that the jury based its verdicts on
    sufficient evidence. We agree with the State.
    When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard
    of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    State, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); see Tenn. R.
    App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 
    143 S.W.3d 771
    , 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid,
    
    91 S.W.3d 247
    , 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This standard applies to findings of guilt based upon
    direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and
    circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 
    13 S.W.3d 389
    , 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1999) (citing State v. Dykes, 
    803 S.W.2d 250
    , 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the
    absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by
    circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 
    505 S.W.2d 237
    , 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury
    decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be
    drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with
    guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v.
    Rice, 
    184 S.W.3d 646
    , 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 
    313 S.W.2d 451
    , 457
    (Tenn. 1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same
    whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v.
    Dorantes, 
    331 S.W.3d 370
    , 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 
    279 S.W.3d 265
    ,
    275 (Tenn. 2009)).
    24
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or
    reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 
    805 S.W.2d 776
    , 779 (Tenn. Crim. App.
    1990). Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact
    from the evidence. State v. Buggs, 
    995 S.W.2d 102
    , 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v.
    State, 
    286 S.W.2d 856
    , 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of
    witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues
    raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 
    958 S.W.2d 651
    ,
    659 (Tenn. 1997). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the
    testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of
    the State.” State v. Grace, 
    493 S.W.2d 474
    , 476 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme
    Court stated the rationale for this rule:
    This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the
    jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their
    demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary
    instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be
    given to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human
    atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a
    written record in this Court.
    Bolin v. State, 
    405 S.W.2d 768
    , 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 
    370 S.W.2d 523
    , 527 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the “‘strongest
    legitimate view of the evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and
    legitimate inferences’” that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 
    143 S.W.3d at 775
     (quoting State v. Smith, 
    24 S.W.3d 274
    , 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of
    guilt against a defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption
    of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence
    was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 
    35 S.W.3d 516
    ,
    557-58 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted).
    Aggravated robbery is robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon. T.C.A. § 39-
    13-402(a)(1) (2014). Robbery is defined as “the intentional or knowing theft of property
    from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” T.C.A. § 39-13-
    401(a) (2014). A theft of property occurs when someone, with the intent to deprive the
    owner of property, knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the
    owner’s effective consent. T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a) (2014). Violence is defined as
    “physical force unlawfully exercised so as to damage, injure or abuse.” State v. Fitz, 
    19 S.W.3d 213
    , 217 (Tenn. 2000). Pointing a weapon satisfies the element of violence.
    State v. Allen, 
    69 S.W.3d 181
    , 186 (Tenn. 2002). Fear is “fear of present personal peril
    from violence offered or impending.” State v. Bowles, 
    52 S.W.3d 69
    , 80 (Tenn. 2001).
    25
    The victim, who had left her home to go to work, returned to her home after
    forgetting to close the door between her home and her garage. She left the front door
    open, and when she turned around, the Defendant was on her front door step. He entered
    her home brandishing a weapon. He placed his hand over her mouth and asked her if
    anyone was home, saying he would kill anyone else there. The Defendant pointed the
    gun at her and told her that he would kill her if she moved. He then told her to remain
    where she was or he would kill her. He told her that if she left the home his friend,
    “Rue,” was waiting outside to kill her. The Defendant then, without the victim’s consent,
    took laptop computers and a guitar from her home, forced her into a bathroom, and left
    the victim’s home in her car. This is sufficient evidence to support the Defendant’s
    aggravated robbery conviction.
    Aggravated burglary occurs when a person, without the effective consent of the
    property owner, enters a habitation with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault or
    enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a theft. T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403(a);
    39-14-402(a)(1) (2014). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
    showed that the Defendant was with two of his friends, Mr. Dobson, nicknamed “Rue,”
    and Mr. Frelix. The men’s vehicle ran out of gas a short distance from the victim’s
    home. Mr. Dobson confirmed that he saw the Defendant, who was armed, go toward the
    victim’s home shortly before this offense with the intent to get gas money. The victim
    recalled that the Defendant referred to a man outside by the nickname “Rue.” The
    Defendant entered the victim’s home, threatened her with a weapon and stole items from
    her, leaving in her car. This evidence sufficiently supports the Defendant’s aggravated
    burglary conviction.
    As to the Defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission
    of a dangerous felony,
    (a) It is an offense to possess a firearm with the intent to go armed
    during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony.
    (b) It is an offense to employ a firearm during the:
    (1) Commission of a dangerous felony;
    (2) Attempt to commit a dangerous felony;
    ....
    (c) A person may not be charged with a violation of subsection (a) or
    26
    (b) if possessing or employing a firearm is an essential element of the
    underlying dangerous felony as charged. In cases where possession or
    employing a firearm are elements of the charged offense, the state may
    elect to prosecute under a lesser offense wherein possession or employing a
    firearm is not an element of the offense.
    Aggravated burglary is a dangerous felony pursuant to the statute. T.C.A. § 39-17-
    1324(i)(1)(H) (2014).
    The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, proved that the
    Defendant entered the victim’s home brandishing a weapon with the intent to steal items
    from her home. As discussed above, he committed aggravated burglary, and he
    employed a gun when so doing. This is sufficient to support his conviction for
    employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.
    To the extent the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove his
    identify as the perpetrator of these offenses, we disagree. As previously stated, the
    Defendant was driving around with his friends Mr. Dobson and Mr. Frelix. Their car ran
    out of gas near the victim’s home. Mr. Dobson said the Defendant left the vehicle
    carrying a gun and traveling toward the victim’s home. Mr. Dobson saw the Defendant
    on the victim’s front porch step and then turned and saw the police at the car, so he
    returned to the vehicle where he interacted with the police and then left the area by bus.
    The Defendant entered the victim’s home brandishing a weapon and telling her that his
    cohort “Rue” would kill her if she left the house. The Defendant proceeded to take items
    from her home and left in her car. Mr. Brown testified that the Defendant came to his
    home on the day of this offense and brought multiple items, which matched the
    description of the items taken from the victim’s home. He told the Defendant not to
    leave these items at his apartment, but the Defendant left a guitar. Law enforcement
    officers found the victim’s car in Mr. Brown’s parking lot and the victim’s guitar in Mr.
    Brown’s closet. When speaking with Mr. Dobson after the offenses, the Defendant told
    Mr. Dobson that this case had received so much media attention because he had asked the
    victim to give him oral sex and that he had stolen her car. The victim identified the
    Defendant from a photographic lineup and in court. This evidence sufficiently supports
    the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of these offenses. He is not entitled to relief
    on this issue.
    C. Sentencing
    The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. He
    asserts that the trial court misapplied the enhancement factor, that he was a leader in the
    commission of this offense, and the enhancement factor that these offenses were
    27
    committed to gratify the Defendant’s desire for pleasure. He further contends that he was
    not a “dangerous offender” so as to support consecutive sentencing. The State contends
    that the Defendant’s sentence is proper, and we agree.
    The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 and its amendments
    describe the process for determining the appropriate length of a defendant’s sentence and
    the manner of service of that sentence. In State v. Bise, the Tennessee Supreme Court
    reviewed changes in sentencing law and the impact on appellate review of sentencing
    decisions. 
    380 S.W.3d 682
     (Tenn. 2012). The Tennessee Supreme Court announced that
    “sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to be
    reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’”
    
    Id. at 708
    . A finding of abuse of discretion “‘reflects that the trial court’s logic and
    reasoning was improper when viewed in light of the factual circumstances and relevant
    legal principles involved in a particular case.’” State v. Shaffer, 
    45 S.W.3d 553
    , 555
    (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 
    6 S.W.3d 235
    , 242 (Tenn. 1999)). To find an
    abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial evidence that would
    support the trial court’s decision. Id.; State v. Grear, 
    568 S.W.2d 285
    , 286 (Tenn. 1978);
    State v. Delp, 
    614 S.W.2d 395
    , 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
    Thus, the reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the
    appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in
    compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-
    10. So long as the trial court sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies
    the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a
    presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 707. We are to also recognize that the defendant
    bears “the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is improper.” State v. Ashby, 
    823 S.W.2d 166
    , 169 (Tenn. 1991).
    In determining the proper sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence,
    if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the
    principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and
    characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by
    the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code
    Annotated sections 40-35-113 and -114; (6) any statistical information provided by the
    administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in
    Tennessee; and (7) any statement the defendant made in the defendant’s own behalf
    about sentencing. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210 (2014); State v. Taylor, 
    63 S.W.3d 400
    , 411
    (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
    In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court
    should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:
    28
    A. The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence
    that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum
    length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of
    each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and
    B. The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as appropriate,
    by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors set out in
    §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.
    T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c).
    Although the trial court should also consider enhancement and mitigating factors,
    the statutory enhancement factors are advisory only. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (2014); see
    also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 699 n. 33, 704; Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343. We note that “a trial
    court’s weighing of various mitigating and enhancement factors [is] left to the trial
    court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. In other words, “the trial court is
    free to select any sentence within the applicable range so long as the length of the
    sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles of [the Sentencing Act].’” Id. at
    343. A trial court’s “misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not
    invalidate the sentence imposed unless the trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act,
    as amended in 2005.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. “[Appellate courts are] bound by a trial
    court’s decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a
    manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of
    the Sentencing Act.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346.
    After review of the record, we cannot find that the record is void of any substantial
    evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Even were we to agree with the
    Defendant’s contention that the trial court misapplied any enhancement factors, the
    Defendant would still not be entitled to relief. The trial court considered the applicable
    enhancement and mitigating factors and it sentenced the Defendant within his applicable
    sentencing range that is consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing
    Act.
    With regard to his consecutive sentences, we review a trial court’s decision to
    impose consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion with a presumption of
    reasonableness. State v. Pollard, 
    432 S.W.3d 851
    , 860 (Tenn. 2013). Tennessee Code
    Annotated section 40-35-115(b) provides that a trial court may order sentences to run
    consecutively if it finds any one of the statutory criteria by a preponderance of the
    evidence. One of those criteria is that the defendant is a “dangerous offender whose
    behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a
    29
    crime in which the risk to human life is high. T.C.A. § 40-35-115. The imposition of
    consecutive sentencing, however, is subject to the general sentencing principles that the
    overall sentence imposed “should be no greater than that deserved for the offense
    committed” and that it “should be the least severe measure necessary to achieve the
    purposes for which the sentence is imposed[.]” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(2), (4). Further,
    when based on the “dangerous offender” criterion, the court must also determine that the
    aggregate sentence is (1) reasonably related to the severity of the offense and (2)
    necessary to protect the public from further crimes. See State v. Wilkerson, 
    905 S.W.2d 933
    , 938 (Tenn. 1995).
    We start with the understanding that the sentence for employment of a firearm
    during the commission of a dangerous felony is required by statute to run consecutively
    to the underlying felony. T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). Therefore, the sentence for the
    employment of a firearm must run consecutively to the aggravated burglary sentence.
    Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the aggravated
    robbery sentence should also run consecutively to the other two sentences. At the
    Defendant’s sentencing hearing, a victim of a separate offense occurring on the same day
    as this incident testified. She said that the Defendant had attempted to rob her at
    gunpoint on the same day, before he robbed the victim. He pointed a gun at her in broad
    daylight while she was in her vehicle in a parking lot and attempted to steal her purse.
    She successfully fended him off. He then used that same weapon to gain access into the
    victim’s home and steal items from inside. The presentence report included facts that
    recounted the Defendant’s involvement in two other armed robberies that same week, one
    of which was the robbery of an elderly woman. We infer from the trial court’s statements
    at sentencing that it found that the Wilkerson factors supported consecutive sentencing,
    and we agree that the facts of the case support such a sentence. The Defendant is not
    entitled to relief on this issue.
    III. Conclusion
    In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the
    judgments of the trial court.
    _________________________________
    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE
    30