State v. Gaylen Rhodes ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
JANUARY SESSION, 1998
FILED
GAYLEN DEWAYNE RHODES, ) February 10, 1998
) No. 02C01-9703-CC-00121
Appellant ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
) HARDIN COUNTY Appellate C ourt Clerk
vs. )
) Hon. C. CREED MCGINLEY, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) (Post-Conviction)
Appellee )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Ron E. Harmon John Knox Walkup
Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter
618 Main Street
Savannah, TN 38372 Elizabeth T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Justice Division
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford
District Attorney General
John Overton
Asst. District Attorney
Hardin County Courthouse
Savannah, TN 38372
OPINION FILED:
AFFIRMED
David G. Hayes
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Gaylen Dewayne Rhodes, appeals as of right from the Hardin
County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, the
appellant pled guilty to one count of first degree murder and one count of theft of
property over one thousand dollars and received an effective sentence of life
imprisonment plus twelve years. In this appeal, the appellant first contends that his
guilty pleas were not voluntary because he was under the influence of medication
during the guilty plea hearing. Second, he contends that his guilty pleas were
coerced and, thus, involuntarily entered as the result of the ineffective assistance of
counsel.1
After a review of the record, we affirm.
The appellant’s guilty pleas stem from his participation in the September
1994 murder of Ronald Phillips and theft of his property. After being wounded by
the appellant, the victim was then fatally shot in the head at point-blank range by the
co-defendant. The co-defendant’s case was severed and he was convicted by a
jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole. The appellant’s pleas were entered on August 30, 1995.
On October 10, 1996, a post-conviction hearing was held. The proof at the
hearing consisted of the testimony of the appellant and the appellant’s trial counsel.
The appellant testified on direct examination that, on the date that he entered his
guilty pleas, he was under the influence of a “mind altering drug.” The appellant
related that he had been prescribed the drug “Prozac” during a mental evaluation in
1
The appellant’s brief alleges deficient performance in several areas of the pre-trial
investigation. We find, however, that these factual allegations of ineffective assistance are not
supported by the argument and are, therefore, waived. Rule 10(b) Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
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Nashville and, because of this, he could not think clearly. He further testified that he
was coerced into pleading guilty by his trial counsel because, “. . . I didn’t have no
choice. And if I went to court that I would be found guilty and I would receive the
death penalty.” The appellant conceded that, in effect, he had repeatedly lied in
response to virtually every question posed by the trial court at the guilty plea
hearing. He explained, “I was advised to go along with what the Judge asked me.”
The testimony of the appellant’s trial counsel materially contradicted the appellant’s
claims. Initially, trial counsel noted that the State had not sought nor ever discussed
seeking the death penalty against the appellant. Trial counsel further stated that at
no time did he threaten or coerce the appellant into pleading guilty and that the
appellant was fully aware of the consequences of his guilty pleas. Following the
hearing, the trial court entered its order, finding that, on the date the guilty pleas
were entered, the appellant responded under oath that “he was drug free and fully
understood the nature of the proceedings against him.” Moreover, the court noted
that at the sentencing hearing, it observed nothing which would indicate that the
appellant was under the influence of any type of drug or mind-altering substance. In
conclusion, the court found that:
[t]here is nothing in the record that would remotely suggest that the
defendant was not afforded his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. In addition the record shows nothing that would
in any way support that the plea was anything less than a voluntary
plea of guilty that was entered into knowingly and intelligently by the
petitioner.
Because the petition was filed on June 24, 1996, it is governed by the
provisions of the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Accordingly, the appellant
bears the burden of establishing, at the evidentiary hearing, his allegations by clear
and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f)(1997). Clear and
convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no serious or substantial
doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hodges v.
S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901, n. 3, (Tenn. 1992). On appeal, we are
bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless we conclude that the evidence and
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the record preponderates against these findings. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752,
755 (Tenn. 1990).
When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, the appellant
bears the burden of showing that (1) the services rendered by trial counsel were
deficient and (2) the deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In cases involving a
guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, the appellant must show “prejudice” by
demonstrating that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted upon going to trial. See Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct.
366, 370 (1985); Bankston v. State, 815 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991),
perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1991).
In this case, the trial court found that the representation provided by
appellant’s counsel was not deficient and that the appellant’s pleas were entered
knowingly and voluntarily. The evidence on appeal does not preponderate against
the trial court’s findings.
Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the
appellant’s petition is affirmed.
____________________________________
DAVID G. HAYES, Judge
CONCUR:
___________________________
JOE B. JONES, Presiding Judge
___________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
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